UC-NRLF 

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LIBRARY 


University  of  California 


A   HISTORY 


OF 


MoDEEisr  Europe 

BY 

C.  A.  FYFFE,  MA. 

BARRISTEB-AT-LAW;  FELLOW   OP  UNIVERSITY  COLLEGE,   OXFORD 

VOL.  I 

FROM  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR  IN 
1792   TO  THE  ACCESSION  OF  LOUIS  XVIIL   IN  1814 

WITH   TWO    MAPS 

SECOND   EDITION,    REVISED 


NEW  YORK 

HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 

1891 


V 


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i^  1. 


or  r\ 


PEEFACE  TO  THE  FIEST  EDITION. 


The  object  of  this  work  is  to  show  how  the  States  of  Europe 
have  gained  the  form  and  character  which  they  possess  at  the 
present  moment.  The  outbreak  of  the  Revolutionary  War  in 
1792,  terminating  a  period  which  now  appears  far  removed  from 
us,  and  setting  in  motion  forces  which  have  in  our  own  day 
produced  a  united  Grermany  and  a  united  Italy,  forms  the  natural 
starting-point  of  a  history  of  the  present  century.  I  have 
endeavoured  to  tell  a  simple  story,  believing  that  a  narrative  in 
which  facts  are  chosen  for  their  significance,  and  exhibited  in 
their  real  connection,  may  be  made  to  convey  as  true  an  impres- 
sion as  a  fuller  history  in  which  the  writer  is  not  forced  by  the 
necessity  of  concentration  to  exercise  the  same  rigour  towards 
himself  and  his  materials.  The  second  volume  of  the  work  will 
bring  the  reader  down  to  the  year  1848 :  the  thiixl,  down  to  the 
present  time. 

London,  1880. 


7l7zt- 


PKEFACE  TO  THE   SECOND  EDITION. 

In  revising  this  volume  for  the  second  edition  I  have  occupied 
myself  mainly  with  two  sources  of  information — the  unpublished 
Records  of  the  English  Foreign  Office,  and  the  published  works 
which  have  during  recent  years  resulted  from  the  investigation 
of  the  Archives  of  Vienna.  The  English  Records  from  1792  to 
1814,  for  access  to  which  I  have  to  express  my  thanks  to  Lord 
Granville,  form  a  body  of  first-hand  authority  of  extraordinary 
richness,  compass,  and  interest.  They  include  the  whole  cor- 
respondence between  the  representatives  of  Great  Britain  at 
Foreign  Courts  and  the  English  Foreign  Office;  a  certain 
number  of  private  communications  between  Ministers  and  these 
representatives ;  a  quantity  of  reports  from  consuls,  agents,  and 
*'  informants  "  of  every  description ;  and  in  addition  to  these  the 
military  reports,  often  admirably  vivid  and  full  of  matter,  sent 
by  the  British  officers  attached  to  the  head-quarters  of  our 
Allies  in  most  of  the  campaigns  from  1792  to  1814.  It  is 
impossible  that  any  one  person  should  go  through  the  whole  of 
this  material,  which  it  took  the  Diplomatic  Service  a  quarter  of 
a  century  to  write.  I  have  endeavoured  to  master  the  cor- 
respondence from  each  quarter  of  Europe  which,  for  the  time 
being,  had  a  preponderance  in  political  or  military  interest, 
leaving  it  when  its  importance  became  obviously  subordinate  to 
that  of  others ;  and  although  I  have  no  doubt  left  untouched 
much  that  would  repay  investigation,  I  trust  that  the  narrative 
has  gained  in  accuracy  from  a  labour  which  was  not  a  light  one, 
and  that  the  few  short  extracts  which  space  has  permitted  me  to 
throw  into  the  notes  may  serve  to  bring  the  reader  nearer  to 
events.  At  some  future  time  I  hope  to  publish  a  selection  from 
the  most  important  documents  of  this  period.     It  is  strange  that 


PBEFAOE,  Tii 

our  learned  Societies,  so  appreciative  of  every  distant  and  trivial 
chronicle  of  the  Middle  Ages,  should  ignore  the  records  of  a 
time  of  such  surpassing  interest,  and  one  in  which  England 
played  so  great  a  part.  No  just  conception  can  be  formed  of 
the  difference  between  English  statesmanship  and  that  of  the 
Continental  Courts  in  integrity,  truthfulness,  and  public  spirit, 
until  the  mass  of  diplomatic  correspondence  preserved  at  London 
has  been  studied ;  nor,  until  this  has  been  done,  can  anything 
like  an  adequate  biography  of  Pitt  be  written. 

The  second  and  less  important  group  of  authorities  with 
which  I  have  busied  myself  during  the  work  of  revision  com- 
prises the  works  of  Hiiffer,  Vivenot,  Beer,  Helfert,  and  others, 
based  on  Austrian  documents,  along  with  the  Austrian  docu- 
ments and  letters  that  have  been  published  by  Vivenot.  The 
last-named  writer  is  himself  a  partizan,  but  the  material  which 
he  has  given  to  the  world  is  most  valuable.  The  mystery  in 
which  the  Austrian  Government  until  lately  enveloped  all  its 
actions  caused  some  of  these  to  be  described  as  worse  than  they 
really  were;  and  I  believe  that  in  the  First  Edition  I  under- 
estimated the  bias  of  Prussian  and  North- German  writers. 
Where  I  have  seen  reasons  to  alter  any  statements,  I  have  done 
so  without  reserve,  as  it  appears  to  me  childish  for  any  one  who 
attempts  to  write  history  to  cling  to  an  opinion  after  the  balance 
of  evidence  seems  to  be  against  it.  The  publication  of  the 
second  volume  of  this  work  has  been  delayed  by  the  revision  of 
the  first;  but  I  hope  that  it  will  appear  before  many  months 
more.  I  must  express  my  obligations  to  Mr.  Oscar  Browning, 
a  fellow-labourer  in  the  same  field,  who  not  only  furnished  me 
with  various  corrections,  but  placed  his  own  lectures  at  my 
disposal ;  and  to  Mr.  Alfred  Kingston,  whose  unfailing  kindness 
and  courtesy  make  so  great  a  difference  to  those  whose  work  lies 
in  the  department  of  the  Record  Office  which  is  under  his  care. 
Xofukm,188a. 


CONTENTS, 


CHAPTER   L 

PRANCE  AND  GERMANY  AT  THE  OUTBREAK  OP  THE  REVOLUTIONARY 

WAR. 

FJIOB 

Outbreak  of  the  Eevolutionary  War  in  1792 — ^Its  immediate  causes — 
Declaration  of  Pillnitz  made  and  withdrawn — ^Agitation  of  the  Priests 
and  Emigrants — War  Policy  of  the  Gironde — Provocations  offered  to 
France  by  the  Powers — State  of  Central  Europe  in  1792 — The  Holy 
Roman  Empire — Austria — Bule  of  the  Hapsburgs — The  Reforms  of 
Maria  Theresa  and  Joseph  II. — Policy  of  Leopold  II. — Government 
and  Foreign  Policy  of  Francis  11. — Prussia — Government  of  Frederick 
"William  II. — Spckl  Condition  of  Prussia— Secondary  States  of  Ger- 
many—  Ecclesiastical  States -r-.Free  Cities — ^Bjiights — Weakness  of 
Germany 1 

CHAPTER   n. 

THE  WAR,  DOWN  TO  THE  TREATIES  OP  BASLE  AND  THE    ESTABLISH- 
MENT OP  THE   DIRECTORY. 

French  and  Austrian  Armies  on  the  Fl%mish  Frontier — Prussia  enters  the 
War — Brunswick  invades  France  —  His  Proclamation — Insurrection 
of  Aug.  10  at  Paris^— Massacres  of  September — Character  of  the  War 
— Brunswick,  checked  at  Valmy,  retreats — The  War  becomes  a  Crusade 
of  France — ^Neighbours  of  France — Custine  enters  Mainz — Dumouriez 
conquers  the  Austrian  Netherlands — Nice  and  Savoy  annexed — Decree 
of  the  Convention  against  aU  Governments — Execution  of  Louis  XVI. — 
War  with  EJpgland,  followed  by  war  with  the  Mediterranean  States — 
Condition  of  England — English  Parties,  how  affected  by  the  Revolution 
— The  Gironde  and  the  Mountain— ^Austria  recovers  the  Netherlands — 
The  Allies  invade  France — La  Vendee — Revolutionary  System  of  1793 
— Errors  of  the  Allies — New  French  Commanders  and  Democratic  Army 
— ^Victories  of  Jourdan,  Hoche,  and  Pichegrtc — Prussia  withdrawing 
from  the  War — Polish  Affairs — Austria  abandons  the  Netherlands — 
Treaties^of  Basle— France  in  1795 — Insurrection  of  13  Vendemiaire— 
Constitution  of  1795 — The  Directory — Effect  of  the  Revolution  on 
the  Spirit  of  Europe  up  to  1795 41 


CONTENTS.  H 

""  CHAPTER    m. 

ITALIAir  CAMPAIGNS  :   TREATY  OP  OAMPO  FOBMIO, 

PAoa 

Triple  attack  on  Austria — Moreau,  Jourdan — Bonaparte  in  Italy — Condition 

of  the  Italian  States — Professions  and  real  intentions  of  Bonaparte  and 
the  Directory — Battle  of  Montenotte — Armistice  with  Sardinia — Cam- 
paign in  Lombardy — Treatment  of  the  Pope,  Naples,  Tuscany — Siege 
of  Mantua — Castiglione — Moreau  and  Jouidan  in  Germany — Their 
retreat — Secret  Treaty  with  Prussia — Negotiations  with  England — 
Cispadane  Republic — Bise  of  the  idea  of  Italian  Independence — Battles 
of  Areola  and  Rivoli — Peace  with  the  Pope  at  Tolentino — Venice — Pre- 
liminaries of  Leoben — The  French  in  Venice — The  French  take  the 
Ionian  Islands  and  give  Venice  to  Austria — Gtenoa — Coup  d*6tat  of  17 
Fructidor  in  Paris — Treaty  of  Campo  Formio — Victories  of  England  at 
Sea — Bonaparte's  project  against  Egypt 110 

CHAPTER   IV. 

FROM  THJE   CONGRESS  OF  RASTADT  TO  THE  ESTABLI8HMBNT  OF  THB 

CONSULATE. 

Congress  of  Eastadt — ^The  Rhenish  Provinces  ceded — Ecclesiastical  States 
of  Germany  suppressed — French  Intervention  in  Switzerland — Helvetic 
Republic — The  French  invade  the  Papal  States — Roman  Republic — 
Expedition  to  Egypt — Battle  of  the  Nile— Coalition  of  1798 — Ferdinand 
of  Naples  enters  Rome — Mack's  defeats— French  enter  Naples — Par- 
thenopean  Republic — ^War  with  Austria  and  Russia — Battle  of  Stockach 
— Murder  of  the  French  Envoys  at  Eastadt — Campaign  in  Lombardy — 
Reign  of  Terror  at  Naples — Austrian  designs  upon  Italy — Suvaroff  and 
the  Austrians — Campaign  in  Switzerland — Campaign  in  Holland — 
Bonaparte  returns  from  Egypt — Coup-d'etat  of  18  Brumaire — Constitu- 
tion of  1799  —  System  of  Bonaparte  in  France — ^Its  effect  on  the 
influence  of  France  abroad 164 

CHAPTER   V. 

FROM  MARENGO  TO  THE  RUPTURE  OP  THB  PEACE  OF  AMIENS. 

Overtures  of  Bonaparte  to  Austria  and  England — The  War  continues— 
Massena  besieged  in  Genoa — Moreau  invades  Southern  Germany- 
Bonaparte  crosses  the  St.  Bernard,  and  descends  in  the  rear  of  the 
Austrians — Battle  of  Marengo — Austrians  retire  behind  the  Mindo— 
Treaty  between  England  and  Austria — Austria  continues  the  War — 
Battle  of  Hohenlinden — Peace  of  Lun6ville— War  between  England 
and  the  Northern  Maritime  League — Battle  of  Copenhagen — Murder  of 
Paul— End  of  the  Maritime  War— English  Army  enters  Eg^pt— French 
defeated  at  Alexandria— They  capitulate  at  Cairo  and  Alexandria — 
Preliminaries  of  Peace  between  England  and  France  signed  at  London, 
followed  by  Peace  of  Amiens — Pitt's  Irish  Policy  and  his  retirement— 


X  CONTENTS, 

VAOB 

Debates  on  the  Peace— Aggressions  of  Bonaparte  during  the  Conti- 
nental Peace — Holland,  Italy,  Switzerland — Settlement  of  Germany 
under  French  and  Russian  influence — Suppression  of  Ecclesiastical 
States  and  Free  Cities— Its  effects — gtein— France  under  the  Consulate 
—The  Civil  Code— The  Concordat 216 

CHAPTER   YI 

THE   EMPIRE,  TO  THE   PEACE   OP  PEESBT7E<J. 

England  claims  Malta — War  renewed— Bonaparte  occupies  Hanover,  and 

blockades  the  Elbe — Eemonstrances  of  Prussia— Cadoudal's  Plot — 
Murder  of  the  Duke  of  Enghien— Napoleon  Emperor — Coalition  of 
1805 — Prussia  holds  aloof— State  of  Austria— Failure  of  Napoleon's 
Attempt  to  gain  Naval  Superiority  in  the  Channel — Campaign  in 
Western  Germany — Capitulation  of  Ulm — Trafalgar — ^Treaty  of  Pots- 
dam between  Prussia  and  the  Allies— The  French  enter  Vienna — Haug- 
witz  sent  to  Napoleon  with  Prussian  Ultimatum — Battle  of  Austerlitz — 
Haugwitz  signs  a  Treaty  of  Alliance  with  Napoleon — Peace — Treaty  of 
Presburg — End  of  the  Holy  Eoman  Empire— Naples  given  to  Joseph 
Bonaparte — Battle  of  Maida — The  Napoleonic  Empire  and  Dynasty — 
Federation  of  the  Rhine — State  of  Germany — Possibility  of  maintaining 
the  Empire  of  1806        .        :        :        T      .        .        .>      .        ,        .266 


^^  CHAPTER  yn. 

^  DEATH  OP  PITT,   TO  THE   PEACE   OP   TILSIT. 

Death  of  Pitt— Minit?try  of  Fox  and  Grenville — Napoleon  forces  Prussia 
into  war  with  England,  and  then  offers^Hanover  to  England — Prussia 
resolves  on  war  with  Napoleon  —  State.oFTrussta— Decline  of  the 
Army — Southern  Germany  with  Napoleon — Austria  neutral — England 
and  Russia  about  to  help  Prussia,  but  not  immediately — Campaign 
of  1806— Battles  o  ^Jena  and  Auerstadt— Ruin  of  the  Prussian  Army 
— Capitulation  of  Fortresses — Demands  of  Napoleon — The  "War  con- 
tinues— Berlin  Decree — Exclusion  of  English  goods  from  the  Continent 
— Russia  enters  the  war — Campaign  in  Poland  and  East  Prussia — 
Eylau — Treaty  of  Bartenstein  —  Friedland — Interview  at  Tilsit —  / 
Alliance  of  Napoleon  and  Alexander — Secret  Articles — English  expedi-  y 
tion  to  Denmark — The  French  enter  Portugal — Prussia  after  the  Peace 
of  Tilsit — Stein's  Edict  oUEnoancipation — The  Prussian  Peasant — 
Reform  of  the  Prussian  Army,  and  creation  of  Municipalities — Stein's 
othOT^^ojects  of  Reform,  which  are  not  carried  out        ....  309 

CHAPTER   Yni. 

SPAIN,   TO   THE   PALL   OP   SARAGOSSA. 

Spain  in  1806 — Napoleon  uses  the  quarrel  between  Ferdinand  and  Godoy — 
He  affects  to  be  Ferdinand's  Protector — Dupont's  Army  enters  Spain — 
Murat  in  Spain— Charles  abdicates— Ferdinand  King — Savary  brings 


CONTENTS.  li 

PAAB 

Ferdinand  to  Bayonno — Napoleon  makes  both  Charles  and  Ferdinand 
regign— Spirit  of  the  Spanish  Nation — Contrast  with  Germany — Rising? 
of  all  Spain— Tho  Notables  at  Bay onne— Campaign  of  1808— Capitula- 
tion of  Baylen— Wellesley  lands  in  Portugal— Vimieiro— Convention 
of  Cintra— Effect  of  the  Spanish  Rising  on  Europe— War  Party  in 
Prussia— Napoleon  and  Alexander  at  Erfurt— Stein  resigns,  and  is 
proscribed— Napoleon  in  Spain — Spanish  Misgovemment— Campaign 
on  tho  Ebro — Campaign  of  Sir  John  Moore— Corunna— Napoleon  leaves 
Spain — Siege  of  Saragossa— Successes  of  the  French     ....  367 

CHAPTER    IX. 

WAB    OF    1809  :    THE    NAPOLEONIC    EMPIRE— SPAIN,  TO  THE  BATTLE 
OF   SALAMANCA. 

Austrian  preparing  for  war — The  war  to  be  one  on  behalf  of  the  German 
Nation — Patriotic  movement  in  Prussia — Expected  Insurrection  in 
North  Germany  —  Plans  of  Campaign  —  Austrian  IVLinifesto  to  the 
Germans — Rising  of  the  Tyrolese— Defeats  of  the  Archduke  Charles 
in  Bavaria— French  in  Vienna — Attempts  of  Dornberg  and  Schill — 
Battle  of  Aspem — Second  passage  of  the  Danube — Battle  of  Wagram — 
Armistice  of  Znaim — Austria  waiting  for  Events — Wellesley  in  SpsJn — 
He  gains  the  Battle  of  Talavera,  but  retreats— Expedition  against 
Antwerp  fails— Austria  makes  Peace — Treaty  of  Vienna — Real  Effects 
of  the  War  of  1809- Austria  after  1809— Metternich— Marriage  of 
Napoleon  with  Marie  Louise — Severance  of  Napoleon  and  Alexander — 
Napoleon  annexes  the  Papal  States,  Holland,  Le  Valais,  and  the  North 
German  Coast— The  Napoleonic  Empire  :  its  benctits  and  wrongs — The 
Czar  withdraws  from  Napoleon's  Commercial  System— War  with  Russia 
imminent — Wellington  in  Portugal ;  Lines  of  Torres  Vedr.is ;  Mas- 
Sena's  Campaign  of  1810,  and  retreat— Soult  in  Andalusia — Wellington's 
Campaign  of  1811 — Capture  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  Badajoz — Salamanca  402 

CHAPTER    X. 

BUSSIAN   CAMPAIGN,   TO   THE   TREATY  OF  KALISCH. 

War  approaching  between  France  and  Russia — Policy  of  Prussia — Harden> 
berg's  Ministry  —  Prussia  forced  into  Alliance  with  Napoleon —  y 
Austrian  Alliance — Napoleon's  Preparations — He  enters  Russia — *' 
Alexander  and  Bemadotte — Plan  of  Russiana  to  fight  a  battle  at 
Drissa  frustrated — They  retreat  on  Witepsk — Sufferings  of  the  French 
— French  enter  Smolensko  —  Battle  of  Borodino  —  Evacuation  of 
Moscow — Moscow  fired — The  Retreat  from  Moscow — French  at 
Smolensko— Advance  of  Russian  Armies  from  North  and  South— Battle 
of  Krusnoi — Passage  of  the  Beresina — The  French  reach  the  Niemen — 
York's  Convention  with  the  Russians — Tho  Czar  and  Stoin — Russian 
Army  enters  Prussia — Stein  raises  East  Prussia — Treaty  of  Kalisch — 
Prussia  declares  War— Enthosiaam  of  the  Nation— Idea  of  German 
Unity— The  Landwehr '     .  4M 


xa  CONTENTS. 

OHAMER   XL 

WAB     OF  LIBERATION,  TO  THE  PEACE  OP  PARIS. 

The  War  of  liboratiqp-^Bliicher  crosses  the  Elbe — Battle  of  Ltitzen — 
The  Allies  retreat  to  Silesia — Battle  of  Bautzen — Armistice — ^Napoleon 
intends  to  intimidate  Austria — Mistaken  as  to  the  Forces  of  Austria — 
•  Mettemich*s  Policy  —  Treaty  of  Eeichenhach — Austria  offers  its 
Mediation-^Congress  of  Prague — Austria  enters  the  War — Armies 
and  Hans  of  Napoleon  and  the  Allies — Campaign  of  August — Battles 
of  Dresden,  Grosbeeren,  the  Katzbach,  and  Kulm— Effect  of  these 
Actions — Battle  of  Dennewitz — German  Policy  of  Austria  favourable 
to  the  Princes  of  the  "Rhenish  Confederacy  —  Frustrated  hopes  of 
German  Unity — ^Battle  ot  Leipzig — ^The  Allies  reach  the  Jihine — Offers 
of  Peace  at  Frankfort — Plan  of  Invasion  of  France — Backwardness  of 
Austria — The  Allies  enter  France — Campaign  of  1814 — Congress  of 
Chatnion — ^Napoleon  moves  to  the  rear  of  the  Allies — The  Allies 
advance  on  Paris — Capitulation  of  Paris— Entry  of  the  Allies— De- 
thronement of  Napoleon — Restoration  of  the  Bourbons — The  Charta— 
Treaty  of  Paris— Territorial  effects  of  the  War,  1792-1814— Every 
Power  except  France  had  gained — France  relatively  weaker  in  Europe 
— Summary  of  the  permanent  effects  of  this  period  on  Europe       •        •  490 


Modern  Europe. 


CHAPTEE    I. 

Oufbreak  of  the  "Revolutionary  Wai  in  1792— Its  immediate  cansea — ^Declaration 

of  Pillnitz  made  and  withdrawn — Agitation  of  the  Priests  and  Emigrants 
— ^War  Policy  of  the  Gironde — Provocations  offered  to  France  by  the 
Powerg— State  of  Central  Europe  in  1792— The  Holy  Roman  Empire — 
Austria — Rule  of  the  Hapsburgs — ^The  Reforms  of  Maria  Theresa  and 
Joseph  II.— Policy  of  Leopold  II. — Government  and  Foreign  Policy  of 
Francis  II. — ^Prussia — Government  of  Frederick  William  II. — Social  con- 
dition of  Prussia— Secondary  States  of  Germany — Ecclesiastical  Statee — 
Free  Cities — Knights — Weakness  of  Germany. 

On  the  morning  of  the  19th  of  April,  1792,  after  weeks 
of  stormy  agitation  in  Pari^,  the  Ministers  of  Louis 
XVI.  brought  down  a  letter  from  the  King  to  the 
Legislative  Assembly  of  France.  The  letter  was  brief 
but  significant.  It  announced  that  the  King  intended 
to  appear  in  the  Hall  of  Assembly  at  noon  on  the 
following  day.  Though  the  letter  did  not  disclose  the 
object  of  the  King's  visit,  ^t  was  known  that  Louis 
had  given  way  to  the  pressure  of  his  Ministry  and  the 
national  cry  for  war,yand  that  a  declaration  of  war 
against  Austria  was  the  measure  which  the  King  was 
about  to  propose  in  person  to  the  Assembly.  On  the 
morrow  the  public  thronged  the  hall ;  the  Assembly 
broke  off  its  debate  at  midday  in  order  to  be  in  readiness 
for  the  King.  Louis  entered  the  hall  in  the  midst  of 
B 


2  MOBEBN  EUROPE.  1792. 

deep  silence,  and  seated  himself  beside  the  President  in 
the   chair   which  was  now  substituted  for  the  throne  of 
France.     At    the  King's  bidding   Greneral  Dumouriez, 
Minister   of    Foreign   Affairs,    read    a    report    to    the 
Assembly,   upon    the    relations    of  France   to    foreign 
Powers.   _The_rfiport  contained  a  long  series  of  charges 
against  Austria,  and  concluded   with  the  recommenda- 
tion  of  war.     When  Dumouriez  ceased  reading  Louis 
rose,  and  in  a  low  voice  declared  that  he  himself  and 
the  whole    of  the   Ministry  accepted   the   report   read 
to  the  Assembly;    that   he   had    used  every  effort  to 
maintain    peace,   and  in  vain ;    and  that  he  was   now 
come,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  Constitution, 
to  propose  that  the  Assembly  declare  war  against  the 
Austrian  Sovereign.     It  was  not  three    months    since 
Louis  himself  had  supplicated   the    Courts    of  Europe 
for  armed  aid  against  his  own  subjects.      The    words 
which  he  now  uttered  were  put  in  his  mouth  by  men 
whom    he  hated,   but  could  not  resist :    the  very  out- 
burst of  applause  that  followed  them  only  proved  the 
fatal  antagonism  that  existed  between  the  nation  and 
the  King.     After   the  President  of  the  Assembly  had 
made  a  short  answer,  Louis  retired  from  the  hall.     The 
Assembly  itself  broke  up,   to  commence  its  debate  on 
the  King's  proposal  after  an  interval   of  some  hours. 
"When   the    House  re-assembled  in  the  evenino*,  those 
few  courageous  men  who  argued  on  grounds  of  national 
interest  and  justice  against  the  passion  of  the  moment 
could  scarcely  obtain  a  hearing.     An  appeal  for  a  setjond 
day's  discussion  was  rejected ;  the  debate  abruptly  closed; 


1792.  THE  REVOLUTIONARY    WAR.  3 

and  the  declaration  of  war  was  carried  against  seven  dis- 
sentient votes.  It  was  a  decision  big  with  consequences 
for  France  and  for  the  world.  From  that  day  began  the 
struggle  between  Eevolutionary  France  and  the  estab- 
lished order  of  Europe.  A  period  opened  in  which 
almost  every  State  on  the  Continent  gained  some  new 
character  from  the  aggressions  of  France,  from  the  laws 
and  political  changes  introduced  by  the  conqueror,  or 
from  the  awakening  of  new  forces  of  national  life  in 
the  crisis  of  successful  resistance  or  of  humiliation.  It 
is  my  intention  to  trace  the  great  lines  of  European 
history  from  that  time  to  the  present,  briefly  sketching 
the  condition  of  some  of  the  principal  States  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  Eevolutionary  War,  and  endeavouring 
to  distinguish,  amid  scenes  of  ever-shifting  incident, 
the  steps  by  which  the  Europe  of  1792  has  become 
the  Europe  of  to-day. 

The  first  two  years  of  the   Eevolution  had  ended 
without  brinij^ino:  France  into  collision  with 

°       °  Piret  threats  of 

foreign  Powers.     This  was  not  due  to  any     J^  j£^ 

1791 

goodwill  that  the  Courts  of  Europe  bore 
to  the  French  people,  or  to  want  of  effort  on  the  part 
of  the  French  aristocracy  to  raise  the  armies  of  Europe 
against  their  own  country.  The  National  Assembly, 
which  met  in  1789,  had  cut  at  the  roots  of  the  power 
of  the  Crown;  it  had  deprived  the  nobility  of  their 
privileges,  and  laid  its  hand  upon  the  revenues  of  the 
Church.  The  brothers  of  King  Louis  XVI.,  with  a 
host  of  nobles  too  impatient  to  pursue  a  course  of  steady 
political  opposition  at  home,  quitted  France,  and  wearied 
B  2 


4  MODERN  EUROPE.  mi. 

foreign  Courts  with  their  appeals  for  armed  assistance. 
The  absolute  monarclis  of  the  Continent  gave  them  a 
warm  and  even  ostentatious  welcome  ;  but  they  confined 
their  support  to  words  and  tokens  of  distinction,  and 
until  the  summer  of  1791  the  Ee volution  was  not 
seriously  threatened  with  the  interference  of  the  stranger. 
The  flight  of  King  Louis  from  Paris  in  June,  1791, 
followed  by  his  capture  and  his  strict  coDfinement 
within  the  Tuileries,  gave  rise  to  the  first  definite  project 
of  foreign  intervention.*  Louis  had  fled  from  his 
capital  and  from-  the  National  Assembly;  he  returned, 
the  hostage  of  a  populace  already  familiar  with  outrage 
and  bloodshed.  For  a  moment  the  exasperation  of 
Paris  brought  the  Eoyal  Family  into  real  jeopardy. 
The  Emperor  Leopold,  brother  of  Marie  Antoinette, 
trembled  for  the  safety  of  his  unhappy  sister,  and 
addressed  a  letter  to  the  European  Courts  from  Padua, 
on  the  6th  of  July,  proposing  that  the  Powers  should 
unite  to  preserve  the  Eoyal  Family  of  France  from 
popular  violence.  Six  weeks  later  the  Emperor  and 
King  Frederick  William  II.  of  Prussia  met  at  Pillnitz, 
in  Saxony.  A  declaration  was  published  by  the  two 
Sovereigns,  stating  that  they  considered  the  position  of 
the  King  of  France  to  be  matter  of  European  concern, 
and  that,  in  the  event  of  all  the  other  great  Powers 
consenting  to  a  joint  action,  they  were  prepared  to  sup- 
ply an  armed  force  to  operate  on  the  French  frontier. 
Had  the  National  Assembly  instantly  declared  war  on 

*  flanke,    Ursprung    und    Beginn    der    Revolutionskriege,    p.    90 
Vivenot,  Quelleu  zur  Geschiclite  der  Kaiserpolitik  Oosterreichs,  1, 185, 208. 


179L  BEGLAIUTION   OF  PILLNITZ.  ft 

Leopold  and  Frederick  William,  its  action  would  have 
been  justified  by  every  rule  of  international  law.  The 
Assembly  did  not,  however,  declare  war,  and  for  a  good 
reason.  It  was  known  at  Paris  that  the  manifesto  was 
no  more  than  a  device  of  the  Emperor's  to  intimidate 
the  enemies  of  the  Royal  Family.  Leopold,  when  he 
pledged  himself  to  join  a  coalition  of  all  the  Powers, 
was  in  fact  aware  that  England  would  be  no  party  to 
any  such  coalition.  He  was  determined  to  do  nothing 
that  would  force  him  into  war;  and  it  did  not  occur 
to  him  that  French  politicians  would  understand  the 
emptiness  of  his  threats  as  well  as  he  did  himself. 
Yet  this  turned  out  to  be  the  case;  and  whatever 
indignation  the  manifesto  of  Pillnitz  excited  in  th^ 
mass  of  the  French  people,  it  was  received  with 
more  derision  than  alarm  by  the  men  who  were  cog- 
nisant of  the  afiairs  of  Europe.  All  the  politicians  of 
the  National  Assembly  knew  that  Prussia  and  Austria 
had  lately  been  on  the  verge  of  war  with  one  another  upon 
the  Eastern  question ;  they  even  underrated  the  effect  of 
the  French  revolution  in  appeasing  the  existing  enmities 
of  the  great  Powers.  No  important  party  in  France 
regarded  the  Declaration  of  Pillnitz  as  a 
possible  reason  for  hostilities;  and  the  ^i"itz  with- 
challenge  given  to  France  was  soon  publicly  . 
withdrawn.  It  was  withdrawn  when  Louis  XVI.,  by 
accepting  the  Constitution  made  by  the  National 
Assembly,  placed  himself,  in  the  sight  of  Europe,  in 
the  position  of  a  free  agent.  On  the  14th  September, 
1791,  the  King,  by  a  solemn  public  oath,  idei^tified  his 


6  MODERN  BVEOFE.  i-^sl 

will  with  that  of  the  nation.  It  was  known  in  Paris 
that  he  had  been  urged  by  the  emigrants  to  refuse  his 
assent,  and  to  plunge  the  nation  into  civil  war  by-  an 
open  breach  with  the  Assembly.  The  frankness  with 
which  Louis  pledged  himself  to  the  Constitution,  the 
seeming  sincerity  of  his  patriotism,  again  turned  the 
tide  of  public  opinion  in  his  favour.  His  flight  was 
forgiven;  the  restrictions  placed  upon  his  personal 
liberty  were  relaxed.  Louis  seemed  to  be  once  more 
reconciled  with  France,  and  France  was  relieved  from 
the  ban  of  Europe.  The  Emperor  announced  that  the 
circumstances  which  had  provoked  the  Declaration  of 
Pillnitz  no  longer  existed,  and  that  the  Powers,  though 
prepared  to  revive  the  League  if  future  occasion  should 
arise,  suspended  all  joint  action  in  reference  to  the  in- 
ternal affairs  of  France. 

The  National  Assembly,  which,  in  two  years,  had 
carried  France  so  far  towards  the  eroal  of 

Priests  and  emi-  " 

^^ina^S  political  and  social  freedom,  now  declared 
its  work  ended.  In  the  mass  of  the  nation 
there  was  little  desire  for  further  change.  The  griev- 
ances which  pressed  most  heavily  upon  the  common 
,  course  of  men's  lives — unfair  taxation,  exclusion  from 
public  employment,  monopolies  among  the  townspeople, 
and  the  feudal  dues  which  consumed  the  produce  of  the 
peasant, — ^had  been  swept  away.  It  was  less  by  any 
general  demand  for  further  reform  than  by  the  an- 
tagonisms already  kindled  in  the  Eevolution  that 
France  was  forced  into  a  new  series  of  violent  changes. 
The  King  himself  was  not  sincerely  at  one  with  the 


17UL  THE   PRIESTS   AND    THE   EMIGRANTS.  7 

nation;  in  everything  that  most  keenly  touched  his  con- 
science he  had  unwillingly  accepted  the  work  of  the  As- 
semhly.  The  Church  and  the  noblesse  were  bent  on 
undoing  what  had  already  been  done.  Without  inter- 
fering with  doctrine  or  ritual,  the  National  Assembly 
had  re-organised  the  ecclesiastical  system  of  France, 
and  had  enforced  that  supremacy  of  the  State  over 
the  priesthood  to  which,  throughout  the  eighteenth 
century,  the  Governments  of  Catholic  Europe  had  been 
steadily  tending.  The  Civil  Constitution  of  the  Clergy, 
which  was  created  by  the  National  Assembly  in  1790, 
transformed  the  priesthood  from  a  society  of  landowners 
into  a  body  of  salaried  oflficers  of  the  State,  and  gave  to 
the  laity  the  election  of  their  bishops  and  ministers. 
The  change,  carried  out  in  this  extreme  form,  threw  th« 
whole  body  of  bishops  and  a  great  part  of  the  lower 
clergy  into  revolt.  Their  interests  were  hurt  by  the 
sale  of  the  Church  lands;  their  consciences  were 
wounded  by  the  system  of  popular  election,  which  was 
condemned  by  the  Pope.  In  half  the  pulpits  of  France 
the  principles  of  the  Eevolution  were  anathematised, 
and  the  vengeance  of  heaven  denounced  against  the 
purchasers  of  the  secularised  Church  lands.  Beyond  the 
frontier  the  emigrant  nobles,  who  might  have  tempered 
the  Eevolution  by  combining  with  the  many  liberal  men 
of  their  order  who  remained  at  home,  gathered  in  arms, 
and  sought  the  help  of  foreigners  against  a  nation  in 
which  they  "could  see  nothing  but  rebellious  dependents 
of  their  own.  The  head-quarters  of  the  emigrants  were 
at  Coblentz  in  the  dominions  of  the  Elector  of  Treves. 


8  MODERN  EUBOPK  mh 

They  formed  themselves  into  regiments,  nnmbering  in 
all  some  few  thousands,  and  occupied  themselves  with 
extravagant  schemes  of  vengeance  against  all  French- 
men who  had  taken  part  in  the  destruction  of  the 
privileges  of  their  caste. 

Had  the  elections  which  followed  the  dissolution  of 
the  National  Assembly  sent  to  the  Legis- 

Legislative  As-       ,     ,  ,       ,  «  T_       x  l 

sembiy,  Oct.  laturc  3,  Dodj  01  mcu  bent  only  on 
maintaining  the  advantages  already  won,  it 
would  have  been  no  easy  task  to  preserve  the  peace  of 
France  in  the  presence  of  the  secret  or  open  hostility 
of  the  Court,  the  Church,  and  the  emigrants.  But  the 
trial  was  .not  made.  The  leading  spirits  among  the 
new  representatives  were  not  men  of  compromise. 
In  the  Legislative  Body  which  met  in  1791  there  were 
all  the  passions  of  the  Assembly  of  1789,  without  any 
of  the  experience  which  that  Assembly  had  gained. 
A  decree,  memorable  among  the  achievements  of 
political  folly,  had  prohibited  members  of  the  late 
Chamber  from  seeking  re-election.  The  new  Legis- 
lature was  composed  of  men  whose  political  creed  had 
been  drawn  almost  wholly  from  literary  sources;  the 
most  dangerous  theorists  of  the  former  Assembly  were 
released  from  Parliamentary  restraints,  and  installed, 
like  Eobespierre,  as  the  orators  of  the  clubs.  Within 
the  Chamber  itself  the  defenders  of  the  Monarchy  and 
of  the  Constitution  which  had  just  been  given  to  France 
were  far  outmatched  by  the  party  of  advance.  The 
most  conspicuous  of  the  new  deputies  formed  the 
group  named  after  the  district  of  the  Gironde,  where 


l^L  WAB-rOLICY   OF  THE    QIRONBE.  9 

several  of  their  leaders  had  been  elected.  The  orator 
Yergniaud,  pre-eminent  among  companions  of  singular 
eloquence,  the  philosopher  Condorcet,  the  veteran 
journalist  Brissot,  gave  to  this  party  an  ascendancy 
in  the  Chamber  and  an  influence  in  the  country  the 
more  dangerous  because  it  appeared  to  belong  to  men 
elevated  above  the  ordinary  regions  of  political  strife. 
Without  the  fixed  design  of  turning  the  monarchy 
into  a  republic,  the  orators  of  the  Grironde  sought 
to  carry  the  revolutionary  movement  over  the  barrier 
erected  against  it  in  the  Constitution  of  1791.  From 
the  moment  of  the  opening  of  the  Assembly  it  was 
clear  that  the  Girondins  intended  to  precipitate  the 
conflict  between  the  Court  and  the  nation  by  devoting 
all  the  wealth  of  their  eloquence  to  the  subjects  which 
divided  France  the  most.  To  Brissot  and  the  men  who 
furnished  the  ideas  of  the  party,  it  would  have  seemed 
a  calamity  that  the  Constitution  of  1791,  with  its  re- 
spect for  the  prerogative  of  the  Crown  and  its  tolerance 
of  mediaeval  superstition,  should  fairly  get  under 
way.  In  spite  of  Eobespierre's  prediction  ^^  ^ 
that  war  would  give  France  a  strong  ti^eoironde. 
sovereign  in  the  place  of  a  weak  one,  the  Girondins 
persuaded  themselves  that  the  best  means  of  dimiJaish- 
ing  or  overthrowing  monarchical  power  in  France  was  a 
war  with  the  sovereigns  of  Europe;  and  henceforward 
they  laboured  for  war  with  scarcely  any  disguise.* 

Nor   were   occasions   wanting,   if  war  was  needful 
for   France.     The   protection    which    the    Elector    of 

*  Yon  Sybel,  Geschichte  der  Eeyolatiouszeit,  i  289. 


10  MODERN  EUROPE, 


I7d2. 


Treves  gave  to  tlie  emigrant  army  at  Coblentz  was 
so  flagrant  a  violation  of  international  law  that  tlie 
Gironde  had  the  support  of  the  whole  nation  when 
they  called  upon  the  King  to  demand  the  dispersal 
of  the  emigrants  in  the  most  peremptory  form. 
^N'ational  feeling  was  keenly  excited  by  debates  in 
which  the  military  preparations  of  the  emigrants  and 
the  encouragement  given  to  them  by  foreign  princes 
were  denounced  with  all  the  energy  of  southern  elo- 
quence. On  the  13th  of  December  Louis  declared  to  the 
Electors  of  Treves  and  Mainz  that  he  would  treat  them 
as  enemies  unless  the  armaments  within  their  territories 
were  dispersed  by  January  15th;  and  at  the  same 
time  he  called  upon  the  Emperor  Leopold,  as  head 
of  the  Germanic  body,  to  use  his  influence  in  bring- 
ing the  Electors  to  reason.  The  demands  of  France 
were  not  resisted.  On  the  16th  January,  1792,  Louis 
informed  the  Assembly  that  the  emigrants  had  been 
expelled  from  the  electorates,  and  acknowledged  the 
good  offices  of  Leopold  in  effecting  this  result.  The 
substantial  cause  of  war  seemed  to  have  disappeared; 
Notes  of  ^^^  another  had  arisen  in  its  place.  In 
v^2\\  a  note  of  December  21st  the  Austrian 
minister  Kaunitz  used  expressions  which 
implied  that  a  league  of  the  Powers  was  still  in 
existence  against  France.  Nothing'  could  have  come 
more  opportunely  for  the  war-party  in  the  Assembly. 
Brissot  cried  for  an  immediate  declaration  of  war, 
and  appealed  to  the  French  nation  to  vindicate  its 
honour  by  an   attack   both   upon   the   emigrants   and 


1792.  LBOTOLB'S   DESPATCH,  11 

upon  their  imperial  protector.  The  issue  depended 
upon  the  relative  power  of  the  Crown  and  the  Opposi- 
tion. Leopold  saw  that  war  was  inevitable  unless  the 
Constitutional  party,  which  was  still  in  office,  rallied 
for  one  last  effort,  and  gained  a  decisive  victory  over  its 
antagonists.  In  the  hope  of  turning  public  opinion 
against  the  Grironde,  he  permitted  Kaunitz  to  send  a 
despatch  to  Paris  which  loaded  the  leaders  of  the  war- 
party  with  abuse,  and  exhorted  the  French  nation  to 
deliver  itself  from  men  who  would  bring  upon  it  the 
hostility  of  Europe.  (Feb.  17.)*  The  despatch  gave 
singular  proof  of  the  inability  of  the  cleverest  sovereign 
and  the  most  experienced  minister  of  the  age  to  dis- 
tinguish between  the  fears  of  a  timid  cabinet  and  the 
impulses  of  an  excited  nation.  Leopold's  vituperations 
might  have  had  the  intended  effect  if  they  had  been 
addressed  to  the  Margrave  of  Baden  or  the  Doge  of 
Venice;  addressed  to  the  French  nation  and  its  popular 
Assembly  in  the  height  of  civil  conflict,  they  were  as 
oil  poured  upon  the  flames.  Leopold  ruined  the  party 
which  he  meant  to  reinforce ;  he  threw  the  nation  into 
the  arms  of  those  whom  he  attacked.  His  despatch  was 
received  in  the  Assembly  with  alternate  murmurs  and 
bursts  of  laughter;  in  the  clubs  it  excited  a  wild  outburst 
of  rage.  The  exchange  of  diplomatic  notes  continued  for 
a  few  weeks  more ;  but  the  real  answer  of  France  to 
Austria  was  tlie  "  Marseillaise,"  composed  at  Strasburg 
almost  simultaneously  with  Kaunitz'  attack  upon  the 
Jacobins.  The  sudden  death  of  the  Emperor  on 
*  Yivenot,  QucUen,  i.  372.    Baches  et  Boui,  ziii.  340,  xIy.  24 


12  MODERN  EUBOPK  1792. 

March  1st  produced  no  pause  in  the  controversy. 
Delessart,  the  Foreign  Minister  of  Louis,  was 
thrust  from  office,  and  replaced  by  Dumouriez,  the 
representative  of  the  war-party.  Expostulation  took 
a  sharper  tone ;  old  subjects  of  complaint  were 
War  dedared  Tcvivcd ;  and  the  armies  on  each  side 
April  20. 1792.  ^^^^  already  pressing  towards  the  frontier 
when  the  unhappy  Louis  was  brought  down  to  the 
Assembly  by  his  Ministers,  and  compelled  to  propose 
the  declaration  of  war. 

It  is  seldom  that  the  professed  grounds  correspond 

with  the  real  motives  of  a  war;    nor  was 

grotmds    of        this  tho  casc  in  1792.     The  ultimatum  of 

war. 

the  Austrian  Grovemment  demanded  that 
compensation  should  be  made  to  certain  German  nobles 
whose  feudal  rights  over  their  peasantry  had  been 
abolished  in  Alsace ;  that  the  Pope  should  be  indemnified 
for  Avignon  and  the  Yenaissin,  which  had  been  taken 
from  him  by  France;  and  that  a  Government  should 
be  established  at  Paris  capable  of  ajffording  the  Powers 
of  Europe  security  against  the  spread  of  democratic 
agitation.  No  one  supposed  the  first  two  grievances 
to  be  a  serious  ground  for  hostilities.  The  rights  of 
the  German  nobles  in  Alsace  over  their  villagers  were 
no  doubt  protected  by  the  treaties  which  ceded  those 
districts  to  France;  but  every  politician  in  Europe 
would  have  laughed  at  a  Government  which  allowed 
the  feudal  system  to  survive  in  a  comer  of  its  dominions 
out  of  respect  for  a  settlement  a  century  and  a  half 
old:  nor  had  the  Assembly  refused  to  these  foreign 


17«2.  PRETENDED    CAUSES    OF    WAB.  18 

seigneurs  a  compensation  claimed  in  vain  by  King 
Louis  for  the  nobles  of  France.  As  to  the  annexa- 
tion of  Avignon  and  the  Venaissin,  a  power  which, 
like  Austria,  had  joined  in  dismembering  Poland,  and 
had  just  made  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  dismember 
Turkey,  could  not  gravely  reproach  France  for  incor- 
porating a  district  which  lay  actually  within  it,  and 
whose  inhabitants,  or  a  great  portion  of  them,  were 
anxious  to  become  citizens  of  France.  The  third  de- 
mand, the  establishment  of  such  a  government  as 
Austria  should  deem  satisfactory,  was  one  which 
no  high-spirited  people  could  be  expected  to  entertain. 
Nor  was  this  in  fact  expected  by  Austria.  Leopold 
had  no  desire  to  attack  France,  but  he  had  used  threats, 
and  would  not  submit  to  the  humiliation  of  renouncing 
them.  He  would  not  hav6  begun  a  war  for  the  pur- 
pose of  delivering  the  French  Crown ;  but,  when  he  found 
that  he  was  himself  certain  to  be  attacked,  he  accepted 
a  war  with  the  Eevolution  without  regret.  On  the 
other  side,  when  the  Gironde  denounced  the  league  of 
the  Kings,  they  exaggerated  a  far-off  danger  for  the 
ends  of  their  domestic  policy.  The  Sovereigns  of 
the  Continent  had  indeed  made  no  secret  of  their 
hatred  to  the  Eevolution.  Catherine  of  Kussia  had 
exhorted  every  Court  in  Europe  to  make  war ;  Gustavus 
of  Sweden  was  surprised  by  a  violent  Expectation  ot 
death  in  the  midst  of  preparations  against  Sla^oiJ^tbi 
France;  Spain,  Naples,  and  Sardinia  were  ^y*  ^g 
ready  to  follow  leaders  stronger  than  them-  "''^ 
selves.     But  fche  statesmen  of  the  French  ARKAmKlv 


14  MODERN  EUROPE.  179a 

well  understood  tlie  interval  that  separates  hostile 
feeling  from  actual  attack ;  and  the  unsubstantial  nature 
of  the  danger  to  France,  whether  from  the  northern  or 
the  southern  Powers,  was  proved  by  the  very  fact  that 
Austria,  the  hereditary  enemy  of  France,  and  the  country 
of  the  hated  Marie  Antoinette,  was  treated  as  the  main 
enemy.  Nevertheless,  the  Courts  had  done  enough  to 
excite  the  anger  of  millions  of  French  people  who  knew 
of  their  menaces,  and  not  of  their  hesitations  and 
reserves.  The  man  who  composed  the  "  Marseillaise  " 
was  no  maker  of  cunningly-devised  fables ;  the  crowds 
who  first  sang  it  never  doubted  the  reality  of  the 
dangers  which  the  orators  of  the  Assembly  denounced. 
The  Courts  of  Europe  had  heaped  up  the  fuel;  the 
Grirondins  applied  the  torch.  The  mass  of  the  French 
nation  had  httle  means  of  appreciating  what  passed  in 
Europe ;  they  took  their  facts  from  their  leaders,  who 
considered  it  no  very  serious  thing  to  plunge  a  nation 
into  war  for  the  furtherance  of  internal  liberty.  Events 
were  soon  to  pass  their  own  stem  and  mocking  sentence 
upon  the  wisdom  of  the  Grirondin  statesmanship. 

After   voting   the  Declaration  of  War  the  French 
Assembly  accepted  a  manifesto,  drawn  up 

Germany  follows       ^  r^        i  i  •  •        n  p 

Austria  into  the  by  Uoudorcet,  renouncing  m  the  name  or 
the  French  people  all  intention  of  conquest. 
The  manifesto  expressed  what  was  sincerely  felt  by  men 
like  Condorcet,  to  whom  the  Eevolution  was  still  too 
sacred  a  cause  to  be  stained  with  the  vulgar  lust  of  ag- 
grandisement. But  the  actual  course  of  the  war  was 
determined  less  by  the  intentions  with  which  the  French 


19M.  QEEMANY   INVOLVED   IN   TEE    WAR.  IS 

began  it  than  by  the  political  condition  of  the  States 
which  bordered  upon  the  French  frontier.  The  war  was 
primarily  a  war  with  Austria,  but  the  Sovereign  of 
Austria  was  also  the  head  of  Germany.  The  German 
Ecclesiastical  Princes  who  ruled  in  the  Khenish  provinces 
had  been  the  most  zealous  protectors  of  the  emigrants ; 
it  was  impossible  that  they  should  now  j&nd  shelter  in 
neutrality.  Prussia  had  made  an  alliance  with  the 
Emperor  against  France;  other  German  States  followed  in 
the  wake  of  one  or  other  of  the  great  Powers.  If  France 
proved  stronger  than  its  enemy,  there  were  governments 
besides  that  of  Austria  which  would  have  to  take  their 
account  with  the  Ee volution.  Nor  indeed  was  Austria 
the  power  most  exposed  to  violent  change.  The  mass 
of  its  territory  lay  far  from  France;  at  the  most,  it 
risked  the  loss  of  Lombardy  and  the  Netherlands.  Ger- 
many at  large  was  the  real  area  threatened  g^^  ^^  o^ 
by  the  war,  and  never  was  a  political  com-  "'^^* 

munity  less  fitted  to  resist  attack  than  Germany  at  the 
end  of  the  eighteenth  century.  It  was  in  the  divisions 
of  the  German  people,  and  in  the  rivalries  of  the  two 
leading  German  governments,  that  France  found  its 
surest  support  throughout  the  Ee  volution  ary  war,  and 
its  keenest  stimulus  to  conquest.  It  will  throw  light 
upon  the  sudden  changes  that  now  began  to  break  over 
Europe  if  we  pause  to  make  a  brief  survey  of  the  state 
of  Germany  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  to  note  the 
character  and  policy  of  its  reigning  sovereigns,  and  to 
cast  a  glance  over  the  circumstances  which  had  brought 
the  central  district  of  Europe  into  its  actual  condition. 


16  MODERN  EUBOPK  im. 

Germany  at  large  still  preserved  the  mediaeval  name 
and  forms  of  the  Holy  Eoman  Empire.  The  members 
„  ,    ^  of  this  so-called  Empire  were,  however,  a 

Holy  icoman  -l 

^^^^'"-  multitude  of  independent  States;  and  the 
chief  of  these  States,  Austria,  combined  with  its  Grerman 
provinces  a  large  territory  which  did  not  even  in  name 
form  part  of  the  Grermanic  body.  The  motley  of  the 
Empire  was  made  up  by  governments  of  every  degree  of 
strength  and  weakness.  Austria  and  Prussia  possessed 
both  political  traditions  and  resources  raising  them  to 
the  rank  of  great  European  Powers ;  but  the  sovereign- 
ties of  the  second  order,  such  as  Saxony  and  Bavaria, 
had  neither  the  security  of  strength  nor  the  free  energy 
often  seen  in  small  political  communities ;  whilst  in  the 
remaining  petty  States  of  Grermany,  some  hundreds  in 
number,  all  public  life  had  long  passed  out  of  mind  in  a 
drowsy  routine  of  official  benevolence  or  oppression.  In 
theory  there  still  existed  a  united  Germanic  body ;  in 
reality  Germany  was  composed  of  two  great  monarchies 
in  embittered  rivalry  with  one  another,  and  of  a  multi- 
tude of  independent  principalities  and  cities  whose  mem- 
bership in  the  Empire  involved  little  beyond  a  liabiKty 
to  be  dragged  into  the  quarrels  of  their  more  powerful 
neighbours.  A  German  national  feeling  did  not  exist, 
because  no  combination  existed  uniting  the  interests  of 
all  Germany.  The  names  and  forms  of  political  union 
had  come  down  from  a  remote  past,  and  formed  a 
grotesque  anachronism  amid  the  realities  of  the 
eighteenth  century.  The  head  of  the  Germanic  body 
held  office  not  by  hereditary  right,  but  as  the  elected 


1«0-I74a  STATE    OF   GERMANY.  17 

successor  of  Charlemagne  and  the  Eoman  Caesars.  Since 
the  fifteenth  century  the  imperial  dignity  had  rested 
with  the  Austrian  House  of  Hapsburg  ;  but,  with  the 
exception  of  Charles  V.,  no  sovereign  of  that  House  had 
commanded  forces  adequate  to  the  creation  of  a  united 
German  state,  and  the  opportunity  which  then  ofiered 
itself  was  allowed  to  pass  away.  The  Keformation 
severed  Northern  Grermany  from  the  Catholic  monarchy 
of  the  south.  The  Thirty  Years'  War,  terminating 
in  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century,  secured 
the  existence  of  Protestantism  on  the  Continent  of 
Europe,  but  it  secured  it  at  the  cost  of  Germany, 
which  was  left  exhausted  and  disintegrated.  By  the 
Treaty  of  Westphalia,  a.d.  1648,  the  independence  of 
every  member  of  the  Empire  was  recognised,  gince  i648,  au 
and  the  central  authority  was  henceforth  a     states  indepen- 

•^  dent  of  the  Em- 

mere  shadow.  The  Diet  of  the  Empire,  p^'- 
where  the  representatives  of  the  Electors,  of  the 
Princes,  and  of  the  Free  Cities,  met  in  the  order  of 
the  Middle  Ages,  sank  into  a  Heralds'  College,  oc- 
cupied with  questions  of  title  and  precedence  ;  affairs 
of  real  importance  were  transacted  by  envoys  from 
Court  to  Court.  For  purposes  of  war  the  Empire 
was  divided  into  Circles,  each  Circle  supplying  in 
theory  a  contingent  of  troops;  but  this  military 
organisation  existed  only  in  letter.  The  greater  and 
the  intermediate  States  regulated  their  armaments,  as 
they  did  their  policy,  without  regard  to  the  Diet  of 
Ratisbon ;  the  contingents  of  the  smaller  sovereignties 
and  free  cities  were  in   every  degree  of   inefficiency, 

0 


18  MODERN  EUBOPK  ia»-i740. 

corruption,  and  disorder ;  and  in  spite  of  tlie  courage 
of  the  Grerman  soldier,  it  could  make  little  difference 
in  a  European  war  whether  a  regiment  which  had 
its  captain  appointed  hy  the  city  of  Grmiind,  its 
lieutenant  by  the  Abbess  of  Eotenmiinster,  and  its 
ensign  by  the  Abbot  of  Gregenbach,  did  or  did  not  take 
the  field  with  numbers  fifty  per  cent,  below  its  statutory 
contingent.*  How  loose  was  the  connection  subsisting 
between  the  members  of  the  Empire,  how  slow  and 
cumbrous  its  constitutional  machinery,  was  strikingly 
proved  after  the  first  inroads  of  the  French  into  Germany 
in  1792,  when  the  Diet  deliberated  for  four  weeks 
before  calling  out  the  forces  of  the  Empire,  and  for 
five  months  before  declaring  war. 

The  defence  of  Germany  rested  in  fact  with  the 
armies  of  Austria  and  Prussia.  The  Austrian  House  of 
Austria.  Hapsburg  held  the  imperial  title,  and  gathered 
around  it  the  sovereigns  of  the  less  progressive  German 
States.  While  the  Protestant  communities  of  Northern 
Germany  identified  their  interests  with  those  of  the 
rising  Prussian  Monarchy,  religious  sympathy  and 
the  tradition  of  ages  attached  the  minor  Catholic 
Courts  to  the  political  system  of  Vienna.  Austria 
gained  something  by  its  patronage ;  it  was,  how- 
ever, no  real  member  of  the  German  family.  Its 
interests  were  not  the  interests  of  Germany ;  its  power, 
great  and  enduring  as  it  proved,  was  not  based  mainly 
upon  German  elements,  nor  used  mainly  for  German 

*  Hausser,  Deutsche  Geschichte,  L  88.     Vivenot,  Herzog  Albrecht, 

i.78. 


MO^.1740.  THE  AUSTRIAN  MONABOHY.  19 

ends.  The  title  of  the  Austrian  monarch  gave  the  hest 
idea  of  the  singular  variety  of  races  and  nationalities 
which  owed  their  political  union  only  to  their  submis- 
sion to  a  common  head.  In  the  shorter  form  of  state  the 
reigning  Hapsburg  was  described  as  King  of  Hungary,  -y^' 
Bohemia,  Croatia,  Slavonia,  and  Gralicia ;  Archduke  of 
Austria ;  Grand  Duke  of  Transylvania ;  Duke  of 
Styria,  Carinthia,  and  Carniola;  and  Princely  Count 
of  Hapsburg  and  Tyrol.  At  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  of  1792  the  dominions  of  the  House  of  Austria 
included  the  Southern  Netherlands  and  the  Duchy 
of  Milan,  in  addition  to  the  great  bulk  of  the  terri- 
tory which  it  still  governs.  Eleven  distinct  languages 
were  spoken  in  the  Austrian  monarchy  with  countless 
varieties  of  dialects.  Of  the  elements  of  the  popula- 
tion the  Slavic  was  far  the  largest,  numbering  about  ten 
millions,  against  five  million  Germans  and  three  million 
Magyars ;  but  neither  numerical  strength  nor  national 
objects  of  desire  coloured  the  policy  of  a  family  which 
looked  indifferently  upon  all  its  subject  races  as  instru- 
ments for  its  own  aggrandisement.  Milan  and  the 
Netherlands  had  come  into  the  possession  of  Austria 
since  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century,  but 
the  destiny  of  the  old  dominions  of  the  Hapsburg 
House  had  been  fixed  for  many  generations  in  the 
course  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War.  In  that 
struggle,  as  it  affected  Austria,  the  con-  ^^^i^ 
flict  of  the  ancient  and  the  reformed  faith 
had  become  a  conflict  between  the  Monarchy,  allied  with 
the  Church,  and  every  element  of  national  hfe  and  inde- 
0  2 


20  MODERN  EUBOPK  1600-1740. 

pendence,  allied  with  tlie  Eeformation.  Protestantism, 
then  dominant  in  almost  all  the  Hapsburg  territories, 
was  not  put  down  without  extinguishing  the  political 
liberties  of  Austrian  Grermany,  the  national  life  of 
Bohemia,  the  spirit  and  ambition  of  the  Hungarian 
nobles.  The  detestable  desire  of  the  Emperor  Ferdi- 
nand, "  Bather  a  desert  than  a  country  full  of  here- 
tics," was  only  too  well  fulfilled  in  the  subsequent 
history  of  his  dominions.  In  the  German  provinces, 
except  the  Tyrol,  the  old  Parliaments,  and  with  them  all 
trace  of  liberty,  disappeared ;  in  Bohemia  the  national 
Protestant  nobility  lost  their  estates,  or  retained  them 
only  at  the  price  of  abandoning  the  religion,  the 
language,  and  the  feelings  of  their  race,  until  the 
country  of  Huss  passed  out  of  the  sight  of  civilised 
Europe,  and  Bohemia  represented  no  more  than  a  blank, 
unnoticed  mass  of  tillers  of  the  soil.  In  Hungary, 
where  the  nation  was  not  so  completely  crushed  in 
the  Thirty  Years'  War,  and  Protestantism  survived,  the 
wholesale  executions  in  1686,  ordered  by  the  Tribunal 
known  as  the  ''  Slaughter-house  of  Eperies,"  illustrated 
the  traditional  policy  of  the  Monarchy  towards  the  spirit 
of  national  independence.  Two  powers  alone  were 
allowed  to  subsist  in  the  Austrian  dominions,  the 
power  of  the  Crown  and  the  power  of  the  Priesthood ; 
and,  inasmuch  as  no  real  national  unity  could  exist 
among  the  subject  races,  the  unity  of  a  blind  devotion 
to  the  Catholic  Church  was  enforced  over  the  greater 
part  of  the  Monarchy  by  all  the  authority  of  the  State. 
Under  the  pressure  of  this  soulless  despotism  the 


I60o-i74a  TOBPOB    UNDER    THE    HAPSBZTROS.  21 

mind  of  man  seemed  to  lose  all  its  finer  powers.  The 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  in  which  no  de- 
cade parsed  in  England  and  France  without  the  pro- 
duction of  some  literary  masterpiece,  some  scientific 
discovery,  or  some  advance  in  political  reasoning,  are 
marked  by  no  single  illustrious  Austrian  name,  except 
that  of  Haydn  the  musician.  When,  after  three  genera- 
tions of  torpor  succeeding  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  the 
mind  of  North  Grermany  awoke  again  in  Winckelmann 
and  Lessing,  and  a  widely-diffused  education  gave  to  the 
middle  class  some  compensation  for  the  absence  of  all 
political  freedom,  no  trace  of  this  revival  appeared  in 
Austria.  The  noble  hunted  and  slept ;  the  serf  toiled 
heavily  on ;  where  a  school  existed,  the  Jesuit  taught  his 
schoolboys  ecclesiastical  Latin,and  sent  them  away  unable 
to  read  their  mother-tongue.  To  this  dull  and  impene- 
trable society  the  beginnings  of  improvement  could  only 
be  brought  by  military  disaster.  The  loss 
of  Silesia  in  the  first  years  of  Maria  Theresa     nLii'SiJrei. 

•^  1740-1780. 

disturbed  the  slumbers  of  the  Grovernment, 
and  reform  began.  Although  the  old  provincial 
Assemblies,  except  in  Hungary  and  the  Netherlands, 
had  long  lost  all  real  power,  the  Crown  had  never 
attempted  to  create  a  uniform  system  of  adminis- 
tration :  the  collection  of  taxes,  the  enlistment  of 
recruits,  was  still  the  business  of  the  feudal  land- 
owners of  each  district.  How  such  an  antiquated  order 
was  likely  to  fare  in  the  presence  of  an  energetic  enemy 
was  clearly  enough  shown  in  the  first  attack  made 
upon   Austria   by  Frederick  the  Great.     As  the  basis 


22  MODERN  EUROPE,  1740-1780. 

of  a  better  military  organisation,  and  in  the  hope  of 
arousing  a  stronger  national  interest  among  her 
subjects,  Theresa  introduced  some  of  the  offices  of 
a  centralised  monarchy,  at  the  same  time  that  she 
improved  the  condition  of  the  serf,  and  substituted  a 
Grerman  education  and  Grerman  schoolmasters  for  those 
of  the  Jesuits.  The  peasant,  hitherto  in  many  parts 
of  the  monarchy  attached  to  the  soil,  was  now  made 
free  to  quit  his  lord's  land,  and  was  secured  from  eject- 
ment so  long  as  he  fulfilled  his  duty  of  labouring  for 
the  lord  on  a  fixed  number  of  days  in  the  year.  Beyond 
this  Theresa's  reform  did  not  extend.  She  had  no 
desire  to  abolish  the  feudal  character  of  country  life ; 
she  neither  wished  to  temper  the  sway  of  Catholicism, 
nor  to  extinguish  those  provincial  forms  which  gave  to 
the  nobles  within  their  own  districts  a  shadow  of  political 
independence.  Herself  conservative  in  feeling,  attached 
to  aristocracy,  and  personally  devout,  Theresa  consented 
only  to  such  change  as  was  recommended  by  her  trusted 
counsellors,  and  asked  no  more  than  she  was  able  to 
obtain  by  the  charm  of  her  own  queenly  character. 

With  the  accession  of  her  son  Joseph  II.  in  1780  a 
new   era  began   for   Austria.     The   work   deferred  by 
joeephn  1780     Thcrcsa  was  then  taken  up  by  a  monarch 
~^^^'  whose  conceptions  of  social  and  religious  re- 

form left  little  for  the  boldest  innovators  of  France  ten 
years  later  to  add.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  creation 
of  a  great  military  force  for  enterprises  of  foreign  con- 
quest was  an  end  always  present  in  Joseph's  mind,  and 
that  the  thirst  for  uncontrolled  despotic  power  never  left 


1780-1790.  REFORMS    OF  JOSEPH  U.  28 

him ;  but  by  the  side  of  these  coarser  elements  there  was 
in  Joseph's  nature  something  of  the  true  fire  of  the  man 
who  lives  for  ideas.  Passionately  desirous  of  elevating 
every  class  of  his  subjects  at  the  same  time  that  he 
ignored  all  their  habits  and  wishes,  Joseph  attempted 
to  transform  the  motley  and  priest-ridden  collection  of 
nations  over  whom  he  ruled  into  a  single  homogeneous 
body,  organised  after  the  model  of  France  and  Prussia, 
worshipping  in  the  spirit  of  a  tolerant  and  enlightened 
Christianity,  animated  in  its  relations  of  class  to  class  by 
the  humane  philosophy  of  the  eighteenth  century.  In 
the  first  year  of  his  reign  Joseph  abolished  every  juris- 
diction that  did  not  directly  emanate  from  the  Crown, 
and  scattered  an  army  of  officials  from  Ostend  to  the 
Dniester  to  conduct  the  entire  public  business  of  his 
dominions  under  the  immediate  direction  of  the  central 
authority  at  Vienna.  In  succeeding  years  edict  fol- 
lowed edict,  dissolving  monasteries,  forbidding  Church 
festivals  and  pilgrimages,  securing  the  protection  of  the 
State  to  every  form  of  Christian  worship,  abolishing  the 
exemption  from  land-tax  and  the  monopoly  of  public 
offices  enjoyed  by  the  nobility,  transforming  the 
Universities  from  dens  of  monkish  ignorance  into  schools 
of  secular  learning,  converting  the  peasant's  personal 
service  into  a  rent-charge,  and  giving  him  in  the  officer  of 
the  Crown  a  protector  and  an  arbiter  in  all  his  dealings 
with  his  lord.  Noble  and  enlightened  in  his  aims, 
Joseph,  like  every  other  reformer  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  underrated  the  force  which  the  past  exerts  over 
the  present;  he  could  see  nothing  but   prejudice  and 


84  MODERN  EUROPE.  1780-1790 

unreason  in  the  attacliment  to  provincial  custom  or 
time-honoured  opinion;  he  knew  nothing  of  that 
moral  law  which  limits  the  success  of  revolutions  by  the 
conditions  which  precede  them.  What  was  worst  united 
with  what  was  best  in  resistance  to  his  reforms.  The 
bigots  of  the  University  of  Louvain,  who  still  held  out 
against  the  discoveries  of  Newton,  excited  the  mob  to 
insurrection  against  Joseph,  as  the  enemy  of  religion ; 
the  Magyar  landowners  in  Hungary  resisted  a  system 
which  extinguished  the  last  vestiges  of  their  national 
independence  at  the  same  time  that  it  destroyed  the 
harsh  dominion  which  they  themselves  exercised  over 
their  peasantry.  Joseph  alternated  between  conces- 
sion and  the  extreme  of  autocratic  violence.  At  one 
moment  he  resolved  to  sweep  away  every  local  right 
that  fettered  the  exercise  of  his  power;  then,  after 
throwing  the  Netherlands  into  successful  revolt,  and 
forcing  Hungary  to  the  verge  of  armed  resistance,  he 
revoked  his  unconstitutional  ordinances  (January  28, 
1790),  and  restored  all  the  institutions  of  the  Hungarian 
monarchy  which  existed  at  the  date  of  his  accession. 

A  month  later,  death  removed  Joseph  from  his 
Leo  old  n  struggle  and  his  sorrows.  His  successor, 
1790-1792.  Leopold  II.,  found  the  monarchy  involved 

as  Eussia's  ally  in  an  attack  upon  Turkey ;  threatened 
by  the  Northern  League  of  Prussia,  England,  and 
Holland ;  exhausted  in  finance ;  weakened  by  the 
revolt  of  the  Netherlands ;  and  distracted  in  every 
province  by  the  conflict  of  the  ancient  and  the  modern 
system  of  government,  and  the  assertion  of  new  social 


1790-1792.  FOLIOY   OF  LEOPOLD   IL  26 

rights  that  seemed  to  have  been  created  only  in  order  to 
be  extinguished.  The  recovery  of  Belgium  and  the  con- 
clusion of  peace  with  Turkey  were  effected  under  cir- 
cumstances that  brought  the  adroit  and  guarded  states- 
manship of  Leopold  into  just  credit.  His  settlement  of 
the  conflict  between  the  Crown  and  the  Provinces,  between 
the  Church  and  education,  between  the  noble  and  the 
serf,  marked  thr  line  in  which,  for  better  or  for  worse, 
Austrian  policy  was  to  run  for  sixty  years.  Provincial 
rights,  the  privileges  of  orders  and  corporate  bodies, 
Leopold  restored;  the  personal  sovereignty  of  his 
house  he  maintained  unimpaired.  In  the  more  liberal 
part  of  Joseph's  legislation,  the  emancipation  of  learn- 
ing from  clerical  control,  the  suppression  of  unjust 
privilege  in  taxation,  the  abolition  of  the  feudal  services 
of  the  peasant,  Leopold  was  willing  to  make  conces- 
sions to  the  Church  and  the  aristocracy  ;  to  the  spirit  of 
national  independence  which  his  predecessor's  aggression 
had  excited  in  Bohemia  as  well  as  in  Hungary,  he 
made  no  concession  beyond  the  restoration  of  certain 
cherished  forms.  An  attempt  of  the  Magyar  nobles 
to  affix  conditions  to  their  acknowledgment  of  Leopold 
as  King  of  Hungary  was  defeated ;  and,  by  creating 
new  offices  at  Vienaa  for  the  affairs  of  Illyria  and  Tran- 
sylvania, and  making  them  independent  of  the  Hun- 
garian Diet,  Leopold  showed  that  the  Crown  possessed 
an  instrument  against  the  dominant  Magyar  race  in  the 
Slavic  and  Eomanic  elements  of  the  Hungarian  King- 
dom.*    On  the  other  hand,  Leopold  consented  to  restore 

•  Springer,  Greschichte  Oesterreichs,  L,  46L 


26  MODERN  EUROPE.  1790-1792. 

to  the  Church  its  control  over  the  higher  education,  and 
to  throw  back  the  burden  of  taxation  upon  land  not 
occupied  by  noble  owners.  He  gave  new  rigour  to  the 
censorship  of  the  press ;  but  the  gain  was  not  to  the 
Church,  to  which  the  censorship  had  formerly  belonged, 
but  to  the  Government,  which  now  employed  it  as  an 
instrument  of  State.  In  the  great  question  of  the 
emancipation  of  the  serf  Leopold  was  confronted  by  a 
more  resolute  and  powerful  body  of  nobility  in  Hungary 
than  existed  in  any  other  province.  The  right  of  the 
lord  to  fetter  the  peasant  to  the  soil  and  to  control  his 
marriage  Leopold  refused  to  restore  in  any  part  of  his 
dominions ;  but,  while  in  parts  of  Bohemia  he  succeeded 
in  maintaining  the  right  given  by  Joseph  to  the  peasant 
to  commute  his  personal  service  for  a  money  payment, 
in  Hungary  he  was  compelled  to  fall  back  upon  the 
system  of  Theresa,  and  to  leave  the  final  settlement  of 
the  question  to  the  Diet.  Twenty  years  later  the  states- 
man who  emancipated  the  peasants  of  Prussia  observed 
that  Hungary  was  the  only  part  of  the  Austrian 
dominions  in  which  the  peasant  was  not  in  a  better 
condition  than  his  fellows  in  North  Germany  ;*  and  so 
torpid  was  the  humanity  of  the  Diet  that  until  the 
year  1835  the  prison  and  the  flogging-board  continued 
to  form  a  part  of  every  Hungarian  manor. 

Of  the  self-sacrificing  ardour  of  Joseph  there  was 
no  trace  in  Leopold's  character ;  yet  his  political  aims 
were  not  low.  During  twenty-four  years'  government 
of  Tuscany  he  had  proved  himseK  almost  an  ideal  ruler 

•  Pertz,  Leben  Stein,  ii.,  402.    Paget,  Travels  in  Hungary,  1. 131. 


oi»  rnit  ^V 

VERSITYl 

1792.  AUSTRIA    UNDER   ^^^^^^^  fj^^^^y^^^     27 

in  the  pursuit  of  peace,  of  religious  enlightenment, 
and  of  the  material  improvement  of  his 
little  sovereignty.  Eaised  to  the  Austrian  poid,  March  i, 
throne,  the  compromise  which  he  effected 
with  the  Church  and  the  aristocracy  resulted  more  from  a 
supposed  political  necessity  than  from  his  own  incHnation. 
So  long  as  Leopold  lived  Austria  would  not  have  wanted 
an  intelligence  capable  of  surveying  the  entire  field  of 
public  business,  nor  a  will  capable  of  imposing  unity  of 
action  upon  the  servants  of  State.  To  the  misfortune 
of  Europe  no  less  than  of  his  own  dominions,  Leopold 
was  carried  off  by  sickness  at  the  moment  when  the 
Eevolutionary  War  broke  out.  An  uneasy  reaction 
against  Joseph's  reforms  and  a  well-grounded  dread  of 
the  national  movements  in  Hungary  and  the  Nether- 
lands were  already  the  principal  forces  in  the  official 
world  at  Vienna;  in  addition  to  these  came  the  new 
terror  of  the  armed  proselytism  of  the  Eevolution.  The 
successor   of  Leopold,  Francis   II.,  was   a 

.    1  .,  .  .  1  I  1  1  .  Francis  n.,  179S. 

Sickly  prince,  m  whose  homely  and  unim- 
aginative mind  the  great  enterprises  of  Joseph,  amidst 
which  he  had  been  brought  up,  excited  only  aversion. 
Amongst  the  men  who  surrounded  him,  routine  and  the 
dread  of  change  made  an  end  of  the  higher  forms  of 
public  life.  The  Government  openly  declared  that 
all  change  should  cease  so  long  as  the  war  lasted ;  even 
the  pressing  question  of  the  peasant's  relation  to  his 
lord  was  allowed  to  remain  unsettled  by  the  Hungarian 
Diet,  lest  the  spirit  of  national  independence  should  find* 
expression  in  its    debates.     Over  the   whole  internal 


28  MODERN  EUROPE.  1792-a 

administration  of  Austria  the  torpor  of  tlie  days  before 
Theresa  seemed  to  be  returning.  Its  foreign  policy,  how- 
ever, bore  no  trace  of  this  timorous,  conservative  spirit. 
Joseph,  as  restless  abroad  as  at  home,  had  shared  the 
ambition  of  the  Eussian  Empress  Catherine,  and 
troubled  Europe  with  his  designs  upon  Turkey,  Venice, 
and  Bavaria.  These  and  similar  schemes  of  territorial 
extension  continued  to  fill  the  minds  of  Austrian  courtiers 
and  ambassadors.  Shortly  after  the  outbreak  of  war 
with  France  the  aged  minister  Kaunitz,  who  had  been  at 
the  head  of  the  Foreign  Office  during  three  reigns,  retired 
from  power.  In  spite  of  the  first  partition  of  Poland, 
made  in  combination  with  Russia  and  Prussia  in  1772, 
and  in  spite  of  subsequent  attempts  of  Joseph  against 
Turkey  and  Bavaria,  the  policy  of  Kaunitz  had  not  been 
one  of  mere  adventure  and  shifting  attack.  He  had  on 
the  whole  remained  true  to  the  principle  of  alliance 
with  France  and  antagonism  to  Prussia ;  and  when  the 
revolution  brought  war  within  sight,  he  desired  to  limit 
the  object  of  the  war  to  the  restoration  of  monarchical 
government  in  France.  The  conditions  under  which  the 
young  Emperor  and  the  King  of  Prussia  agreed  to 
turn  the  war  to  purposes  of  territorial  aggrandisement 
caused  Kaunitz,  with  a  true  sense  of  the  fatal  import  of 
this  policy,  to  surrender  the  power  which  he  had  held 
for  forty  years.  It  was  secretly  agreed  between  the  two 
courts  that  Prussia  should  recoup  itself  for  its  expenses 
against  France  by  seizing  part  of  Poland.  On  behalf  of 
Austria  it  was  demanded  that  the  Emperor  should 
annex  Bavaria,  giving  Belgium  to  the  elector  as  com- 


17W.  AUSTRIAN   QBEEB   FOB    TERRITORY,  29 

pensation.  Both  these  schemes  violated  what  Kaunitz 
held  to  be  sound  policy.  He  believed  that  the  interests 
of  Austria  required  the  consolidation  rather  than  the 
destruction  of  Poland ;  and  he  declared  the  exchange 
of  the  Netherlands  for  Bavaria  to  be,  in  the  actual 
state  of  affairs,  impracticable.*  Had  the  coalition  of 
1792  been  framed  on  the  principles  advocated  by 
Kaunitz,  though  Austria  might  not  have  effected  the 
restoration  of  monarchical  power  in  France,  the  alliance 
would  not  have  disgracefully  shattered  on  the  crimes 
and  infamies  attending  the  second  partition  of  Poland. 

From  the  moment  when  Kaunitz  retired  from  office, 
territorial  extension  became  the  great  object  of  the 
Austrian  Court.  To  prudent  statesmen  the  scattered 
provinces  and  varied  population  of  the  Austrian  State 
would .  have  suggested  that  Austria  had  more  to  lose 
than  any  European  Power;  to  the  men  of  1792  it 
appeared  that  she  had  more  to  gain.  The  Netherlands 
might  be  increased  with  a  strip  of  French  Flanders ; 
Bavaria,  Poland,  and  Italy  were  all  weak  neigh- 
bours, who  might  be  made  to  enrich  Austria  in 
their  turn.  A  sort  of  magical  virtue  was  attached  to 
the  acquisition  of  territory.  If  so  many  square  miles 
and  so  many  head  of  population  were  gained,  whether 
of  alien  or  kindred  race,  mutinous  or  friendly,  the  end 
of  all  statesmanship  was  realised,  and  the  heaviest 
sacrifice  of  life  and  industry  repaid.     Austria  affected 

•  Ranke.  Ursprung  and  Beginn,  p.  256.  Vivenot,  Qaellen,  i.,  133, 165. 
The  acqtusition  of  Bavaria  was  declared  by  the  Austrian  Cabinet  to  be  the 
summum  bonum  of  the  monarchy. 


30  MODERN   EUBOPK  1740-I78a 

to  act  as  tlie  centre  of  a  defensive  alliance,  and  io  fight 
for  the  common  purpose  of  giving  a  Government  to 
Trance  which  would  respect  the  rights  of  its  neighbours. 
In  reality,  its  own  military  operations  were  too  often 
controlled,  and  an  efiective  common  warfare  frustrated, 
at  one  moment  by  a  design  upon  French  Flanders,  at 
another  by  the  course  of  Polish  or  Bavarian  intrigue,  at 
another  by  the  hope  of  conquests  in  Italy.  Of  all  the 
interests  which  centred  in  the  head  of  the  House  of 
Hapsburg,  the  least  befriended  at  Vienna  was  the 
interest  of  the  Empire  and  of  Germany. 

Nor,  if  Austria  was  found  wanting,  had  Germany 
any  permanent  safeguard  in  the  rival  Protes- 
tant State.  Prussia,  the  second  great 
German  Power  and  the  ancient  enemy  of  Austria,  had 
been  raised  to  an  influence  in  Europe  quite  out  of 
proportion  to  its  scanty  resources  by  the  genius  of 
Frederick  the  Great  and  the  earlier  Princes  of  the 
House  of  HohenzoUern.  Its  population  was  not  one- third 
of  that  of  France  or  Austria;  its  wealth  was  perhaps 
not  superior  to  that  of  the  Republic  of  Venice.  That 
a  State  so  poor  in  men  and  money  should  play  the 
part  of  one  of  the  great  Powers  of  Europe  was  possible 
only  so  long  as  an  energetic  ruler  watched  every  move- 
ment of  that  complicated  machinery  which  formed  both 
army  and  nation  after  the  prince's  own  type.  Frederick 
gave  his  subjects  a  just  administration  of  the  law; 
he  taught  them  productive  industries;  he  sought  to 
bring  education  to  their  doors* ;  but  he  required  that 

♦Biedennaim,  Deutschland  im  Achtzehnten  Jahrhimdert,  iv.  1144. 


1786.  PBUSaiA    UNDER   FBEDEEIOK  H  31 

the  citizen  should  account  himself  before  all  the  servant 
of  the  State.  Every  Prussian  either  worked  in  the 
great  official  hierarchy  or  looked  up  to  it  as  the 
providence  which  was  to  direct  all  his  actions  and 
supply  all  his  judgments.  The  burden  of  taxation 
imposed  by  the  support  of  an  army  relatively  three  times 
as  great  as  that  of  any  other  Power  was  wonderfully 
lightened  by  Frederick's  economy:  far  more  serious 
than  the  tobacco-monopoly  and  the  forage-requisitions, 
at  which  Frederick's  subjects  grumbled  during  his  life- 
time, was  the  danger  that  a  nation  which  had  only 
attained  political  greatness  by  its  obedience  to  a  rigorous 
administration  should  fall  into  political  helplessness, 
when  the  clear  purpose  and  all-controlling  care  of  its 
ruler  no  longer  animated  a  system  which,  without  him, 
was  only  a  pedantic  routine.  What  in  England  we 
are  accustomed  to  consider  as  the  very  substance  of 
national  life, — the  mass  of  political  interest  and  opinion, 
diffused  in  some  degree  amongst  all  classes,  at  once 
the  support  and  the  judge  of  the  servants  of  the  State, 
— had  in  Prussia  no  existence.  Frederick's  subjects 
obeyed  and  trusted  their  Monarch ;  there  were  probably 
not  five  hundred  persons  outside  the  public  service 
who  had  any  political  opinions  of  their  own.  Prussia 
did  not  possess  even  the  form  of  a  national  representa- 
tion; and,  although  certain  provincial  assemblies  con- 
tinued to  meet,  they  met  only  to  receive  the  instructions* 
of  the  Crown-officers  of  their  district.  In  the  absence 
of  all  public  criticism,  the  old  age  of  Frederick  must 
in  itself  have  endangered  the  efficiency  of  the  military 


32  MODERN  EUROPE.  1786-1792. 

system  which  had  raised  Prussia  to  its  sudden 
eminence.*  The  impulse  of  Frederick's  successor 
was  sufficient  to  reverse  the  whole  system  of  Prus- 
sian foreign  policy,  and  to  plunge  the  country  in 
alliance  with  Austria  into  a  speculative  and  unneces- 
sary war. 

On   the    death   of    Frederick   in    1786,  the  crown 
Frederick        passcd  to  Frederick  William  II.,  his  nephew. 

William  n.,  ^  '  r 

1786.  Frederick  William  was  a  man  of  common 

type,  showy  and  pleasure-loving,  interested  in  puhlic 
affairs,  but  incapable  of  acting  on  any  fixed  principle. 
His  mistresses  gave  the  tone  to  political  society.  A 
knot  of  courtiers  intrigued  against  one  another  for  the 
management  of  the  King;  and  the  policy  of  Prussia 
veered  from  point  to  point  as  one  unsteady  impulse  gave 
place  to  another.  In  countries  less  dependent  than 
Prussia  upon  the  personal  activity  of  the  monarch, 
Frederick  William's  faults  might  have  been  neutralised 
by  able  Ministers;  in  Prussia  the  weakness  of  the  King 
was  the  decline  of  the  State.  The  whole  fabric  of 
national  greatness  had  been  built  up  by  the  royal  power; 
the  quality  of  the  public  service,  apart  from  which  the 
nation  was  politically  non-existent,  was  the  quality  of 
its  head.  When  in  the  palace  profusion  and  intrigue 
took  the  place  of  Frederick  the  Grreat's  unflagging 
labour,  the  old  uprightness,  industry,  and  precision  which 
had  been  the  pride  of  Prussian  administration  fell  out 
of  fashion  everywhere.  Yet  the  frivolity  of  the  Court 
was  a  less  active  cause  of  military  decline  than  the 
•  Oarlyle,  Friedrich,  vi  667. 


1798.  THE   AUSTRIAN  ALLIANOE.  38 

abandonment  of  the  first  principles  of  Prussian  policy  * 
If  any  political  sentiment  existed  in  the  nation,  it  was 
the  sentiment  of  antagonism  to  Austria.  The  patriotism 
of  the  army,  with  all  the  traditions  of  the  great  King, 
turned  wholly  in  this  direction.  When,  out  ^^jjj^,^  ^^ 
of  sympathy  with  the  Bourbon  family  and     ^^  ^^, 

.  1792. 

the  emigrant  French  nobles,  Frederick 
William  allied  himself  with  Austria  (Feb.  1792),  and 
threw  himself  into  the  arms  of  his  ancient  enemy  in 
order  to  attack  a  nation  which  had  not  wronged  him, 
he  made  an  end  of  all  zealous  obedience  amongst  his 
servants.  Brunswick,  the  Prussian  Commander-in- 
Chief,  hated  the  French  emigrants  as  much  as  he  did  the 
Eevolution ;  and  even  the  generals  who  did  not  origin, 
ally  share  Brunswick's  dislike  to  the  war  recovered  their 
old  jealousy  of  Austria  after  the  first  defeat,  and  exerted 
themselves  only  to  get  quit  of  the  war  at  the  first 
moment  that  Prussia  could  retire  from  it  without 
disgrace.  The  very  enterprise  in  which  Austria  had 
consented  that  the  Court  of  Berlin  should  seek  its  reward 
— the  seizure  of  a  part  of  Poland — proved  fatal  to  the 
coalition.  The  Empress  Catherine  was  already  laying 
her  hand  for  the  second  time  upon  this  unfortunate 
country.  It  was  easy  for  the  opponents  of  the  Austrian 
alliance  who  surrounded  King  Frederick  William  to  con- 
trast the  barren  effort  of  a  war  against  France  with  the 
cheap  and  certain  advantages  to  be  won  by  annexation, 
in  concert  with  Russia,  of  Polish  territory.  To  pursue  one 
of  these  objects  with  vigour  it  was  necessary  to  relinquish 
•  Hausser,  i  197.  Hardenberg  (fi&nke),  i.  139.  Von  Sybel,  i  272. 
D 


34  MODERN  EUMOPK  1792. 

the  other.  Prussia  was  not  rich  enough  to  maintain 
armies  both  on  the  Vistula  and  the  Ehine.  Nor,  in  the 
opinion  of  its  rulers,  was  it  rich  enough  to  be  very  tender 
of  its  honour  or  very  loyal  towards  its  allies  * 

In  the  institutions  of  Prussia  two  opposite  systems 
sodai  system  of  ^xistcd  sidc  by  sidc,  exhibiting  in  the  strong- 
^''^'^-  est  form  a  contrast  which  in  a  less  degree 
was  present  in  most  Continental  States.  The  political 
independence  of  the  nobility  had  long  been  crushed; 
the  King's  Grovernment  busied  itself  with  every  detail 
of  town  and  village  administration;  yet  along  with 
this  rigorous  development  of  the  modern  doctrine  of 
the  unity  and  the  authority  of  the  State  there 
existed  a  social ,  order  more  truly  archaic  than  that 
of  the  Middle  Ages  at  their  better  epochs.  The 
inhabitants  of  Prussia  were  divided  into  the  three 
classes  of  nobles,  burghers,  and  peasants,  each  confined 
to  its  own  stated  occupations,  and  not  marrying  outside 
its  own  order.     The  soil  of  the  country  bore  the  same 

•"The  connection  with  the  House  of  Austria  and  the  present  under- 
taking continue  to  be  very  unpopular.  It  is  openly  said  that  one  half  of 
the  treasure  was  uselessly  spent  at  Reichenbach,  and  that  the  other  half 
will  be  spent  on  the  present  occasion,  and  that  the  sovereign  will  be  re- 
duced to  his  former  level  of  Margrave  of  Brandenburg."  Eden,  from 
Berlin ;  June  19,  1792.  Records :  Prussia,  vol.  151.  "  He  (MoUendorf ) 
reprobated  the  alliance  with  Austria,  condemning  the  present  inter- 
ference in  the  affairs  of  France  as  ruinous,  and  censuring  as  un- 
dignified and  contrary  to  the  most  important  interests  of  this  country 
the  leaving  Russia  sole  arbitress  of  the  fate  of  Poland.  He,  however,  said, 
what  every  Prussian  without  any  exception  of  party  will  say,  that  this 
country  can  never  acquiesce  in  the  establishment  of  a  good  government 
in  Poland,  since  in  a  short  time  it  would  rise  to  a  very  decided  superi- 
ority." Id.,  July  17.  Mr.  Cobden's  theory  that  the  partition  of  Poland 
was  effected  in  the  interest  of  good  government  must  have  caused  some 
surprise  at  Berlin. 


I    ' 


iwa  800IAL   SYSTEM   OF  PRUSSIA.  35 

distinction;  peasant's  land  could  not  be  owned  by  a 
burgher ;  burgher's  land  could  not  be  owned  by  a  noble. 
No  occupation  was  lawful  for  the  noble,  who  was  usually 
no  more  than  a  poor  gentleman,  but  the  service  of 
the  Crown ;  the  peasant,  even  where  free,  might  not 
practise  the  handicraft  of  a  burgher.  But  the  mass 
of  the  peasantry  in  the  country  east  of  the  Elbe  were 
serfs  attached  to  the  soil ;  and  the  noble,  who  was  not 
permitted  to  exercise  the  slightest  influence  upon 
the  government  of  his  country,  inherited  along  with 
his  manor  a  jurisdiction  and  police-control  over  all 
who  were  settled  within  it.  Frederick  had  allowed 
^  serfage  to  continue  because  it  gave  him  in  each  manorial 
lord  a  task-master  whom  he  could  employ  in  his  own 
service.  System  and  obedience  were  the  sources  of  his 
power;  and  if  there  existed  among  his  subjects  one  class 
trained  to  command  and  another  trained  to  obey,  it  was 
so  much  the  easier  for  him  to  force  the  country  into  the 
habits  of  industry  which  he  required  of  it.  In  the  same 
spirit,  Frederick  officered  his  army  only  with  men  of  the 
noble  caste.  4They  brought  with  them  the  habit  of  com- 
mand ready-formed;  the  peasants  who  ploughed  and 
threshed  at  their  orders  were  not  likely  to  disobey  them 
in  the  presence  of  the  enemy.  It  was  possible  that  such  a 
system  should  produce  great  results  so  long  as  Frederick 
was  there  to  guard  against  its  abuses ;  Frederick  gone, 
the  degradation  of  servitude,  the  insolence  of  caste,  was 
what  remained.  When  the  army  of  France,  led  by  men 
who  had  worked  with  their  fathers  in  the  fields,  hunted 
a  Eang  of  Prussia  amidst  his  capitulating  grandees  from 
B  3 


36  MODERN  EUBOPB.  1750-90. 

the  centre  to  tlie  verge  of  his  dominions,  it  was  seen 
what  was  the  permanent  value  of  a  system  which 
recognised  in  the  nature  of  the  poor  no  capacity  but 
one  for  hereditary  subjection.  The  French  peasant, 
plundered  as  he  was  by  the  State,  and  vexed  as  he  was 
with  feudal  services,  knew  no  such  bondage  as  that  of 
the  Prussian  serf,  who  might  not  leave  the  spot  where 
he  was  born ;  only  in  scattered  districts  in  the  border- 
provinces  had  serfage  survived  in  France.  It  is  signifi- 
cant of  the  difference  in  self-respect  existing  in  the 
peasantry  of  the  two  countries  that  the  custom  of 
striking  the  common  soldier,  universal  in  Grermany,  was 
in  France  no  more  than  an  abuse,  practised  by  the 
admirers  of  Frederick,  and  condemned  by  the  better 
officers  themselves. 

In  all  the  secondary  States  of  Grermany  the  govem- 

Minor  states  of     ^^^^'^  ^as  au  absolutc  monarchy ;  though, 

Germany.        -^^^^   ^^^   thcrc,   as   iu    Wurtembcrg,   the 

shadow  of  the  old  Assembly  of  the  Estates  survived; 
and  in  Hanover  the  absence  of  the  Elector,  King 
Greorge  III.,  placed  power  in  the  hands  of  a  group 
of  nobles  who  ruled  in  his  name.  Society  every- 
where rested  on  a  sharp  division  of  classes  similar 
in  kind  to  that  of  Prussia;  the  condition  of  the 
peasant  ranging  from  one  of  serfage,  as  it  existed 
in  Mecklenburg,*   to   one  of  comparative  freedom  and 

*  The  condition  of  Mecklenburg  is  thus  described  in  a  letter  written  by 
Stein  during  a  journey  in  1802  : — "  I  found  the  aspect  of  the  country  as 
cheerless  as  its  misty  northern  sky  ;  great  estates,  much  of  them  in  pasture 
or  fallow ;  an  extremely  thin  population ;  the  entire  labouring  class  under 
the  yoke  of  serfage ;  stretches  of  land  attached  to  solitary  ill-built  farm. 


vn.  EOOLESIASTIOAL   STATES.  87 

comfort  in  parts  of  tlie  southern  and  western  States. 
The  sovereigns  differed  widely  in  the  enlightenment 
or  selfishness  of  their  rule;  but,  on  the  whole,  the 
character  of  government  had  changed  for  the  better  of 
late  years;  and,  especially  in  the  Protestant  States, 
efforts  to  improve  the  condition  of  the  people  were 
not  wanting.  Frederick  the  Great  had  in  fact  created 
a  new  standard  of  monarchy  in  Germany.  Forty 
years  earlier,  Versailles,  with  its  unfeeling  splendours,  its 
glorification  of  the  personal  indulgence  of  the  monarch 
had  been  the  ideal  which  wi4-v 
inferiority,  the   ( 

to  imitate.     To  .^  cover  acres  of 

ground  with  state  apartments,  to  lavish  the  revenues  of 
the  country  upon  a  troop  of  mistresses  and  adventurers, 
to  patronise  the  arts,  to  collect  with  the  same  com- 
placency the  masterpieces  of  ancient  painting  that 
adorn  the  Dresden  Gallery,  or  an  array  of  valuables 
scarcely  more  interesting  than  the  chests  of  treasure 
that  were  paid  for  them.  In  the  ecclesiastical  States, 
headed  by  the  Electorates  of  Mainz,  Treves,  and  Cologne, 
the  affectation  of  a  distinctively  Christian 
or  spiritual  character  had  long  been  aban- 
doned. The  prince-bishop  and  canons,  who  were  nobles 
appointed   from   some  other  province,  lived  after  the 

honses;  in  short,  li  monotony,  a  dead  stillness,  spreading  over  the  whole 
country,  au  absence  of  life  and  activity  that  quite  overcame  my  spirita. 
The  home  of  the  Mecklenburg  noble,  who  weighs  like  a  load  on  his 
peasants  instead  of  improving  their  condition,  gives  me  the  idea  of  the 
den  of  some  wild  beast,  who  devastates  everything  about  him,  and 
surrounds  himself  with  the  silence  of  the  grave."  Pertz,  Leben  Stein, 
l^  192.    For  a  more  cheerful  description  of  Miinsier,  see  id.,  L,  24L 


states. 


38  MODERN  EUBOPK  1792. 

gay  fashion  of  the  time,  at  the  expense  of  a  land 
in  which  they  had  no  interest  extending  beyond  their 
own  lifetime.  The  only  feature  distinguishing  the 
ecclesiastical  residence  from  that  of  one  of  the  minor 
secular  princes  was  that  the  parade  of  state  was  per- 
formed by  monks  in  the  cathedral  instead  of  by  soldiers 
on  the  drill-ground,  and  that  even  the  pretence  of 
married  life  was  wanting  among  the  flaunting  harpies 
who  frequented  a  celibate  Court.  Yet  even  on  the 
Ehine  and  on  the  Moselle  the  influence  of  the  great 
King  of  Prussia  had  begun  to  make  itself  felt.  The 
intense  and  peneii^tins:  industry  of  Frederick  was  not 
within  the  re  ich  of  every  petty  sovereign  who  might 
envy  its  results ;  but  the  better  spirit  of  the  time  was 
seen  under  some  of  the  ecclesiastical  princes  in  the  en- 
couragement of  schools,  the  improvement  of  the  roads, 
and  a  retrenchment  in  courtly  expenditure.  That  deeply- 
seated  moral  disease  which  resulted  frohi  centuries  of 
priestly  rule  was  not  to  be  so  Hghtly  shaken  off.  In  a 
district  where  IN'ature  most  bountifully  rewards  the  in- 
dustry of  man,  twenty-four  out  of  every  hundred  of  the 
population  were  monks,  nuns,  or  beggars.* 

Two   hundred   petty  principalities,  amongst  which 

Weimar,  the   home  of   Groethe,    stood  out 

Free  Cities.'    in    the     brisfhtcst    relief    from    the    level 

Knights,  O 

of  princely  routine  and  self-indulgence ; 
fifty  imperial  cities,  in  most  of  which  the  once  vigorous 
organism  of  civic  life  had  shrivelled  to  the  type 
of  the  English  rotten  borough,   did  not  exhaust    the 

*  Perthes,  Staatsleben,  p.  116.     Rigby,  Letters  from  France,  p.  215. 


15W.  WEAKNESS    OF   OERMANY.  89 

divisions  of  Germany.  Several  hundred  Knights  of  the 
Empire,  owing  no  allegiance  except  to  the  Emperor, 
exercised,  each  over  a  domain  averaging  from  three  to 
four  hundred  inhabitants,  all  the  rights  of  sovereignty, 
with  the  exception  of  the  right  to  make  war  and  treaties. 
The  districts  in  which  this  order  survived  were  scattered 
over  the  Catholic  States  of  the  south-west  of  Q-ermany, 
where  the  knights  maintained  their  prerogatives  by 
federations  among  themselves  and  by  the  support 
of  the  Emperor,  to  whom  they  granted  sums  of 
money.  There  were  instances  in  which  this  union  of 
the  rights  of  the  sovereign  and  the  landlord  was  turned 
to  good  account ;  but  the  knight's  land  was  usually  the 
scene  of  such  poverty  and  degradation  that  the  traveller 
needed  no  guide  to  inform  him  when  he  entered  it.  Its 
wretched  tracks  interrupted  the  great  lines  of  communi- 
cation between  the  Rhine  and  farther  Grermany  ;  its 
hovels  were  the  refuge  of  all  the  criminals  and  vagabonds 
of  the  surrounding  country ;  for  no  police  existed  but 
the  bailiffs  of  the  knight,  and  the  only  jurisdiction  was 
that  of  the  lawyer  whom  the  knight  brought  over  from 
the  nearest  town.  Nor  was  the  disadvantage  only 
on  the  side  of  those  who  were  thus  governed.  The 
knight  himself,  even  if  he  cherished  some  traditional 
reverence  for  the  shadow  of  the  Empire,  was  in  the 
position  of  a  man  who  belongs  to  no  real  country. 
If  his  sons  desired  any  more  active  career  than  that 
of  annuitants  upon  the  family  domains,  they  could 
obtain  it  only  by  seeking  employment  at  one  or 
other  of  the  greater  Courts,  and  by  identifying  them- 


40  MODERN  EUROPE,  1792. 

selves  with  the  interests  of  a  land  which  they  entered 
as  strangers. 

Such  was  in  outline  the  condition  of  Grermany  at 
the  moment  when  it  was  brought  into  collision  with  the 
new  and  unknown  forces  of  the  Trench  Eevolution.  A 
system  of  small  States,  which  in  the  past  of  Grreece  and 
Italy  had  produced  the  finest  types  of  energy  and  genius, 
had  in  Grermany  resulted  in  the  extinction  of  all  vigorous 
life,  and  in  the  ascendancy  of  all  that  was  stagnant,  little, 
and  corrupt.  If  political  disorganisation,  the  decay  pf 
public  spirit,  and  the  absence  of  a  national  idea,  are  the 
signs  of  impending  downfall,  ^ermany  was  ripe  for 
foreign  conquest.  The  obsolete  and  dilapidated  fabric  of 
the  Empire  had  for  a  century  past  been  sustained  only 
by  the  European  tradition  of  the  Balance  of  Power,  or 
by  the  absence  of  serious  attack  from  without.  Austria 
once  overpowered,  the  Empire  was  ready  to  fall  to  pieces 
by  itself:  and  where,  among  the  princes  or  the  people 
of  Grermany,  were  the  elements  that  gave  hope  of  its 
renovation  in  any  better  form  of  national  life  ? 


CHAPTEE  n. 

French  and  Austrian  armies  on  the  Flemish  frontier — Pmssia  enters  the  war 
— Brunswick  invades  France — His  Proclamation — Insurrection  of  Aug.  10 
at  Paris — Massacres  of  September — Character  of  the  war — Brunswick, 
checked  at  Valmy,  retreats — The  War  becomes  a  Crusade  of  France — 
Neighbours  of  France — Custine  enters  Mainz — Dumouriez  conquers  the 
Austrian  Netherlands — Nice  and  Savoy  annexed — Decree  of  the  Convention 
against  all  Governments — Execution  of  Louia  XVL — War  with  England, 
followed  by  war  with  the  Mediterranean  States — Condition  of  England — 
English  Parties,  how  affected  by  the  Revolution — The  Gironde  and  the 
Mountain — Austria  recovers  the  Netherlands — The  Allies  invade  France 
— La  Vendee — Revolutionary  System  of  1793 — Errors  of  the  Allies — New 
French  Commanders  and  Democratic  Army — ^Victories  of  Jourdan,  Hoche, 
and  Pichegru — Prussia  withdrawing  from  the  war — Polish  Affairs — Austria 
abandons  the  Netherlands — Treaties  of  Basle— France  in  1796 — Insurrec' 
tion  of  13  Vendemiaire — Constitution  of  1795 — The  Directory— Effect  of 
the  Revolution  on  the  spirit  of  Europe  up  to  1796. 

The  war  between  France  and  Austria  opened  in  April, 
1792,   on  the  Flemish  frontier.     The  first 
encounters  were  discreditable  to  the  French     Flemish  frontier. 

Apnl,  1792. 

soldiery,  who  took  to  flight  and  murdered 
one  of  their  generals.  The  discouragement  with  which 
the  nation  heard  of  these  reverses  deepened  into  sullen 
indignation  against  the  Court,  as  weeks  and  months 
passed  by,  and  the  forces  lay  idle  on  the  frontier  or 
met  the  enemy  only  in  trifling  skirmishes  which  left 
both  sides  where  they  were  before.  If  at  this  crisis 
of  the  Ee volution,  with  all  the  patriotism,  all  the 
bravery,  all  the  military  genius  of  France  burning  for 
service,  the  Grovernment  conducted  the  war  with  results 


42  MODERN  EUBOPJS.  1788. 

scarcely  distinguishable  from  those  of  a  parade,  the 
suggestion  of  treason  on  the  part  of  the  Court  was 
only  too  likely  to  be  entertained.  The  internal  diffi- 
culties of  the  country  were  increasing.  The  Assembly 
had  determined  to  banish  from  France  the  priests  who 
rejected  the  new  ecclesiastical  system,  and  the  King  L^l 
placed  his  veto  upon  their  decree.  He  had  refused  to 
permit  the  formation  of  a  camp  of  volunteers  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Paris.  He  had  dismissed  the  popular 
Ministry  forced  upon  him  by  the  Grironde.  A  tumult 
on  the  20th  of  June,  in  which  the  mob  forced  their  way 
into  the  Tuileries,  showed  the  nature  of  the  attack 
impending  upon  the  monarchy  if  Louis  continued  to 
oppose  himself  to  the  demands  of  the  nation ;  but  the 
lesson  was  lost  upon  the  King.  Louis  was  as  little 
able  to  nerve  himself  for  an  armed  conflict  with  the 
populace  as  to  reconcile  his  conscience  to  the  Eccle- 
siastical Decrees,  and  he  surrendered  himself  to  a  pious 
inertia  at  a  moment  when  the  alarm  of  foreign  invasion 
doubled  revolutionary  passion  all  over  France.  Prussia, 
in  pursuance  of  a  treaty  made  iu  February,  united  its 
forces  to  those  of  Austria.  Forty  thousand  Prussian 
troops,  under  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  the  best  of 
_^   .  Frederick's    surviving    erenerals,    advanced 

Prussian     army  o       o  •» 

fXf7i'^^     along  the  Moselle.     From  Belgium  and  the 

clamation.  -r-»i   •  j  a         i     • 

upper  lihme  two  Austrian  armies  converged 
upon  the  line  of  invasion ;  and  the  emigrant  nobles 
were  given  their  place  among  the  forces  of  the  Allies. 

On  the  25th  of  July  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,   in 
the  name  of   the  Emperor  and  the  King  of  Prussia, 


BBUNQWIOK'a   MANIFESTO,  48 

issued  a  proclamation  to  the  French  people,  which, 
but  for  the  difference  between  violent  words  and 
violent  deeds,  would  have  left  little  to  be  com- 
plained of  in  the  cruelties  that  henceforward  stained 
the  popular  cause.  In  this  manifesto,  after  declar- 
ing that  the  Allies  entered  France  in  order  to  deliver 
Louis  from  captivity,  and  that  members  of  the 
National  Guard  fighting  against  the  invaders  would 
be  punished  as  rebels  against  their  king,  the  Sovereigns 
addressed  themselves  to  the  city  of  Paris  and  to  the 
representatives  of  the  French  nation : — "  The  city  of 
Paris  and  its  inhabitants  are  warned  to  submit  without 
delay  to  their  King  ;  to  set  that  Prince  at  entire  liberty, 
and  to  show  to  him  and  to  all  the  Eoyal  Family  the 
inviolability  and  respect  which  the  law  of  nature 
and  of  nations  imposes  on  subjects  towards  their 
Sovereigns.  Their  Imperial  and  Royal  Majesties  will 
hold  all  the  members  of  the  National  Assembly,  of  the 
Municipality,  and  of  the  National  Gruard  of  Paris 
responsible  for  all  events  with  their  heads,  before  mili- 
tary tribunals,  without  hope  of  pardon.  They  further 
declare  that,  if  the  Tuileries  be  forced  or  insulted,  or 
the  least  violence  offered  to  the  King,  the  Queen,  or  the 
Royal  Family,  and  if  pro^dsion  be  not  at  once  made  for 
their  safety  and  liberty,  they  will  inflict  a  memorable 
vengeance,  by  delivering  up  the  city  of  Paris  to  military 
execution  and  total  overthrow,  and  the  rebels  guilty  of 
such  crimes  to  the  punishment  they  have  merited."  * 

♦  Buchez  et  Roux,  xvi.,  279.  One  of  the  originals  of  this  declaration, 
handed  to  the  British  ambassador,  is  in  the  London  Records :  Pmssia. 
vol.  161. 


4A  MODERN  EUROPE.  1792. 

This  challenge  was  not  necessary  to  determine  the 
fate  of  Louis.  Since  the  capture  of  the  Bastille  in  the 
first  days  of  the  Eevolution  the  National  Government 
had  with  difficulty  supported  itself  against  the  populace 
of  the  capital ;  and,  even  before  the  foreigner  threatened 
Paris  with  fire  and  sword,  Paris  had  learnt  to  look  for 
the  will  of  France  within  itself.  As  the  columns  of 
Brunswick  advanced  across  the  north-eastern  frontier, 
Danton  and  the  leaders  of  the  city- democracy  marshalled 
their  army  of  the  poor  and  the  desperate  to  overthrow 
that  monarchy  whose  cause  the  invader  had  made  his 
own.  The  Eepublic  which  had  floated  so  long  in  the 
thoughts  of  the  Girondins  was  won  in  a  single  day  by 
the  populace  of  Paris,  amid  the  roar  of  cannons  and  the 
flash  of  bayonets.  On  the  10th  of  August  Danton 
let  loose  the  armed  mob  upon  the  Tuileries. 

Insttrrection,  -i 

August  10, 1792.  Louis  quitted  the  Palace  without  giving 
orders  to  the  guard  either  to  fight  or  to  retire ;  but  the 
guard  were  ignorant  that  their  master  desired  them  to 
ofier  no  resistance,  and  one  hundred  and  sixty  of 
the  mob  were  shot  down  before  an  order  reached 
the  troops  to  abandon  the  Palace.  The  cruelties  which 
followed  the  victory  of  the  people  indicated  the  fate  in 
store  for  those  whom  the  invader  came  to  protect.  It  is 
doubtful  whether  the  foreign  Courts  would  have  made 
any  serious  attempt  to  undo  the  social  changes  efiected 
by  the  Revolution  in  France  ;  but  no  one  supposed  that 
those  thousands  of  self- exiled  nobles  who  now  returned 
behind  the  guns  of  Brunswick  had  returned  in  order  to 
take  their  places  peacefully  in  the  new  social  order.     In 


17»  mSUBBEOTION   OF  AUGUST  la  46 

their  own  imagination,  as  much  as  in  that  of  the  people, 
they  returned  with  fire  and  sword  to  repossess  them- 
selves of  rights  of  which  they  had  been  despoiled,  and 
to  take  vengeance  upon  the  men  who  were  responsible  for 
the  changes  made  in  France  since  1789.*  In  the  midst 
of  a  panic  little  justified  by  the  real  military  situation, 
Danton  inflamed  the  nation  with  his  own  passionate 
courage  and  resolution;  he  unhappily  also  thought  it 
necessary  to  a  successful  national  defence  chat  the 
reactionary  party  at  Paris  should  be  paralysed  by  a 
terrible  example.      The  prisons  were  filled 

^  ^  Kaasacrea  in 

with  persons  suspected  of  hostility  to  the     ^^^^s^vl*^ 
national  cause,  and  in  the  first  days  of  September  many 


•  The  accounts  of  the  emigrants  sent  to  Engknd  by  Lord  Elgin, 
envoy  at  Brussels,  and  Sir  J.  Murray,  our  military  attach^  with  Bruns- 
wick's army  (in  Records:  Flanders,  voL  221)  are  instructive  :  "  The  conduct 
of  the  army  under  the  Princes  of  France  is  universally  reprobated.  Their 
appearance  in  dress,  in  attendants,  in  preparations,  is  ridiculous.  As  an 
instance,  however  trivial,  it  may  be  mentioned  that  on  one  of  the  waggons 
was  written  Toilette  de  Monsi&wr.  The  spirit  of  vengeance,  however, 
which  they  discover  on  every  occasion  is  far  more  serious.  Wherever  they 
have  passed,  they  have  exercised  acts  of  cruelty,  in  banishing  and  severely 
punishing  those  persons  who,  though  probably  culpable,  had  yet  been  left 
untouched  by  the  Prussian  commanders.  To  such  an  extent  has  this  been 
carried  that  the  commander  at  Verdun  would  not  suffer  any  Frenchman 
(emigrant)  to  pass  a  night  in  the  town  without  a  special  permission.** 
Sept.  21.  After  the  failure  of  the  campaign,  Elgin  writes  of  the  emigrants : 
"  They  everywhere  added  to  the  cruelties  for  some  of  which  several  hussars 
had  been  executed :  carried  to  its  extent  the  vengeance  threatened  in  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick's  Declaration,  in  burning  whole  villages  where  a  shot 
was  fired  on  them:  and  on  the  other  hand  by  their  self-sufficiency, 
want  of  subordination  and  personal  disrespect,  have  drawn  upon  them- 
selves the  contempt  of  the  combined  armies."  Oct.  6.  So  Ute  as 
1796,  the  exile  Louis  XYlll.  declared  his  intention  to  restore  the 
"property  and  rights"  {i.e.,  tithes,  feudal  dues,  Ac.)  of  the  nobles  and 
clergy,  and  to  punish  the  men  who  had  "  committed  offences."  See  Letter 
to  Pichegru,  May  4, 1796,  in  Manuscrit  In^t  de  Louis  X YHl.,  p.  464. 


46  MODERN  EUBOPK  im. 

hundreds  of  these  imforttmate  persons  were  massacred 
by  gangs  of  assassins  paid  by  a  committee  of  the 
Municipality.  Danton  did  not  disguise  his  approval  of 
the  act.  He  had  made  up  his  mind  that  the  work  of 
the  Revolution  could  only  be  saved  by  striking  terror 
into  its  enemies,  and  by  preventing  the  Royalists  from 
co-operating  with  the  invader.  But  the  multitudes  who 
flocked  to  the  standards  of  1792  carried  with  them  the 
patriotism  of  Danton  unstained  by  his  guilt:  Right  or 
wrong  in  its  origin,  the  war  was  now  unquestionably  a 
just  one  on  the  part  of  Prance,  a  war  against  a  privileged 
class  attempting  to  recover  by  force  the  unjust  advan- 
tasres  that  they  had  not  been  able  to  maintain, 

The  war  now  a 

war  of  defence,  g^  ^g^j,  agaiust  thc  forcigucr  in  defence  of 
the  right  of  the  nation  to  deal  with  its  own  government. 
Since  the  great  religious  wars  there  had  been  no  cause 
so  rooted  in  the  hearts,  so  close  to  the  lives  of  those 
who  fought  for  it.  Every  soldier  who  joined  the 
armies  of  France  in  1792  joined  of  his  own  free 
will.  No  conscription  dragged  the  peasant  to  the 
frontier.  Men  left  their  homes  in  order  that  the 
fruit  of  the  poor  man's  labour  should  be  his  own, 
in  order  that  the  children  of  France  should  inherit 
some  better  birthright  than  exaction  and  want,  in  order 
that  the  late-won  sense  of  human  right  should  not  be 
swept  from  the  earth  by  the  arms  of  privilege  and  caste. 
It  was  a  time  of  high- wrought  hope,  of  generous  and 
pathetic  self-sacrifice ;  a  time  that  left  a  deep  and  in- 
delible impression  upon  those  who  judged  it  as  eye-wit- 
nesses.    Years  afterwards  the  poet  Wordsworth,  then 


I  UNIVERSITY    I 

alienated  from  France  and  cold  in  the  cause  of  liberty, 
could  not  recall  without  tears  the  memories  of  1792.* 

The  defence  of  France  rested  on  General  Dumouriez. 
The  fortresses  of  Longwy  and  Verdun, 
covering  the  passage  of  the  Meuse,  had  v22^sepu 
fallen  after  the  briefest  resistance ;  the 
troops  that  could  be  collected  before  Brunswick's  ap- 
proach were  too  few  to  meet  the  enemy  in  the  open  field. 
Happily  for  France  the  slow  advance  of  the  Prussian 
general  permitted  Dumouriez  to  occupy  the  difficult 
country  of  the  Argonne,  where,  while  waiting  for  his 
reinforcements,  he  was  able  for  some  time  to  hold  the 
invaders  in  check.  At  length  Brunswick  made  his  way 
past  the  defile  which  Dumouriez  had  chosen  for  his  first 
line  of  defence ;  but  it  was  only  to  find  the  French 
posted  in  such  strength  on  his  flank  that  any  further 
advance  would  imperil  his  own  army.  If  the  advance 
was  to  be  continued,  Dumouriez  must  be  dislodged. 
Accordingly,  on  the  20th  of  September,  Brunswick 
directed  his  artillery  against  the  hills  of  Valmy, 
where  the  French  left  was  encamped.  The  cannonade 
continued  for  some  hours,  but  it  was  followed  by  no 
general  attack.  The  firmness  of  the  French  under 
Brunswick's  fire  made  it  clear  that  they  would 
not  be  displaced  without  an  obstinate  battle ;  and, 
disappointed  of  victory,  the  King  of  Prussia  began 
to  listen  to  proposals  of  peace  sent  to  him  by 
Dumouriez. t      A   week   spent    in    negotiation   served 

•  Wordsworth,  Prelude,  Book  IX. 

t  The  correspondence  is  in   Ranke,  Urspruug  nnd  Boginn,  p.  871. 
Saoh  was  the  famine  in  the  Prussian  camp  that  Dumouriez  sent  the  King 


Retreat  of 
Brunswick. 


48  MODERN  EUROPE,  1792. 

only  to  strengthen  the  French  and  to  aggravate  the 
scarcity  and  sickness  within  the  Grerman  camp.  Dissen- 
sions broke  out  between  the  Prussian  and  Austrian  com- 
manders ;  a  retreat  was  ordered ;  and  to  the  astonishment 
o£  Europe  the  veteran  forces  of  Brunswick 
fell  back  before  the  mutinous  soldiery  and 
unknown  generals  of  the  Eevolution,  powerless  to  delay 
for  a  single  month  the  evacuation  of  France  and  the 
restoration  of  the  fortresses  which  they  had  captured. 

In  the  meantime  the  Legislative  Assembly  had 
decreed  its  own  dissolution  in  consequence  of  the  over- 
throw of  the  monarchy  on  August  10th,  and  had  ordered 
the  election  of  representatives  to  frame  a  constitution  for 
^  ^      ^       France.     The   elections   were   held  in   the 

The  Conventioii 

^L^  EepubiS;  crisis  of  invasion,  in  the  height  of  national 
indignation  against  the  alliance  of  the 
aristocracy  with  the  foreigner,  and,  in  some  districts, 
under  the  influence  of  men  who  had  not  shrunk  from 
ordering  the  massacres  in  the  prisons.  At  such  a 
moment  a  Constitutional  Eoyalist  had  scarcely  more 
chance  of  election  than  a  detected  spy  from  the  enemy's 
camp.  The  Grirondins,  who  had  been  the  party  of 
extremes  in  the  Legislative  Assembly,  were  the  party  of 
moderation  and  order  in  the  Convention.  By  their  side 
there  were  returned  men  whose  whole  being  seemed  to 
be  compounded  out  of  the  forces  of  conflict,  men  who, 
sometimes   without  conscious   depravity,    carried    into 

of  Prussia  twelve  loaves,  twelve  pounds  of  coffee,  and  twelve  pounds  of 
sugar.  The  official  account  of  the  campaign  is  in  the  Berlmiache  2!eUv/ng 
of  Oct  11, 1792. 


1788.  EXPANSION  OF   THE   REVOLUTION  40 

political  and  social  struggles  that  direct,  unquestioning 
employment  of  force  which  has  ordinarily  been  reserved 
for  war  or  for  the  diffusion  of  religious  doctrines.  The 
moral  differences  that  separated  this  party  from  the 
Q-ironde  were  at  once  conspicuous :  the  political  creed 
of  the  two  parties  appeared  at  first  to  be  much  the  same. 
Monarchy  was  abolished,  and  France  declared  a  Republic. 
(Sept.  21.)  Office  continued  in  the  hands  of  the 
Gironde  ;  but  the  vehement,  uncompromising  spirit  of 
their  rivals,  the  so-called  party  of  the  Mountain,  quickly 
made  itself  felt  in  all  the  relations  of  France  to  foreign 
Powers.  The  intention  of  conquest  might 
still    be    disavowed    as   it    had    been    five     comes  a  cnuad* 

of  democracy. 

months  before;  but  were  the  converts  to 
liberty  to  be  denied  the  right  of  uniting  themselves 
to  the  French  people  by  their  own  free  will  ?  When 
the  armies  of  the  Republic  had  swept  its  assailants 
from  the  border-provinces  that  gave  them  entrance 
into  France,  were  those  provinces  to  be  handed  back 
to  a  government  of  priests  and  nobles?  The  scruples 
which  had  condemned  all  annexation  of  territory 
vanished  in  that  orgy  of  patriotism  which  followed  the 
expulsion  of  the  invader  and  the  discovery  that  the 
Revolution  was  already  a  power  in  other  lands  than 
France.  The  nation  that  had  to  fight  the  battle  of 
European  freedom  must  appeal  to  the  spirit  of  freedom 
wherever  it  would  answer  the  call;  the  conflict  with 
sovereigns  must  be  maintained  by  arming  their  subjects 
against  them  in  every  land.  In  this  conception  of  the 
universal  alliance  of  the  nations,,  the  Governments  with 
1 


50  MODERN  EUROPE,  1792. 

whicli  France  was  not  yet  at  war  were  scarcely 
distinguished  from  those  which  had  pronounced  against 
her.  The  frontier-lines  traced  by  an  obsolete  diplo- 
macy, the  artificial  guarantees  of  treaties,  were  of 
little  account  against  the  living  and  inalienable  sove- 
reignty of  the  people.  To  men  inflamed  with  the 
passions  of  1792  an  argument  of  international  law 
scarcely  conveyed  more  meaning  than  to  Peter  the 
Hermit.  Among  the  statesmen  of  other  lands,  who 
had  no  intention  of  abandoning  all  the  principles  recog- 
nised as  the  public  right  of  Europe,  the  lauguage  now 
used  by  France  could  only  be  understood  as  the  avowal 
of  indiscriminate  aggression. 

The  Revolution  had  displayed  itself  in  France  as  a 
The  neighbours  forcc  of  uulou  as  wcU  as  of  division.  It  had 
driven  the  nobles  across  the  frontier;  it  had 
torn  the  clergy  from  their  altars;  but  it  had  reconciled 
sullen  Corsica ;  and  by  abolishing  feudal  rights  it  had 
made  France  the  real  fatherland  of  the  Teutonic  peasant 
in  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  It  was  now  about  to  prove  its 
attractive  power  in  foreign  lands.  At  the  close  of  the 
last  century  the  nationalities  of  Europe  were  far  less 
consolidated  than  they  are  at  present;  only  on  the 
Spanish  and  the  Swiss  frontier  had  France  a  neighbour 
that  could  be  called  a  nation.  On  the  north,  what  is 
now  the  kingdom  of  Belgium  was  in  1792  a  collection 
of  provinces  subject  to  the  House  of  Austria.  The 
German  population  both  of  the  districts  west  of  the 
Rhine  and  of  those  opposite  to  Alsace  war  parcelled 
out   among   a  number  of  petty  principalities.     Savoy, 


17W.  OUSTINE    TAKES   MAINZ.  61 

though  west  of  the  chain  of  the  Alps  and  French  in 
speech,  formed  part,  of  the  kingdom  of  Piedmont,  which 
was  itself  severed  by  history  and  by  national  character 
from  the  other  States  of  Northern  Italy.  Along  the 
entire  frontier,  from  Dunkirk  to  the  Maritime  Alps, 
France  nowhere  touched  a  strong,  united,  and  inde- 
pendent people;  and  along  this  entire  frontier,  except  in 
the  country  opposite  Alsace,  the  armed  proselytism  of 
the  French  Eevolution  proved  a  greater  force  than  the 
influences  on  which  the  existing  order  of  things  depended. 
In  the  Low  Countries,  in  the  Principalities  of  the  Rhine, 
in  Switzerland,  in  Savoy,  in  Piedmont  itself,  the 
doctrines  of  the  Eevolution  were  welcomed  by  a  more 
or  less  numerous  class,  and  the  armies  of  France 
appeared,  though  but  for  a  moment,  as  the  missionaries 
of  liberty  and  right  rather  than  as  an  invading  enemy. 

No  sooner  had  Brunswick  been  brought  to  a  stand 
by  Dumouriez  at  Valmy  than  a  French  division  under 
Custine  crossed  the  Alsatian  frontier  and  custine  enten 
advanced  upon  Spires,  where  Brunswick  ^^^^'  ^^*^' 
had  left  large  stores  of  war.  The  garrison  was  defeated 
in  an  encounter  outside  the  town;  Spires  and  Worms 
surrendered  to  Custine.  In  the  neighbouring  fortress 
of  Mainz,  the  key  to  western  Germany,  Custine's 
advance  was  watched  by  a  republican  party  among  the 
inhabitants,  from  whom  the  French  general  learnt  that 
he  had  only  to  appear  before  the  city  to  become  its 
master.  Brunswick  had  mdeea  apprehended  the  failure 
of  his  invasion  of  France,  but  he  had  never  given  a 
thought  to  the  defence  of  Germany ;  and,  although  the 
E  2 


52  MODERN  EUROPE.  1790-1792. 

Eng  of  Prussia  had  been  warned  of  the  defenceless 
state  of  Mainz,  no  steps  had  been  taken  beyond  the 
payment  of  a  sum  of  money  for  the  repair  of  the 
fortifications,  which  money  the  Archbishop  expended 
in  the  purchase  of  a  wood  belonging  to  himself  and  the 
erection  of  a  timber  patchwork.  On  news  arriving  of  the 
capture  of  Spires,  the  Archbishop  fled,  leaving  the  ad- 
ministration to  the  Dean,  the  Chancellor,  and  the  Com- 
mandant. The  Chancellor  made  a  speech,  calling  upon 
his  "beloved  brethren"  the  citizens  to  defend  themselves 
to  the  last  extremity,  and  daily  announced  the  overthrow 
of  Dumouriez  and  the  approaching  entry  of  the  Allies 
into  Paris,  until  Custine's  soldiers  actually  came  into 
sight.*  Then  a  council  of  war  declared  the  city  to  be 
untenable ;  and  before  Custine  had  brought  up  a  single 
siege- gun  the  garrison  capitulated,  and  the  French  were 
welcomed  into  Mainz  by  the  partisans  of  the  Eepublic 
(Oct.  20).  With  the  French  arms  came  the  French 
organisation  of  liberty.  A  club  was  formed  on  the  model 
of  the  Jacobin  Club  of  Paris ;  existing  officers  and  dis- 
tinctions of  rank  were  abolished ;  and  although  the  mass 
of  the  inhabitants  held  aloof,  a  Eepublic  was  finally  pro- 
claimed, and  incorporated  with  the  Eepublic  of  France. 
The  success  of  Custine's  raid  into  Grermany  did 
not  divert  the  Convention  from  the  de- 
vades  the  Ne-     sifiTU   of  attacking:   Austria   in  the  JSTether- 

therlands.  ^  ^ 

lands,    which    Dumouriez    had    from    the 
first  pressed  upon  the  Government.     It  was  not  three 
years  since  the  Netherlands  had  been  in  revolt  against 
•Forster,  Werke,  vi.,  386b 


17»  00NQUE8T   OF   THE   NETHEBLAND8.  6S 

the  Emperor  Joseph.  In  its  origin  the  revolt  was  a 
reactionary  movement  of  the  clerical  party  against 
Joseph's  reforms;  but  there  soon  sprang  up  am- 
bitions and  hopes  at  variance  with  the  first  impulses 
of  the  insurrection ;  and  by  the  side  of  monks  and 
monopolists  a  national  party  came  into  existence,  pro- 
claiming the  sovereignty  of  the  people,  and  imitating 
all  the  movements  of  the  French  Revolution.  During 
the  brief  suspension  of  Austrian  rule  the  popular  and 
the  reactionary  parties  attacked  one  another;  and  on 
the  restoration  of  Leopold's  authority  in  1791  the 
democratic  leaders,  with  a  large  body  of  their  followers, 
took  refuge  beyond  the  frontier,  looking  forward  to  the 
outbreak  of  war  between  Austria  and  France.  Their 
partisans  formed  a  French  connection  in  the  interior 
of  the  country;  and,  by  some  strange  illusion,  the 
priests  themselves  and  the  close  corporations  which 
had  been  attacked  by  Joseph  supposed  that  their  in- 
terests would  be  respected  by  Revolutionary  France.* 
Thus  the  ground  was  everywhere  pre- 
pared for  a  French  invasion.      Dumouriez       Jema^ 

^  ^  Nov. «. 

crossed  the  frontier.     The  border  fortresses 

no  longer  existed ;  and  after  a  single  battle  won  by 

•  "  The  very  night  the  news  of  the  late  Emperor's  (Leopold's)  death 
arrived  here  (Brussels),  inflammatory  advertisements  and  invitations  to 
arm  were  distributed."  One  culpnt "  belonged  to  the  Choir  of  St.  Gadule  : 
he  chose  the  middle  of  the  day,  and  in  the  presence  of  many  people  posted 
up  a  paper  in  the  church,  exhorting  to  a  general  insnrrection.  The 
remainder  of  this  strange  production  was  the  description  of  a  vision  he 
pretended  to  have  seen,  representing  the  soul  of  the  lat-e  emperor  on  its 
way  to  join  that  of  Joseph,  already  suffering  in  the  other  world.*  CoL 
Gardiner,  March  20,  1792.     Records :  Flanders,  vol  220. 


54  MODERN   EUBOPJS.  1792. 

the  French  at  Jemappes  on  the  6th  of  Novemher,*  the 
Austrians,  finding  the  population  universally  hostile, 
abandoned  the  Netherlands  without  a  struggle. 

The  victory  of  Jemappes,  the  first  pitched  battle 
won  by  the  Republic,  excited  an  outburst  of  revolu- 
tionary fervour  in  the  Convention  which  deeply  affected 
the  relations  of  France  to  Great  Britain,  hitherto  a 
neutral  spectator  of  the  war.  A  manifesto  was  published 
declaring  that  the  French  nation  offered  its  alliance  to 
all  peoples  who  wished  to  recover  their  freedom,  and 
charging  the  generals  of  the  Eepublic  to  give  their  pro- 
tection to  all  persons  who  might  suffer  in  the  cause  of 
liberty.  (Nov.  19.)  A  week  later  Savoy  and  Nice 
Nice  and  savo  ^^^^  anncxcd  to  Fraucc,  the  population  of 
annexed.  Savoy  haviug  dcclarcd  in  favour  of  France 
on  the  outbreak  of  war  between  France  and  Sardinia. 
On  the  15th  of  December  the  Convention  proclaimed 
that  social  and  political  revolution  was  henceforth  to 
accompany  every  movement  of  its  armies  on  foreign 
soil.  "  In  every  country  that  shall  be  occupied  by  the 
armies  of  the  French  Republic  " — such  was  the  sub- 

*  Elg^,  from  Brussels,  Nov.  6.  **  A  brisk  cannonade  lias  been  heard 
this  whole  forenoon  in  the  direction  of  Mons.  It  is  at  this  moment  some- 
what diminished,  though  not  at  an  end."  Nov.  7.  "  Several  messengers 
have  arrived  from  camp  in  the  course  of  the  night,  but  all  the  Ministers 
(I  have  seen  them  all)  deny  having  received  one  word  of  detail.  .  .  . 
Couriers  have  been  sent  this  night  in  every  direction  to  call  in  aU  the  de- 
tachments on  the  frontiers.  .  .  .  The  Government  is  making  every 
arrangement  for  quitting  Brussels :  their  papers  are  already  prepared, 
their  carriages  ready."  .  .  .  Then  a  PS.  "  A  cannonade  is  distinctly 
heard  again.  .  .  .  AU  the  emigrants  now  here  are  removing  with  the 
utmost  haste."  Nov.  9.  **  The  confusion  throughout  the  country  is  ex- 
treme. The  roads  are  covered  with  emigrants,  and  persons  of  these 
provinces  flying  from  the  French  armies."    Records :  Flanders,  vol.  222. 


vm,  FRANCE   AND   ENGLAND,  56 

stance  of  the  Decree  of  December  15tli — "the  generals 
shall  announce  the  abolition  of  all  exist-  j^^^^^  ^  j^ 
ing  authorities ;  of  nobility,  of  serfage,  of 
every  feudal  right  and  every  monopoly ;  they  shall  pro- 
claim the  sovereignty  of  the  people,  and  convoke  the 
inhabitants  in  assemblies  to  form  a  provisional  Govern- 
ment, to  which  no  officer  of  a  former  Grovernment,  no 
noble,  nor  any  member  of  the  former  privileged  corpor- 
ations shall  be  eligible.  They  shall  place  under  the 
charge  of  the  French  Eepublic  all  property  belonging 
to  the  Sovereign  or  his  adherents,  and  the  property  of 
every  civil  or  religious  corporation.  The  French  nation 
will  treat  as  enemies  any  people  which,  refusing  liberty 
and  equality,  desires  to  preserve  its  prince  and  privileged 
castes,  or  to  make  any  accommodation  with  them." 

This  singular  announcement  of  a  new  crusade 
caused  the  Q-overnment  of  Great  Britain 
to  arm.  Although  the  decree  of  the 
Convention  related  only  to  States  with  which  France 
was  at  war,  the  Convention  had  in  fact  formed 
connections  with  the  English  revolutionary  societies; 
and  the  French  Minister  of  Marine  informed  his 
sailors  that  they  were  about  to  carry  fifty  thousand 
caps  of  liberty  to  their  English  brethren.  No  prudent 
statesman  would  treat  a  mere  series  of  threats  against 
all  existing  authorities  as  ground  for  war ;  but  the  acts 
of  the  French  Government  showed  that  it  intended  to 
carry  into  effect  the  violent  interference  in  the  affairs 
of  other  nations  announced  in  its  manifestos.  Its 
agents  were  stirring  up  dissatisfaction  in  every  State ; 


56  MODERN  EUBOPJS.  im 

and  although  the  annexation  of  Savoy  and  the  occupa- 
tion of  the  Netherlands  might  be  tre?.ted  as  incidental 
to  the  conflict  with  Austria  and  Sardinia,  in  which 
G-reat  Britain  had  pledged  itself  to  neutrality,  other  acts 
of  the  Convention  were  certainly  ^  infringements  of  the 
rights  of  allies  of  England.  A  series  of  European 
treaties,  oppressive  according  to  our  own  ideas,  but 
in  keeping  with  the  ideas  of  that  age,  prohibited  the 
navigation  of  the  River  Scbelde,  on  which  Antwerp 
is  situated,  in  order  tbafc  the  commerce  of  the  North 
Sea  might  flow  exclusively  into  Dutch  ports.  On  the 
conquest  of  Belgium  the  French  Grovernment  gave 
orders  to  Dumouriez  to  send  a  flotilla  down 
the  river,  and  to  declare  Antwerp  an  open 
port  in  right  of  the  law  of  nature,  which  treaties 
cannot  abrogate.  Whatever  the  folly  of  commercial 
restraints,  the  navigation  of  the  Scbelde  was  a  question 
between  the  Antwerpers  and  the  Dutch,  and  one  in 
which  France  had  no  direct  concern.  The  incident, 
though  trivial,  was  viewed  in  England  as  one  among 
many  proofs  of  the  intention  of  the  French  to  in- 
terfere vdth  the  affairs  of  neighbouring  States  at 
their  pleasure.  In  ordinary  times  it  would  not  have 
been  easy  to  excite  much  interest  in  England  on 
behaK  of  a  Dutch  monopoly;  but  the  feeling  of  this 
country  towards  the  French  Revolution  had  been  con- 
verted into  a  passionate  hatred  by  the  massacres  of 
September,  and  by  the  open  alliance  between  the  Con- 
vention and  the  Revolutionary  societies  in  England 
itself.     Pitt  indeed,  whom  the  Parisians   imagined  to 


tm,  WAB    WITH   ENGLAND,  57 

be  their  most  malignant  enemy,  laboured  against  tbe 
swelling  national  passion,  and  hoped  against  all  hope 
for  peace.  Not  only  was  Pitt  guiltless  of  the  desire  to 
add  this  country  to  the  enemies  of  France,  but  he 
earnestly  desired  to  reconcile  France  with  Austria,  in 
order  that  the  Western  States,  whose  embroilment  left 
Eastern  Europe  at  the  mercy  of  Catherine  of  Eussia, 
might  unite  to  save  both  Poland  and  Turkey  from 
falling  into  the  hands  of  a  Power  whose  steady  aggres- 
sion threatened  Europe  more  seriously  than  all  the 
noisy  and  outspoken  excitement  of  the  French  Conven- 
tion. Pitt,  moreover,  viewed  with  deep  disapproval  the 
secret  designs  of  Austria  and  Prussia.*     If  the  French 

*  In  Nov.  1792,  Gren^dlle  ordered  the  English  envoys  at  Vienna 
and  Berlin  to  discover,  if  possible,  the  real  designs  of  aggrandisement 
held  by  those  Courts.  Mr.  Straton,  at  Vienna,  got  wind  of  the  agree- 
ment against  Poland.  "  I  requested  Count  Philip  Cobenzl "  (the 
Austrian  Minister)  "  that  he  would  have  the  goodness  to  open  himself 
confidentially  to  me  on  the  precise  object  which  the  two  allied  Courts 
might  have  in  contemplation.  This,  however,  the  Count  was  by  no 
means  disposed  to  do;  on  the  contrary,  he  went  round  the  compass 
of  evasion  in  order  to  avoid  a  direct  answer.  But  determined  as  I 
was  to  push  the  Austrian  Minister,  I  heaped  question  on  question,  until 
I  forced  him  to  say,  blushing,  and  with  evident  signs  of  embarrassment, 
*  Count  Stadion '  (Ambassador  at  London)  '  will  be  able  to  satisfy  the 
curiosity  of.  the  British  Minister,  to  whatever  point  it  may  be  directed.* " 
Jan.  20,  1793.  Records  :  Austria,  vol.  32.  Stadion  accordingly  informed 
Lord  Grenville  of  the  Polish  and  Bavarian  plans.  Grenville  expressed  his 
concern  and  regret  at  the  aggression  on  Poland,  and  gave  reasons  against 
the  Bavarian  exchange.  To  our- envoy  with  the  King  of  Prussia  Greu>'ille 
wrote :  "  It  may  possibly  be  the  intention  of  the  Courts  to  adopt  a  plan  of 
indemnifying  themselves  for  the  expense  of  the  war  by  ^-esh  acquisitions 
in  Poland,  and  carrying  into  execution  a  new  partition  of  that  country. 
You  will  not  fail  to  explain  in  the  most  distinct  and  pointed  manner  his 
Majesty's  entire  disapprobation  of  such  a  plan,  and  his  determination  on 
no  account  to  concur  in  any  measures  which  may  tend  to  the  oompletiion  of 
a  design  so  unjust  in  itself."  Jan.  4,  1793.  Records :  Army  in  Germany, 
Tol  437.    At  Vienna  Cobenzl  declared,  Feb.  9,  that  Austria  could  not  now 


68  MODERN  EUBOFE.  vm. 

executive  would  have  given  any  assurance  that  the 
Netherlands  should  not  be  annexed,  or  if  the  French 
ambassador,  Chauvelin,  who  was  connected  with  English 
plotters,  had  been  superseded  by  a  trustworthy  nego- 
tiator, it  is  probable  that  peace  might 
L?Sl°\vf.  have  been  preserved.  But  when,  on  the 
execution  of  King  Louis  (Jan,  21,  1798), 
Chauvelin  was  expelled  from  England  as  a  suspected 
alien,  war  became  a  question  of  days.* 

Points  of  technical  right  figured  in  the  complaints 
of  both  sides;  but  the  real  ground  of  war  was 
perfectly  understood.  France  considered  itself  en- 
titled to  advance  the  Eevolution  and  the  Eights  of 
Man  wherever  its  own  arms  or  popular  insurrection 
gave  it  the  command.  England  denied  the  right 
of  any  Power  to  annul  the  political  system  of  Europe 
at  its  pleasure,  No  more  serious,  no  more  sufficient, 
ground  of  war  ever  existed  between  two  nations ; 
yet  the  event  proved  that,  with  the  highest  justi- 
fication for  war,  the  highest  wisdom  would  yet  have 
chosen  peace.  England's  entry  into  the  war  con- 
verted it  from  an  affair  of  two  or  three  campaigns 
into  a  struggle  of  twenty  years,  resulting  in  more 
violent  convulsions,  more  widespread  misery,  and 
more  atrocious  crimes,  than   in   all  probability   would 

**  even  manifest  a  wish  to  oppose  the  projects  of  Prussia  in  Poland,  as  in 
that  case  his  Prussian  Majesty  would  probably  withdraw  his  assistance 
from  the  French  war;  nay,  perhaps  even  enter  into  an  alliance  with  that 
nation  and  invade  Bohemia."    Records :  Austria,  vol.  32. 

*  Auckland,  ii.  464.    Papers  presented  to  Parliament,  1793.    Mr.  Oscar 
Browning,  in  Fortnightly  Review,  Feb.  1888w 


J    ' 


1798.  CONDITION   OF  SNQLAND.  59 

have  resulted   even   from    the   temporary    triumph   of 
the  revolutionary  cause  in  1793.     But  in  both  nations 
political   passion   welcomed   impending  calamity ;    and 
the  declaration  of  war  by  the  Convention 
on    February    1st     only    anticipated    the     w.   Feb.i«t. 
desire    of    the     English    people.       Great 
Britain   once   committed  to   the   struggle,  Pitt  spared 
neither    money   nor    intimidation    in    his     efforts    to 
unite    all    Europe    against    France.     Holland  was   in- 
cluded with  England  in  the  French  declara- 
tion of  war :   the  Mediterranean  States  felt     Seiiu™^ 
that  the  navy  of  England  was   nearer   to     war. 
them   than    the    armies    of    Austria    and 
Prussia;    and   before  the  end  of  the  summer  of  1793, 
Spain,  Portugal,  Naples,  Tuscany,  and  the  Papal  States 
had  joined  the  Coalition. 

The  Jacobins  of  Paris  had  formed  a  wrong  estimate 
of  the  political  condition  of  Ensfland.     At     ^    ^        ^ 

••■  *-•  French  wrongly 

the  outbreak  of  the  war  they  believed  that  SJ^ed  to!^ 
England  itself  was  on  the  verge  of  revolu- 
tion. They  mistook  the  undoubted  discontent  of  a 
portion  of  the  middle  and  lower  classes,  which  showed 
itself  in  the  cry  for  parliamentary  reform,  for  a  general 
sentiment  of  hatred  towards  existing  institutions, 
like  that  which  in  France  had  swept  away  the 
old  order  at  a  single  blow.  The  Convention  re- 
ceived the  addressee  of  English  Radical  societies,  and 
imagined  that  the  abuses  of  the  parliamentary  system 
under  George  III.  had  alienated  the  whole  nation. 
"What  they   had  found  in  Belgium  and  in  Savoy — 


60  MODERN  EUBOPK  1783-1793 

a  people  tliankM  to  receive  tlie  Eights  of  Man  from 
tlie  soldiers  of  the  Eevolution — they  expected  to  find 
among  the  dissenting  congregations  of  London  and  the 
factory -hands  of  Sheffield.  The  singular  attraction  exer- 
cised hy  each  class  in  England  upon  the  one  helow  it,  as 
well  as  the  indifference  of  the  nation  generally  to  all 
ideals,  was  little  understood  in  France,  although  the 
Eevolutions  of  the  two  countries  bore  this  contrast 
on  their  face.  A  month  after  the  fall  of  the  Bastille 
the  whole  system  of  class-privilege  and  monopoly  had 
vanished  from  French  law ;  fifteen  years-  of  the  English 
Commonwealth  had  left  the  structure  of  English 
society  what  it  had  been  at  the  beginning.  But 
poHtical  observation  vanished  in  the  delirium  of 
1793  ;  and  the  French  only  discovered  when  it  was 
too  late  that  in  Grreat  Britain  the  Eevolution  had  fallen 
upon  an  enemy  of  unparalleled  stubbornness  and  inex- 
haustible strength. 

In  the  first  Assembly  of  the  Eevolution  it  was 
Pouticai  condi-  ^sual  to  spcak  of  the  Enghsh  as  free  men 
tiono  Eng    d.     ^j^^^^^   j^^^   Frcuch   ought   to   imitate;    in 

the  Convention  it  was  usual  to  speak  of  them  as 
slaves  whom  the  French  ought  to  deliver.  The 
institutions  of  England  bore  in  fact  a  very  different 
aspect  when  compared  with  the  absolute  monarchy 
of  the  Bourbons  and  when  compared  with  the  demo- 
cracy of  1793.  Frenchmen  who  had  lived  under 
the  government  of  a  Court  which  made  laws  by 
edict  and  possessed  the  right  to  imprison  by  letters- 
patent  looked   with   respect   upon   the  Parliament    of 


178&-1793.  ENGLISH  POLITICAL   PARTIES.  61 

England,  its  trial  by  jury,  and  its  freedom  of  the  press. 
The  men  who  had  sent  a  king  to  prison  and  con- 
fiscated the  estates  of  a  great  part  of  the  aristocracy 
could  only  feel  compassion  for  a  land  where  three- 
fourths  of  the  national  representatives  were  nominees 
of  the  Crown  or  of  wealthy  peers.  Nor,  in  spite 
of  the  personal  sympathy  of  Fox  with  the  French 
revolutionary  movement,  was  there  any  real  affinity 
between  the  English  Whig  party  and  that  which  now 
ruled  in  the  Convention.  The  event  which  fixed  the 
character  of  English  liberty  during  the  ^he  whigs  not 
eighteenth  century,  the  Ee volution  of  1688,  ^«™«~**°- 
had  nothing  democratic  in  its  nature.  That  revolution 
was  directed  against  a  system  of  Eoman  Catholic 
despotism  ;  it  gave  political  power  not  to  the  mass 
of  the  nation,  which  had  no  desire  and  no  capacity 
to  exercise  it,  but  to  a  group  of  noble  families  and 
their  retainers,  who,  during  the  reigns  of  the  first 
two  Georges,  added  all  the  patronage  and  influence 
of  the  Crown  to  their  social  and  constitutional  weight 
in  the  country.  The  domestic  history  of  England  since 
the  accession  of  George  III.  had  turned  chiefly  upon 
the  obstinate  struggle  of  this  monarch  to  deliver  him- 
self from  all  dependence  upon  party.  The  divi- 
sions of  the  Whigs,  their  jealousies,  but,  above  all, 
their  real  alienation  from  the  mass  of  the  people 
whose  rights  they  professed  to  defend,  ultimately 
gave  the  King  the  victory,  when,  after  twenty  years 
of  errors,  he  found  in  the  younger  Pitt  a  Minister 
capable   of  uniting  the   interests   of  the   Crown  with 


62  MODERN  EUROPE.  1789-1793. 

the  ablest  and  most  patriotic  liberal  statesmanship. 
Bribes,  threats,  and  every  species  of  base  influence 
had  been  employed  by  King  Greorge  to  break  up  the 
great  Coalition  of  1783,  which  united  all  sections 
of  the  Whigs  against  him  under  the  Ministry  of  Fox 
and  North;  but  the  real  support  of  Pitt,  whom  the 
King  placed  in  office  with  a  minority  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  was  the  temper  of  the  nation  itself,  wearied 
with  the  exclusiveness,  the  corruption,  and  the  party- 
spirit  of  the  Whigs,  and  willing  to  believe  that  a  popular 
Minister,  even  if  he  had  entered  upon  power  unconstitu- 
tionally, might  do  more  for  the  country  than  the  consti- 
tutional proprietors  of  the  rotten  boroughs. 

From  1783  down  to  the  outbreak  of  the  French 
Ktt  Minister,  Revolutlou,  Pitt,  as  a  Tory  Minister  con- 
fronted by  a  Whig  Opposition,  governed 
England  on  more  liberal  principles  than  any  statesman 
who  had  held  power  during  the  eighteenth  century. 
These  years  were  the  last  of  the  party-system  of 
England  in  its  original  form.  The  French  Ee volution 
made  an  end  of  that  old  distinction  in  which  the  Tory 
was  known  as  the  upholder  of  Crown -prerogative  and 
the  Whig  as  the  supporter  of  a  constitutional  oligarchy 
of  great  families.  It  created  that  new  political 
antagonism  in  which,  whether  under  the  names  of 
Whig  and  Tory,  or  of  Liberal  and  Conservative,  two 
great  parties  have  contended,  one  for  a  series  of 
beneficial  changes,  the  other  for  the  preservation  of 
the  existing  order.  The  convulsions  of  France  and 
the  dread  of  revolutionary  agitation  in  England  trans- 


1792.  THE   BEAOTION  IN  ENGLAND.  63 

formed  both  Pitt   and   the   Whigs  by  whom  he  was 
opposed.      Pitt    sacrificed   his   schemes   of 

,  n        '  J        Effect  of  Prcmch 

peaceiul  progress  to  loreign  war  and  Eevoiution  <m 
domestic  repression,  and  set  his  face  against 
the  reform  of  Parliament  which  he  had  once  himself 
proposed.  The  Whigs  broke  up  into  two  sections,  led 
respectively  by  Burke  and  by  Fox,  the  one  denouncing 
the  violence  of  the  Revolution,  and  ultimately  uniting 
itself  with  Pitt;  the  other  friendly  to  the  Eevoiu- 
tion, in  spite  of  its  excesses,  as  the  cause  of  civil 
and  religious  liberty,  and  identifying  itself,  under  the 
healthy  influence  of  parliamentary  defeat  and  dis- 
appointment, with  the  defence  of  popular  rights  in 
England  and  the  advocacy  of  enlightened  reform. 

The  obliteration  of  the  old  dividing-line  in  English 
politics  may  be  said  to  date  from  the  day  when  the 
ancient  friendship  of  Burke  and  Fox  was  bitterly  severed 
by  the  former  in  the  House  of  Commons.  (May  6, 
1791.)  The  charter  of  the  modern  Conservative  party 
was  that  appeal  to  the  nation  which  Burke  had  already 
published,  in  v the  autumn  of  1790,  under  the  title  of 
"  Reflections  on  the  French  Revolution." 
In  this  survey  of  the  political  forces  which  flections,**  Oct., 
he  saw  in  action  around  him,  the  great  Wliig 
writer,  who  in  past  times  had  so  passionately  defended 
the  liberties  of  America  and  the  constitutional  tradition 
of  the  English  Parliament  against  the  aggression  of 
George  III.,  attacked  the  Revolution  as  a  system  of 
violence  and  caprice  more  formidable  to  freedom  than 
the   tyranny    of    any    Crown.      He   proved   that   the 


64  MODERN  EVEOPE.  1792. 

politicians  and  societies  of  England  who  had  given  it 
their  sympathy  had  given  their  syrapathy  to  measures 
and  to  theories  opposed  to  every  principle  of  1688. 
Above  all,  he  laid  bare  that  agency  of  riot  and  destruc- 
tiveness  which,  even  within  the  first  few  months  of 
the  Eevolution,  filled  him  with  presentiment  of  the 
calamities  about  to  fall  upon  France.  Burke's  treatise 
was  no  dispassionate  inquiry  into  the  condition  of  a 
neighbouring  state  :  it  was  a  denunciation  of  Jacobinism 
as  fierce  and  as  little  qualified  by  political  charity  as  were 
the  maledictions  of  the  Hebrew  prophets  upon  their 
idolatrous  neighbours ;  and  it  was  intended,  like  these, 
to  excite  his  own  countrymen  against  innovations 
among  themselves.  It  completely  succeeded.  It  ex- 
pressed, and  it  heightened,  the  alarm  arising  among  the 
Liberal  section  of  the  propertied  class,  at  first  well 
inclined  to  the  Eevolution :  and,  although  the  Whigs 
of  the  House  of  Commons  pronounced  in  favour  of 
Fox  upon  his  first  rupture  with  Burke,  the  tide  of 
public  feeling,  rising  higher  with  every  new  outrage  of 
the  Revolution,  soon  invaded  the  legislature,  and  carried 
the  bulk  of  the  Whiff  party  to  the  side  of 

Most  of  the  °    -^        '' 

puf  ag^?£Ll    the  Minister,  leaving  to  Fox  and  his  few 
ance.  faithful  adhcrcuts  the  task  of  maintaining 

an  unheeded  protest  against  the  blind  passions  of  war, 
and  the  increasing  rigour  with  which  Pitt  repressed 
every  symptom  of  popular  disaffection. 

The  character  of  violence  which  Burke  traced  and 
condemned  in  the  earliest  acts  of  the  Revolution  dis- 
played itself  in  a  much  stronger  light  after  the  over- 


MM.  FRANCE   AFTER   AUGUST   10.  85 

throw  of  the  Monarchy  by  the  insurrection  of  August 
10th.     That  event  was  the  work   of   men 

1  1     -I     ji  -Tk      •    •  1  TheGKrondeand 

who  commanded  the  Jransian  democracy,  the  commune  oi 
not  the  work  of  orators  and  party- leaders  in 
the  Assembly.  The  Girondins  had  not  hesitated  to 
treat  the  victory  as  their  own,  by  placing  the  great 
offices  of  State,  with  one  exception,  in  the  hands  of 
their  leaders;  they  instantly  found  that  the  real 
sovereignty  lay  elsewhere.  The  Council  of  the  Com- 
mune, or  Municipality,  of  Paris,  whose  members  had 
seized  their  post  at  the  moment  of  the  insurrection,  was 
the  only  administrative  body  that  possessed  the  power 
to  enforce  its  commands ;  in  the  Ministries  of  State 
one  will  alone  made  itself  felt,  that  of  Danton,  whom 
the  Girondins  had  unwillingly  admitted  to  office  along 
with  themselves.  The  massacres  of  September  threw 
into  fuU  light  the  powerlessness  of  the  expiring  Assem- 
bly. For  five  successive  days  it  was  unable  to  check 
the  massacres;  it  was  unable  to  bring  to  justice  the 
men  who  had  planned  them,  and  who  called  upon  the 
rest  of  France  to  follow  their  example.  With  the 
meeting  of  the  Convention,  however,  the  Girondins, 
who  now  regarded  themselves  as  the  legitimate  govern- 
ment, and  forgot  that  they  owed  office  to  an  insurrection, 
expected  to  reduce  the  capital  to  submission.  They 
commanded  an  overwhelming  majority  in  the  new 
chamber ;  they  were  supported  by  the  middle  class  in 
all  the  great  cities  of  France.  The  party  of  the 
Mountain  embraced  at  first  only  the  deputies  of  Paris, 
and   a  group    of    determined   men   who  admitted   no 

^  OF  TH»  ^ 

i  TIN  TVER  SIT  Y   I 


eQ  MODERN  EUROPE,  1798. 

criticism  on  the  measures  which  the  democracy  of  Paris 
had  thought  necessary  for  the  Revolution. 

The  Gironde  and       -r        tt  n  i  •  l^  n  mi 

the  Mountain  in     In  the  Conventiou  they  were  the  assailed, 

the  Convention.  "^ 

not  the  assailants.  Without  waiting  to 
secure  themselves  hy  an  armed  force,  the  orators  of  the 
Grironde  attempted  to  crush  both  the  Municipality  and 
the  deputies  who  ruled  at  the  Clubs.  They  reproached 
the  Municipality  with  the  murders  of  September;  they 
accused  Robespierre  of  aiming  at  the  Dictatorship.  It 
was  under  the  pressure  of  these  attacks  that  the  party 
of  the  Mountain  gathered  its  strength  within  the  Con- 
vention, and  that  the  populace  of  Paris  transferred  to 
the  Grironde  the  passionate  hatred  which  it  had  hitherto 
borne  to  the  King  and  the  aristocracy.  The  gulf  that  lay 
between  the  people  and  those  who  had  imagined  them- 
selves to  be  its  leaders  burst  into  view.  The  Grirondins 
saw  with  dismay  that  the  thousands  of  hungry  work- 
men whose  victory  had  placed  them  in  power  had 
fought  for  something  more  tangible  than  Republican 
phrases  from  Tacitus  and  Plutarch.  On  one  side 
was  a  handful  of  orators  and  writers,  steeped  in  the 
rhetoric  and  the  commonplace  of  ancient  Rome,  and 
totally  strange  to  the  real  duties  of  government ;  on 
the  other  side  the  populace  of  Paris,  such  as  centuries 
of  despotism,  privilege,  and  priestcraft  had  made  it : 
sanguinary,  unjust,  vindictive ;  convulsed  since  the  out- 
break of  the  Revolution  with  every  passion  that  sways 
men  in  the  mass  ;  taught  no  conception  of  progress  but 
the  overthrow  of  authority,  and  acquainted  with  no  title 
to  power  but  that  which  was  bestowed  by  itself.     If  the 


1793.  THE  QIEONBE  AND   THE   MOUNTAIN.  67 

GHrondins  were  to  remain  in  power,  they  could  do  so  only 
by  drawing  an  army  from  the  departments,  or  by  identi- 
fying themselves  with  the  multitude.  They  declined  to 
take  either  course.  Their  audience  was  in  the  Assembly 
alone ;  their  support  in  the  distant  provinces.  Paris, 
daily  more  violent,  listened  to  men  of  another  stamp. 
The  Municipality  defied  the  Government;  the  Moun- 
tain answered  the  threats  and  invectives  of  the  majority 
in  the  Assembly  by  displays  of  popular  menace  and 
tumult.  In  the  eyes  of  the  common  people,  who  after 
so  many  changes  of  government  found  themselves  more 
famished  and  more  destitute  than  ever,  the  Grironde  was 
now  but  the  last  of  a  succession  of  tyrannies ;  its  states- 
men but  impostors  who  stood  between  the  people  and 
the  enjoyment  of  their  liberty. 

Among  the  leaders  of  the  Mountain,  Danton  aimed 
at  the  creation  of  a  central  Eevolutionary  Government, 
armed  with  absolute  powers  for  the  prosecution  of  the 
war;  and  he  attacked  the  Girondins  only  when  they 
themselves  had  rejected  his  support.  Eobespierre, 
himself  the  author  of  little  beyond  destruction,  was  the 
idol  of  those  whom  Eousseau's  writings  had  filled  with 
the  idea  of  a  direct  exercise  of  sovereignty  by  the 
people.  It  was  in  the  trial  of  the  King  that  the 
Gironde  first  confessed  it^  submission  to  the  democracy 
of  Paris.  The  Girondins  in  their  hearts  desired  to  save 
the  King ;  they  voted  for  his  death  with  the  hope  of 
maintaining  their  influence  in  Paris,  and  of  clearing 
themselves  from  the  charge  of  lukewarmness  in  the 
cause  of  th^  Eevolution.  But  the  sacrifice  was  as  vain 
p  2 


68  MODERN  JEJUBOPE.  im, 

as  it  was  dishonourable.  The  populace  and  the  party 
of  the  Mountain  took  the  act  in  its  true  character,  as 
an  acknowledgment  of  their  own  victory.  A  series  of 
measures  was  brought  forward  providing  for  the  poorer 
classes  at  the  expense  of  the  wealthy.  The  Gironde, 
now  forced  to  become  the  defenders  of  property,  encoun- 
tered the  fatal  charge  of  deserting  the  cause  of  the 
people ;  and  from  this  time  nothing  but  successful 
foreign  warfare  could  have  saved  their  party  from  ruin. 
Instead  of  success  came  inaction,  disaster,  and 
treason.  The  army  of  Flanders  lay  idle  during 
January  and  February  for  want  of  provisions  and 
materials  of  war ;  and  no  sooner  had  Dumouriez  opened 
the  campaign  against  Holland  than  he  was  recalled 
by  intelligence  that  the  Austrians  had  fallen  upon 
his  lieutenant,  Miranda,  at  Maestricht,  and  driven  the 
French  army  before  them.  Dumouriez  returned,  in 
order  to  fight  a  pitched  battle  before  Brussels.  He 
attacked    the    Austrians     at    Neerwinden 

Defeat  and  trea- 

rfez^^M^cS:     (March  18),  and  suffered  a  repulse  incon- 

1793 

siderable  in  itself,  but  sufficient  to  demoralise 
an  army  composed  in  great  part  of  recruits  and  National 
Guards.*       His   defeat    laid    Flanders    open    to    the 

•Ton  Sybel,  ii.,  259.  Tliugut,  Yertrauliclie  Briefe,  i.,  17.  Letters 
from  Brussels,  23rd  Marcli  in  Records  r  Flanders,  vol.  222.  "  The  Huzars 
are  in  motion  aU  round,  so  that  we  hope  to  have  them  here  to- 
morrow. Most  of  the  French  troops  who  arrived  last,  and  which  are 
mostly  peasants  armed  with  pikes,  are  returning  home,  besides  a  great 
number  of  their  volunteers."  24th  March.  *'  At  this  moment  we  hear  the 
cannon.  The  French  have  just  had  it  cry'd  in  the  town  that  all  the  tailors 
who  are  making  coats  for  the  army  must  bring  them  made  or  unmade,  and 
be  paid  directly.  ....  They  beat  the  drums  to  drown  the  report  of  the 
cannon.  ....    You  have  not  a  conception  of  the  confusion  in  the  town. 


17W.  FALL   OF  THE    QTRONDB.  m 

Austrians ;  but  Dumouriez  intended  that  it  should 
inflict  upon  the  Eepublic  a  far  heavier  blow.  Since  the 
execution  of  the  King,  he  had  been  at  open  enmity  with 
the  Jacobins.  He  now  proposed  to  the  Austrian  com- 
mander to  unite  with  him  in  an  attack  upon  the 
Convention,  and  in  re-establishing  monarchy  in  France. 
The  first  pledge  of  Dumouriez's  treason  was  the 
surrender  of  three  commissioners  sent  by  the  Convention 
to  his  camp ;  the  second  was  to  have  been  the  surrender 
of  the  fortress  of  Cond^.  But  Dumouriez  had  overrated 
his  influence  with  the  army.  Plainer  minds  than  his  own 
knew  how  to  deal  with  a  general  who  intrigues  with  the 
foreigner.  Dumouriez's  orders  were  disregarded;  his 
movements  watched ;  and  he  fled  to  the  Austrian  lines 
under  the  fire  of  his  own  soldiers.  About  thirty  officers 
and  eight  hundred  men  passed  with  him  to  the  enemy. 
The  defeat  and  treason  of  Dumouriez  brought  the 
army  of  Austria  over  the  northern  frontier.  Defeats  <m  the 
Almost  at  the  same  moment  Custine  was     5evoit*°of  i* 

Vend^.  March* 

overpowered  in  the  Palatinate;  and  the  ^^^ 
conquests  of  the  previous  autumn,  with  the  exception 
of  Mainz,  were  lost  as  rapidly  as  they  had  been  won. 
Custine  fell  back  upon  the  lines  of  Weissenburg, 
leaving  the  defence  of  Mainz  to  a  garrison  of  17,000 
men,  which,  alone  among  the  Republican  armies,  now 
maintained  its  reputation.     In  France  itself  civil  war 

....  This  moment  passed  four  Aastrians  with  their  heads  cut  to  pieces, 
and  one  with  his  eye  poked  oat.  The  French  are  retiring  by  the  Porte 
d'Anderlecht."  Ostend,  April  4th.  "  This  day,  before  two  of  the  clock, 
twenty-five  Austrian  hnzars  entered  the  town  while  the  inhabitants 
employed  burning  the  tree  of  liberty." 


70  MOBBEN  EUROPE.  vm. 

broke  out.  The  peasants  of  La  Yendee,  a  district 
destitute  of  large  towns,  and  scarcely  touched  either 
by  the  evils  which  had  produced  the  Revolution  or 
by  the  hopes  which  animated  the  rest  of  France, 
had  seen  with  anger  the  expulsion  of  the  parish 
priests  who  refused  to  take  the  oath  to  the  Con- 
stitution. A  levy  of  300,000  men,  which  was  ordered 
by  the  Convention  in  February,  1793,  threw  into  revolt 
the  simple  Yendeans,  who  cared  for  nothing  outside  their 
own  parishes,  and  preferred  to  fight  against  their  country- 
men rather  than  to  quit  their  homes.  The  priests  and  the 
Royalists  fanned  these  village  outbreaks  into  a  religious 
war  of  the  most  serious  character.  Though  poorly 
armed,  and  accustomed  to  return  to  their  homes  as  soon 
as  fighting  was  over,  the  Yendean  peasantry  proved 
themselves  a  formidable  soldiery  in  the  moment  of 
attack,  and  cut  to  pieces  the  half- disciplined  battalions 
which  the  Government  sent  against  them.  On  the 
north,  France  was  now  assailed  by  the  English  as  well 
as  by  the  Austrians.  The  Allies  laid  siege  to  Cond^ 
and  Yalenciennes,  and  drove  the  French  army  back  in 
disorder  at  Famars.  Each  defeat  was  a  blow  dealt 
to  the  Government  of  the  Gironde  at  Paris.  With 
foreign  and  civil  war  adding  disaster  to  disaster, 
with  the  general  to  whom  the  Gironde  had  entrusted 
the  defence  of  the  Republic  openly  betraying  it 
to  its  enemies,  the  fury  of  the  capital  was  easily 
excited  against  the  party  charged  with  all  the  mis- 
fortunes of  France.  A  threatening  movement  of  the 
middle   classes   in    resistance   to    a    forced    loan   pre- 


178a  GOVERNMENT   OF  179a  71 

cipitated  the  struggle.  The  Girondins  were  accused 
of  arresting  the  armies  of  the  Eepublic  in  the  midst  of 
their  conquests,  of  throwing  the  frontier  open  to  the 
foreigner,  and  of  kindling  the  civil  war  of  La  Vend6e. 
On  the  31st  of  May  a  raging  mob  invaded  the  Con- 
vention. Two  days  later  the  representatives  of  France 
were  surrounded  by  the  armed  forces  of 
the   Commune;    the    twenty-four    leading     crushes  the 

'  -^  O        Gironde.  June  2 

members  of  the  Gironde  were  placed  under 
arrest,  and  the  victory  of  the  Mountain  was  completed.* 
The  situation  of  France,  which  was  serious  before, 
now  became  desperate;  for  the  Girondins, 
escaping  from  their  arrest,  called  the  ^^^^^^^ 
departments  to  arms  against  Paris. 
Normandy,  Bordeaux,  Marseilles,  Lyons,  rose  in  in- 
surrection against  the  tyranny  of  the  Mountain,  and 
the  Royalists  of  the  south  and  west  threw  themselves 
into  a  civil  war  which  they  hoped  to  turn  to  their  own 
advantage.  But  a  form  of  government  had  now  arisen 
in  France  well  fitted  to  cope  with  extraordinary  perils. 
It  was  a  form  of  government  in  which  there  was 
little  trace  of  the  constitutional  tendencies  of  1789, 
one  that  had  come  into  being  as  the  stress  of  con- 
flict threw  into  the  background  the  earlier  hopes 
and  efforts  of  the  Revolution.  In  the  two  earlier 
Assemblies  it  had  been  a  fixed  principle  that  the  re- 
presentatives of  the  people  were  to  control  the  Govern- 
ment, but  were  not  to  assume  executive  powers  them- 
selves. After  the  overthrow  of  Monarchy  on  the  10th 
•  Mortimer-Teruaiix,  vii,  412^ 


72  MODERN  EUBOPK  1798. 

August,  the  Ministers,  tliougli  still  nominally  possessed 
of  powers  distinct  from  the  representative  body,  began 
to  be  checked  by  Committees  of  the  Convention 
appointed  for  various  branches  of  the  public  service ; 
and  in  March,  1793,  in  order  to  meet  the  increasing 
difficulties  of  the  war,  a  Committee  of  Public  Safety 
was  appointed,  charged  with  the  duty  of  exercising  a 
general  surveillance  over  the  administration.  In  this 
Committee,  however,  as  in  all  the  others,  the  Gironde 
were  in  the  majority ;  and  the  twenty -four  members  who 
composed  it  were  too  numerous  a  body  to  act  with 
effect.  The  growing  ascendancy  of  the  Mountain 
produced  that  concentration  of  force  which  the  times 
required.  The  Committee  was  reduced  in  April  to  nine 
members,  and  in  this  form  it  ultimately  became  the 
supreme  central  power.  It  was  not  until  after  the  revolt 
of  Lyons  that  the  Committee,  exchanging  Danton's 
influence  for  that  of  Eobespierre,  adopted  the  principle 
of  Terror  which  has  made  the  memory  of  their  rule 
one  of  the  most  sinister  in  history. 

Their  authority  steadily  increased.  The  members 
divided  among  themselves  the  great  branches  of 
government.  One  directed  the  army,  another  the 
navy,  another  foreign  afiairs;  the  signature  of  three 
members  practically  gave  to  any  measure  the  force  of 
law,  for  the  Convention  accepted  and  voted  their  reports 
as  a  matter  of  course.     Whilst  the  Com- 

Oonunissioners  ,.  _  _ 

^theconven-      mittcc  gave   ordcrs  as  the  supreme  execu- 
tive, eighty  of  the  most  energetic  of  the 
Mountain  spread  themselves  over  France,  in  parties  of 


1798.  BEION   OF   TEBEOE.  98 

two  and  three,  with  the  title  of  Commissioners  of  the 
Convention,  and  with  powers  over-riding  those  of  all 
the  local  authorities.  They  were  originally  appointed 
for  the  purpose  of  hastening  on  the  levy  ordered  by 
the  Convention  in  March,  hut  their  powers  were  gradually 
extended  over  the  whole  range  of  administratio;i. 
Their  will  was  absolute,  their  authority  supreme. 
Where  the  councillors  of  the  Departments  or  the 
municipal  officers  were  good  Jacobins,  the  Commissioners 
availed  themselves  of  local  machinery ;  where  they  sus- 
pected their  principles,  they  sent  them  to  the  scaffold, 
and  enforced  their  own  orders  by  whatever  means  were 
readiest.  They  censured  and  dismissed  the  generals; 
one  of  them  even  directed  the  movements  of  a  fleet  at 
sea.  What  was  lost  by  waste  and  confusion  and  by  the 
interference  of  the  Commissioners  in  military  move- 
ments was  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  vigour 
which  they  threw  into  all  the  preparations  of  war,  and 
by  the  unity  of  purpose  which,  at  the  price  of  unsparing 
bloodshed,  they  communicated  to  every  group  where 
Frenchmen  met  together. 

But  no  individual  energy  could  have  sustained 
these  dictatorships  without  the  support  of  a  popular 
organisation.  All  over  France  a  system  of  revolutionary 
government  sprang  up,  which  superseded  all  existing 
institutions  just  as  the  authority  of  the  Commissioners 
of  the  Convention  superseded  all  existing 
local  powers.  The  local  revolutionary  ad-  tjpMjjr  •y.tan 
ministration  consisted  of  a  Committee,  a 
Club,  and  a  Tribunal.*     In  each  of  21,000  communes 

*  Berriat-St-Frix,  Ls  Justice  Bevolatioimaire,  introd. 


74  MODERN  EUEOFE.  1793. 

a  committee  of  twelve  was  elected  by  the  people,  and 
entrusted  by  the  Convention,  as  the  Terror  gained 
ground,  with  boundless  powers  of  arrest  and  imprison- 
ment. Popular  excitement  was  sustained  by  clubs, 
where  the  peasants  and  labourers  assembled  at  the  close 
of.  their  day's  work,  and  applauded  the  victories  or 
denounced  the  enemies  of  the  Be  volution.  A  Tribunal 
with  swift  procedure  and  powers  of  life  and  death  sat  in 
each  of  the  largest  towns,  and  judged  the  prisoners  who 
were  sent  to  it  by  the  committees  of  the  neighbouring 
district.  Such  was  the  government  of  1793 — an 
executive  of  uncontrolled  power  drawn  from  the  members 
of  a  single  Assembly,  and  itseK  brought  into  immediate 
contact  with  the  poorest  of  the  people  in  their  assem- 
blies and  clubs.  The  balance  of  interests  which  creates 
a  constitutional  system,  the  security  of  life,  liberty,  and 
property,  which  is  the  essence  of  every  recognised  social 
order,  did  not  now  exist  in  Trance.  One  public  pur- 
pose, the  defence  of  the  Eevolution,  became  the  law 
before  which  aU  others  lost  their  force.  Treating  all 
France  like  a  town  in  a  state  of  siege,  the  Grovernment 
took  upon  itself  the  duty  of  providing  support  for  the 
poorest  classes  by  enactments  controlling  the  sale  and 
possession  of  the  necessaries  of  life.  The  price  of 
corn' and  other  necessaries  was  fixed;  and,  when  the 
Law  of  the  traders  and  producers  consequently  ceased 
°'^*  to  bring  their  goods  to  market,  the  Com- 
missioners of  the  Convention  were  empowered  to  make 
requisition  of  a  certain  quantity  of  corn  for  every  acre 
of  ground.     Property  was  thus  placed  at  the  disposal  of 


1788.  EEIQN   OF   TEBUOB.  71 

the  men  who  already  exercised  absolute  political  power. 
"  The  state  of  France/*  said  Burke,  ''  is  perfectly  simple. 
It  consists  of  but  two  descriptions,  the  oppressors 
and  the  oppressed.''  It  is  in  vain  that  the  attempt 
has  been  made  to  extenuate  the  atrocious  and  sense- 
less cruelties  of  this  time  by  extolling  the  great  legis- 
lative projects  of  the  Convention,  or  pleading  the  dire 
necessity  of  a  land  attacked  on  every  side  by  the 
foreigner,  and  rent  with  civil  war.  The  more  that  is 
known  of  the  Eeign  of  Terror,  the  more  hateful,  the 
meaner  and  more  disgusting  is  the  picture  unveiled. 
France  was  saved  not  by  the  brutalities,  but  by  the  energy, 
of  the  faction  that  ruled  it.  It  is  scarcely  too  much  to  say 
that  the  cause  of  European  progress  would  have  been 
less  injured  by  the  military  overthrow  of  the  Republic, 
by  the  severance  of  the  border  provinces  from  France  and 
the  restoration  of  some  shadow  of  the  ancient  regime, 
than  by  the  traditions  of  horror  which  for  the  next 
fifty  years  were  inseparably  associiited  in  men's  minds 
with  the  victory  of  the  people  over  established  power. 

The  Revolutionary  organisation  did  not  reach  its 
full  vigour  till  the  autumn  of  1793,  when 
the  prospects  of  France  were  at  their  M^ch-sept., 
worst.  Custine,  who  was  brought  up 
from  Alsace  to  take  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
North,  found  it  so  demoralised  that  he  was  unable  to 
attempt  the  relief  of  the  fortresses  which  were  now 
besieged  by  the  Allies.  Cond^  surrendered  to  the 
Austrians  on  the  10th  of  July ;  Valenciennes  capitulated 
to    the    Duke   of    York    a    fortnight    later.      In   the 


76  MOBEEN  EUROPE.  1793. 

east  the  fortune  of  war  was  no  better.  An  attack 
made  on  tlie  Prussian  army  besieging  Mainz  totally 
failed;  and  on  tbe  23rd  of  July  this  great  fortress, 
which  had  been  besieged  since  the  middle  of  April, 
passed  back  into  the  hands  of  the  Grermans.  On 
every  side  the  Eepublic  seemed  to  be  sinking  before 
its  enemies.  Its  frontier  defences  had  fallen  before  the 
victorious  Austrians  and  English ;  Brunswick  was  ready 
to  advance  upon  Alsace  from  conquered  Mainz ;  Lyons 
and  Toulon  were  in  revolt ;  La  Vendee  had  proved  the 
grave  of  the  forces  sent  to  subdue  it.  It  was  in  this 
crisis  of  misfortune  that  the  Convention  placed  the 
entire  male  population  of  France  between  the  ages  of 
eighteen  and  twenty-five  at  the  disposal  of  the  Govern- 
ment, and  turned  the  whole  country  into  one  great 
camp  and  arsenal  of  war.  Nor  was  there  wanting  a 
mind  equal  to  the  task  of  giving  order  to  this  vast 
material.  The  appointment  of  Carnot,  an  officer  of 
engineers,  to  a  seat  on  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety 
placed  the  military  administration  of  France  in  the 
hands  of  a  man  who,  as  an  organiser,  if  not  as  a  strate- 
gist, was  soon  to  prove  himself  without  equal  in  Europe. 
Nevertheless,  it  was  to  the  dissensions  and  to  the 
bad  policy  of  the  Allies  more  than  to  the  energy  of 
its  own  Government  that  France  owed  its 

Til  6  AllifiS  spfit  

each  their     safctv.     Thc   obiect  for   which  the   Allies 

separate  ends.  "^  ♦^ 

professed  to  be  carrying  on  the  war,  the 
establishment  of  a  pacific  Government  in  France,  was 
subordinated  to  schemes  of  aggrandisement,  known  as 
the  acquisition  of  just  indemnities.  While  Prussia,  bent 


OT8.  THE  DEMOOBATTO   ABMT.  77 

chiefly  on  preventing  the  Emperor  from  gaining  Bavaria 
in  exchange  for  Belgium,  kept  its  own  army  inactive  on 
the  Rhine,*  Austria,  with  the  full  approval  of  Pitt's 
Cabinet,  claimed  annexations  in  Northern  France,  as 
well  as  Alsace,  and  treated  the  conquered  town  of  Cond^ 
as  Austrian  territory.!  Henceforward  all  the  opera- 
tions of  the  northern  army  were  directed  to  the  ac- 
quisition of  frontier  territory,  not  to  the  pursuit  and 
overthrow   of  the   Republican   forces.      The   war   was 


*  "  The  King  of  Pmssia  has  been  educated  in  the  persuasion  that  the 
execution  of  that  exchange  involves  the  ruin  of  his  family,  and  he  is  the 
more  sore  about  it  that  by  the  qualified  consent  which  he  has  given  to  its 
taking  place  he  has  precluded  himself  from  opposing  it  by  arms.  Accord- 
ingly, every  idle  story  which  arrives  from  Munich  which  tends  to  revive  this 
apprehension  makes  au  impression  which  I  am  unable,  at  the  first  moment,  to 
efface."  Lord  Yarmouth,  from  the  Prussian  camp,  Aug.  12, 1793,  Records : 
Army  in  Germany,  437.  "  Marquis  Lucchesini,  the  effectual  director,  is 
desirous  of  avoiding  every  expense  and  every  exertion  of  the  troops  ;  of 
leaving  the  whole  burden  of  the  war  on  Austria  and  the  other  combined 
Powers ;  and  of  seeing  difficulties  multiply  in  the  arrangements  which  the 
Court  of  Yienna  may  wish  to  form.  I  do  not  perceive  any  object  beyond 
this ;  no  desire  of  diminishing  the  power  of  France ;  no  system  or  feeling 
for  crushing  the  opinions,  the  doctrines,  of  that  country."  Elgin,  May  17. 
Records  :  Flanders,  vol.  223. 

t  Auckland,  iii.,  24.  Thugut,  Yertrauliche  Briefs  i.,  13.  Grenville 
to  Eden,  Sept.  7th,  1793,  Records :  Austria,  vol.  34 :  a  most  important 
historical  document,  setting  out  the  principles  of  alliance  between  England 
and  Austria.  Austria,  if  it  will  abandon  the  Bavarian  exchange,  may 
claim  annexations  on  the  border  of  the  Netherlands,  in  Alsace  and  Lorraine, 
and  in  the  intermediate  parts  of  the  frontier  of  France.  England's 
indemnity  "  must  be  looked  for  in  the  foreign  settlements  and  colonies  of 
France.  .  .  .  His  Majesty  has  an  interest  in  seeing  the  House  of 
Austria  strengthen  itself  by  acquisitions  on  the  French  frontier.  The 
Emperor  must  see  with  pleasure  tlie  relative  increase  of  the  naval  and 
commercial  resources  of  this  country  beyond  those  of  France."  In  the  face 
of  this  paper,  it  cannot  be  maintained  that  the  war  of  1793  was,  after  the 
first  few  months,  purely  defensive  on  England's  part ;  thongh  no  doabt 
Pitt's  notion  of  an  indemnity  was  fair  and  modest  in  comparison  with 
the  schemes  and  acts  of  his  enemy. 


78  MODERN  EUROPE.  ITSS. 

openly  converted  from  a  war  of  defence  into  a  war  of 
spoliation.  It  was  a  change  which  mocked  the  dis- 
interested professions  with  which  the  Allies  had  taken 
up  arms;  in  its  military  results  it  was  absolutely 
ruinous.  In  face  of  the  immense  levies  which  promised 
the  French  certain  victory  in  a  long  war,  the  only  hope 
for  the  Allies  lay  in  a  rapid  march  to  Paris ;  they  pre- 
ferred the  extreme  of  division  and  delay.  No  sooner 
had  the  advance  of  their  united  armies  driven  Custine 
from  his  stronghold  at  Eamars,  than  the  English  com- 
mander led  off  his  forces  to  besiege  Dunkirk,  while  the 
Austrians,  under  Prince  Coburg,  proceeded  to  invest 
Cambray  and  Le  Quesnoy.  The  line  of  the  invaders  thus 
extended  from  the  Channel  to  Brunswick's  posts  at 
Landau,  on  the  border  of  Alsace  ;  the  main  armies  were 
out  of  reach  of  one  another,  and  their  strength  was 
diminished  by  the  corps  detached  to  keep  up  their  com- 
munications. The  French  held  the  inner  circle;  and  the 
advantage  which  this  gave  them  was  well  understood 
by  Carnot,  who  now  inspired  the  measures  of  the 
Committee.  In  steadiness  and  precision  the  French 
recruits  were  no  match  for  the  trained  armies  of 
Germany ;  but  the  supply  of  them  was  inexhaustible, 
and  Carnot  knew  that  when  they  were  thrown  in  suffi- 
cient masses  upon  the  enemy  their  courage  and 
enthusiasm  would  make  amends  for  their  inexperience. 
The  successes  of  the  Allies,  unbroken  from  February 
to  August,  now  began  to  alternate  with  defeats ;  the 
flood  of  invasion  was  first  slowly  and  obstinately  re- 
pelled, then  swept  away  before  a  victorious  advance. 


1793  YOMK  DRIVEN  FROM  DUNKIBK  7» 

It  was  on  the  British  commander  that  the  first  blow 
was  struck.  The  forces  that  could  he  detached  from  the 
French  Northern  army  were  not  sufficient  to  drive  York 
from  before  Dunkirk;  but  on  the  Moselle  there  were 
troops  engaged  in  watching  an  enemy  who  was  not 
likely  to  advance ;  and  the  Committee  did  not  hesitate 
to  leave  this  side  of  France  open  to  the  Prussians  in 
order  to  deal  a  decisive  stroke  in  the  north.  Before  the 
movement  was  noticed  by  the  enemy,  Carnot  had  trans- 
ported 30,000  men  from  Metz  to  the  English  Channel ; 
and    in   the  first  week  of    September    the 

^  .  ,^_      -  M     T       York  driyen 

German  corps  covering  York  was  assailed  from  rhmidrk, 
by  Greneral  Houchard  with  numbers  double 
its  own.  The  Germans  were  driven  back  upon  Dun- 
kirk ;  York  only  saved  his  own  army  from  destruction 
by  hastily  raising  the  siege  and  abandoning  his  heavy 
artillery.  The  victory  of  the  French,  however,  was  ill 
followed  up.  Houchard  was  sent  before  the  Eevolu- 
tionary  Tiibunal,  and  he  paid  with  his  life  for  his 
mistakes.  Custine  had  already  perished,  unjustly 
condemned  for  the  loss  of  Mainz  and  Valenciennes. 

It  was  no  unimportant  change  for  France  when  the 
successors   of   Custine    and   Houchard   re- 
ceived their  commands  from  the  Committee    to  men  oTIS 

people. 

of  Public  Safety.  The  levelling  principle 
of  the  Eeign  of  Terror  left  its  effect  on  France  through 
its  operation  in  the  army,  and  through  this  almost  alone. 
Its  executions  produced  only  horror  and  reaction;  its 
confiscations  were  soon  reversed  ;  but  the  creation  of  a 
thoroughly    democratic   army,   the   work    of  the   men 


80  .  MODERN  EUROPE.  i79a 

who  overtlirew  the  Grironde,  gave  the  most  powerful 
and  abiding  impulse  to  social  equality  in  France.  The 
first  generals  of  the  Eevolution  had  been  officers  of  the 
old  army,  men,  with  a  few  exceptions,  of  noble  birth, 
who,  like  Custine,  had  enrolled  themselves  on  the 
popular  side  when  most  of  their  companions  quitted 
the  country.  These  generals  were  connected  with  the 
politicians  of  the  Grironde,  and  were  involved  in  its  fall. 
The  victory  of  the  Mountain  brought  men  of  another 
type  into  command.  Almost  all  the  leaders  appointed 
by  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety  were  soldiers 
who  had  served  in  the*  ranks.  In  the  levies  of  1792 
and  1793  the  officers  of  the  newly-formed  battalions 
were  chosen  by  the  recruits  themselves.  Patriotism, 
energy  of  character,  acquaintance  with  warfare,  instantly 
brought  men  into  prominence.  Soldiers  of  the  old  army, 
like  Massena,  who  had  reached  middle  life  with  their 
knapsacks  on  their  backs ;  lawyers,  like  the  Breton 
Moreau;  waiters  at  inns,  like  Murat,  found  themselves 
at  the  head  of  their  battalions,  and  knew  that  Carnot 
was  ever  watching  for  genius  and  ability  to  call  it  to  the 
highest  commands.  With  a  million  of  men  under  arms, 
there  were  many  in  whom  great  natural  gifts  supplied 
the  want  of  professional  training.  It  was  also  inevitable 
that  at  the  outset  command  should  sometimes  fall  into  the 
hands  of  mere  busy  politicians;  but  the  character  of  the 
generals  steadily  rose  as  the  Committee  gained  the  as- 
cendancy over  a  knot  of  demagogues  who  held  the  War 
Ministry  during  the  summer  of  1793  ;  and  by  the  end  of 
the  year  there  was  scarcely  one  officer  in  high  command 


1998.  TEE   DJEMOOBATIO   AUMY.  81 

who  had  not  proved  himself  worthy  of  his  post.  In 
the  investigation  into  Houchard's  conduct  at  Dunkirk, 
Carnot  learnt  that  the  victory  had  in  fact  been  won  by 
Jourdan,  one  of  the  generals  of  division.  Jourdan  had 
begun  life  as  a  common  soldier  fifteen  years  before. 
Discharged  at  the  end  of  the  American  War,  he  had  set 
up  a  draper's  shop  in  Limoges,  his  native  town.  He 
joined  the  army  a  second  time  on  the  outbreak  of  the 
Eevolutionary  War,  and  the  men  of  his  battalion  elected 
him  captain.  His  ability  was  noticed;  he  was  made 
successively  general  of  brigade  and  general  of  division  ; 
and,  upon  the  dismissal  of  Houchard,  Carnot  summoned 
him  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  North.  The 
Austrians  were  now  engaged  in  the  invest- 
ment   of    Maubeusfe.      On    the    15th    of    toryatwati%I 

®  nies,  Oct.  16. 

October    Jourdan    attacked    and    defeated 
their  covering  army  at  Wattignies.     His  victory  forced 
the   Austrians    to    raise   the   siege,    and  brought   the 
campaign  to  an  end  for  the  winter. 

Thus    successful    on    the    northern    frontier,    the 
Eepublic    carried   on   war   aerainst   its   in-     , 

r  o  Lyons,   Toidon, 

temal  enemies  without  pause  and  without  ^^!**SS^ 
mercy.  Lyons  surrendered  in  October  ;  its 
citizens  were  slaughtered  by  hundreds  in  cold  blood. 
Toulon  had  thrown  itself  into  the  hands  of  the  English, 
and  proclaimed  King  Louis  XVI L  It  was  besieged  by 
land;  but  the  operations  produced  no  effect  until 
Napoleon  Bonaparte,  captain  of  artillery,  planned  the 
capture  of  a  ridge  from  which  the  cannon  of  the 
besiegers  would   command    the   English    fleet   in   the 


82  MODERN  EUROPE,  179a 

harbour.  Hood,  the  British  admiral,  now  found  his 
position  hopeless.  He  took  several  thousands  of  the 
inhabitants  on  board  his  ships,  and  put  out  to  sea, 
blowing  up  the  French  ships  which  he  left  in  the 
harbour.  Hood  had  received  the  fleet  from  the  Eoyal- 
ists  in  trust  for  their  King ;  its  destruction  gave  England 
command  of  the  Mediterranean  and  freed  Naples  from 
fear  of  attack ;  and  Hood  thought  too  little  of  the 
consequences  which  his  act  would  bring  down  upon 
those  of  the  inhabitants  of  Toulon  whom  he  left 
behind.*  The  horrors  that  followed  the  entry  of  the 
Eepublican  army  into  the  city  did  not  prevent  Pitt  from 
including  among  the  subjects  of  congratulation  in  the 
King's  Speech  of  1794  "the  circumstances  attending 
the  evacuation  of  Toulon."  It  was  perhaps  fortunate 
for  the  Royalists  in  other  parts  of  Prance  that  they 

*  The  first  mention  of  Bonaparte's  name  in  any  British  document 
occurs  in  an  account  of  the  army  of  Toulon  sent  to  London  in  Dec.  1793  by 
a  spy.  "  Les  capifaines  d'artillerie,  eleves  dans  cet  etat,  connbissent  leur 
service  et  ont  tons  du  talens.  lis  pr6f eroient  I'employer  pour  une  meilleure 
cause.  .  .  Le  sixieme,  nomme  Bonaparte,  tres  republicain,  a  ete  tue  sous 
ks  murs  de  Toulon."  Records  :  France,  vol.  599.  Austria  undertook  to 
send  5,000  troops  from  Lombardy  to  defend  Toulon,  but  broke  its  engage- 
ment. "  Ton  will  wait  on  M.  Tlmgut  (the  Austrian  Minister)  and  claim 
in  the  most  peremxitory  terms  the  performance  of  this  engagement.  It 
would  be  very  offensive  to  his  Majesty  that  a  request  made  so  repeatedly 
on  his  part  should  be  neglected ;  but  it  is  infinitely  more  so  to  see  that, 
when  this  country  is  straining  every  nerve  for  the  common  cause,  a  body 
of  troops  for  the  want  of  which  Toulon  may  possibly  at  this  moment 
be  lost,  have  remained  inactive  at  Milan.  You  wUl  admit  of  no 
further  excuses."  Greuville  to  Eden,  Nov.  24,  1793.  Thugut's  written 
answer  was,  "  The  Emperor  gave  the  order  of  march  at  a  moment  when 
the  town  of  Toulon  had  nc  garrison.  Its  preservation  then  seemed  matter 
of  pressing  neeessiiy,  but  now  all  inquietude  on  this  score  has  happily 
disappeared.  The  troops  of  different  nations  already  assembled  at  Toulon 
put  the  place  out  of  all  danger."    Records :  Austria,  voL  35. 


19M.  PBU88IA    WITEDBAWING.  at 

failed  to  receive  the  assistance  of  England.  Help  was 
promised  to  the  Vendeans,  but  it  arrived  too  late.  The 
appearance  of  Kleber  at  the  head  of  the  army  which 
had  defended  Mainz  had  already  turned  the  scale. 
Brave  as  they  were,  the  Yendeans  could  not  long 
resist  trained  armies.  The  war  of  pitched  battles  ended 
on  the  Loire  with  the  year  1793.  It  was  succeeded 
by  a  war  of  merciless  and  systematic  destruction  on 
the  one  side,  and  of  ambush  and  surprises  on  the  other. 
At  home  the  foes  of  the  Eepublic  were  sinking  ;  its 
invaders  were  too  much  at  discord  with  one  Pmssia  with- 
another  to  threaten  it  any  longer  with  serious     the  war  on  ao- 

J  O  count  of  Polish 

danger.  Prussia  was  in  fact  withdrawing  '^*^- 
from  the  war.  It  has  been  seen  that  when  King 
Frederick  William  and  the  Emperor  concerted  the 
autumn  campaign  of  1792,  the  understanding  was 
formed  that  Prussia,  in  return  for  its  efforts  against 
France,  should  be  allowed  to  seize  part  of  western 
Poland,  if  the  Empress  Catherine  should  give  her  con- 
sent. With  this  prospect  before  it,  the  thoughts  of  the 
Prussian  Government  had  been  from  the  first  busied  more 
with  Poland,  where  it  hoped  to  enter  into  possession, 
than  with  France,  where  it  had  only  to  fight  Austria's 
battles.  Negotiations  on  the  Polish  question  had  been 
actively  carried  on  between  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg 
during  the  first  months  of  the  war ;  and  in  January, 
1793,  the  Empress  Catherine  had  concluded  a  Treaty  of 
Partition  with  King  Frederick  William,  in  virtue  of 
which  a  Prussian  army  under  Geneml  MoUendorf  imme- 
diately entered  western  Poland.  It  was  thought  good 
o  2 


84  MODSBN  EUROPE.  Wk 

poKcy  to  keep  the  terms  of  this  treaty  secret  from 
Austria,  as  it  granted  a  much  larger  portion  of  Poland 
to  Prussia  than  Austria  was  willing  that  it  should 
receive.  Two  months  passed  before  the  Austrian 
Sovereign  learnt  how  he  had  been  treated  by  his  ally. 
He  then  denounced  the  treaty,  and  assumed  so  threat- 
ening an  attitude  that  the  Prussians  thought  it  necessary 
to  fortify  the  territory  that  they  had  seized."^  The 
Ministers  who  had  been  outwitted  by  the  Court  of  Berlin 
were  dismissed;  Baron  Thugut,  who  from  the  first 
had  prophesied  nothing  but  evil  of  the  Prussian  alliance, 
was  called  to  power.  The  history  of  this  statesman, 
who  for  the  next  eight  years  directed  the  war-policy  of 
Austria,  and  filled  a  part  in  Europe  subordinate  only  to 
those  of  Pitt  and  Bonaparte,  has  until  a  recent  date  been 
drawn  chiefly  from  the  representations  of  his  enemies. 
Humbly  born,  scornful  and  inaccessible,  Thugut  was 
detested  by  the  Viennese  aristocracy ;  the  French  emi- 
grants hated  and  maligned  him  on  account  of  his 
indifference  to  their  cause ;  the  public  opinion  of 
Austria  held  him  responsible  for  unparalleled  mili- 
tary disasters ;  Prussian  generals  and  ambassadors, 
whose  reports  have  formed  the  basis  of  Prussian  histories, 
pictured  him  as  a  Satanic  antagonist.  It  was  long 
believed  of  Thugut  that  while  ambassador  at  Constan- 
tinople he  had  sold  the  Austrian  cypher  to  the  French ; 

•  Hausser,  i.,  482.  "  La  Pnisse,"  wrote  Thugut  at  this  time, "  par- 
viendra  au  moyen  de  son  alliance  a  nous  f aire  plus  de  mal  qu'elle  ne  nous 
a  fait  par  lee  guerres  les  plus  sanglantes."  Briefe  i.,  12,  15.  Thugut 
even  pi'oposed  that  England  should  encourage  the  Poles  to  resist.  Eden, 
April  16 ;  Records  :  Austria,  vol.  33. 


im.  THUOUT.  86 

that  in  1794  he  prevented  his  master's  armies  from 
winning  victories  because  he  had  speculated  in  the 
French  funds;  and  that  in  1799  he  occasioned  the 
murder  of  the  French  envoys  at  Rastadt,  in  order  to 
recover  documents  incriminating  himself.  Better  sources 
of  information  are  now  opened,  and  a  statesman,  jealous, 
bitter,  and  over -reaching,  but  not  without  great  qualities 
of  character,  stands  in  the  place  of  the  legendary  criminal. 
It  is  indeed  clear  that  Thugut's  hatred  of  Prussia 
amounted  almost  to  mania;  it  is  also  clear  that  his 
designs  of  aggression,  formed  in  the  school  of  the 
Emperor  Joseph,  were  fatally  in  conflict  with  the 
defensive  principles  which  Europe  ought  to  have  opposed 
to  the  aggressions  of  France.  Evidence  exists  that 
during  the  eight  years  of  Thugut's  ministry  he  enter- 
tained, together  or  successively,  projects  for  the  annex- 
ation of  French  Flanders,  Bavaria,  Alsace,  part  of 
Poland,  Venice  and  Dalmatia,  Salzburg,  the  Papal 
Legations,  the  Republic  of  Genoa,  Piedmont,  and 
Bosnia;  and  to  this  list  Tuscany  and  Savoy  ought 
probably  to  be  added.  But  the  charges  brought  against 
Thugut  of  underhand  dealings  with  France,  and  of  the 
willing  abandonment  of  German  interests  in  return  for 
compensation  to  Austria  in  Italy,  rest  on  insufficient 
ground.  Though,  like  every  other  politician  at  Vienna 
and  Berlin,  he  viewed  German  affairs  not  as  a  matter 
of  nationality  but  in  subordination  to  the  general  in- 
terests of  his  own  Court,  Thugut  appears  to  have 
been,  of  all  the  Continental  statesmen  of  that  time, 
the   steadiest  enemy    of    French    aggression,   and  to 


86  MOBEBN  EUROPE.  ITM. 

Jiave   offered  the  longest  resistance   to  a  peace  that 
was  purchased  bj  the  cession  of  German  soil."^ 

Nevertheless,  from  the  moment  when  Thugut  was 
called  to  power  the  alliance  between  Austria  and  Prussia 
was  .doomed.  Others  might  perhaps  have  averted  a 
rupture ;  Thugut  made  no  attempt  to  do  so.  The  siege 
of  Mainz  was  the  last  serious  operation  of  war  which  the 
Prussian  army  performed.  The  mission  of  an  Austrian 
envoy,  Lehrbach,  to  the  Prussian  camp  in  August,  1793, 
and  his  negotiations  on  the  Polish  and  the  Bavarian 
questions,  only  widened  the  breach  between  the  two 
Courts.  It  was  known  that  the  Austrians  were  en- 
couraging the  Polish  Diet  to  refuse  the  cession  of  the 
provinces  occupied  by  Prussia;  and  the  advisers  of 
King  Frederick  William  in  consequence  recommended 
him  to  quit  the  Ehine,  and  to  place  himself  at  the  head 
of  an  army  in  Poland.  At  the  head-quarters  of  the 
Allies,  between  Mainz  and  the  Alsatian  frontier,  all  was 
dissension  and  intrigue.  The  impetuosity  of  the  Austrian 
general,  Wiirmser,  who  advanced  upon  Alsace  without 
consulting  the  King,  was  construed  as  a  studied  insult. 
On  the  29th  of  September,  after  informing  the  allied 
Courts  that  Prussia  would  henceforth  take  only  a 
subordinate  part  in  the  war.  King  Frederick  William 

*  The  English  Government  found  that  Thugut  was  from  the  first 
indifferent  to  their  own  aim,  the  restoration  of  the  Bourbons,  or  establish- 
ment of  some  orderly  government  in  France.  In  so  far  as  he  concerned 
himself  with  the  internal  affairs  of  France,  he  hoped  rather  for  continued 
dissension,  as  facilitating  the  annexation  of  French  territory  by  Austria. 
"  Qu'on  profite  de  ce  conflit  des  partis  en  France  pour  tacher  de  se  rendre 
maitre  des  f  orteresses,  afin  de  f  aire  la  loi  au  parti  qui  aura  prevalu,  et  I'obhger 
d*acheter  la  paix  et  la  protection  de  I'empereur,  en  lui  cedaut  telle  partie 
de  sea  conquetes  que  S.  M.  jugera  de  sa  convenance."    Briefe,  i,  13. 


ITBi  VI0T0BIE8   OF  HOOHE.  «7 

quitted  the  army,  leaving  orders  with  the  Duke  of 
Brunswick  to  fight  no  great  Lattle.  It  was  in  vain 
that  Wurmser  stormed  the  lines  of  Weissenburg  (Oct.  13), 
and  victoriously  pushed  forward  into  Alsace.  The 
hopes  of  a  Eoyalist  insurrection  in  Strasburg  proved 
illusory.  The  Grerman  sympathies  shown  by  a  portion 
of  the  upper  and  middle  classes  of  Alsace  only  brought 
down  upon  them  a  bloody  vengeance  at  the  hands  of  St. 
Just,  commissioner  of  the  Convention.  The  peasantry, 
partly  from  hatred  of  the  feudal  burdens  of  the  old 
regime,  partly  from  fear  of  St.  Just  and  the  guillotine, 
thronged  to  the  French  camp.  In  place  of  the  beaten 
generals  came  Hoche  and  Pichegru  :  Hoche,  lately  a 
common  soldier  in  the  Guards,  earning  by  a  humble 
industry  little  sums  for  the  purchase  of  books,  now,  at 
the  age  of  twenty-six,  a  commander  more  than  a  match 
for  the  wrangling  veterans  of  Germany ;  Pichegru,  six 
years  older,  also  a  man  sprung  from  the  people,  once 
a  teacher  in  the  military  school  of  Brienne,  after- 
wards a  private  of  artillery  in  the  American  War. 
A  series  of  harassing  encounters  took  place  during 
December.  At  length,  with  St.  Just  cheering  on  the 
Alsatian  peasants  in  the  hottest  of  the  fire,  these  generals 
victoriously  carried  the  Austrian  positions  victories  of 
at  Worth  and  at  Weissenburg  (Dec.  23,  26).  "  jgra  •t^J^ 
The  Austrian  commander  declared  his  army  »>«»-^>««.26- 
to  be  utterly  ruined ;  and  Brunswick,  who  had  abstained 
from  rendering  his  ally  any  real  assistance,  found  him- 
self a  second  time  back  upon  the  Rhine.* 

*  The  despatches  of  Lord  Yarmouth  from  the  Prossian  and  Aostrian 


88  MODERN  EUROPE.  1794. 

The  virtual  retirement  of  Prussia  from  the  Coalition 

was  no  secret  to  the  French  Grovernment : 

with^   p?S!     amonsfst  the  Allies  it  was  viewed  in  various 

April,  1794.  O 

lights.  The  Empress  Catherine,  who  had 
counted  on  seeing  her  troublesome  Prussian  friend 
engaged  with  her  detested  French  enemy,  taunted  the 
King  of  Prussia  with  the  loss  of  his  personal  honour. 
Austria,  conscious  of.  the  antagonism  between  Prussian 
and  Austrian  interests  and  of  the  hollow  character  of 
the  Coalition,  would  concede  nothing  to  keep  Prussia 
in  arms.  Pitt  alone  was  willing  to  make  a  sacrifice, 
in  order  to  prevent  the  rupture  of  the  alliance.  The 
King  of  Prussia  was  ready  to  continue  the  struggle 
with  France  if  his  expenses  were  paid,  but  not  other- 
wise. Accordingly,  after  Austria  had  refused  to  con- 
tribute the  small  sum  which  Pitt  asked,  a  bargain  was 
struck  between  Lord  Malmesbury  and  the  Prussian 
Minister  Haugwitz,  by  which  Great  Britain  undertook 
to  furnish  a  subsidy,  provided  that  60,000  Prussian 
troops,  under  General  MoUendorf,  were  placed  at 
the  disposal  of  the  Maritime  Powers*  It  was  Pitt's 
intention  that  the  troops  which  he  subsidised  should 
be    massed    with    Austrian    and   English    forces    for 

head-quarters,  from  July  17  to  Nov.  22,  1793,  give  a  lively  picture  both 
of  the  military  operations  and  of  the  political  intrigues  of  this  period. 
They  are  accompanied  by  the  MS.  journal  of  the  Austrian  army  from 
Sept.  15  to  Dec.  14,  each  copy  apparently  with  Wurmser's  autograph, 
and  by  the  original  letter  of  the  Prussian  Minister,  Lucchesini,  to  Lord 
Yarmouth,  announcing  the  withdrawal  of  Prussia  from  the  war.  "  M.  de 
Lucchesini  read  it  to  me  very  hastily,  and  seemed  almost  ashamed  of  a 
part  of  its  contents."  Records  :  Army  in  Germany,  vols.  437,  438,  439. 
*  Hardenberg  (Rauke),  i.,  181.   Yivenot,  Herzog  Albrecht,  i.,  10. 


im.  PBU88IA   AND   POLAND,  80 

the  defence  of  Belgium  :  the  Prussian  Ministry,  avail- 
ing themselves  of  an  ambiguous  expression  in  the  treaty, 
insisted  on  keeping  them  inactive  upon  the  Upper 
Ehine.  Mollendorf  wished  to  guard  Mainz  :  other  men 
of  influence  longed  to  abandon  the  alliance  with 
Austria,  and  to  employ  the  whole  of  Prussia's  force 
in  Poland.  At  the  moment  when  Haugwitz  was 
contracting  to  place  Mollendorf's  army  at  Pitt's  disposal, 
Poland  had  risen  in  revolt  under  Kosciusko, 
and  the  Russian  garrison  which  occupied  Kosciusko. 
Warsaw  had  been  overpowered  and  cut  to 
pieces.  Catherine  called  upon  the  King  of  Prussia  for 
assistance ;  but  it  was  not  so  much  a  desire  to  rescue 
the  Empress  from  a  momentary  danger  that  excited 
the  Prussian  Cabinet  as  the  belief  that  her  vengeance 
would  now  make  an  absolute  end  of  what  remained  of 
the  PoUsh  kingdom.  The  prey  was  doomed;  the 
wisdom  of  Prussia  was  to  be  the  first  to  seize  and  drag 
it  to  the  ground.  So  large  a  prospect  offered  itself  to 
the  Power  that  should  crush  Poland  during  the  brief 
paralysis  of  the  Russian  arms,  that,  on  the  first  news  of 
the  outbreak,  the  King's  advisers  urged  him  instantly 
to  make  peace  with  France  and  to  throw  his  whole 
strength  into  the  Polish  struggle.  Frederick  William 
could  not  reconcile  himself  to  making  peace  with  the 
Jacobins ;  but  he  ordered  an  army  to  march  upon  War- 
saw, and  shortly  afterwards  placed  himself  at  its  head. 
(May,  1794.)  When  the  King,  who  was  the  only  politician 
in  Prussia  who  took  an  interest  in  the  French  war,  thus 
publicly  acknowledged  the  higher  importance  of  the  Polish 


90  MODERN  EVEOTE.  1794. 

campaign,  "his  generals  upon  the  Eliine  made  it  their 
only  object  to  do  nothing  which  it  was  possible  to  leave 
undone  without  actually  forfeiting  the  British  subsidy. 
Instead  of  fighting,  Mollendorf  spent  his  time  in  urging 
other  people  to  make  peace.  It  was  in  vain  that 
.Malmesbury  argued  that  the  very  object  of  Pitt's  bar- 
gain was  to  keep  the  French  out  of  the  Netherlands : 
Mollendorf  had  made  up  his  mind  that  the 
fuses  to  help  in     armv  should  not  be  committed  to  the  orders 

Flanders.  ^ 

of  Pitt  and  the  Austrians.  He  continued 
in  the  Palatinate,  alleging  that  any  movement  of  the 
Prussian  army  towards  the  north  would  give  the  French 
admittance  to  southern  Germany.  Pitt's  hope  of  de- 
fending the  Netherlands  now  rested  on  the  energy  and 
on  the  sincerity  of  the  Austrian  Cabinet,  and  on  this 
alone. 

After  breaking  up  from  winter  quarters  in  the  spring 
of  1794,   the  Austrian  and  English  allied  forces  had 

successfully  laid  siege  to  Landrecies,  and 
sarabre.  May-     defeated  thc  enemy  in  its  neighbourhood.* 

Their  advance,  however,  was  checked  by  a 
movement  of  the  French  Army  of  the  North,  now  com- 

*  Elgin  reports  after  this  engagement,  May  Ist,  1794 — "  The  French 
army  appears  to  continue  mnch  what  it  has  hitherto  been,  vigorous  and 
persevering  where  (as  in  villages  and  woods)  the  local  advantages  are  of  a 
nature  to  supply  the  defects  of  military  science  ;  weak  and  helpless  beyond 
belief  where  cavalry  can  act,  and  manoeuvres  are  possible.  .  .  .  The 
magazines  of  the  army  are  stored,  and  the  provisions  regularly  given  out 
to  the  troops,  and  good  in  quality.  Indeed,  it  is  singular  to  observe  in  all 
the  villages  where  we  have  been  forward  forage,  &c.,  in  plenty,  and  all  the 
country  cultivated  as  usual.  The  inhabitants,  however,  have  retired  with 
the  French  army ;  and  to  that  degree  that  the  tract,  we  have  lately  taken 
possession  of  is  absolutely  deserted.     .    .     .     The  execution  of  Danton 


17M.  AUSTRIA  EVACUATES  THE  NETHERLANDS.        91 

manded  by  Pichegru,  towards  the  Flemish  coast.  York 
and  the  English  troops  were  exposed  to  the  attack,  and 
suffered  a  defeat  at  Turcoing.  The  decision  of  the  cam- 
paign lay,  however,  not  in  the  west  of  Flanders,  bnt  at 
the  other  end  of  the  Allies'  position,  at  Charleroi  on  the 
Sambre,  where  a  French  victory  would  either  force  the 
Austrians  to  fall  back  eastwards,  leaving  York  to  his 
fate,  or  sever  their  communications  with  Germany. 
This  became  evident  to  the  French  Government ;  and 
in  May  the  Commissioners  of  the  Convention  forced 
the  generals  on  the  Sambre  to  fight  a  series  of  battles, 
in  which  the  French  repeatedly  succeeded  in  crossing 
the  Sambre,  and  were  repeatedly  driven  back  again.  The 
fate  of  the  Netherlands  depended,  however,  on  some- 
thing beside  victory  or  defeat  on  the  Sambre.  The 
Emperor  had  come  with  Baron  Thugut  to  Belgium  in 
the  hope  of  imparting  greater  unity  and  energy  to  the 
allied  forces,  but  his  presence  proved  useless.  Among 
the  Austrian  generals  and  diplomatists  there  were  several 
who  desired  to  withdraw  from  the  contest  in  the  Nether- 
lands, and  to  follow  the  example  of  Prussia  in  Poland. 
The  action  of  the  army  was  paralysed  by  intrigues. 
*'  Every  one,"  wrote  Thugut,  "  does  exactly  as  he  pleases : 

has  produced  no  greater  effect  in  the  army  than  other  execations,  and  we 
have  found  many  papers  on  those  who  fell  in  the  late  actions  treating  it 
with  ridicule,  and  as  a  source  of  joy.'*  Records :  Flanders,  226.  "  I  am 
in  hopes  to  hear  from  you  on  the  subject  of  the  French  prisoners,  as  to 
where  I  am  to  apply  for  tho  money  I  advance  for  their  subsistence.  They 
are  a  great  number  of  them  almost  naked,  some  entirely  so.  It  is  absolutely 
shocking  to  humanity  to  see  them.  I  would  purchase  some  coarse  dothiug 
for  those  that  are  in  the  worst  state,  bnt  know  not  how  far  I  should  be 
authorised.  They  are  mostly  old  men  and  boys."  Consul  Harward,  at 
Ostend,  March  4ith«  id. 


92  MODERN  EUBOPK  V9L 

there  is  absolute  anarchy  and  disorder."*  At  the  begin- 
ning of  June  the  Emperor  quitted  the  army;  the  com- 
bats on  the  Sambre  were  taken  up  by  Jour  dan  and  60,000 
fresh  troops  brought  from  the  army  of  the  Moselle ; 
and  on  the  26th  of  June  the  French  defeated  Coburg 
at  Fleurus,  as  he  advanced  to  the  relief  of  Charleroi, 
unconscious  that  Charleroi  had  surrendered  on  the  day 
before.  Even  now  the  defence  of  Belgium  was  not 
hopeless ;  but  after  one  council  of  war  had  declared  in 
favour  of  fighting,  a  second  determined  on  a  retreat.  It 
was  in  vain  that  the  representatives  of  England  appealed  to 
the  good  faith  and  military  honour  of  Austria. 
doT^  the  Nether-     NamuT  aud  Louvaiu  were  abandoned ;  the 

lands,  July,1794. 

French  pressed  onwards ;  and  before  the  end 
of  July  the  Austrian  army  had  fallen  back  behind  the 
Meuse.  York,  forsaken  by  his  allies,  retired  northwards 
before  the   superior  forces  of  Pichegru,   who   entered 

*  These  events  are  the  subject  of  controversy.  See  Hiiffer,  Oestreich 
und  Preussen,  p.  62.  Yon  Sybel,  iii.,  138.  Vivenot,  Clerfayt,  p.  38. 
The  old  belief,  defended  by  Yon  Sybel,  was  that  Thugut  himseK  had  deter- 
mined upon  the  evacuation  of  Belgium,  and  treacherously  deprived  Ooburg 
of  forces  for  its  defence.  But,  apart  from  other  evidence,  the  tone  of  ex- 
asperation that  runs  through  Thugut's  private  letters  is  irreconcilable  with 
this  theory.  Lord  Elgin,  whose  reports  are  used  by  Yon  Sybel,  no 
doubt  believed  that  Thugut  was  playing  false ;  but  he  was  a  bad  judge, 
being  in  the  hands  of  Thugut's  opponents,  especially  General  Mack,  whom 
he  glorifies  in  the  most  absurd  way.  The  other  English  envoy  in  Belgium, 
Lord  Yarmouth,  reported  in  favour  of  Thugut's  good  faith  in  this 
matter,  and  against  military  intriguers.  Records:  Army  in  Grermany, 
vol.  440.  A  letter  of  Prince  Waldeck's  in  Thugut,  i.,  387,  and  a  con- 
versation between  Mack  and  Sir  Morton  Eden,  on  Feb.  3rd.  1797, 
reported  by  the  latter  in  Records:  Austria,  vol.  48,  appear  to  fix  the 
responsibility  for  the  evacuation  of  Belgium  on  these  two  generals, 
Waldeck  and  Mack,  and  on  the  Emperor's  confidential  military  adviser, 
RolliiL 


1991  ENOLANJ)  AND  ITS  ALLIES.  W 

Antwerp  and  made  himself  master  of  the  whole  of  the 
Netherlands  up  to  the  Dutch  frontier.* 

Such  was  the  result  of  Great  Britain's  well-meant 
effort  to  assist  the  two  great  military  P'owers  to  defend 
Europe  against  the  Ke volution.  To  the  aim  of  the 
English  Minister,  the  defence  of  existing 
rights  against  democratic  aggression,  most  pointed  by  tK 
of  the  public  men  alike  of  Austria  and 
Prussia  were  now  absolutely  indifferent.  They  were 
willing  to  let  the  French  seize  and  revolutionise  any 
territory  they  pleased,  provided  that  they  themselves 
obtained  their  equivalent  in  Poland.  England  was  in 
fact  in  the  position  of  a  man  who  sets  out  to  attack  a 
highway  robber,  and  offers  each  of  his  arras  to  a  pick- 
pocket. The  motives  and  conduct  of  these  politicians 
were  justly  enough  described  by  the  English  statesmen 
and  generals  who  were  brought  into  closest  contact  with 
them.     In  the  councils  of  Prussia,  Malmesbury  declared 


*  "  Should  the  French  come  they  will  find  this  town  perfectly  empty 
Except  my  own,  I  do  not  think  there  are  three  honses  in  Ost«nd  with  a  bed 
in  them.  So  general  a  panic  I  never  witnessed.'*  June  30th. — "  To  remain 
here  alone  would  be  a  wanton  sacrifice.  God  knows  'tis  an  awful  stroke  to 
me  to  leave  a  place  just  as  I  began  to  be  comfortably  settled."  Consul 
Harward ;  Records  :  Army  in  Germany,  vol.  440.  "  All  the  English  are 
arrested  in  Ostend :  the  men  are  confined  in  the  Capuchin  convent, 
and  the  women  in  the  Convent  des  Soeurs  Blancs.  All  the  Flamands 
from  the  age  of  17  to  32  are  forced  to  go  for  soldiers.  At  Bruges 
the  French  issued  an  order  for  800  men  to  present  themselves.  Thirty 
only  came,  in  consequence  of  which  they  rang  a  bell  on  the  Grand  Place, 
and  the  inhabitants  thinking  that  it  was  some  ordinance,  quitted  their 
houses  to  hear  it,  when  they  were  surrounded  by  the  French  soldiers,  and 
upwards  of  1,000  men  secured,  gentle  and  simple,  who  were  all  imme- 
diately set  to  work  on  the  canab.'*  Mr.  W.  Poppleton,  Flushing,  Sept  4. 
Records  :  Flanders,  voL  227. 


94  MODERN  EUROPE.  1794. 

that  lie  could  find  no  quality  but  "  great  ani  shabby  art 
and  cunning  ;  ill  will,  jealousy,  and  every  sort  of  dirty 
passion/'  From  the  head-quarters  of  Mollendorf  he 
wrote  to  a  member  of  Pitt's  Cabinet :  "  Here  I  have  to 
do  with  knavery  and  dotage.  .  .  .  If  we  listened 
only  to  our  feelings,  it  would  be  difficult  to  keep  any 
measure  with  Prussia.  We  must  consider  it  an  alliance 
with  the  Algerians,  whom  it  is  no  disgrace  to  pay,  or 
any  impeachment  of  good  sense  to  be  cheated  by.''  To 
the  Austrian  commander  the  Duke  of  York  addressed 
himself  with  royal  plainness  :  "  Your  Serene  Highness, 
the  British  nation,  whose  public  opinion  is  not  to  be 
despised,  will  consider  that  it  has  been  bought  and  sold."* 
The  sorry  concert  lasted  for  a  few  months  longer. 
French  reach  the  ^^burg,  the  Austriau  commaudcr,  was  dis- 
Rhine,oct.,i794.     j^|ggg^  g^|j  jTj^Q  pcrcmptory  demand  of  Great 

Britain;  his  successor, Clerf ay t, after  losing  a  battle  on  the 
Ourthe,  offered  no  further  resistance  to  the  advance  of  the 
Kepublican  army,  and  the  campaign  ended  in  the  capture 
of  Cologne  by  the  French,  and  the  disappearance  of  the 
Austrians  behind  the  Ehine.  The  Prussian  subsidies 
granted  by  England  resulted  in  some  useless  engage- 
ments between  Mollendorf  s  corps  in  the  Palatinate  and 
a  French  army  double  its  size,  followed  by  the  retreat 
of  the  Prussians  into  Mainz.  It  only  remained  for 
Grreat  Britain  to  attempt  to  keep  the  French  out  of  Hol- 

*  Malmesbury,  ii.,  126.  Yon  Sybel,  iil,  168.  Grenville  made  Coburg'e 
dismissal  a  sine  qua  non  of  the  continuance  of  English  co-operation. 
Instructions  to  Lord  Spencer,  July  19, 1794.  Records  :  Austria,  36.  But 
for  the  Austrian  complaints  against  the  English,  see  Yivenot,  Clerfayt, 
p.  60. 


1794.  PICHEOEU  CONQUERS  HOLLAND.  95 

land.  The  defence  of  the  Dutch,  after  everything  sonth 
of  the  river  Waal  had  been  lost,  Pitt  determined  to  en- 
trust to  abler  hands  than  those  of  the  Duke  of  York ; 
but  the  presence  of  one  high-born  blunderer  more  or 
less  made  little  difference  in  a  series  of  operations  con- 
ceived in  indifference  and  perversity.  Clerfayt  would 
not,  or  could  not,  obey  the  Emperor's  orders  and  succour 
his  ally.  City  after  city  in  Holland  welcomed  the 
French.  The  very  elements  seemed  to  declare  for  the 
Eepublic.  Pichegru's  army  marched  in  safety  over  the 
frozen  rivers ;  and,  when  the  conquest  of  the  land  was 
completed,  his  cavalry  crowned  the  campaign 
by  the  capture  of  the  Dutch  fleet  in  the  quo*  Holland" 
midst  of  the  ice-bound  waters  of  the  Texel. 
The  British  regiments,  cut  off  from  home,  made  their 
way  eastward  through  the  snow  towards  the  Hanoverian 
frontier,  in  a  state  of  prostrate  misery  which  is  compared 
by  an  eye-witness  of  both  events  to  that  of  the  French 
on  their  retreat  in  1813  after  the  battle  of  Leipzig  * 

The  first  act  of  the  struggle  between  France  and  the 
Monarchies  of  Europe  was  concluded.  The  result  of 
three  years  of  war  was  that  Belgium,  Nice,  and  Savoy 
had  been  added  to  the  territory  of  the  Eepublic,  and 
that  French  armies  were  in  possession  of  Holland,  and 
the  whole  of  Germany  west  of  the  Ehine.  In  Spain 
and  in  Piedmont  the  mountain-passes  and  some  extent 
of  country  had  been  won.  Even  on  the  seas,  in  spite 
of  the  destruction  of  the  fleet  at  Toulon,  and  of  a  heavy 

•  Schlosser,  xv.,  203 :  borne  out  by  the  NarratiTe  of  an  Officer,  printed 
in  Annual  Register,  1795,  p.  14a 


M  MOBBBN  EUROPE,  HM. 

defeat  by  Lord  Howe  off  Usiiant  on  the  1st  of  June, 
1794,  the  strength  of  France  was  still  formidable  ;  and 
the  losses  which  she  inflicted  on  the  commercial  marine 
of  her  enemies  exceeded  those  which  she  herself  sustained. 
England,  which  had  captured  most  of  the  French  West 
Indian  Islands,  was  the  only  Power  that  had  wrested 
anything  from  the  Eepublic.  The  dream  of  suppressing 
the  Revolution  by  force  of  arms  had  vanished  away;  and 
the  States  which  had  entered  upon  the  contest  in  levity, 
in  fanaticism,  or  at  the  bidding  of  more  powerful  allies, 
found  it  necessary  to  make  peace  upon  such  terms  as  they 
could  obtain.  Holland,  in  which  a  strong  Republican 
party  had  always  maintained  connection  with  France, 
abolished  the  rule  of  its  Stadtholder,  and  placed  its 
resources  at  the  disposal  of  its  conquerors.  Sardinia 
entered  upon  abortive  negotiations.  Spain,  in  return  for 
peace,  ceded  to  the  Republic  the  Spanish  half  of  St. 
Domingo  (July  22,  1795).  Prussia  concluded  a  Treaty 
at  Basle  (April  5),  which  marked  and  perpetuated  the 
division  of  Germany  by  providing  that,  although  the 
Empire  as  a  body  was  still  at  war  with  France,  the 
benefit  of  Prussia's  neutrality  should  extend  to  all  Ger- 
man States  north  of  a  certain  line.  A  secret  article 
Treaties  of  Basle  stipulated  that,  upou  thc  conclusiou  of  a 
s^a^  Jul  ^^  general  peace,  if  the  Empire  should  cede  to 
^^^^'  France  the  principalities  west  of  the  Rhine, 

Prussia  should  cede  its  own  territory  lying  in  that  dis- 
trict, and  receive  compensation  elsewhere.* 

Yivenot,  Herzog  Albrecht,  iii.,  69, 512.  Martens,  Recueil  des  Traits, 
▼L,  4&,  52.    Hardenberg,  i.,  287.    Yiyenot,  Olerfayt,  p.  32.    "  Le  Boi  de 


1795.  THE    TREATIES  OF  BASLE.  97 

Humiliating  such  a  peace  certainly  was ;  yet  it 
would  probably  have  been  the  happiest 
issue  for  Europe  hacj  every  Power  been  landamtinuetE 
forced  to  accept  its  conditions.  The  terri- 
tory gained  by  France  was  not  much  more  than  the 
very  principle  of  the  Balance  of  Power  would  have 
entitled  it  to  demand,  at  a  moment  when  Eussia,  vic- 
torious over  the  Polish  rebellion,  was  proceeding  to 
make  the  final  partition  of  Poland  among  the  three 
Eastern  Monarchies ;  and,  with  all  its  faults,  the  France 
of  1795  would  have  offered  to  Europe  the  example  of  a 
great  free  State,  such  as  the  growth  of  the  military  spirit 
made  impossible  after  the  first  of  Napoleon's  campaigns. 
But  the  dark  future  was  withdrawn  from  the  view  of 
those  British  statesmen  who  most  keenly  felt  the  evils 
of  the  present ;  and  England,  resolutely  set  against  the 
course  of  French  aggression,  still  found  in  Austria  an 
ally  willing  to  continue  the  struggle.  The  financial 
help  of  Great  Britain,  the  Eussian  offer  of  a  large  share 
in  the  spoils  of  Poland,  stimulated  the  flagging  energy 
of  the  Emperor's  government.  Orders  were  sent  to 
Clerfayt  to  advance  from  the  Ehine  at  whatever  risk, 
in  order  to  withdraw  the  troops  of  the  Eepublic  from 
the  west  of  France,  where  England  was  about  to  land  a 
body  of  Eoyalists.  Clerfayt,  however,  disobeyed  his 
instructions,  and  remained  inactive  till  the  autumn. 
He  then  defeated  a  French  army  pushing  beyond  the 

Pruss©,*'  wrote  the  Empress  Catherine,  "  est  une  m^hante  bdte  et  un  grand 
coclion.'*  Prussia  made  no  attempt  to  deliver  the  unhappy  son  of  Loois 
XVI.  from  his  captivity. 


France  in  1795. 


98  MODERN  EUBOPK  1795. 

Ehine,  and  drove  back  tlie  besiegers  of  Mainz ;  but  the 
British  expedition  had  abeady  failed,  and  the  time  was 
passed  when  Clerfayt's  successes  .might  have  produced 
a  decisive  result.''^ 

A  new  Government  was  now  entering  upon  power  in 
France.  The  Eeign  of  Terror  had  ended 
in  July,  1794,  with  the  life  of  Eobespierre. 
The  men  by  whom  Eobespierre  was  overthrown  were 
Terrorists  more  cruel  and  less  earnest  than  himself,  who 
attacked  him  only  in  order  to  save  their  own  lives,  and 
without  the  least  intention  of  restoring  a  constitutional 
Government  to  France.  An  overwhelming  national 
reaction  forced  them,  however,  to  represent  themselves 
as  the  party  of  clemency.  The  reaction  was  indeed  a 
simple  outburst  of  human  feeling  rather  than  a  change 
in  political  opinion.     Among  the  victims  of  the  Terror 

♦  The  British  Government  had  formed  the  most  sangnine  estimate  of 
the  strength  of  the  Royalist  movement  in  France.  "  I  cannot  let  your 
servant  return  without  troubling  you  with  these  few  lines  to  conjure  you 
to  use  every  possible  effort  to  give  life  and  vigour  to  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment at  this  critical  moment.  Strongly  as  I  have  spoken  in  my  despatch 
of  the  present  state  of  France,  I  have  said  much  less  than  my  information, 
drawn  from  various  quarters,  and  applying  to  almost  every  part  of  France, 
would  fairly  warrant.  We  can  never  hope  that  the  circumstances,  as  far 
as  they  regard  the  state  of  France,  can  be  more  favourable  than  they  now 
are.  For  God's  sake  enforce  these  points  with  all  the  earnestness 
which  I  am  sure  you  will  feel  upon  them."  Grenville  to  Eden,  April  17, 
1795 ;  Records :  Austria,  vol.  41.  After  the  failure  of  the  expedition, 
the  British  Government  made  the  grave  charge  against  Thugut  that 
while  he  was  oJficiaUy  sending  Clerfayt  pressing  orders  to  advance,  he 
secretly  told  him  to  do  nothing.  "  It  is  in  vain  to  reason  with  the  Austrian 
Ministers  on  the  folly  and  ill  faith  of  a  system  which  they  have  been  under 
the  necessity  of  concealing  from  you,  and  which  they  will  probably  en- 
deavour to  disguise."  Grenville  to  Eden,  Oct.,  1795 ;  id.,  vol.  43.  This 
charge,  repeated  by  historians,  is  disproved  by  Thugut's  private  letters. 
Brief e,  i.,  221,  seq.    No  one  more  bitterly  resented  Clerfayt's  inaction. 


1795.  FRANCE  AFTER   THE  TERROR,  99 

the  great  majority  had  been  men  of  the  lower  or  middle 
class,  who,  except  in  La  Vendue  and  Brittany,  were  as 
little  friendly  to  the  old  regime  as  their  executioners. 
Every  class  in  France,  with  the  exception  of  the  starving 
city  mobs,  longed  for  security,  and  the  quiet  routine  of 
life.  After  the  disorders  of  the  Eepublic  a  monarchical 
government  naturally  seemed  to  many  the  best  guarantee 
of  peace ;  but  the  monarchy  so  contemplated  was  the 
liberal  monarchy  of  1791,  not  the  ancient  Court,  with 
its  accessories  of  a  landed  Church  and  privileged  noblesse. 
Eeligion  was  still  a  power  in  France ;  but  the  peasant, 
with  all  his  superstition  and  all  his  desire  for  order,  was 
perfectly  free  from  any  delusions  about  the  good  old 
times.  He  liked  to  see  his  children  baptised ;  but  he 
had  no  desire  to  see  the  priest's  tithe-collector  back  in 
his  barn  :  he  shuddered  at  the  summary  marketing  of 
Conventional  Commissioners ;  but  he  had  no  wish  to 
resume  his  labours  on  the  fields  of  his  late  seigneur. 
To  be  a  Monarchist  in  1795,  among  the  shopkeepers  of 
Paris  or  the  farmers  of  Normandy,  meant  no  more  than 
to  wish  for  a  political  system  capable  of  subsisting  for 
twelve  months  together,  and  resting  on  some  other  basis 
than  forced  loans  and  compulsory  sales  of  property. 
But  among  the  men  of  the  Convention,  who  had 
abolished  monarchy  and  passed  sentence  of  death  upon 
the  King,  the  restoration  of  the  Crown  seemed  the 
bitterest  condemnation  of  all  that  the  Convention  had 
done  for  France,  and  a  sentence  of  outlawry  against 
themselves.  If  the  will  of  the  nation  was  for  the 
moment  in  favour  of  a  restored  monarchy,  the  Conven- 
H  2 


100  MODERN  EUROPE,  1795 

tion  determined  that  its  will  must  be  overpowered  by 
force  or  thwarted  by  constitutional  forms.  Threatened 
alternately  by  the  Jacobin  mob  of  Paris  and  by  the 
Eoyalist  middle  class,  the  Grovernment  played  off  one 
enemy  against  the  other,  until  an  ill-timed  effort  of  the 
emigrant  noblesse  gave  to  the  Convention  the  prestige 
of  a  decisive  victory  over  E-oyalists  and  foreigners  com- 
bined.     On  the  27th  of  June,  1795,  an  English  fleet 

landed   the   flower   of  the    old  nobility  of 
beron,  j^e  2?"     Fraucc  at  the  Bay  of  Quiberon  in  southern 

Brittany.  It  was  only  to  give  one  last 
fatal  proof  of  their  incapacity  that  these  unhappy  men 
appeared  once  more  on  French  soil.  Within  three  weeks 
after  their  landing,  in  a  region  where  for  years  together 
the  peasantry,  led  by  their  landlords,  baffled  the  best 
generals  of  the  Eepublic,  this  invading  army  of  the 
nobles,  supported  by  the  fleet,  the  arms,  and  the  money 
of  England,  was  brought  to  utter  ruin  by  the  discord  of 
its  own  leaders.  Before  the  nobles  had  settled  who  was 
to  command  and  who  was  to  obey.  General  Hoche  sur- 
prised their  fort,  beat  them  back  to  the  edge  of  the 
peninsula  where  they  had  landed,  and  captured  all  who 
were  not  killed  fighting  or  rescued  by  English  boats. 
(July  20.)  The  Commissioner  Tallien,  in  order  to  purge 
himself  from  the  just  suspicion  of  Eoyalist  intrigues, 
caused  six  hundred  prisoners  to  be  shot  in  cold  blood. ^ 
At  the  moment  when  the   emigrant  army  reached 

*  The  documents  relating  to  the  expedition  to  Quiberon,  with  several 
letters  of  D'Artois,  Charette,  and  the  Yendean  leaders,  are  in  Records : 
France,  vol.  600. 


1798.  THE   CONSTITUTION  OF  1796.  Ktt 

France,  tlie  Convention  was  engaged  in  discussing  the 
political  system  which  was  to  succeed  its  own  rule.  A 
week  earlier,  the  Committee  appointed  to  p^^^^  ^  o,^ 
draw  up  a  new  constitution  for  France  had  **'*^^=^'^^^- 
presented  its  report.  The  main  object  of  the  new 
constitution  in  its  original  form  was  to  secure  France 
against  a  recurrence  of  those  evils  which  it  had  suffered 
since  1792.  The  calamities  of  the  last  three  years  were 
ascribed  to  the  sovereignty  of  a  single  Assembly.  A 
vote  of  the  Convention  had  established  the  Eevolutionary 
Tribunal,  proscribed  the  Grirondins,  and  placed  France 
at  the  mercy  of  eighty  individuals  selected  by  the  Con- 
vention from  itself.  The  legislators  of  1795  desired  a 
guarantee  that  no  party,  however  determined,  should 
thus  destroy  its  enemies  by  a  single  law,  and  unite 
supreme  legislative  and  executive  power  in  its  own 
hands.  With  the  object  of  dividing  authority, 
the  executive  was,  in  the  new  draft-constitution, 
made  independent  of  the  legislature,  and  the  legis- 
lature itself  was  broken  up  into  two  chambers.  A 
Directory  of  five  members,  chosen  by  the  Assemblies, 
but  not  responsible  except  under  actual  impeachment, 
was  to  conduct  the  administration,  without  the  right  of 
proposing  laws ;  a  Chamber  of  five  hundred  was  to  sub- 
mit laws  to  the  approval  of  a  CouncQ  of  two  hundred 
and  fifty  Ancients,  or  men  of  middle  life ;  but  neither 
of  these  bodies  was  to  exercise  any  influence  upon  the 
actual  government.  One  director  and  a  third  part  of 
each  of  the  legislative  bodies  were  to  retire  every  year.* 

♦  Von  Sybel,  iii  537.    Bnchei  et  Roux,  xxxvi,  486. 


102  MODERN  EUROPE.  1795. 

The  project  thus  outlined  met  with  general  approval, 
and  gained  even  that  of  the  Royalists,  who  believed 
that  a  popular  election  would  place  them  in  a  majority 
in  the  two  new  Assemblies.  Such  an  event  was,  how- 
ever, in  the  eyes  of  the  Convention,  the  one  fatal 
possibility  that  must  be  averted  at  every  cost.  In  the 
midst  of  the  debates  upon  the  draft- constitution  there 
arrived  the  news  of  Hoche's  victory  at  Quiberon.  The 
Convention  rained  couras:e  to  add  a  clause 

Constitution    of  o  o 

tionofvS:  providing  that  tj£Q^hJrds„._Q£-~the....new 
deputies  should  be  appointed  from  among 
its  own  members,  thus  rendering  a  Royalist  majority 
in  the  Chambers  impossible.  With  this  condition 
attached  to  it,  the  Constitution  was  laid  before  the 
country.  The  provinces  accepted  it;  the  Royalist 
middle  class  of  Paris  rose  in  insurrection,  and  marched 
against  the  Convention  in  the  Tuileries.  Their  revolt 
was  foreseen ;  the  defence  of  the  Convention  was 
entrusted  to  Greneral  Bonaparte,  who  met  the  attack  of 
the  Parisians  in  a  style  unknown  in  the  warfare  of  the 
capital.  Bonaparte's  command  of  trained  artillery  secured 
him  victory;  but  the  struggle  of  the  4th  of  October  (13 
Vendemiaire)  was  the  severest  that  took  place  in  Paris 
during  the  Revolution,  and  the  loss  of  life  in  fighting 
greater  than  on  the  day  that  overthrew  the  Monarchy. 

The  new  Grovernment  of  France  now  entered  into 

The  Directory,     powcr.     Mcmbcrs  of  the  Convention  formed 

Oct.,  1795.        two-thirds  of  the   new  legislative   bodies  ; 

the  one-third  which  the  country  was  permitted  to  elect 

consisted  chiefly  of  men  of  moderate  or  Royalist  opinions. 


1795,  THE  DIBEOTOBY,  103 

The  five  persons  who  were  chosen  Directors  were  all 
Conventionalists  who  had  voted  for  the  death  of  the 
King ;  Carnot,  however,  who  had  won  the  victories 
without  sharing  in  the  cruelties  of  the  Keign  of  Terror, 
was  the  only  member  of  the  late  Committee  of  Public 
Safety  who  was  placed  in  power.  In  spite  of  the 
striking  homage  paid  to  the  great  act  of  regicide  in  the 
election  of  the  five  Directors,  the  establishment  of  the 
Directory  was  accepted  by  Europe  as  the  close  of 
revolutionary  disorder.  The  return  of  constitutional 
rule-ia-&ance  was  marked  by  a  declaration  on  the  part 
of  the  King  of  England  of  his  willingness  to  treat  for 
peace.  A  gentler  spirit  seemed  to  have  arisen  in  the  Ee- 
public.  Although  the  laws  against  the  emigrants  and 
non-juring  priests  were  still  unrepealed,  the  exiles  began 
to  return  unmolested  to  their  homes.  Life  resumed 
something  of  its  old  aspect  in  the  capital.  The  rich  and 
the  gay  consoled  themselves  with  costlier  luxury  for 
all  the  austerities  of  the  Reign  of  Terror.  The  labour- 
ing classes,  now  harmless  and  disarmed,  were  sharply 
taught  that  they  must  be  content  with  such  improve- 
ment in  their  lot  as  the  progress  of  society  might  bring. 
At  the  close  of  this  first  period  of  the  Revolutionary 
War  we  may  pause  to  make  an  estimate 
of  the  new  influences   which   the   French     to  Europe  in  th« 

Berolntion. 

Revolution  had  brought  into  Europe,  and  of 
the  effects  which  had  thus  far  resulted  from  them.     The 
opinion  cun'ent  among  the  French  people  themselves, 
that  the  Revolution  gave  birth  to  the  modem  life  not  of 
France  only  but  of  the  Western  Continent  generally,  is 


104  MODEBN  EUROPE. 

true  of  one  great  set  of  facts ;  it  is  untrue  of  another. 
There  were  conceptions  in  France  in  1789  which  made 
France  a  real  contrast  to  most  of  the  Continental  mon- 
archies ;  there  were  others  which  it  shared  in  common 
with  them.  The  ideas  of  social,  legal,  and  ecclesiastical 
reform  which  were  realised  in  1789  were  not  peculiar  to 
France ;  what  was  peculiar  to  France  was  the  idea  that 
these  reforms  were  to  be  effected  by  the  nation  itself.  ^ 
In  other  countries  reforms  had  been  initiated  by  Govern- 
ments, and  forced  upon  an  unwilling  people.  Innovation 
sprang  from  the  Crown ;  its  agents  were  the  servants  of 
the  State.  A  distinct  class  of  improvements,  many  of 
them  identical  with  the  changes  made  by  the  Eevolu- 
tion  in  France,  attracted  the  attention  in 

Absolute  govem- 

S^ntSyeig^ed  ^  greater  or  less  degree  of  almost  all  the 
inreorms.  Westem  Courts  of  the  eighteenth  century. 

The  creation  of  a  simple  and  regular  administrative 
system  ;  the  reform  of  the  clergy ;  the  emancipation  of 
the  Church  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Pope,  and  of  all 
ordei's  in  the  State  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Church  ; 
the  amelioration  of  the  lot  of  the  peasant ;  the  introduc- 
tion of  codes  of  law  abolishing  both  the  cruelties  and 
the  confusion  of  ancient  practice, — all  these  were  pur- 
poses more  or  less  familiar  to  the  absolute  sovereigns  of 
the  eighteenth  century,  whom  the  French  so  summarily 
described  as  benighted  tyrants.  It  was  in  Austria, 
Prussia,  and  Tuscany  that  the  civilising  3nergy  of  the 
Crown  had  been  seen  in  its  strongest  form,  but  even  the 
Governments  of  Naples  and  Spain  had  caught  the  spirit 
of  change.     The  religious  tolerance  which  Joseph  gave 


BEFOBMa  BEFORE  THE  REVOLUTION.  105 

to  Austria,  the  rejection  of  Papal  authority  and  the 
abolition  of  the  punishment  of  death  which  Leopold 
effected  in  Tuscany,  were  bolder  efforts  of  the  same 
political  rationalism  which  in  Spain  minimised  the 
powers  of  the  Inquisition  and  in  Naples  attempted  to 
found  a  system  of  public  education.  In  all  this,  however, 
there  was  no  trace  of  the  action  of  the  people,  or  of  any 
sense  that  a  nation  ought  to  raise  itself  above  a  state  of 
tutelage.  Men  of  ideas  called  upon  Governments  to 
impose  better  institutions  upon  the  people,  not  upon 
the  people  to  wrest  them  from  the  Governments. 

In  France  alone  a  view  of  public  affairs  had  grown 
up  which  impelled  the  nation  to  create  its 
reforms  for  itself .     If  the  substance  of  many     nation  itaei? 

•^         acted. 

of  the  French  revolutionary  changes  coin- 
cided with  the  objects  of  Austrian  or  of  Tuscan  reform, 
there  was  nothing  similar  in  their  method.  In  other 
countries  reform  sprang  from  the  command  of  an  en- 
lightened ruler ;  in  France  it  started  with  the  Declara- 
tion of  the  Rights  of  Man,  and  aimed  at  the  creation 
of  local  authority  to  be  exercised  by  the  citizens  them- 
selves. The  source  of  this  difference  lay  partly  in  the 
influence  of  England  and  America  upon  French  opinion, 
but  much  more  in  the  existence  within  France  of  a 
numerous  and  energetic  middle  class,  enriched  by  com- 
merce, and  keenly  interested  in  all  the  speculation  and 
literary  activity  of  the  age.  This  was  a  class  that  both 
understood  the  wrongs  which  the  other  classes  inflicted 
or  suffered,  and  felt  itself  capable  of  redressing  them. 
For  the  flogged  and  over-driven  peasant  in  Naples  or 


106  MOJJEBN  EUROPE. 

Hungary  no  ally  existed  but  the  Crown.  In  most  of 
those  poor  and  backward  States  which  made  up  monarch- 
ical Europe,  the  fraction  of  the  inhabitants  which 
neither  enjoyed  privilege  nor  stood  in  bondage  to  it  was 
too  small  to  think  of  forcing  itself  into  power.  The 
nobles  sought  to  preserve  their  feudal  rights  :  the  Crown 
sought  to  reduce  them ;  the  nation,  elsewhere  than  in 
France,  did  not  intervene  and  lay  hands  upon  power  for 
itself,  because  the  nation  was  nothing  but  the  four 
mutually  exclusive  classes  of  the  landlords  who  com- 
manded, the  peasants  who  served,  the  priests  who  idled, 
and  the  soldiers  who  fought.  Trance  differed  from  all 
the  other  monarchies  of  the  Continent  in  possessing  a 
public  which  blended  all  classes  and  was  dominated  by 
none ;  a  public  comprehending  thousands  of  men  who 
were  familiar  with  the  great  interests  of  society,  and 
who,  whether  noble  or  not  noble,  possessed  the  wealth 
and  the  intelhgence  that  made  them  rightly  desire  a 
share  in  power. 

Liberty,   the  right  of  the  nation  to  govern  itseK, 
seemed  at  the  outset  to  be  the  s^reat  princi- 

Movements  C3  i 

Site*  rS  pie  of  the  Eevolution.  The  French  people 
themselves  believed  the  question  at  issue  to 
be  mainly  between  authority  and  popular  right;  the 
rest  of  Europe  saw  the  Revolution  under  the  same  as- 
pect. Hence,  in  those  countries  where  the  example  of 
France  produced  political  movements,  the  effect  was  in 
the  first  instance  to  excite  agitation  against  the  Grovern- 
ment,  whatever  might  be  the  form  of  the  latter.  In 
England  the  agitation   was   one   of   the  middle  class 


w  ■  •  '-.  rr  y, 
OF  TTTR 


UMAOTION.      ^^^CAUFQgH^b^/^  107 

against  the  aristocratic  parliamentary  system ;  in  Hun- 
gary, it  was  an  agitation  of  the  nobles  against  the  Crown ; 
on  the  Ehine  it  was  an  agitation  of  the  commercial  classes 
against  ecclesiastical  rule.  But  in  every  case  in  which  the 
reforming  movement  was  not  supported  by  the  presence 
of  French  armies,  the  terrors  which  succeeded  the 
first  sanguine  hopes  of  the  Eevolution  struck  the 
leaders  of  these  movements  with  revulsion  and  despair, 
and  converted  even  the  better  Q-ovemments  into  engines 
of  reaction.  In  France  itself  it  was  seen  that  the 
desire  for  liberty  among  an  enlightened  class  could  not 
suddenly  transform  the  habits  of  a  nation  accustomed 
to  accept  everything  from  authority.  Privilege  was  de- 
stroyed, equality  was  advanced;  but  instead  of  self- 
government  the  Revolution  brought  France  the  most  ab- 
solute rule  it  had  ever  known.  It  was  not  that  the  Revolu- 
tion had  swept  by,  leaving  things  where  they  were  before : 
it  had  in  fact  accomplished  most  of  those  great  changes 
which  lay  the  foundation  of  a  sound  social  life :  but 
the  faculty  of  self-government,  the  first  condition  of 
any  lasting  political  Kberty,  remained  to  be  slowly  won. 
Outside  France  reaction  set  in  without  the  benefit 
of  previous  change.  At  London,  Vienna, 
Naples,  and  Madrid,  Governments  gave  up 
all  other  objects  in  order  to  devote  themselves  to  the 
suppression  of  Jacobinism.  Pitt,  whose  noble  aims  had 
been  the  extinction  of  the  slave-tmde,  the  reform  of 
Parliament,  and  the  advance  of  national  intercourse  by 
free  trade,  surrendered  himself  to  men  whose  thoughts 
centred  upon  informers.  Gagging  Acts,  and  constructive 


108  MODEBN  ETJEOFE, 

treasons,  and  who  opposed  all  legislation  upon  the  slave- 
trade  because  slaves  had  been  freed  by  the  Jacobins  of 
the  Convention.  State  trials  and  imprisonments  became 
the  order  of  the  day ;  but  the  reaction  in  England  at 
least  stopped  short  of  the  scaffold.  At  Vienna  and 
Naples  fear  was  more  cruel.  The  men  who  either  were, 
or  affected  to  be,  in  such  fear  of  revolution  that  they 
discovered  a  Jacobinical  allegory  in  Mozart's  last  opera,* 
did  not  spare  life  when  the  threads  of  anything  like  a 
real  conspiracy  were  placed  in  their  hands.  At  Vienna 
terror  was  employed  to  crush  the  constitutional  opposi- 
tion of  Hungary  to  the  Austrian  Court.  In  Naples  a 
long  reign  of  cruelty  and  oppression  began  with  the 
creation  of  a  secret  tribunal  to  investigate  charges  of 
conspiracy  made  by  informers.  In  Mainz,  the  Arch- 
bishop occupied  the  last  years  of  his  government,  after 
his  restoration  in  1793,  with  a  series  of  brutal  punish- 
ments and  tyrannical  precautions. 

These  were  but  instances  of  the  effect  which  the 
first  epoch  of  the  Eevolution  produced  upon  the  old 
European  States.  After  a  momentary  stimulus  to  free- 
dom it  threw  the  nations  themselves  into  reaction  and 
apathy;  it  totally  changed  the  spirit  of  the  better 
governments,  attaching  to  all  liberal  ideas  the  stigma  of 
Eevolution,  and  identifying  the  work  of  authority  with 
resistance  to  every  kind  of  reform.  There  were  States 
in  which  this  change,  the  first  effect  of  the  Eevolution, 
was  also  its  only  one ;  States  whose  history,  as  in  the 

•  For  the   police  interpretation   of  the    Zauherflote,  see  Springer, 
Qeschichte  Oest«rreichs,  yqL  i»  p.  49. 


REACTION,  IM 

case  of  England,  is  for  a  whole  generation  the  history 
of  political  progress  unnaturally  checked  and  thrown 
out  of  its  course.  There  were  others,  and  these  the 
more  numerous,  where  the  first  stimulus  and  the  first 
reaction  were  soon  forgotten  in  new  and  penetrating 
changes  produced  hy  the  successive  victories  of  France. 
The  nature  of  these  changes,  even  more  than  the  war- 
fare which  introduced  them,  gives  its  interest  to  the 
period  on  which  we  are  about  to  enter. 


CHAPTEE  m. 

Triple  attack  on  Austria — Moreau,  Jourdan — Bonaparte  in  Italy — Condition  of  the 
Italian  States — Professions  and  real  intentions  of  Bonaparte  and  the  Directory 
— Battle  of  Montenotte — Armistice  with  Sardinia— Campaign  in  Lomhardy 
— Treatment  of  the  Pope,  Naples,  Tuscany — Siege  of  Mantua — Castiglione 
— Moreau  and  Jourdan  in  Germany — Their  retreat — Secret  Treaty  with 
Prussia — Negotiations  with  England — Cispadane  Eepublic — Eise  of  the  idea 
of  Italian  Independence — Battles  of  Areola  and  Eivoli — Peace  with  the 
Pope  at  Tolentino — Venice — Preliminaries  of  Leoben — The  French  in  Venice 
— The  French  take  the  Ionian  Islands  and  give  Venice  to  Austria — Genoa 
— Coup  d'etat  of  17  Fructidor  in  Paris — Treaty  of  Campo  Formio — ^Vic- 
tories of  England  at  sea — Bonaparte's  project  against  Egypt. 

With  the  opening  of  the  year  1796  the  leading  interest 
of  European  history  passes  to  a  new  scene.  Hitherto  the 
progress  of  French  victory  had  been  in  the  direction  of 
the  Ehine  :  the  advance  of  the  army  of  the  Pyrenees 
had  been  cut  short  by  the  conclusion  of  peace  with 
Spain ;  the  army  of  Italy  had  achieved  little 

Armies  of  Italy,       ,  ,  ,  •       n 

the  Danube,  and     bevoud  somc  obscurc  successes  m  the  moun- 

the  Mam,  1796.  "^ 

tains.  It  was  the  appointment  of  Napoleon 
Bonaparte  to  the  command  of  the  latter  force,  in  the 
spring  of  1796,  that  first  centred  the  fortunes  of  the 
Republic  in  the  land  beyond  the  Alps.  Freed  from 
Prussia  by  the  Treaty  of  Basle,  the  Directory  was  now 
able  to  withdraw  its  attention  from  Holland  and  from 
the  Lower  Rhine,  and  to  throw  its  whole  force  into  the 
struggle  with  Austria.  By  the  advice  of  Bonaparte  a 
threefold  movement  was  undertaken  against  Vienna,  by 


17ML  BONAPARTE   IN  ITALY.  Ill 

way  of  Lombardy,  by  the  valley  of  the  Danube,  and  by 
the  valley  of  the  Main.  General  Jourdan,  in  command 
of  the  army  that  had  conquered  the  Netherlands,  was 
ordered  to  enter  Grermany  by  Frankfort ;  Moreau  crossed 
the  Rhine  at  Strasburg :  Bonaparte  himself,  drawing 
his  scanty  supplies  along  the  coast-road  from  Nice,  faced 
the  allied  forces  of  Austria  and  Sardinia  upon  the  slopes 
of  the  Maritime  Apennines,  forty  miles  to  the  west  of 
Genoa.  The  country  in  which  he  was  about  to  operate 
was  familiar  to  Bonaparte  from  service  there  in  1794  ; 
his  own  descent  and  language  gave  him  singular  ad- 
vantages in  any  enterprise  undertaken  in  Italy.  Bona- 
parte was  no  Italian  at  heart ;  but  he  knew  at  least 
enough  of  the  Italian  nature  to  work  upon  its  better  im- 
pulses, and  to  attach  its  hopes,  so  long  as  he  needed  the 
support  of  Italian  opinion,  to  his  own  career  of  victory, 
hree  centuries  separated  the  Italy  of  that  day  from 
the  bright  and  vigorous  Italy  which,  in  the  glow  of  its 
Republican  freedom,  had  given  so  much  to  Northern 
Europe  in  art.,  in  letters,  and  in  the  charm  condition  o* 
of  life.  A  long  epoch  of  subjection  to  des-  ^^^' 
potic  or  foreign  rule,  of  commercial  inaction,  of  decline 
in  mind  and  character,  had  made  the  Italians  of  no  ac- 
count among  the  political  forces  of  Europe.  Down  to 
the  peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  in  1748  their  provinces 
were  bartered  between  the  Bourbons  and  the  Hapsburgs ; 
and  although  the  settlement  of  that  date  left  no  part  of 
Italy,  except  the  Duchy  of  Milan,  incorporated  in  a 
foreign  empire,  yet  the  crown  of  Naples  was  vested  in  a 
younger  branch  of  the  Spanish  Bourbons,  and  the  mar- 


112  MODERN  EUEOPK  1796. 

riage  of  Maria  Theresa  with  the  Archduke  Francis  made 
Tuscany  an  appanage  of  the  House  of  Austria.  Venice 
and  Grenoa  retained  their  independence  and  their  repub- 
lican government,  but  little  of  their  ancient  spirit.  At 
the  outbreak  of  the  Eevolutionary  War,  Austrian  in- 
fluence was  dominant  throughout  the  peninsula,  Marie 
Caroline,  the  Queen  and  the  ruler  of  Ferdinand  of 
Naples,  being  the  sister  of  the  Emperor  Leopold  and 
Marie  Antoinette.  With  the  exception  of  Piedmont, 
which  preserved  a  strong  military  sentiment  and  the 
tradition  of  an  active  and  patriotic  policy,  the  Italian 
States  were  either,  like  Venice  and  Grenoa,  anxious  to 
keep  themselves  out  of  danger  by  seeming  to  hear  and 
see  nothing  that  passed  around  them,  or  governed  by 
families  in  the  closest  connection  with  the  great  reign- 
ing Houses  of  the  Continent.  Neither  in  Italy  itself, 
nor  in  the  general  course  of  European  affairs  during  the 
Napoleonic  period,  was  anything  determined  by  the 
sentiment  of  the  Italian  people.  The  peasantry  at  times 
fought  against  the  French  with  energy ;  but  no  strong 
impulse,  like  that  of  the  Spaniards,  enlisted  the  upper 
class  of  Italians  either  on  the  side  of  Napoleon  or  on 
that  of  his  enemies.  Acquiescence  and  submission  had 
become  the  habit  of  the  race ;  the  sense  of  national  unity 
and  worth,  the  personal  pride  which  makes  the  absence 
of  liberty  an  intolerable  wrong,  only  entered  the  Italian 
character  at  a  later  date. 

Yet  in  spite  of  its  political  nullity,  Italy  was  not  in  a 
state  of  decline.  Its  worst  days  had  ended  before  the 
middle  of  the  eighteenth  century.   The  fifty  years  preced- 


1740-1790.       ITALY  IN  THE  EIQHTEENTH  OENTTJEY,         118 

ing  the  French  Revolution,  if  they  had  brought  nothing  of 
the  spirit  of  liberty,  had  in  all  other  respects  been  years 
of  progress  and  revival.  In  Lombardy  the  government 
of  Maria  Theresa  and  Joseph  awoke  life  and  motion 
after  ages  of  Spanish  torpor  and  misrule.  Traditions  of 
local  activity  revived ;  the  communes  were  encouraged 
in  their  works  of  irrigation  and  rural  im-  B«vivai  after 
provement;  a  singular  liberality  towards  ^^^' 
opinion  and  the  press  made  the  Austrian  possessions  the 
centre  of  the  intellectual  movement  of  Italy.  In  the 
south,  progress  began  on  the  day  when  the  last  foreign 
Viceroy  disappeared  from  Naples  (1735),  and  Eang 
Charles  III.,  though  a  member  of  the  Spanish  House, 
entered  upon  the  government  of  the  two  Sicilies  as  an 
independent  kingdom.  Venice  and  the  Papal  States 
alone  seemed  to  be  untouched  by  the  spirit  of  material 
and  social  improvement,  so  active  in  the  rest  of  Italy 
before  the  interest  in  political  life  had  come  into  being. 
Nor  was  the  age  without  its  intellectual  distinction. 
If  the  literature  of  Italy  in  the  second  half  of  the 
eighteenth  century  had  little  that  recalled  the  inspira- 
tion of  its  splendid  youth,  it  showed  at  least  a  return  to 
seriousness  and  an  interest  in  important  things.  The 
political  economists  of  Lombardy  were  scarcely  behind 
those  of  England ;  the  work  of  the  Milanese  Beccaria 
on  "  Crimes  and  Punishments  **  stimulated  the  reform 
of  criminal  law  in  every  country  in  Europe ;  an  intelli- 
gent and  increasing  attention  to  problems  of  agriculture, 
commerce,  and  education  took  the  place  of  the  fatuous 
gallantries  and  insipid  criticism  which  had  hitherto 
I 


114  MOBBBN  EUBOPE,  1796l 

made  up  the  life  of  Italians  of  birth  and  culture.  One 
man  of  genius,  Yittorio  Alfieri,  the  creator  of  Italian 
tragedy,  idealised  both  in  prose  and  verse  a  type  of 
rugged  independence  and  resistance  to  tyrannical  power. 
Alfieri  was  neither  a  man  of  political  judgment  himself 
nor  the  representative  of  any  real  political  current  in 
Italy ;  but  the  lesson  which  he  taught  to  the  Italians, 
the  lesson  of  respect  for  themselves  and  their  country, 
was  the  one  which  Italy  most  of  all  required  to  learn ; 
and  the  appearance  of  this  manly  and  energetic  spirit 
in  its  literature  gave  hope  that  the  Italian  nation  would 
not  long  be  content  to  remain  without  political  being. 
Italy,  to  the  outside  world,  meant  little  more  than 
the  ruins  of  the  Eoman  Forum,  the  galleries 
of  Florence,  the  paradise  of  Capri  and  the 
Neapolitan  coast ;  the  singular  variety  in  its  local  con- 
ditions of  life  gained  little  attention  from  the  foreigner. 
There  were  districts  in  Italy  where  the  social  order  was 
almost  of  a  Polish  type  of  barbarism ;  there  were  others 
where  the  rich  and  the .  poor  lived  perhaps  under  a 
happier  relation  than  in  any  other  country  in  Europe. 
The  difference  depended  chiefly  upon  the  extent  to  which 
municipal  life  had  in  past  time  superseded  the  feudal 
order  under  which  the  territorial  lord  was  the  judge  and 
the  ruler  of  his  own  domain.  In  Tuscany  the  city  had 
done  the  most  in  absorbing  the  landed 
nobility  ;  in  Naples  and  Sicily  it  had  done 
the  least.  When,  during  the  middle  ages,  the  Eepublic 
of  Florence  forced  the  feudal  lords  who  surrounded  it  to 
enter  its  walls   as  citizens,  in  some   cases  it  deprived 


1740-1790.  TVBOANY,  116 

them  of  all  authority,  in  others  it  permitted  them  to 
retain  a  jurisdiction  over  their  peasants ;  but  even  in 
these  instances  the  sovereignty  of  the  city  deprived  the 
feudal  relation  of  most  of  its  harshness  and  force. 
After  the  loss  of  Florentine  liberty,  the  Medici,  aping 
the  custom  of  older  monarchies,  conferred  the  title  of 
marquis  and  count  upon  men  who  preferred  servitude  to 
freedom,  and  accompanied  the  grant  of  rank  with  one  of 
hereditary  local  authority;  but  the  new  institutions 
took  no  deep  hold  on  country  life,  and  the  legislation 
of  the  first  Archduke  of  the  House  of  Lorraine  (1749) 
left  the  landed  aristocracy  in  the  position  of  mere 
country  gentlemen.*  Estates  were  not  very  large:  the 
prevalent  agricultural  system  was,  as  it  still  is,  that  of 
the  mezzeria,  a  partnership  between  the  landlord  and 
tenant;  the  tenant  holding  by  custom  in  perpetuity, 
and  sharing  the  produce  with  the  landlord,  who  supplied 
a  part  of  the  stock  and  materials  for  farming.  In  Tus- 
cany the  conditions  of  the  mezzeria  were  extremely 
favourable  to  the  tenant ;  and  if  a  cheerful  country  life 
under  a  mild  and  enlightened  government  were  all  that 
a  State  need  desire,  Tuscany  enjoyed  rare  happiness. 

Far  different  was  the  condition  of  Sicily  and  Naples. 
Here  the  growth  of  city  life  had  never  Yi^^x^^xA 
affected  the  rough  sovereignty  which  the  ^  '' 
barons  exercised  over  great  tracts  of  country  withdrawn 
from  the  civilised  world.  When  Charles  III.  ascended 
the  throne  in  1735,  he  found  whole  provinces  in  which 
there  was  absolutely  no  administration  of  justice  on  the 

*  Zobi,  Storia  Civile  della  Toscaua,  L,  284. 

I  2 


116  MODERN  EUROPE.  i740-i»a 

part  of  the  State.  The  feudal  rights  of  the  nohility 
were  in  the  last  degree  oppressive,  the  barbarism  of  the 
people  was  in  many  districts  extreme.  Out  of  two 
thousand  six  hundred  towns  and  villages  in  the  king- 
dom, there  were  only  fifty  that  were  not  subject  to  feudal 
authority.  In  the  manor  of  San  Grennaro  di  Palma, 
fifteen  miles  from  IS'aples,  even  down  to  the  year  1786 
the  officers  of  the  baron  were  the  only  persons  who  lived 
in  houses  ;  the  peasants,  two  thousand  in  number,  slept 
among  the  corn-ricks.*  Charles,  during  his  tenure  of 
the  Neapolitan  crown,  from  1735  to  1759,  and  the 
Ministers  Tanucci  and  Caraccioli  under  his  feeble  suc- 
cessor Ferdinand  IV.,  enforced  the  authority  of  the 
State  in  justice  and  administration,  and  abolished  some 
of  the  most  oppressive  feudal  rights  of  the  nobility ; 
but  their  legislation,  though  bold  and  even  revolutionary 
according  to  an  English  standard,  could  not  in  the 
course  of  two  generations  transform  a  social  sysjbem 
based  upon  centuries  of  misgovernment  and  disorder. 
At  the  outbreak  of  the  French  Revolution  the  Kingdom 
of  the  Two  Sicilies  was,  as  it  still  in  a  less  degree  is,  a 
land  of  extreme  inequalities  of  wealth  and  poverty,  a  land 
where  great  estates  wasted  in  the  hands  of  oppressive  or 

*  Galanti,  Descrizione  delle  Sicilie,  1786,  i.,  279.  He  adds,  "The 
Samnites  and  the  Lucanians  could  not  have  shown  so  horrible  a  spectacle, 
because  they  had  no  feudal  laws."  Galanti's  book  gives  perhaps  the  best 
idea  of  the  immense  task  faced  by  monarchy  in  the  eighteenth  century 
in  its  struggle  against  what  he  justly  calls  **  gli  orrori  del.governo  f  eudale." 
Nothing  but  a  study  of  these  details  of  actual  life  described  by  eye- 
witnesses can  convey  an  adequate  impression  of  the  completeness  and  the 
misery  of  the  feudal  order  in  the  more  backward  countries  of  Europe  till 
far  down  in  the  eighteenth  century.  There  is  a  good  anonymous  account 
of  Sicily  in  1810  in  Castlereagh,  8.  217. 


1740-1790.  NAPLES   AND   8I0ILT.  117 

indolent  owners,  and  the  peasantry,  untrained  either  by 
remunerative  industry  or  by  a  just  and  regular  enforce- 
ment of  the  law,  found  no  better  guide  than  a  savage 
and  fanatical  priesthood.  Over  the  rest  of  Italy  the 
conditions  of  life  varied  through  all  degrees  between  the 
Tuscan  and  the  Neapolitan  type.  Piedmont,  piedmont. 
in  military  spirit  and  patriotism  far  superior 
to  the  other  Italian  States,  was  socially  one  of  the  most 
backward  of  all.  It  was  a  land  of  priests,  nobles,  and 
soldiers,  where  a  gloomy  routine  and  the  repression  of 
all  originality  of  thought  and  character  drove  the  most 
gifted  of  its  children,  like  the  poet  Alfieri,  to  seek  a 
home  on  some  more  liberal  soil. 

During  the  first  years  of  the  Ee volution,  an  attempt 
had  been  made  by  French  enthusiasts  to  professions  and 
extend  the  Revolution  into  Italy  by  means     of  the  Directory 

•^        "^  and  Bonaparte, 

of  associations  in  the  principal  towns ;  but  ^^^• 
it  met  with  no  great  success.  A  certain  liberal  move- 
ment arose  among  the  young  men  of  the  upper  classes 
at  Naples,  where,  under  the  influence  of  Queen  Marie 
Caroline,  the  Government  had  now  become  reactionary ; 
and  in  Turin  and  several  of  the  Lombard  cities  the 
French  were  not  without  partisans;  but  no  general 
disaffection  like  that  of  Savoy  existed  east  of  the  Alps. 
The  agitation  of  1789  and  1792  Kad  passed  by  without 
bringing  either  liberty  or  national  independence  to  the 
Italians.  When  Bonaparte  received  his  command,  that 
fervour  of  Eepublican  passion  which,  in  the  midst  of 
violence  and  wrong,  had  seldom  been  wanting  in  the 
first  leaders  of  the  Revolutionary  War,  had  died  out  in 


118  MODERN  EUROPE,  '  179CI 

France.  The  politicians  wlio  survived  the  Eeign  of 
Terror  and  gained  office  in  the  Directory  repeated  the 
old  phrases  ahout  the  Eights  of  Man  and  the  Liberation 
of  the  Peoples  only  as  a  mode  of  cajolery.  Bonaparte 
entered  Italy  proclaiming  himself  the  restorer  of  Italian 
freedom,  but  with  the  deliberate  purpose  of  using  Italy 
as  a  means  of  recruiting  the  exhausted  treasury  of  France. 
His  correspondence  with  the  Directory  exposes  with 
brazen  frankness  this  well-considered  system  of  pillage 
and  deceit,  in  which  the  general  and  the  Grovernment 
were  cordially  at  one.  On  the  further  question,  how 
France  should  dispose  of  any  territory  that  might  be 
conquered  in  Northern  Italy,  Bonaparte  and  the  Direc- 
tory had  formed  no  understanding,  and  their  purposes 
were  in  fact  at  variance.  The  Directory  wished  to 
conquer  Lombardy  in  order  to  hand  it  back  to  Austria 
in  return  for  the  Netherlands  ;  Bonaparte  had  at  least 
formed  the  conception  that  an  Italian  State  was  possible, 
and  he  intended  to  convert  either  Austrian  Lombardy 
itself,  or  some  other  portion  of  Northern  Italy,  into  a 
Eepublic,  serving  as  a  military  outwork  for  France. 

The  campaign  of  1796  commenced  in  April,  in  the 
Bonaparte    se-     mouutaius  abovc  the  coast-road  connecting 

parates  the  Aus-       -^-r.  i     /^  -i-k  i     > 

trian  and  sardi-     Nicc  auQ  (xcnoa.     Bouapartc  s  own  army 

nian    Armies,  •*■  •' 

April  1796.  numbered  40,000  men;  the  force  opposed 

to  it  consisted  of  38,000  Austrians,  under  Beaulieu, 
and  a  smaller  Sardinian  army,  so  placed  upon  the 
Piedmontese  Apennines  as  to  block  the  passes  from  the 
coast-road  into  Piedmont,  and  to  threaten  the  rear  of 
the  French  if  they  advanced  eastward  against  Grenoa. 


1796.  CAMPAIGN  OF  1796.  U9 

The  Piedmontese  army  drew  its  supplies  from  Turin,  the 
Austrian  from  Mantua ;  to  sever  the  two  armies  was  to 
force  them  on  to  lines  of  retreat  conducting  them  farther 
and  farther  apart  from  one  another.  Bonaparte  foresaw 
the  effect  which  such  a  separation  of  the  two  armies  would 
produce  upon  the  Sardinian  Government.  For  four  days 
he  reiterated  his  attacks  at  Montenotte  and  Millesimo, 
until  he  had  forced  his  own  army  into  a  position  in  the 
centre  of  the  Allies;  then,  leaving  a  small  force  to 
watch  the  Austrians,  he  threw  the  mass  of  his  troops 
upon  the  Piedmontese,  and  drove  them  back  to  within 
thirty  miles  of  Turin.  The  terror-stricken  Government, 
anticipating  an  outbreak  in  the  capital  itself,  accepted 
an  armistice  from  Bonaparte  atCherasco  (April  28),  and 
handed  over  to  the  French  the  fortresses  of  Coni,  Ceva, 
and  Tortona,  which  command  the  entrances  of  Italy. 
It  was  an  unworthy  capitulation,  for  Turin  could  not 
have  been  taken  before  the  Austrians  re- 
turned in  force;  but  Bonaparte  had  justly  E^J??  ^***^ 
calculated  the  effect  of  his  victory ;  and  the 
annistice,  which  was  soon  followed  by  a  treaty  of  peace 
between  France  and  Sardinia,  ceding  Savoy  to  the 
Eepublic,  left  him  free  to  follow  the  Austrians,  un- 
troubled by  the  existence  of  some  of  the  strongest 
fortresses  of  Europe  behind  him. 

In  the  negotiations  with  Sardinia  Bonaparte  de- 
manded the  surrender  of  the  town  of  Valenza,  as 
necessary  to  secure  his  passage  over  the  river  Po. 
Having  thus  led  the  Austrian  Beaulieu  to  concentrate 
his  forces  at  this  point,  he  suddenly  moved  eastward 


120  MODERN  EUROPE,  179«, 

along  the  southern  bank  of  the  river,  and  crossed  at 
Piacenza,  fifty  miles  below  the  spot  where  Beaulieu 
was  awaiting  him.  It  was  an  admirable  movement. 
The  Austrian  general,  with  the  enemy  threatening  his 
communications,  had  to  abandon  Milan  and  all  the 
country  west  of  it,  and  to  fall  back  upon  the  line  of  the 
Bridge  of  Lodi,  ^^^'^-  Bonaparte  followed,  and  on  the  10th 
^^  ^^'  of  May  attacked  the  Austrians  at  Lodi.  He 
himself  stormed  the  bridge  of  Lodi  at  the  head  of  his 
Grrenadiers.  The  battle  was  so  disastrous  to  the  Aus- 
trians that  they  could  risk  no  second  engagement,  and 
retired  upon  Mantua  and  the  line  of  the  Mincio.* 

Bonaparte  now  made  his  triumphal  entry  into  Milan 
(May  15).     The  splendour  of  his  victories 

Bonaparte  in  t     i   •  .  i»  p   •        i    i   •       (> 

Muan.    Extor-     and  his  Warm  expressions  oi  iriendship  tor 

tions.  ^  ,  ^ 

Italy  excited  the  enthusiasm  of  a  population 
not  hitherto  hostile  to  Austrian  rule.  A  new  political 
movement  began.  With  the  French  army  there  came  all 
the  partisans  of  the  French  Eepublic  who  had  been  ex- 
pelled from  other  parts  of  Italy.    Uniting  with  the  small 

*  Correspondance  de  Napoleon,!.,  260.  Botta,  Kb.  vi.  Despatches  of  Ool. 
Graham,  British  attache  with  the  Austrian  army,  in  Records  :  Italian  States, 
vol.  57.  These  most  interesting  letters,  which  begin  on  May  19,  show  the 
discord  and  suspicion  prevalent  from  the  first  in  the  Austrian  army.  "  Beau- 
lieu  has  not  met  with  cordial  co-operation  from  his  own  generals,  stUl  less 
from  the  Piedmontese.  He  accuses  them  of  having  chosen  to  be  beat  in 
order  to  bring  about  a  peace  promised  in  January  last."  "  Beaulieu  was 
more  violent  than  ever  against  his  generals  who  have  occasioned  the  failure 
of  his  plans.  He  said  nine  of  them  were  cowards.  I  believe  some  of  them 
are  ill-affected  to  the  cause."  June  15.—"  Many  of  the  officers  comfort  them- 
selves with  thinking  that  defeat  must  force  peace,  and  others  express  them- 
selves in  terms  of  despair."  July  25.— Beaulieu  told  Graham  that  if  Bona- 
parte had  pushed  on  after  the  battle  of  Lodi,  he  might  have  gone  straight 
into  Mantua.    The  preparations  for  defence  were  made  later. 


1796.  BONAPARTE  IN   MILAN.  121 

revolutionary  element  already  existing  in  Milan,  they 
began  to  form  a  new  public  opinion  by  means  of  journals 
and  patriotic  meetings.  It  was  of  the  utmost  import- 
ance to  Bonaparte  that  a  Republican  party  should  be 
organised  among  the  better  classes  in  the  towns  of  Lom- 
bardy;  for  the  depredations  of  the  French  army 
exasperated  the  peasants,  and  Bonaparte's  own  measures 
were  by  no  means  of  a  character  to  win  him  unmixed 
goodwill.  The  instructions  which  he  received  from  the 
Directory  were  extremely  simple.  "  Leave  nothing  in 
Italy,"  they  wrote  to  him  on  the  day  of  his  entry  into 
Milan,  "  which  will  be  useful  to  us,  and  which  the 
political  situation  will  allow  you  to  remove."  If 
Bonaparte  had  felt  any  doubt  as  to  the  meaning  of  such 
an  order,  the  pillage  of  works  of  art  in  Belgium  and 
Holland  in  preceding  years  would  have  shown  him  that 
it  was  meant  to  be  literally  interpreted.  Accordingly, 
in  return  for  the  gift  of  liberty,  the  Milanese  were 
invited  to  offer  to  their  deliverers  twenty  million 
francs,  and  a  selection  from  the  paintings  in  their 
churches  and  galleries.  The  Dukes  of  Parma  and 
Modena,  in  return  for  an  armistice,  were  required  to 
hand  over  forty  of  their  best  pictures,  and  a  sum  of 
money  proportioned  to  their  revenues.  The  Dukes 
and  the  townspeople  paid  their  contributions  with  good 
grace  :  the  peasantry  of  Lombardy,  whose  cattle  were 
seized  in  order  to  supply  an  army  that  marched  without 
any  stores  of  its  own,  rose  in  arms,  and  threw  them- 
selves into  Pavia,  killing  all  the  French  soldiers  who 
fell  in  their  way.      The  revolt  was  instantly  suppressed, 


122  MODERN  EUROPE.  1796. 

and  tlie  town  of  Pavia  given  up  to  pillage.  In  deference 
to  the  Liberal  party  of  Italy,  the  movement  was 
described  as  a  conspiracy  of  priests  and  nobles. 

The    way  into   Central  Italy  now  lay  open  before 
Bonaparte.     Eome  and  Naples  were  in  no  condition  to 
offer  resistance ;  but  with  true  military  judgment  the 
French   general  declined    to  move  against  this  feeble 
prey  until  the  army  of  Austria,  already  crippled,  was 
completely  driven  out  of  the  field.     Instead  of  crossing 
Battle  on  the     ^^®  Apcunines,  Bonaparte  advanced  against 
Mmcio,May29.     ^^^  Austrlau  posltlous  upou  the  Mincio.    It 
suited   him   to   violate  the  neutrality  of  the   adjacent 
Venetian  territory  by  seizing  the  town  of  Brescia.     His 
example  was  followed  by  Beaulieu,  who  occupied  Pes- 
chiera,  at  the  foot  of  the  Lake  of  Garda,  and  thus  held  the 
Mincio  along  its  whole  course  from  the  lake  to  Mantua. 
A  battle  was  fought  and  lost  by  the  Austrians  half-way 
between  the  lake  and  the  fortress.     Beaulieu's  strength 
was  exhausted ;  he  could  meet  the  enemy  no  more  in 
the  field,  and  led  his  army  out  of  Italy  into  the  Tyrol, 
leaving  Mantua  to  be   invested  by  the  French.     The 
first  care  of  the  conqueror  was  to  make  Venice  pay  for 
the  crime  of  possessing  territory  intervening  between 
the  eastern  and  western  extremes  of  the  Austrian  dis- 
trict.    Bonaparte  affected  to  believe  that  the  Venetians 
had  permitted  Beaulieu  to  occupy  Peschiera  before  he- 
seized  upon  Brescia  himself.  He  uttered  terrifying  threats 
to  the  envoys   who  came   from    Venice   to   excuse  an. 
imaginary  crime.     He  was  determined  to  extort  money 
from  the  Venetian  Eepublic ;  he  also  needed  a  pretext 


1796  BONAPAliTE   IN  BOLOGNA.  123 

for  occupying  Verona,  and  for  any  future  wrongs.  **  I 
have  purposely  devised  this  rupture,"  he  wrote  to  the 
Directory  (June  7th),  "  in  case  you  should 
wish  to  obtain  five  or  six  millions  of  francs 
from  Venice.  If  you  have  more  decided  intentions,  I 
think  it  would  be  well  to  keep  up  the  quarrel."  The 
intention  referred  to  was  the  disgraceful  project  of  sacri- 
ficing Venice  to  Austria  in  return  for  the  cession  of 
the  Netherlands,  a  measure  based  on  plans  familiar  to 
Thugut  as  early  as  the  year  1793.* 

The  Austrians  were  fairly  driven  out  of  Lombardy, 
and  Bonaparte  was  now  free  to  deal  with  southern 
Italy.  He  advanced  into  the  States  of  the  Church,  and 
expelled  the  Papal  Legate  from  Bologna.  Ferdinand  of 
Naples,  who  had  lately  called  heaven  and  earth  to  wit- 
ness the  fury  of  his  zeal  against  an  accursed  j^n^igtice  with 
horde  of  regicides,  thought  it  prudent  to  n*p^^"^"°««- 
stay  Bonaparte's  hand,  at  least  until  the  Austrians  were 
in  a  condition  to  renew  the  war  in  Lombardy.  He  asked 
for  a  suspension  of  hostilities  against  his  own  kingdom. 
The  fleet  and  the  sea-board  of  Naples  gave  it  import- 
ance in  the  struggle  between  France  and  Armistice  with 
England,  and  Bonaparte  granted  the  king  an  23. 
armistice  on  easy  terms.     The  Pope,  in  order  to  gain  a 

•  Thugut,  Briefe,  i.,  107.  A  correspondence  on  this  subject  was  carried 
on  in  cyplier  between  Thugut  and  Ludwig  Cobenzl,  Austrian  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg  in  1793-4.  During  Thugufs  absence  in  Belgium,  June,  1794, 
Cobenzl  sent  a  duplicate  despatch,  not  in  cypher,  to  Vienna.  Old  Prince 
Kaunitz,  the  ex-minister,  heard  that  a  courier  had  arrived  from  St.  Peters- 
burg, and  demanded  the  despatch  at  the  Foreign  OflSce  "like  a  dictator." 
It  was  given  to  him.  "  Ainsi,"  says  Thugut,  "  adieu  an  secret  qui  depnis 
nn  an  a  ^te  conserve  avec  Unt  de  solus ! " 


124  MODERN  EUROPE.  '  1796. 

few  montlis'  truce,  had  to  permit  the  occTipation  of 
Ferrara,  Eavenna,  and  Ancona,  and  to  recognise  the 
necessities,  the  learning,  the  taste,  and  the  virtue  of 
his  conquerors  by  a  gift  of  twenty  million  francs,  ^ve 
hundred  manuscripts,  a  hundred  pictures,  and  the  busts 
of  Marcus  and  Lucius  Brutus.  The  rule  of  the  Pope 
was  unpopular  in  Bologna,  and  a  Senate  which  Bona- 
parte placed  in  power,  pending  the  formation  of  a 
popular  Grovernment,  gladly  took  the  oath  of  fidehty 
to  the  French  Eepublic.  Tuscany  was  the  only  State 
that  remained  to  be  dealt'  with.  Tuscany  had  indeed 
made  peace  with  the  Republic  a  year  before,  but 
the  ships  and  cargoes  of  the  English  merchants  at 
Leghorn  were  surely  fair  prey ;  and,  with  the  pretence 
of  punishing  insults  offered  by  the  English  to  the 
French  flag,  Bonaparte  descended  upon  Leghorn,  and 
seized  upon  everything  that  was  not  removed  before 
his  approach.  Once  established  in  Leghorn,  the  French 
declined  to  quit  it.  By  way  of  adjusting  the  relations 
of  the  Grrand  Duke,  the  English  seized  his  harbour  of 
Porto  Ferraio,  in  the  island  of  Elba. 

Mantua  was  meanwhile  invested,  and  thither,  after 

his  brief  incursion  into  Central  Italy,  Bonaparte  returned. 

Towards  the  end  of  July  an  Austrian  re- 

Battles   of   Lo-  •^ 

ff^nT,*^  j^^l;  lieving  army,  nearly  double  the  strength  of 
Bonaparte's,  descended  from  the  Tyrol.  It 
was  divided  into  three  corps  :  one,  under  Quosdanovich, 
advanced  by  the  road  on  the  west  of  Lake  Grarda ;  the 
others,  under  Wurmser,  the  commander-in-chief,  by 
the   roads  between    the    lake    and  the    river    Adige 


1796.  BATTLES   ABOVE   MANTUA.  125 

The  peril  of  the  French  was  extreme ;  their  outlying 
divisions  were  defeated  and  driven  in ;  Bonaparte  could 
only  hope  to  save  himself  by  collecting  all  his  forces  at 
the  foot  of  the  lake,  and  striking  at  one  or  other 
of  the  Austrian  armies  before  they  effected  their  junc- 
tion on  the  Mincio.  He  instantly  broke  up  the  siege 
of  Mantua,  and  withdrew  from  every  position  east 
of  the  river.  On  the  30th  of  July,  Quosdanovich  was 
attacked  and  checked  at  Lonato,  on  the  west  of  the 
Lake  of  Grarda.  Wurmser,  unaware  of  his  colleague's 
repulse,  entered  Mantua  in  triumph,  and  then  set  out, 
expecting  to  envelop  Bonaparte  between  two  fires.  But 
the  French  were  ready  for  his  approach. .  Wurmser  was 
stopped  and  defeated  at  Castiglione,  while  the  western 
Austrian  divisions  were  still  held  in  check  at  Lonato.  The 
junction  of  the  Austrian  armies  had  become  impossible. 
In  five  days  the  skill,  of  Bonaparte  and  the  unsparing 
exertions  of  his  soldiery  had  more  than  retrieved  all  that 
appeared  to  have  been  lost.*     The  Austrians  retired  into 

*  Wurmser's  reports  are  in  Vivenot,  Clerfayt,  p.  477.  Gralwun's  daily 
despatches  from  the  Austrian  head-quarters  give  a  vivid  picture  of  these 
operations,  and  of  the  sudden  change  from  exultation  to  despair.  Aug.  1. — 
"  I  have  the  honour  to  inform  your  lordship  that  the  siege  of  Mantua  is 
raised,  the  French  having  retreated  last  night  with  the  utmost  precipita- 
tion." Aug.  2. — "  The  Austrians  are  in  possession  of  all  the  French  mor- 
tars and  cannon,  amounting  to  about  140,  with  190,000  shells  and  bombs ; 
the  loss  of  the  Imperial  army  is  inconsiderable."  Aug.  6. — **  The  rout  of 
this  day  has  sadly  changed  the  state  of  affairs.  There  are  no  accounts  of 
General  Quosdanovich."  Aug.  9. — "  Our  loss  in  men  and  cannon  was 
much  greater  than  was  imagined.  I  had  no  idea  of  the  possibility  of  the 
extent  of  such  misfortunes  as  have  overwhelmed  us."  Aug.  17. — '*  It  is 
scarcely  possible  to  describe  the  state  of  disorder  and  discouragement  that 
prevails  in  the  army.  Were  I  free  from  apprehensions  about  the  fate  of 
my  letter  "  (he  liad  lost  his  baggage  and  his  cypher  in  it),  "  I  should  despair 
of  finding  language  adequate  to  convey  a  just  idea  of  the  discontent  of  the 


126  MODERN  EUBOPK  1!W. 

the  Tyrol,  beaten  and  dispirited,  and  leaving  15,000 
prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

Bonaparte  now  prepared  to  force  his  way  into  Grer- 
many  by  the  Adige,  in  fulfilment  of  the  original  plan  of 
the  campaign.  In  the  first  days  of  September  he  again 
routed  the  Austrians,  and  gained  possession  of  Eoveredo 
and  Trent.  Wurmser  hereupon  attempted  to  shut  the 
French  up  in  the  mountains  by  a  movement  southwards; 
but,  while  he  operated  with  insufficient  forces  between 
the  Brenta  and  the  Adige,  he  was  cut  off  from  Germany, 
and  only  escaped  capture  by  throwing  himself  into 
Mantua  with  the  shattered  remnant  of  his  army.  The 
road  into  Germany  through  the  Tyrol  now  lay  open ; 
but  in  the  midst  of  his  victories  Bonaparte  learnt  that 
the  northern  armies  of  Moreau  and  Jourdan,  with  which 
he  had  intended  to  co-operate  in  an  attack  upon  Vienna, 
were  in  full  retreat. 

Moreau's  advance  into  the  valley  of  the  Danube  had, 
during:  the  months  of    July   and   Aus^ust, 

Invasion  of  Geiv  °  J  n 

^d^^l^lfn,     been  attended  with  unbroken  military  and 
"^^     *     *     political  success.     The   Archduke  Charles, 


officers  with  General  Wurmser.  From  generals  to  subalterns  the  uni- 
versal language  is  *  qu'il  faut  faire  la  paix,  car  nous  ne  savons  pas  faire  la 
guerre.' "  Aug.  18. — "  Not  only  the  commander-in-chief,  but  the  greatest 
number  of  the  generals  are  objects  of  contempt  and  ridicule."  Aug.  27. 
— **  I  do  not  exaggerate  when  I  say  that  I  have  met  with  instances  of  down- 
right dotage."  "  It  was  in  general  orders  that  wine  should  be  distributed 
to  the  men  previous  to  the  attack  of  the  29th.  There  was  some  difficulty 
in  getting  it  up  to  Monte  Baldo.  General  Bayolitzy  observed  that  *  it  did 
not  signify,  for  the  men  might  get  the  value  in  money  afterwards.'  The 
men  marched  at  six  in  the  evening  without  it,  to  attack  at  daybreak,  and 
received  four  kreutzers  afterwards.  This  is  a  fact  I  can  attest.  In  action 
I  saw  officers  sent  on  urgent  messages  going  at  a  foot's  pace  :  they  say  that 
their  horses  are  haK  starved,  and  that  they  cannot  afford  to  kill  them." 


1796.  CAMPAIGN  OF  THE  ABOHDUKE  0HABLE8.         127 

who  was  entrusted  with  the  defence  of  the  Empire,  found 
himself  unable  to  bring  two  armies  into  the  field  capable 
of  resisting  those  of  Moreau  and  Jourdan  separately, 
and  he  therefore  determined  to  fall  back  before  Moreau 
towards  Nuremberg,  ordering  Wartensleben,  who  com- 
manded the  troops  facing  Jourdan  on  the  Main,  to 
retreat  in  the  same  direction,  in  order  that  the  two 
armies  might  throw  their  collected  force  upon  Jourdan 
while  still  at  some  distance  north  of  Moreau.*  The 
design  of  the  Archduke  succeeded  in  the  end,  but  it 
opened  Grermany  to  the  French  for  six  weeks,  and 
showed  how  worthless  was  the  military  constitution  of 
the  Empire,  and  how  little  the  Grermans  had  to  expect 
from  one  another.  After  every  skirmish  won  by  Moreau 
some  neighbouring  State  abandoned  the  common  defence 
and  hastened  to  make  its  terms  with  the  invader.  On 
the  17th  of  July  the  Duke  of  Wiirtemberg  purchased 
an  armistice  at  the  price  of  four  million  francs ;  a  week 
later  Baden  gained  the  French  general's  protection  in 
return  for  immense  supplies  of  food  and  stores.  The 
troops  of  the  Swabian  Circle  of  the  Empire,  who  were 
ridiculed  as  "  harlequins  "  by  the  more  martial  Austrians, 
dispersed  to  their  homes ;  and  no  sooner  had  Moreau 
entered  Bavaria  than  the  Bavarian  contingent  in  its 
turn  withdrew  from  the  Archduke.  Some  consideration 
was  shown  by  Moreau's  soldiery  to  those  districts  which 
had  paid  tribute  to  their  general ;  but  in  the  region  of 
the  Main,  Jourdan's  army  plundered  without  distinction 

•  Grundsatze  (Archduke  Oharles),    ii,   202L      Bnlletins   in    Wiener 
Zeitung,  Juue— Oct  1796. 


128  MODERN  EUBOPE.  1796. 

and  without  inercy.  They  sacked  the  churches,  they 
maltreated  the  children,  they  robbed  the  very  beggars  of 
their  pence.  Before  the  Archduke  Charles  was  ready  to 
strike,  the  peasantry  of  this  country,  whom  their  govern- 
ments were  afraid  to  arm,  had  begun  effective  reprisals 
of  their  own.  At  length  the  retreating  movement  of 
the  Austrians  stopped.  Leaving  30,000  men  on  the  Lech 
to  disguise  his  motions  from  Moreau,  Charles 
Charles''*'  over-     tumed  suddeulv  northwards  from  ISTeubure^ 

powers  Jourdan.  *'  " 

on  the  17th  August,  met  Wartensleben  at 
Amberg,  and  attacked  Jourdan  at  this  place  with  greatly 
superior  numbers.  Jourdan  was  defeated  and  driven 
back  in  confusion  towards  the  Ehine.  The  issue  of  the 
campaign  was  decided  before  Moreau  heard  of  his  col- 
league's danger.  It  only  remained  for  him  to  save  his 
own  army  by  a  skilful  retreat.  Jourdan's  soldiers,  re- 
turning through  districts  which  they  had  devastated,  suf- 
fered heavier  losses  from  the  vengeance  of  the  peasantry 
than  from  the  army  that  pursued  them.  By  the  autumn 
of  1796  no  Frenchman  remained  beyond  the  Ehine. 
The  campaign  had  restored  the  military  spirit  of  Austria; 
it  had  given  Germany  a  general  in  whom  soldiers  could 
trust;  but  it  had  also  shown  how  willing  were  the 
Governments  of  the  minor  States  to  become  the  vassals  of 
a  foreigner,  how  little  was  wanting  to  convert  the  western 
half  of  the  Empire  into  a  dependency  of  France. 

With  each  change  in  the  fortunes  of 
vrtth     Prussia,     the  Campaign  of  1796  the  diplomacy  of  the 

Continent  had  changed  its  tone.  When  Mo- 
reau won  hifi  first  victories,  the  Court  of  Prussia,  yielding 


1791  PBU88IA    AND    AUSTRIA,  129 

to  the  pressure  of  the  Directory,  substituted  for  the  con- 
ditional clauses  of  the  Treaty  of  Basle  a  definite 
agreement  to  the  cession  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  ^ 
and  a  stipulation  that  Prussia  should  be  compensated 
for  her  own  loss  by  the  annexation  of  the  Bishopric  of  . 
Miinster.  Prussia  could  not  itself  cede  provinces  of  the 
Empire :  it  could  only  agree  to  their  cession.  In  this 
treaty,  however,  Prussia  definitely  renounced  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  Empire,  and  accepted  the  system  known 
as  the  Secularisation  of  Ecclesiastical  States,  the  first 
step  towards  an  entire  reconstruction  of  Germany.* 
The  engagement  was  kept  secret  both  from  the  Emperor 
and  from  the  ecclesiastical  princes.  In  their  negotiations 
with  Austria  the  Directory  were  less  successful. 
Although  the  long  series  of  Austrian  disasters  had 
raised  a  general  outcry  against  Thugut's  persistence 
in  the  war,  the  resolute  spirit  of  the  Minister  never 
bent ;  and  the  ultimate  victory  of  the  Archduke 
Charles  more  than  restored  his  influence  over  the 
Emperor.  Austria  refused  to  enter  into  any  negotiation 
not  conducted  in  common  with  England,  and  the 
Directory  were  for  the  present  foiled  in  their  attempts 
to  isolate  England  from  the  Continental  Powers.  It 
was  not  that  Thugut  either  hoped  or  cared  for  that 
restoration  of  Austrian  rule  in  the  Netherlands  which 
was  the  first  object  of  England's  Continental  policy. 
The  abandonment  of  the  Netherlands  by  France  was, 
however,  in  his  opinion  necessary  for  Austria,  as  a  step 
towards  the  acquisition  of  Bavaria,  which  was  still  the 

*  Martens,  tL,  69. 
J 


180  MOBMEN  UUEOPR  17«L 

cherisliecl  hope  of  the  Viennese  Government.  It  was  in 
vain  that  the  Directory  suggested  that  Austria  should 
annex  Bavaria  without  offering  Belgium  or  any  other 
compensation  to  its  ruler.  Thugut  could  hardly  be 
induced  to  listen  to  the  French  overtures.  He  had 
received  the  promise  of  immediate  help  from  the 
Empress  Catherine ;  he  was  convinced  that  the  Ee- 
public,  already  anxious  for  peace,  might  by  one  sustained 
effort  be  forced  to  abandon  all  its  conquests ;  and  this 
was  the  object  for  which,  in  the  winter  of  1796,  army 
after  army  was  hurled  against  the  positions  where 
Bonaparte  kept  his  guard  on  the  north  of  the  still 
unconquered  Mantua.* 

In  England  itself  the  victory  of  the  Archduke 
Charles  raised  expectations  of  peace.  The  war  had- 
become  unpopular  through  the  loss  of  trade  with  France, 
Spain,  and  Holland,  and  petitions  for  peace  daily 
reached  Parliament.  Pitt  so  far  yielded  to  the  prevalent 
feeling  as  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  the  Directory, 
and  despatched  Lord  Malmesbury  to  Paris ; 
to  Paris,  Oct.,     but  the  couditiou  upon  which  Pitt  insisted, 

1796.  ^  J-  ' 

the    restoration    of    the     Netherlands    to 
Austria,  rendered   agreement  hopeless;  and  as  soon  as 

*  This  seenls  to  me  to  be  the  probable  trutli  about  Austria's  policy  in 
1796,  of  wliich  opposite  views  will  be  found  in  Hausser,  vol  ii., 
cli.  1 — 3  and  in  Hiiffer,  Oestreich  und  Preussen,  p.  142.  Tbugut  professed 
in  1793  to  have  given  up  the  project  of  the  Bavarian  exchange  in  defer- 
ence to  England.  He  admitted,  however,  soon  afterwards,  that  he  had 
again  been  pressing  the  King  of  Prussia  to  consent  to  it,  but  said  that 
this  was  a  ruse,  intended  to  make  Prussia  consent  to  Austria's  annexing 
a  large  piece  of  France  instead.  Eden,  Sept.,  1793;  Records:  Austria, 
vol.  34.  The  incident  shows  the  difficulty  of  getting  at  the  truth  in 
diplomacy. 


1998.  MAJMEaBUBY  AT  PABI8.  131 

Pitt's  terms  were  known  to  the  Directory,  Malraesbury 
was  ordered  to  leave  Paris.  Nevertheless,  the  negotiation 
was  not  a  mere  feint  on  Pitt's  part.  He  was  possessed 
by  a  fixed  idea  that  the  resources  of  France  were 
exhausted,  and  that,  in  spite  of  the  conquest  of  Lom- 
bardy  and  the  Rhine,  the  Republic  must  feel  itself  too 
weak  to  continue  the  war.  Amid  the  disorders  of 
Revolutionary  finance,  and  exaggerated  reports  of  suffer- 
ing and  distress,  Pitt  failed  to  recognise  the  enormous 
increase  of  production  resulting  from  the  changes  which 
had  given  the  peasant  full  property  in  his  land  and 
labour,  and  thrown  vast  quantities  of  half- waste  domain 
into  the  busy  hands  of  middling  and  small  proprietors.* 
Whatever  were  the  resources  of  France  before  the 
Revolution,  they  were  now  probably  more  than  doubled 
Pitt's  behef  in  the  economic  ruin  of  Fi-ance,  the  only 
ground  on  which  he  could  imagine  that  the  Directory 

*  Tet  the  Govemment  had  had  warning  of  this  in  a  series  of  striking 
reports,  sent  by  one  of  Lord  Elgin's  spies  during  the  Beign  of  Terror. 
*'  Jamais  la  France  ne  fut  cultivee  comme  elle  Test.  11  n'y  a  pas  un  arpent 
qui  ne  soit  ensemence,  sauf  dans  les  lieux  oil  operent  les  armees  belliger. 
antes.  Cette  culture  universello  a  ^te  forc^e  par  les  Directrices  la 
oil  on  ne  la  faisait  pas  volontairement."  June  8,  1794;  Records: 
Flanders,  vol.  226.  Elgin  had  established  a  line  of  spies  from  Paris  to  the 
Belgian  frontier.  Every  one  of  these  persons  was  arrested  by  the  Revolu- 
tionary authorities.  Elgin  then  fell  in  with  the  writer  of  the  above,  whose 
name  is  concealed,  and  placed  him  on  tlie  Swiss  frontier.  He  was  evidently 
a  person  thoroughly  familiar  with  both  civil  and  military  administration. 
He  appears  to  have  talked  to  every  Frenchman  who  entered  Switzerland ; 
and  his  reports  contain  far  tlie  best  information  that  roached^T^ngland 
during  the  Reign  of  Terror,  contradicting  the  Royalists,  who  said  that  the 
war  was  only  kept  up  by  terrorism.  He  warned  the  Euglish  Government 
that  the  French  nation  in  a  mass  was  on  the  side  of  the  Revolution,  and 
declared  that  the  downfall  of  Robespierre  and  the  terrorists  would  make  no 
difference  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  The  Gt>verument  seems  to  have 
paid  no  attention  to  his  reports,  if  indeed  they  were  ever  read. 

J  2 


132  MODERN  EUBOPE.  '  itml 

would  give  up  Belgium  without  fighting  for  it,  was 
wholly  erroneous,  and  the  French  Q-overnment  would 
have  acted  strangely  if  they  had  listened  to  his  demand. 
Nevertheless,  though  the  Directory  would  not  hear 
of  surrendering  Belgium,  they  were  anxious  to  conclude 
peace  with  Austria,  and  unwilling  to  enter  into  any 
engagements  in  the  conquered  provinces  of  Italy  which 
might  render  peace  with  Austria  more  difficult.  They  had 
instructed  Bonaparte  to  stir  up  the  Italians  against  their 
Grovernments,  but  this  was  done  with  the  object  of  para- 
lysing the  Grovemments,  not  of  emancipating  the  peoples. 
They  looked  with  dislike  upon  any  scheme  of  ItaHan 
reconstruction  which  should  bind  France  to  the  support 
of  newly-formed  Italian  States.  Here,  however,  the 
scruples  of  the  Directory  and  the  ambition 

Bonaparte    ere-  *■  ** 

^iS)nc?^S!  of  Bonaparte  were  in  direct  conflict.  Bona- 
parte intended  to  create  a  political  system 
in  Italy  which  should  bear  the  stamp  of  his  own  mind 
and  require  his  own  strong  hand  to  support  it.  In  one 
of  his  despatches  to  the  Directory  he  suggested  the 
formation  of  a  client  EepubHc  out  of  the  Duchy  of 
Modena,  where  revolutionary  movements  had  broken 
out.  Before  it  was  possible  for  the  Grovemment  to 
answer  him,  he  published  a  decree,  declaring  the 
population  of  Modena  and  Eeggio  under  the  protection 
of  the  French  army,  and  deposing  all  the  officers  of  the 
Duke  (Oct.  4).  When,  some  days  later,  the  answer 
of  the  Directory  arrived,  it  cautioned  Bonaparte  against 
disturbing .  the  existing  order  of  the  Italian  States. 
Bonaparte  repKed  by  uniting  to  Modena  the  Papal 


17W.  THE   0I8PADANE   BBFUBLIO.  183 

provinces  of  Bologna  and  Ferrara,  and  by  giving  to  the 
State  which  he  had  thus  created  the  title  of  the 
Cispadane  Eepuhlic  * 

The  event  was  no  insignificant  one.      It  is  from  this 
time  that  the  idea  of  Italian  independence,     j^^^  ^^  ^^ 
though  foreign  to  the  great  mass  of  the  ^* 

nation,  may  be  said  to  have  taken  birth  as  one  of  those 
political  hopes  which  wane  and  recede,  but  do  not  again 
leave  the  world.  A  class  of  men  who  had  turned  with 
dislike  from  the  earlier  agitation  of  French  Eepublicans 
in  Italy  rightly  judged  the  continued  victories  of 
Bonaparte  over  the  Austrians  to  be  the  beginning  of  a 
series  of  great  changes,  and  now  joined  the  revolutionary 
movement  in  the  hope  of  winning  from  the  overthrow 
of  the  old  Powers  some  real  form  of  national  indepen- 
dence. In  its  origin  the  French  party  may  have 
been  composed  of  hirelings  and  enthusiasts.  This 
ceased  to  be  the  case  when,  after  the  passage  of  the 
Mincio,  Bonaparte  entered  the  Papal  States.  Among 
the  citizens  of  Bologna  in  particular  there  were  men  of 
weight  and  intelligence  who  aimed  at  free  constitutional 
government,  and  checked  in  some  degree  the  more 
numerous  popular  party  which  merely  repeated  the 
phrases  of  French  democracy.  Bonaparte's  own  language 
and  action  excited  the  brightest  hopes.     At  Modena  he 

*  Correspondance  de  Napoleon,  ii  28.  Thugut,  about  this  time, 
formed  the  plau  of  annexing  Bologna  and  Forrara  to  Austria,  and  said 
that  if  this  result  could  be  atrhieved,  the  French  attack  npon  the 
Papal  States  would  be  no  bad  matter.  See  the  instructions  to 
Allvintzy,  in  Yivenot,  Olerfayt,  p.  511,  which  also  contain  the  first 
Austrian  orders  to  imprison  Italian  innovators,  the  beginning  of  Austria's 
later  Italian  policy. 


134  MODERN  IIVBOFE.  1797. 

harangued  tlie  citizens  upon  fhe  miscMef  of  Italy's 
divisions,  and  exhorted  them  to  unite  with  their  brethren 
whom  he  had  freed  from  the  Pope.  A  Congress  was  held 
at  Modena  on  the  16th  of  October.  The  representa- 
tives of  Modena,  Eeggio,  Bologna,  and  Ferrara  declared 
themselves  united  in  a  Eepublic  under  the  protection  of 
France.  They  abolished  feudal  nobility,  decreed  a 
national  levy,  and  summoned  a  Greneral  Assembly  to 
meet  at  Reggio  two  months  later,  in  order  to  create  the 
Constitution  of  the  new  Cispadane  Republic.  It  was  in 
the  Congress  of  Modena,  and  in  the  subsequent  Assembly 
of  Eeggio  (Dec.  25),  that  the  idea  of  Italian  unity  and 
independence  first  awoke  the  enthusiasm  of  any  con- 
siderable body  of  men.  With  what  degree  of  sincerity 
Bonaparte  himself  acted  may  be  judged  from  the 
circumstance  that,  while  he  harangued  the  Cispadanes 
on  the  necessity  of  Italian  union,  he  imprisoned  the 
Milanese  who  attempted  to  excite  a  popular  movement 
for  the  purpose  of  extending  this  union  to  themselves. 
Peace  was  not  yet  made  with  Austria,  and  it  was 
uncertain  to  what  account  Milan  might  best  be  turned. 

Mantua  still  beld  out,  and  in  !N"ovember  the  reliev- 
ing operations  of  the  Austrians  were  renewed.  Two 
armies,  commanded  by  AUvintzy  and  Davidovich,  de- 
scended the  valleys  of  the  Adige  and  the  Piave,  offer- 
ing to  Bonaparte,  whose  centre  was  at  Yerona,  a  new 
Areola,  Nov.  15     Opportunity    of    crushing    his    enemy    in 

"~  *  detail.     Allvintzy,  coming  from  the  Piave, 

brought  the  French  into  extreme  danger  in  a  three 
days'  battle  at  Areola,  but  was  at  last  forced  to  retreat 


1787.  FALL    OF  MANTUA.  185 

with  heavy  loss.  Davidovich,  who  had  been  snccessful 
on  the  Adige,  retired  on  learning  the  overthrow  of  his 
colleague.  Two  months  more  passed,  and  the  Austrians 
for  the  third  time  appeared  on  the  Adige.  A  feint  made 
below  Yerona  nearly  succeeded  in  drawing  Bonaparte 
away  from  Eivoli,  between  the  Adige  and  ^^^^^  j^^  ^^ 
Lake  Grarda,  where  Allvintzy  and  his  main  ifi.1797. 
army  were  about  to  make  the  assault ;  but  the  strength 
of  AUvintzy's  force  was  discovered  before  it  was  too  late, 
and  by  throwing  his  divisions  from  point  to  point  with 
extraordinary  rapidity,  Bonaparte  at  length  overwhelmed 
the  Austrians  in  every  quarter  of  the  battle-field.  This 
was  their  last  effort.  The  surrender  of  Mantua  on  the 
2nd  February,  1797,  completed  the  French  conquest  of 
Austrian  Lombardy.* 

The    Pope   now   found   himself  left  to   settle   his 
account  with  the  invaders,  against  whom, 
even   after    the    armistice,    he    had    never    tino,  Feb.  19, 

1797. 

ceased   to    intrigue. f      His   despatches   to 

Vienna  fell  into  the  hands  of  Bonaparte,  who  declared 

*  Wurmser  had  orders  to  break  out  southwards  into  the  Papal  States. 
"  Tliese  orders  he  (Thugut)  knew  had  reached  the  Marshal,  but  they  were  also 
known  to  the  enemy,  as  a  cadet  of  Strasoldo's  re<^ment,  who  was  carrying 
the  duplicate,  had  been  taken  prisoner,  and  having  been  seen  to  swallow  a 
ball  of  wax,  in  which  the  order  was  wrapped  up,  he  was  immediately  put 
to  death  and  the  paper  taken  out  of  his  stomach."  Eden,  Jan.,  1797; 
Records :  Austria,  vol.  48.  Colonel  Graham,  who  had  been  shut  up  in 
Mautua  since  Sept.  10,  escaped  on  Dec.  17,  and  restored  communication 
between  Wurmser  and  Allvintzy.  He  was  present  at  the  battle  of  Rivoli, 
which  is  described  in  his  despatches. 

t  "  We  expect  every  hour  to  hear  of  the  entry  of  tlie  Neapolitan  troops 
and  the  declaration  of  a  religious  war.  Every  preparation  has  been  made 
for  such  an  event.''  Graves  to  Lord  Granville,  Oct.  1,  1796 ;  liecords  : 
Rome,  vol.  56. 


136  MODERN  EUBOPK  1797. 

the  truce  broken,  and  a  second  time  invaded  the  Papal 
territory.  A  show  of  resistance  was  made  by  the  Roman 
troops ;  but  the  country  was  in  fact  at  the  mercy  of 
Bonaparte,  who  advanced  as  far  as  Tolentino,  thirty 
miles  south  of  Ancona.  Here  the  Pope  tendered  his 
submission.  If  the  Eoman  Court  had  never  appeared 
to  be  in  a  more  desperate  condition,  it  had  never  found 
a  more  moderate  or  a  more  politic  conqueror.  Bona- 
parte was  as  free  from  any  sentiment  of  Christian  piety 
as  Nero  or  Diocletian ;  but  he  respected  the  power  of 
the  Papacy  over  men's  minds,  and  he  understood  the 
immense  advantage  which  any  Government  of  France 
supported  by  the  priesthood  would  possess  over  those 
who  had  to  struggle  with  its  hostility.  In  his  negotia- 
tions with  the  Papal  envoys  he  deplored  the  violence  of 
the  French  Executive,  and  consoled  the  Church  with 
the  promise  of  his  own  protection  and  sympathy.  The 
terms  of  peace  which  he  granted,  although  they  greatly 
diminished  the  ecclesiastical  territory,  were  in  fact 
more  favourable  than  the  Pope  had  any  right  to  expect. 
Bologna,  Ferrara,  and  the  Eomagna,  which  had  been 
occupied  in  virtue  of  the  armistice,  were  now  ceded  by 
the  Papacy.  But  conditions  affecting  the  exercise  of 
the  spiritual  power  which  had  been  proposed  by  the 
Directory  were  withdrawn  ;  and,  beyond  a  provision  for 
certain  payments  in  money,  nothing  of  importance  was 
added  to  the  stipulations  of  the  armistice. 

The  last  days  of  the  Venetian  Republic  were  now  at 
hand.  It  was  in  vain  that  Venice  had  maintained  its 
neutrality  when  all  the  rest  of  Italy  joined  the  enemies 


1797.  BONAFABTE    AND    VENICE.  137 

of  France ;  its  refusal  of  a  French  alliance  was  made  an 
unpardonable  crime.  So  long  as  the  war  with  Austria 
lasted,  Bonaparte  exhausted  the  Venetian  territory  with 
requisitions :  when  peace  came  within  view,  it  was 
necessary  that  he  should  have  some  pretext  for  seizing 
it  or  handing  it  over  to  the  enemy.  In  fulfilment  of 
his  own  design  of  keeping  a  quarrel  open,  he  had  sub- 
jected the  Government  to  every  insult  and  wrong  likely 
to  goad  it  into  an  act  of  war.  When  at  length  Venice 
armed  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  its  neutralit}'-,  the 
organs  of  the  invader  called  upon  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Venetian  mainland  to  rise  against  the  oligarchy,  and  to 
throw  in  their  lot  with  the  liberated  province  of  Milan. 
A  French  alliance  was  once  more  urged  upon  Venice  by 
Bonaparte :  it  was  refused,  and  the  outbreak  which  the 
French  had  prepared  instantly  followed.  Bergamo  and 
Brescia,  where  French  garrisons  deprived  the  Venetian 
Government  of  all  power  of  defence,  rose  in  revolt,  and 
renounced  all  connection  with  Venice.  The  Senate 
begged  Bonaparte  to  withdraw  the  French  garrisons ; 
its  entreaties  drew  nothing  from  him  but  repeated 
demands  for  the  acceptance  of  the  French  alliance, 
which  was  only  another  name  for  subjection.  Little 
as  the  Venetians  suspected  it,  the  only  doubt  now 
present  to  Bonaparte  was  whether  he  should  add  the 
provinces  of  Venetia  to  his  own  Cispadane  Eepublic  or 
hand  them  over  to  Austria  in  exchange  for  other  cessions 
which  France  required. 

Austria   could    defend    itself   iij    Italy   no   longer. 
Before  the  end    of    March   the   mountain-passes   into 


138  MODERN  EUROPE.  1797. 

Carintliia  were  carried  by  Bonaparte.  His  army  drove 
tlie  enemy  before  it  along  the  road  to  Vienna,  until 

both  pursuers  and  pursued  were  within 
of    Leoben,        eighty  miles  of  the  capital.     At  Leoben,  on 

the  7th  of  April,  the  Austrian  commander 
asked  for  a  suspension  of  arms.  It  was  granted,  and 
negotiations  for  peace  commenced.*  Bonaparte  offered 
the  Venetian  provinces,  but  not  the  city  of  Venice,  to 
the  Emperor.  On  the  18th  of  April  preliminaries  of 
peace  were  signed  at  Leoben,  by  which,  in  return  for 
the  Netherlands  and  for  Lombardy  west  of  the  river 
Oglio,  Bonaparte  secretly  agreed  to  hand  over  to 
Austria  the  whole  of  the  territory  of  Venice  upon  the 
mainland  east  of  the  Oglio,  in  addition  to  its  Adriatic 
provinces  of  Istria  and  Dalmatia.      To  disguise  the  act 


•  "  The  clamours  for  peace  have  become  loud  and  importunate.  His 
Imperial  Majesty  is  constantly  assailed  by  all  his  Ministers,  M.  de  Thugut 
alone  excepted,  and  by  all  who  approach  his  person.  Attempts  are  even 
made  ^to  alarm  him  with  a  dread  of  insurrection.  In  the  midst  of  these 
calamities  M.  de  Thugut  retains  his  firmness  of  mind,  and  continues  to 
struggle  against  the  united  voice  of  the  nobility  and  the  numerous  and  trying 
adversities  that  press  upon  him."  Eden,  April  1.  "  The  confusion  at  the 
army  exceeds  the  bounds  of  belief.  Had  Bonaparte  continued  his  pro- 
gress hither  (Yienua),  no  doubt  is  entertained  that  he  might  have  entered 
the  place  without  opposition.  That,  instead  of  risking  this  enterprise,  he 
should  have  stopped  and  given  the  Austrians  six  days  to  recover  from 
their  alarm  and  to  prepare  for  defence,  is  a  circumstance  which  it  is 
impossible  to  account  for."  April  12.  "He "(Mack)  "said  that  when 
this  place  was  threatened  by  the  enemy,  Her  Imperial  Majesty  broke  in 
upon  the  Emperor  while  in  conference  with  his  Minister,  and,  throwing 
herself  and  her  children  at  his  feet,  determined  His  Majesty  to  open  the 
negotiation  which  terminated  in  the  shameful  desertion  of  his  ally.'* 
Aug.  16 ;  Records :  Austria,  vols.  49,  50.  Thugut  subsequently  told  Lord 
Minto  that  if  he  could  have  laid  his  hand  upon  £500,000  in  cash  to  stop  the 
run  on  the  Bank  of  Vienna,  the  war  would  have  been  continued,  in  which 
case  he  believed  he  would  have  surrounded  Bonapai-te's  army. 


1797.  THE   FRENCH   IN    VENICE.  139 

of    spoliation,    it    was    pretended   that   Bologna   and 
Ferrara  should  be  offered  to  Venice  in  return.* 

But  worse  was  yet  to  come.  While  Bonaparte  was 
in  conference  at  Leoben,  an  outbreak  took  place  at 
Verona,  and  three  hundred  French  soldiers,  including 
the  sick  in  the  hospital,  perished  by  popular  ^^^  ^^^^ 
violence.     The  Venetian  Senate  despatched  ^**' 

envoys  to  Bonaparte  to  express  their  grief  and  to  offer 
satisfaction  ;  in  the  midst  of  the  negotiations  intelligence 
arrived  that  the  commander  of  a  Venetian  fort  had  fired 
upon  a  French  vessel  and  killed  some  of  the  crew.  Bona- 
parte drove  the  envoys  from  his  presence,  declaring  that 
he  could  not  treat  with  men  whose  hands  were  dripping 
with  French  blood.  A  declaration  of  war  was  published, 
charging  the  Senate  with  the  design  of  repeating  the 
Sicilian  Vespers,  and  the  panic  which  it  was  Bonaparte's 
object  to  inspire  instantly  followed.  The  Government 
threw  themselves  upon  his  mercy.  Bonaparte  pre- 
tended that  he  desired  no  more  than  to  establish  a  popular 
government  in  Venice  in  the  place  of  the  oligarchy. 
His  terms  were  accepted.  The  Senate  consented  to 
abrogate  the  ancient  Constitution  of  the  Eepublic,  and 
to  introduce  a  French  garrison  into  Venice.  On  the 
12th  of  May  the  Grand  Council  voted  its  own  dissolution. 
Peace  was  concluded.  •  The  public  articles  of  the  treaty 
declared  that  there  should  be  friendship  between  the 
French  and  the  Venetian  Republics ;  that  the  sovereignty 

*  The  cession  of  the  Rhenish  Provinces  was  not,  as  nsnally  stated, 
contained  in  the  Preliminaries.  Corr.  de  Napoleon,  2,  497;  Hiiffer, 
p.  259,  where  the  details  of  the  snbsequent  negotiations  will  bo  found. 


140  MOBEBN  EUBOPK  1797. 

of  Yenlce  slioiild  reside  in  the  body  of  tlie  citizens ;  and 
that  the  French  garrison  should  retire  so  soon  as  the 
new  Government  announced  that  it  had  no  further  need 
of  its  support.  Secret  articles  stipulated  for  a  money- 
payment,  and  for  the  usual  surrender  of  works  of  art ; 
an  indefinite  expression  relating  to  an  exchange  of 
territory  was  intended  to  cover  the  surrender  of  the 
Venetian  mainland,  and  the  union  of  Bologna  and 
Ferrara  with  what  remained  of  Venice.  The  friendship 
and  alliance  of  France,  which  Bonaparte  had  been  so 
anxious  to  bestow  on  Venice,  were  now  to  bear  their 
fruit.  "  I  shall  do  everything  in  my  power,"  he  wrote 
to  the  new  Grovernment  of  Venice,  '*  to  give  you  proof  of 
the  great  desire  I  have  to  see  your  liberty  take  root,  and 
to  see  this  unhappy  Italy,  freed  from  the  rule  of  the 
stranger,  at  length  take  its  place  with  glory  on  the 
scene  of  the  world,  and  resume,  among  the  great  nations, 
the  rank  to  which  nature,  destiny,  and  its  own  position 
call  it."  This  was  for  Venice  ;  for  the  French  Directory 
Bonaparte  had  a  very  different  tale.  "  I  had  several 
motives,"  he  wrote  (May  19),  "in  concluding  the 
treaty  : — ^to  enter  the  city  without  difficulty ;  to  have 
the  arsenal  and  all  else  in  our  possession,  in  order  to 
take  from  it  whatever  we  needed,  under  pretext  of  the 
secret  articles ;  ...  to  evade  the  odium  attaching 
to  the  Preliminaries  of  Leoben ;  to  furnish  pretexts  for 
them,  and  to  facilitate  their  execution." 
,3^ ,     .  As  the  firstfruits  of  the  Venetian  alii- 

French  seize 

Ionian  Islands.    ^^^^^  Bouapartc  seizcd  upon  Corfu  and  the 
other  Ionian  Islands.     "  You  will  start,"  he  wrote  to 


im.  VENIOE.  141 

General  Qentili,  "  as  quickly  and  as  secretly  as  possible, 
and  take  possession  of  all  the  Venetian  establishments  in 
the  Levant.  .  .  If  the  inhabitants  should  be  inclined 
for  independence,  you  should  flatter  their  tastes,  and  in 
all  your  proclamations  you  should  not  fail  to  allude  to 
Greece,  Athens,  and  Sparta."  This  was  to  be  the 
French  share  in  the  spoil.  Yet  even  now,  though 
stripped  of  its  islands,  its  coasts,  and  its  ancient  Italian 
territory,  Venice  might  still  have  remained  a  prominent 
city  in  Italy.  It  was  sacrificed  in  order  to  gain  the 
Rhenish  Provinces  for  France.  Bonaparte  had  returned 
to  the  neighbourhood  of  Milan,  and  received  the 
Austrian  envoy,  De  GaUo,  at  the  villa  of  Montebello. 
Wresting  a  forced  meaning  from  the  Pre-  ^^^  ^  ^ 
liminaries  of  Leoben,  Bonaparte  claimed  ^''^^^'°'^^- 
the  frontier  of  the  Rhine,  ofiering  to  Austria  not  only 
the  territory  of  Venice  upon  the  mainland,  but  the  city 
of  Venice  itself.  De  Gallo  yielded.  Whatever  causes 
subsequently  prolonged  the  negotiation,  no  trace  of 
honour  or  pity  in  Bonaparte  led  him  even  to  feign  a 
reluctance  to  betray  Venice.  "  We  have  to-day  had  our 
first  conference  on  thie  definitive  treaty,*'  he  wrote  to 
the  Directory,  on  the  night  of  the  26th  of  May,  "  and 
have  agreed  to  present  the  following  propositions  :  the 
line  of  the  Rhine  for  France ;  Salzburg,  Passau  for  the 
Emperor ;  .  .  .  the  maintenance  of  the  Germanic 
Body;  .  .  .  Venice  for  the  Emperor.  Venice," 
he  continued,  "  which  has  been  in  decadence  since  the 
discovery  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  and  the  rise  of 
Trieste  and  Ancona,  can  scarcely  survive  the  blows  we 


14-2  MODERN  EUBOPK  1797. 

have  just  struck.  With  a  cowardly  and  helpless  popula- 
tion in  no  way  fit  for  liberty,  without  territory  and 
without  rivers,  it  is  but  natural  that  she  should  go  to 
those  to  whom  we  give  the  mainland."  Thus  was 
Italy  to  be  freed  from  foreign  intervention ;  and  thus 
was  Venice  to  be  regenerated  by  the  friendship  of 
France ! 

In  comparison  with  the  fate  preparing  for  Venice, 
the  sister-republic  of  Genoa  met  with 
generous  treatment.  A  revolutionary 
movement,  long  prepared  by  the  French  envoy,  over- 
threw the  ancient  oligarchical  Grovernment ;  but  demo- 
cratic opinion  and  French  sympathies  did  not  extend 
below  the  middle  classes  of  the  population ;  and,  after 
the  Government  had  abandoned  its  own  cause,  the 
charcoal-burners  and  dock-labourers  rose  in  its  defence, 
and  attacked  the  French  party  with  the  cry  of  "  Viva 
Maria,"  and  with  figures  of  the  Virgin  fastened  to  their 
hats,  in  the  place  where  their  opponents  wore  the  French 
tricolour.  Eeligious  fanaticism  won  the  day ;  the  old 
Government  was  restored,  and  a  number  of  Frenchmen 
who  had  taken  part  in  the  conflict  were  thrown  into 
prison.  The  imprisonment  of  the  Frenchmen  gave 
Bonaparte  a  pretext  for  intervention.  He  disclaimed 
all  desire  to  alter  the  Government,  and  demanded  only 
the  liberation  of  his  countrymen  and  the  arrest  of  the 
enemies  of  France.  But  the  overthrow  of  the  oligarchy 
had  been  long  arranged  with  Faypoult,  the  French 
envoy ;  and  Genoa  received  a  democratic  constitution 
which  placed  the  friends  of  France  in  power  (June  5). 


1797.  FBANOE   IN  1797.  143 

While    Bonaparte,  holding  Court  in   the   Villa  of 
Montebello,    continued    to   negotiate    with 

.  ,  Fhmoe  in  1797. 

Austria  upon  the  basis  of  the  Preliminaries 
of  Leoben,  events  took  place  in  France  which  offered  him 
an  opportunity  of  interfering  directly  in  the  government 
of  the  Republic.  The  elections  which  were  to  replace 
one-third  of  the  members  of  the  Legislature  took  place 
in  the  spring  of  1797.  The  feeling  of  the  country  was 
now  much  the  same  as  it  had  been  in  1795,  when  a 
large  Eoyalist  element  was  returned  for  those  seats  in 
the  Councils  which  the  Convention  had  not  reserved  for 
its  own  members .  France  desired  a  more  equitable  and 
a  more  tolerant  rule.  The  Directory  had  indeed  allowed 
the  sanguinary  laws  against  non-juring  priests  and  re- 
turning emigrants  to  remain  unenforced ;  but  the  spirit 
and  traditions  of  official  Jacobinism  were  still  active  in 
the  Q-overnment.  The  Directors  themselves  were  all 
regicides ;  the  execution  of  the  King  was  still  celebrated 
by  a  national /e^^  ;  offices,  great  and  small,  were  held  by 
men  who  had  risen  in  the  Revolution  ;  the  whole  of  the 
old  gentry  of  France  was  excluded  from  participation 
in  public  life.  It  was  against  this  revolutionary  class- 
rule,  against  a  system  which  placed  the  country  as 
much  at  the  mercy  of  a  few  directors  and  generals  as 
it  had  been  at  the  mercy  of  the  Conventional  Com- 
mittee, that  the  elections  of  1797  were  a  protest. 
Along  with  certain  Bourbonist  conspirators,  a  large 
majority  of  men  were  returned  who,  though  described 
as  Royalists,  were  in  fact  moderate  Constitutionalists, 
and  desired  only  to  undo  that  part  of  the  Revolution 


144  MODERN  EUROPE.  1797. 

wliich  excluded  whole  classes  of  the  nation  from  public 

life.* 

Such  a  party  in  the  legislative  body  naturally  took 
...    .         the  character  of  an  Opposition  to  the  more 

Opposition  to  -L  r 

the  Directory.  ^{q[q^^  scctiou  of  the  Dircctory.  The 
Director  retiring  in  1797  was  replaced  by  the  Consti- 
tutionalist Barthelemy,  negotiator  of  the  treaty  of  Basle ; 
Carnot,  who  continued  in  office,  took  part  with  the  Opposi- 
tion, justly  fearing  that  the  rule  of  the  Directory  would 
soon  amount  to  nothing  more  than  the  rule  of  Bona- 
parte himself.  The  first  debates  in  the  new  Chamber 
arose  upon  the  laws  relating  to  emigrants ;  the  next, 
upon  Bonaparte's  usurpation  of  sovereign  power  in  Italy. 
On  the  23rd  of  June  a  motion  for  information  on  the 
affairs  of  Venice  and  Genoa  was  brought  forward  in  the 
Council  of  Five  Hundred.  Dumolard,  the  mover,  com- 
plained of  the  secrecy  of  Bonaparte's  action,  of  the  con- 
tempt shown  by  him  to  the  Assembly,  of  his  tyrannical 
and  un-republican  interference  with  the  institutions  of 
friendly  States.  No  resolution  was  adopted  by  the 
Assembly ;  but  the  mere  fact  that  the  Assembly  had 
listened  to  a  hostile  criticism  of  his  own  actions  was 
sufficient  ground  in  Bonaparte's  eyes  to  charge  it  with 
Eoyalism  and  with  treason.  Three  of  the  Directors, 
Barras,  Eewbell,  and  Lareveill^re,  had  already  formed 
the  project  of  overpowering  the  Assembly  by  force. 
Bonaparte's  own  interests  led  him  to  offer  them  his  sup- 
port.    If  the  Constitutional  party  gained  power,  there 

•  Gohier,  M^moires  i.    Carnot,  Reponse  a  BaUlenl.     Oorrespondanoe 
de  Napoleon,  ii.  188.    Miot  de  Melito,  ch.  yL 


1797.  17  FBUOTIDOR  145 

was  an  end  to  his  own  unshackled  rule  in  Italy ;  if  the 
Bourbonists  succeeded,  a  different  class  of  men  would 
hold  all  the  honours  of  the  State.  However  feeble  the 
G-ovemment  of  the  Directory,  its  continuance  secured 
his  own  present  ascendancy,  and  left  him  the  hope  of 
gaining  supreme  power  when  the  public  could  tolerate 
the  Directory  no  longer. 

The  fate  of  the  Assembly  was  sealed.     On  the  anni- 
versary of  the  capture  of  the  Bastille,  Bonaparte  issued 
a  proclamation  to  his  army  declaring  the  Republic  to  be 
threatened  by  Royalist  intrigues.    A  banquet 
was  held,  and  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  every     FrSctidor  (Sept. 

3). 

division  signed  addresses  to  the  Directory 
full  of  threats  and  fury  against  conspiring  aristocrats. 
"Indignation  is  at  its  height  in  the  army,"  wrote 
Bonaparte  to  the  Grovernment ;  "  the  soldiers  are  asking 
with  loud  cries  whether  they  are  to  be  rewarded  by  assas- 
sination on  their  return  home,  as  it  appears  all  patriots 
are  to  be  so  dealt  with.  The  peril  is  increasing  every 
day,  and  I  think,  citizen  Directors,  you  must  decide  to 
act  one  way  or  other."  The  Directors  had  no  difficulty 
in  deciding  after  such  an  exhortation  as  this ;  but,  as 
soon  as  Bonaparte  had  worked  up  their  courage,  he  with- 
drew into  the  background,  and  sent  General  Augereau, 
a  blustering  Jacobin,  to  Paris,  to  risk  the  failure  or 
bear  the  odium  of  the  crime.  Augereau  received  the 
military  command  of  the  capital ;  the  air  was  filled  with 
rumours  of  an  impending  blow ;  but  neither  the  majority 
in  the  Councils  nor  the  two  threatened  Directors, 
Carnot  and  Barth^lemy,  knew  how  to  take  measures  of 

K 


146  MODERN  EUBOFE.  1797. 

defence.  On  tlie  night  of  the  3rd  September  (17  Fructi- 
dor)  the  troops  of  Augereau  surrounded  the  Tuileries. 
Barthelemy  was  seized  at  the  Luxembourg  ;  Car'not  fled 
for  his  life ;  the  members  of  the  Councils,  marching  in 
procession  to  the  Tuileries  early  the  next  morning,  were 
arrested  or  dispersed  by  the  soldiers.  Later  in  the  day 
a  minority  of  the  Councils  was  assembled  to  ratify 
the  measures  determined  upon  by  Augereau  and  the 
three  Directors.  Fifty  members  of  the  Legislature,  and 
the  writers,  proprietors,  and  editors  of  forty- two  journals, 
were  sentenced  to  exile ;  the  elections  of  forty-eight  de- 
partments were  annulled ;  the  laws  against  priests  and 
emigrants  were  renewed;  and  the  Directory  was  em- 
powered to  suppress  all  journals  at  its  pleasure.  This 
coup  d'etat  was  described  as  the  suppression  of  a  Eoyalist 
conspiracy.  It  was  this,  but  it  was  something  more.  It 
was  the  suppression  of  all  Constitutional  government, 
and  all  but  the  last  step  to  the  despotism  of  the  chief  of 
the  army. 

The  effect  of  the  movement  was  instantly  felt  in  the 

negotiations  with  Austria  and  with  Eng- 
with  Austria,        land.      Lord  Malmesbury  was  now    again 

in  France,  treating  for  peace  with  fair  hopes 
of  success,  since  the  Preliminaries  of  Leoben  had  removed 
England's  opposition  to  the  cession  of  the  Netherlands. 
The  discomfiture  of  the  moderate  party  in  the  Councils 
brought  his  mission  to  an  abrupt  end.  Austria,  on  the 
other  hand,  had  prolonged  its  negotiations  because  Bona- 
parte claimed  Mantua  and  the  Ehenish  Provinces  in 
addition  to  the  cessions  agreed  upon  at  Leoben.     Count 


1797.  PEAOE    OF   OAMPO    FOBMIO.  147 

Ludwig  Cobenzl,  Austrian  ambassador  at  Sfc.  Peters- 
burg, wbo  had  protected  his  master's  interests  only  too 
well  in  the  last  partition  of  Poland,  was  now  at  the 
head  of  the  plenipotentiaries  in  Italy,  endeavouring  to 
bring  Bonaparte  back  to  the  terms  fixed  in  the  Prelimi- 
naries, or  to  gain  additional  territory  for  Austria  in  Italy. 
The  Jacobin  victory  at  Paris  depressed  the  Austrians  as 
much  as  it  elated  the  French  leader.  Bonaparte  was 
resolved  on  concluding  a  peace  that  should  be  all  his 
own,  and  this  was  only  possible  by  anticipating  an 
invasion  of  Germany,  about  to  be  undertaken  by  Auge- 
reau  at  the  head  of  the  Army  of  the  Ehine.  It  was  to 
this  personal  ambition  of  Bonaparte  that  Venice  was 
sacrificed.  The  Directors  were  willing  that  Austria 
should  receive  part  of  the  Venetian  territory  :  they  for- 
bade the  proposed  cession  of  Venice  itself.  Within  a 
few  weeks  more,  the  advance  of  the  Army  of  the  Ehine 
would  have  enabled  France  to  dictate  its  own  terms  ; 
but  no  consideration  either  for  France  or  for  Italy  could 
induce  Bonaparte  to  share  the  glory  of  the  Peace  with 
another.  On  the  17th  of  October  he  signed  the  final 
treaty  of  Campo  Formio,  which  gave  France  the  frontier 
of  the  Ehine,  and  made  both  the  Venetian  territory 
beyond  the  Adige  and  Venice  itself  the  property  of  the 
Emperor.  For  a  moment  it  seemed  that  the  Treaty  might 
be  repudiated  at  Vienna  as  well  as  at  Paris.  Thugut  pro- 
tested against  it,  because  it  surrendered  Mantua  and  the 
Ehenish  Provinces  without  gaining  for  Austria  the 
Papal  Legations ;  and  he  drew  up  the  ratification  only 
at  the  absolute  command  of  the  Emperor.  The  Direc- 
K  2 


148  MOBBUN  EUBOPK  1797. 

tory,  on  tlie  other  hand,  condemned  the  cession  of 
Venice.  But  their  fear  of  Bonaparte  and  their  own 
had  conscience  left  them  impotent  accessories  of  his 
treachery;  and  the  French  nation  at  large  was  too 
delighted  with  the  peace  to  resent  its  haser  con- 
ditions.* 

By  the  puhlic  articles  of  the  Treaty  of  Campo 
Treaty  of  campo  ^^rmio,  thc  Empcror  ceded  to  France  the 
Forinio,  Oct.  17.  ^iig^nai^  possessions  in  Lomhardy  and  in  the 
Netherlands,  and  agreed  to  the  estahlishment  of  a  Cis- 
alpine Eepuhlic,  formed  out  of  Austrian  Lomhardy,  the 
Venetian  territory  west  of  the  Adige,  and  the  districts 
hitherto  composing  the  new  Cispadane  State.  France 
took  the  Ionian  Islands,  Austria  the  City  of  Venice, 
with  Istria  and  Dalmatia,  and  the  Venetian  mainland 
east  of  the  Adige.  For  the  conclusion  of  peace  hetween 
France  and  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  it  was  agreed  that 
a  Congress  should  meet  at  Eastadt ;  but  a  secret  article 

*  Martens,  Traites,  vi.,  420;  Tliugul;,  Brief e  ii.,  64.  These  letters 
breathe  a  fire  and  passion  rare  among  German  statesmen  of  that  day, 
and  show  the  fine  side  of  Thugut's  character.  The  well-known  story  of 
the  destmction  of  Cobenzl's  vase  by  Bonaparte  at  the  last  sitting,  with  the 
words,  "  Thus  will  I  dash  the  Austrian  Monarchy  to  pieces,"  is  mythical. 
Cobenzl's  own  account  of  the  scene  is  as  follows  : — "  Bonaparte,  excited  by 
not  haying  slept  for  two  nights,   emptied  glass  after  glass  of  punch. 

When    I   explained    with    the    greatest    composure, 

Bonaparte  started  up  in  a  violent  rage,  and  poured  out  a  flood  of  abuse,  at 
the  same  time  scratching  his  name  illegibly  at  the  foot  of  the  statement 
which  he  had  handed  in  as  protocol.  Then  without  waiting  for  our  signa- 
tures, he  put  on  his  hat  in  the  conference-room  itself,  and  left  us.  Until 
he  was  in  the  street  he  continued  to  vociferate  in  a  manner  that  could  only 
be  ascribed  to  intoxication,  though  Clarke  and  the  rest  of  his  smte,  who 
were  waiting  in  the  hall,  did  their  best  to  restrain  him."  "  He  behaved  as 
if  he  had  escaped  from  a  lunatic  asylum.  His  own  people  are  all  agreed 
about  this.**    Hiiffer,  Oestreich  und  Preussen,  p.  453. 


1797.  OAMPO    FOBMIO,  149 

provided  that  the  Emperor  should  use  his  efforts  to  gain 
for  France  the  whole  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  except  a 
tract  including  the  Prussian  Duchies  of  Cleve  and 
Gruelders.  With  humorous  duplicity  the  French 
Government,  which  had  promised  Prussia  the  Bishopric 
of  Miinster  in  return  for  this  very  district,  now  pledged 
itself  to  Austria  that  Prussia  should  receive  no  extension 
whatever,  and  affected  to  exclude  the  Prussian  Duchies 
from  the  Rhenish  territory  which  was  to  be  made  over 
to  France.  Austria  was  promised  the  independent 
Bishopric  of  Salzburg,  and  that  portion  of  Bavaria 
which  lies  between  the  Inn  and  the  Salza.  The  secular  . 
princes  dispossessed  in  the  Rhenish  Provinces  were  to 
be  compensated  in  the  interior  of  the  Empire  by  a 
scheme  framed  in  concert  with  France. 

The  immense  advantages  which  the  Treaty  of  Campo 
Formio  gave  to  France — its  extension  over  A^,gtria  gacriflce. 
•jthe  Netherlands  and  the  Rhenish  Provinces,^  Germany. 
and  the  virtual  annexation  of  Lombardy,  Modena,  and 
the  Papal  Legations  under  the  form  of  a  client-republic 
— were  not  out  of  proportion  to  its  splendid  military 
successes.  Far  otherwise  was  it  with  Austria.  With 
the  exception  of  the  Archduke's  campaign  of  1796,  the 
warfare  of  the  last  three  years  had  brought  Austria 
nothing  but  a  series  of  disasters  ;  yet  Austria  gained  by 
the  Treaty  of  Campo  Formio  as  much  as  it  lost.  In 
the  place  of  the  distant  Netherlands  and  of  Milan  it 
gained,  in  Venice  and  Dalmatia,  a  territory  touching  its 
own,  nearly  equal  to  the  Netherlands  and  Milan  together 
in  population,  and  so  situated  as  to  enable  Austria  to 


160  MODERN  EUROPE.  1797. 

become  one  of  the  naval  Powers  of  the  Mediterranean. 
The  price  which  Austria  paid  was  the  abandonment  of 
Germany,  a  matter  which,  in  spite  of  Thugut's  protests,  ^ 
disturbed  the  Court  of  Vienna  as  little  as  the  betrayal 
of  Venice  disturbed  Bonaparte.  The  Ehenish  Provinces 
were  surrendered  to  the  stranger ;  German  districts  were 
to  be  handed  over  to  compensate  the  ejected  Sovereigns 
^  of  Holland  and  of  Modena ;  the  internal  condition  and 
order  of  the  Empire  were  to  be  superseded  by  one  framed 
not  for  the  purpose  of  benefiting  Germany,  but  for  the 
purpose  of  extending  the  influence  of  France. 

As  defenders  of  Germany,  both  Prussia  and  Austria 
pouc  of  Bona-    ^^^  bccu  fouud  Wanting.     The  latter  Power 
^^^'  seemed  to  have  reaped  in  Italy  the  reward 

of  its  firmness  in  prolonging  the  war.  Bonaparte  ridi- 
culed the  men  who,  in  the  earlier  spirit  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, desired  to  found  a  freer  political  system  in  Europe 
upon  the  ruins  of  Austria's  power.  "  I  have  not  drawn 
my  support  in  Italy,"  he  wrote  to  Talleyrand  (Oct.  7), 
"  from  the  love  of  the  peoples  for  liberty  and  equahty, 
or  at  least  but  a  very  feeble  support.  The  real  support 
of  the  army  of  Italy  has  been  its  own  discipline,  .  .  . 
above  all,  our  promptitude  in  repressing  malcontents 
and  punishing  those  who  declared  against  us.  This  is 
history ;  what  I  say  in  my  proclamations  and  speeches 
is  a  romance.  ...  If  we  return  to  the  foreign  policy 
of  1793,  we  shall  do  so  knowing  that  a  different  policy 
has  brought  its  success,  and  that  we  have  no  longer  the 
great  masses  of  1793  to  enrol  in  our  armies,  nor  the 
support  of  an  entl^jiasm  which  has  its  day  and  does 


17W.  ENGLISH   NAVAL    VICTORIES,  151 

not  return."  Austria  might  well,  for  the  present,  be 
left  in  some  strength,  and  France  was  fortunate  to  have 
so  dangerous  an  enemy  off  her  hands.  England  re- 
quired the  whole  forces  of  the  Eepublic.  "  The  present 
situation,"  wrote  Bonaparte,  after  the  Peace  of  Campo 
Formio,  "  offers  us  a  good  chance.  We  must  set  all  our 
strength  upon  the  sea ;  we  must  destroy  England ;  and 
the  Continent  is  at  our  feet." 

It  had  been  the  natural  hope  of  the  earlier  Eepub- 
licans  that  the  Spanish  and  the  Dutch  navies,  ^^^  ^^  ^ 
if  they  could  be  brought  to  the  side  of  SsT^fckm: 
France,  would  make  France  superior  to  Grreat 
Britain  as  a  maritime  Power.  The  conquest  of  Holland 
had  been  planned  by  Carnot  as  the  first  step  towards  an 
invasion  of  England.  For  a  while  these  plans  seemed  to 
be  approaching  their  fulfilment.  Holland  was  won; 
Spain  first  made  peace,  and  then  entered  into  alliance 
with  the  Directory  (Aug.  1796).  But  each  increase  in 
the  naval  forces  of  the  Eepublic  only  gave  the  admirals 
of  Great  Britain  new  material  to  destroy.  The  Spanish 
fleet  was  beaten  by  Jarvis  off  St.  Vincent;  even  the 
mutiny  of  the  British  squadrons  at  Spithead  and  the 
Nore,  in  the  spring  and  summer  of  1797,  caused  no 
change  in  the  naval  situation  in  the  North  Sea.  Dun- 
can, who  was  blockading  the  Dutch  fleet  in  the  Texel 
when  his  own  squadron  joined  the  mutineers,  continued 
the  blockade  with  one  ship  beside  his  own,  signalling  all 
the  while  as  if  the  whole  fleet  were  at  his  back ;  until 
the  misused  seamen,  who  had  lately  turned  their  guns 
upon  the  Thames,  returned  to  the  admiral,  and  earned 


152  MODERN    EUBOFK  1797. 

his  forgiveness  by  destroying  the  Dutch  at  Camperdown 
as  soon  as  they  ventured  out  of  shelter. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  at  any  time  after  his  return 
from  Italy  Bonaparte  seriously  entertained  the  project 
Bonapaxi^about  ^^  invadiug  Engkud.  The  plan  was  at  any 
to  invade  Egypt.     ^^^^  ^^^^  abandoned,  and  the  preparations, 

which  caused  great  alarm  in  the  English  coast-towns, 
were  continued  only  for  the  purpose  of  disguising 
Bonaparte's  real  design  of  an  attack  upon  Egypt.  Erom 
the  beginning  of  his  career  Bonaparte's  thoughts  had 
turned  towards  the  vast  and  undefended  East.  While 
still  little  known,  he  had  asked  the  French  Grovernment 
to  send  him  to  Constantinople  to  organise  the  Turkish 
army;  as  soon  as  Yenice  fell  into  his  hands,  he  had  seized 
the  Ionian  Islands  as  the  base  for  a  future  conquest  of 
the  Levant.  Every  engagement  that  confirmed  the 
superiority  of  England  upon  the  western  seas  gave  ad- 
ditional reason  for  attacking  her  where  her  power  was 
most  'precarious,  in  the  East.  Bonaparte  knew  that 
Alexander  had  conquered  the  country  of  the  Indus  by  a 
land-march  from  the  Mediterranean,  and  this  was  per- 
haps all  the  information  which  he  possessed  regarding 
the  approaches  to  India ;  but  it  was  enough  to  fix  his 
mind  upon  the  conquest  of  Egypt  and  Syria,  as  the  first 
step  towards  the  destruction  of  the  Asiatic  Empire  of 
England.  Mingled  with  the  design  upon  India  was  a 
dream  of  overthrowing  the  Mohammedan  Grovernment 
of  Turkey,  and  attacking  Austria  from  the  East  with  an 
armv  drawn  from  the  liberated  Christian  races  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire.     The  very  vagueness  of  a  scheme  of 


17W.        BONAFAETE\S   EASTERN   PLANS.  153 

Eastern  conquest  made  it  the  more  attractive  to  Bona- 
parte's genius  and  ambition.  Nor  was  there  any  incli- 
nation on  the  part  of  the  Government  to  detain  the 
general  at  home.  The  Directory,  little  concerned  with 
the  real  merits  or  dangers  of  the  enterprise,  consented 
to  Bonaparte's  project  of  an  attack  upon  Egypt,  thank- 
ful for  any  opportunity  of  loosening  the  grasp  which 
was  now  closing  so  firmly  upon  themselves. 


CHAPTEE  lY. 

Congress  of  Rastadt — The  Rhenish  Provinces  ceded — Ecclesiastical  States  of 
Germany  suppressed — French  intervention  in  Switzerland — Helvetic  Re- 
public— The  French  invade  the  Papal  States — Roman  Republic — Expe- 
dition to  Egypt— Battle  of  the  Nile— Coalition  of  1798— Ferdinand  of 
Naples  enters  Rome — Mack's  defeats — French  enter  Naples — Parthenopean 
Republic — ^War  with  Austria  and  Russia — Battle  of  Stockach — Murder  of 
the  French  Envoys  at  Rastadt — Campaign  in  Lombardy — Reign  of  Terror 
at  Naples — Austrian  designs  upon  Italy — Suvaroff  and  the  Austrians — 
Campaign  in  Switzerland — Campaign  in  Holland — Bonaparte  returns  from 
Egypt — Coup-d'etat  of  18  Brumaire — Constitution  of  1799 — System  of 
Bonaparte  in  France— Its  effect  on  the  influence  of  France  abroad. 

The  public  articles  of  the  Treaty  of  Campo  Formio 
Con  essofEas-  coiitained  only  the  terms  which  had  been 
tadt.  Nov.  1797.  ^gj-gg^j  upon  by  France  and  Austria  in  rela- 
tion to  Italy  and  the  Netherlands :  the  conditions  of 
peace  between  France  and  the  Grermanic  Body,  which 
had  been  secretly  arranged  between  France  and  the  two 
leading  Powers,  were  referred  by  a  diplomatic  fiction  to  a 
Congress  that  was  to  assemble  at  Eastadt.  Accord- 
ingly, after  Prussia  and  Austria  had  each  signed  an  agree- - 
ment  abandoning  the  Ehenish  Provinces,  the  Congress 
was  duly  summoned.  As  if  in  mockery  of  his  helpless 
countrymen,  the  Emperor  informed  the  members  of  the 
Diet  that  "  in  unshaken  fidelity  to  the  great  principle 
of  the  unity  and  indivisibility  of  the  German  Empire,  they 
were  to  maintain  the  common  interests  of  the  Fatherland 
with  noble  conscientiousness  and  Grerman  steadfastness ; 
and  so,  united  with  their  imperial  head,  to  promote  a 
just  and  lasting  peace,  founded  upon  the  basis  of  the 


1797.  OONOEESS  AT  BA8TADT.  166 

integrity  of  tlie  Empire  and  of  its  Constitution."*  Thus 
the  Congress  was  convoked  upon  the  pretence  of  pre- 
serving what  the  two  greater  States  had  determined  to 
sacrifice ;  while  its  real  object,  the  suppression  of  the 
ecclesiastical  principalities  and  the  curtailment  of 
Bavaria,  was  studiously  put  out  of  sight. 

The  Congress  was  composed  of  two  French  envoys, 
of  the  representatives  of  Prussia  and  j^^^j^  ^,  ^^ 
Austria,  and  of  a  committee,  numbering  with 
their  secretaries  seventy-four  persons,  appointed  by  the 
Diet  of  Eatisbon.  But  the  recognised  negotiators  formed 
only  a  small  part  of  the  diplomatists  who  flocked  to 
Eastadt  in  thc^hope  of  picking  up  something  from  the 
wreck  of  the  Hlmpire.  Every  petty  German  sovereign, 
even  communities  which  possessed  no  political  rights  at 
all,  thought  it  necessary  to  have  an  agent  on  the  spot, 
in  order  to  filch,  if  possible,  some  trifling  advantage 
from  a  neighbour,  or  to  catch  the  first  riimour  of  a  pro- 
posed annexation.  It  was  the  saturnalia  of  the  whole 
tribe  of  busybodies  and  intriguers  who  passed  in  Grer- 
many  for  men  of  state.  They  spied  upon  one  another ; 
they  bribed  the  secretaries  and  doorkeepers,  they  bribed 
the  very  cooks  and  coachmen,  of  the  two  omnipotent 
French  envoys.  Of  the  national  humiliation  of  Ger- 
many, of  the  dishonour  attaching  to  the  loss  of  entire 
provinces  and  the  reorganisation  of  what  remained  at 
the  I  idding  of  the  stranger,  there  seems  to  have  been 

•  Hausser,  Deutsche  (Jeschichte,  2, 147.  Vivenot,  Rastadter  Congress, 
p.  17.  Yon  Lang,  Memoiren,  i.  33.  It  is  alleged  that  the  official  who  drew 
up  this  docnineut  had  not  been  made  acquainted  with  the  secret  cIausos. 


156  MODERN  EUBOPB.  1798. 

no  sense  in  the  political  circles  of  tlie  day.  The  collapse 
of  the  Empire  was  viewed  rather  as  a  subject  of  merri- 
ment. A  gaiety  of  life  and  language  prevailed,  impos- 
sible among  men  who  did  not  consider  themselves  as  the 
spectators  of  a  comedy.  Cobenzl,  the  chief  Austrian 
plenipotentiary,  took  his  travels  in  a  fly,  because  his 
mistress,  the  citoyenne  Hyacinthe,  had  decamped  with 
all  his  carriages  and  horses.  A  witty  but  profane 
pamphlet  was  circulated,  in  which  the  impending  sacri- 
fice of  the  Empire  was  described  in  language  borrowed 
from  the  Grospel  narrative,  Prussia  taking  the  part  of 
Judas  Iscariot,  Austria  that  of  Pontius  Pilate,  the 
Congress  itself  being  the  chief  priests  and  Pharisees  as- 
sembling that  they  may  take  the  Holy  Poman  Empire 
by  craft,  while  the  army  of  the  Empire  figures  as  the 
"  multitude  who  smote  upon  their  breasts  and  departed." 
In  the  utter  absence  of  any  Grerman  pride  or  patriotism 
the  French  envoys  not  only  obtained  the  territory  that 
they  required,  but  successfully  embroiled  the  two  leading 
Powers  with  one  another,  and  accustomed  the  minor  States 
to  look  to  France  for  their  own  promotion  at  the  cost  of 
their  neighbours.  The  contradictory  pledges  which  the 
French  Grovernment  had  given  to  Austria  and  to  Prussia 
caused  it  no  embarrassment.  To  deceive  one  of  'the  two 
powers  was  to  win  the  gratitude  of  the  other ;  and  the 
Directory  determined  to  fulfil  its  engagement  to  Prussia 
at  the  expense  of  the  bishoprics,  and  to  ignore  what  it 
had  promised  to  Austria  at  the  expense  of  Bavaria. 

A  momentary  difl&culty  arose  upon  the  opening  of 
the   Congress,  when   it   appeared  that,  misled  by  the 


1798.  GERMAN   EOOLESIASTIOAL    STATES.  157 

Emperor's  protestations,  the  Diet  had  only  empowered 
its  Committee  to  treat  upon  the  basis  of  the  integrity 
of  the  Empire  (Dec.  9).  The  French  declined  to  nego- 
tiate until  the  Committee  had  procured  full  powers: 
and  the  prospects  of  the  integrity  of  the  Rhenish  pto- 
Empire  were  made  clear  enough  a  few  days  ^*^ 

later  by  the  entry  of  the  French  into  Mainz,  and  the 
formal  organisation  of  the  Ehenish  Provinces  as  four 
French  Departments.  In  due  course  a  decree  of  the 
Diet  arrived,  empowering  the  Committee  to  negotiate 
at  their  discretion :  and  for  some  weeks  after  the 
inhabitants  of  the  Rhenish  Provinces  had  been  subjected 
to  the  laws,  the  magistracy,  and  the  taxation  of  France, 
the  Committee  deliberated  upon  the  proposal  for  their 
cession  with  as  much  minuteness  and  as  much  im- 
partiality as  if  it  had  been  a  point  of  speculative 
philosophy.  At  length  the  French  put  an  end  to  the 
tedious  trifling,  and  proceeded  to  the  question  of  com- 
pensation for  the  dispossessed  lay  Princes.  This  they 
proposed  to  effect  by  means  of  the  disestablishment,  or 
secularisation,  of  ecclesiastical  States  in  the  interior  of 
Germany.  Prussia  eagerly  supported  the 
French  proposal,  both  with  a  view  to  the        states 

J^      A  ropproMod. 

annexation  of  the  great  Bishopric  of  Miin- 
ster,  and  from  ancient  hostility  to  the  ecclesiastical 
States  as  instruments  and  allies  of  Catholic  Austria. 
The  Emperor  opposed  the  destruction  of  his  faithful 
dependents ;  the  ecclesiastical  princes  themselves  raised 
a  bitter  outcry,  and  demonstrated  that  the  fall  of  their 
order  would  unloose  the  keystone  of  the  political  system 


168  MODERN  EUROPE.  .1798. 

of  Europe ;  but  they  found  few  friends.  If  Prussia 
coveted  the  great  spoils  of  Miinster,  the  minor  sovereigns, 
as  a  rule,  were  just  as  eager  for  the  convents  and  abbeys 
that  broke  the  continuity  of  their  own  territories  :  only 
the  feeblest  of  all  the  members  of  the  Empire,  the 
counts,  the  knights,  and  the  cities,  felt  a  respcctf.il 
sympathy  for  their  ecclesiastical  neighbours,  and  foresa*v 
that  in  a  system  of  annexation  their  own  turn  would 
come  next.  The  principle  of  secularisation  was  accepted 
by  the  Congress  without  much  difficulty,  all  the  energy 
of  debate  being  reserved  for  the  discussion  of  details : 
arrangements  which  were  to  transfer  a  few  miles  of 
ground  and  half  a  dozen  custom-houses  from  some 
bankrupt  ecclesiastic  to  some  French-bought  duke 
excited  more  interest  in  Grermany  than  the  loss  of  the 
Rhenish  provinces,  and  the  subjection  of  a  tenth  part  of 
the  German  nation  to  a  foreign  rule. 

One  more  question  was  unexpectedly  presented  to 
the  Congress.  After  proclaiming  for  six  years  that 
the  Ehine  was  the  natural  boundary  of  France,  the 
French  Grovernment  discovered  that  a  river  cannot  be  a 
military  frontier  at  all.  Of  what  service,  urged  the 
French  plenipotentiaries,  were  Strasburg  and  Mainz,  so 
long  aS  they  were  commanded  by  the  guns  on  the 
opposite  bank  ?  If  the  Rhine  was  to  be  of  any  use  to 
France,  France  must  be  put  in  possession  of  the 
fortresses  of  Kehl  and  Castel  upon  the  German  side. 
Outrageous  as  such  a  demand  appears,  it  found  sup- 
porters among  the  venal  politicians  of  the  smaller 
Courts,  and  furnished  the  Committee  with  material  for 


179a  SWITZERLAND.  151) 

arguments  that  extended  over  four  months.     But  the 

policy    of    Austria    was    now    taking  a  direction  that 

rendered  the  resolutions  of  the  Congress  of  very  little 

importance.      It   had   hecome  clear  that   France   was 

inclining  to   an   alliance    with    Prussia,  and  that   the 

Bavarian  annexations  promised  to  Austria  by  the  secret 

articles  of  Campo  Formio  were  to  be  withheld.      Once 

convinced,  by  the  failure  of  a  private  negotiation  in 

Alsace,  that  the  French  would  neither  be  content  with 

their  gains  of  179'7,  nor  permit  Austria  to  extend  its 

territory  in  Italy,  Thugut  determined  upon  a 

renewal  of  the  war.*      In  spite  of  a  power-      minea  on  war, 

f  ul  opposition  at  Court,  Thugut's  stubborn 

will   still   controlled  the  fortune  of  Austria :  and  the 

aggressions  of  the  French  Eepublic  in  Switzerland  and 

the  Papal  States,  at  the  moment  when  it  was  dictating 

terms  of  peace  to  the  Empire,  gave  only  too  much  cause 

for  the  formation  of  a  new  European  league. 

At  the  close  of  the  last  century  there  was  no  country 

where  the  spirit  of  Eepublican  freedom  was  so  strong, 

or  where  the  conditions  of  life  were  so  level, 

as  in  Switzerland ;  its  inhabitants,  however,    tion  in  Switzer- 
land. 

were  far  from   enjoying  complete  political 
equality.      There   were   districts  which   stood   in    the 
relation  of  subject  dependencies    to    one   or    other    of 
the  ruling  cantons  :  the  Pays  de  Vaud  was  governed  by 
an  officer  from  Berne ;  the  valley  of  the  Ticino  belonged 

*  "  Tout  annonce  qnll  sera  de  tonte  impossibilite  de  finir  sveo  ces 
gaenx  de  Fran9ai8  autremeut  que  par  moyens  do  fermet^."  Thugut, 
ii,  105.  For  the  negotiation  at  Seltz,  see  Historische  Zeitschrift, 
dii.,  27. 


160  MODERN  EUBOPK  1797-8. 

to  TJri;  and  in  most  of  the  sovereign  cantons  themselves 
authority  was  vested  in  a  close  circle  of  patrician 
families.  Thus,  although  Switzerland  was  free  from  the 
more  oppressive  distinctions  of  caste,  and  the  Govern- 
ments, even  where  not  democratic,  were  usually  just  and 
temperate,  a  sufficiently  large  class  was  excluded  from 
political  rights  to  give  scope  to  an  agitation  which 
received  its  impulse  from  Paris.  It  was  indeed  among 
communities  advanced  in  comfort  and  intelligence,  and 
divided  from  those  who  governed  them  by  no  great 
barrier  of  wealth  and  prestige,  that  "the  doctrines  of  the 
Eevolution  found  a  circulation  which  they  could  never 
gain  among  the  hereditary  serfs  of  Prussia  or  the  priest- 
ridden  peasantrj^  of  the  Roman  States.  As  early  as  the 
year  1792  a  French  army  had  entered  the  territory  of 
Greneva,  in  order  to  co-operate  with  the  democratic 
party  in  the  city.  The  movement  was,  however,  checked 
by  the  resolute  action  of  the  Bernese  Senate ;  and  the 
relations  of  France  to  the  Federal  Grovernment  had 
subsequently  been  kept  upon  a  friendly  footing  by  the 
good  sense  of  Barthelemy,  the  French  ambassador  at 
Berne,  and  the  discretion  with  which  the  Swiss  Grovern- 
ment avoided  every  occasion  of  offence.  On  the 
conquest  of  Northern  Italy,  Bonaparte  was  brought 
into  direct  connection  with  Swiss  affairs  by  a  reference 
of  certain  points  in  dispute  to  his  authority  as  arbitrator. 
Bonaparte  solved  the  difficulty  by  annexing  the  district 
of  the  Yalteline  to  the  Cisalpine  Republic  and  from 
that  time  he  continued  in  communication  with  the  Swiss 
democratic   leaders  on  the  subject  of  a  French  inter- 


1798.  THE   FBENOH  IN  SWITZEBLAND.  161 

vention  in  Switzerland,  the  real  purpose  of  which  was 
to  secure  the  treasure  of  Berne,  and  to  organise  a 
government,  like  that  of  Holland  and  the  Cisalpine 
Eepublic,  in  immediate  dependence  upon  France. 

At  length  the  moment  for  armed  interference  ar- 
rived.     On  the   15th   December,   1797,    a     _ 

War  between 

French  force  entered  the  Bishopric  of  Basle,  l^S^r^'Jfra'! 
and  gave  the  signal  for  insurrection  in  the 
Pays  de  Yaud.  The  Senate  of  Berne  summoned  the 
Diet  of  the  Confederacy  to  provide  for  the  common 
defence :  the  oath  of  federation  was  renewed,  and  a 
decree  was  passed  calling  out  the  Federal  army.  It  was 
now  announced  by  the  French  that  they  would  support 
the  Yaudois  revolutionary  party,  if  attacked.  The 
Bernese  troops,  however,  advanced ;  and  the  bearer  of  a 
flag  of  truce  having  been  accidentally  killed,  war  was 
declared  between  the  French  Eepublic  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  Berne.  Democratic  movements  immediately 
followed  in  the  northern  and  western  cantons ;  the 
Bernese  Government  attempted  to  negotiate  with  the 
French  invaders,  but  discovered  that  no  terms  would  be 
accepted  short  of  the  entire  destruction  of  the  existing 
Federal  Constitution.  Hostilities  commenced ;  and  the 
Bernese  troops,  supported  by  contingents  from  most  of 
the  other  cantons,  offered  a  brave  but  inefiectual  resist- 
ance to  the  advance  of  the  French,  who  entered  the 
Federal  capital  on  the  6th  of  March,  1798.  Tlie 
treasure  of  Berne,  amounting  to  about  £800,000,  accu- 
mulated by  ages  of  thrift  and  good  management,  was 
seized  in  order  to  provide  for  Bonaparte's  next  cam- 
L 


162  MODERN  EUROPE.  1798. 

paign,  and  for  a  host  of  voracious  soldiers  and  contractors. 
A  system  of  robbery  and  extortion,  more  shameless  even 
than  that  practised  in  Italy,  was  put  in  force  against  the 
cantonal  governments,  against  the  monasteries,  and 
against  private  individuals.  In  compensation  for  the 
Helvetic  Bepub-  Hiatcrial  losses  inflicted  upon  the  country,  the 
uc,  April  12.  ^^^  Helvetic  Kepublic,  one  and  indivisible, 
was  proclaimed  at  Aarau.  It  conferred  an  equality  of 
political  rights  upon  all  natives  of  Switzerland,  and  sub- 
stituted for  the^ancient  varieties  of  cantonal  sovereignty 
a  singie_national  government,  composed,  like  that  of 
France,  of  a  Directory'andjjwo  Councils  of  Legislature. 
The  towns  and  districts  which  had  been  hitherto 
excluded  from  a  share  in  government  welcomed  a  change 
which  seemed  to  place  them  on  a  level  with  their  former 
superiors  :  the  mountain-cantons  fought  with  traditional 
heroism  in  defence  of  the  liberties  which  they  had  in- 
herited from  their  fathers;  but  they  were  compelled, 
one  after  another,  to  submit  to  the  overwhelming  force 
of  France,  and  to  accept  the  new  constitution.  Tet, 
even  now,  when  peace  seemed  to  have  been  restored, 
and  the  whole  purpose  of  France  attained,  the  tyranny 
and  violence  of  the  invaders  exhausted  the  endurance  of 
a  spirited  people.  The  magistrates  of  the  Eepublic 
were  expelled  from  office  at  the  word  of  a  French  Com- 
mission; hostages  were  seized;  at  length  an  oath  of 
allegiance  to  the  new  order  was  required  as  a  condition 
for  the  evacuation  of  Switzerland  by  the  French  army. 
Eevolt  broke  out  in  Unterwalden,  and  a  handful  of 
peasants  met  the  French  army  at  the  village  of  Stanz, 


1798.  THE   FRENCH   ENTER    ROME.  163 

near  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Lake  of  Lucerne  (Sept.  8). 
There  for  three  days  they  fought  with  unyielding 
courage.  Their  resistance  inflamed  the  French  to  a  cruel 
vengeance :  slaughtered  families  and  burning  villages 
renewed,  in  this  so-called  crusade  of  liberty,  the  savagery 
of  ancient  war. 

Intrigues  at  Eome  paved  the  way  for  a  French 
intervention  in  the  affairs  of  the  Papal  French  intrigue. 
States,  coincident  in  time  with  the  invasion  ^ 
of  Switzerland.  The  residence  of  the  French  ambas- 
sador at  Eome,  Joseph  Bonaparte,  was  the  centre  of  a 
democratic  agitation.  The  men  who  moved  about  him 
were  in  great  part  strangers  from  the  north  of  Italy, 
but  they  found  adherents  in  the  middle  and  professional 
classes  in  Eome  itself,  although  the  mass  of  the  poor 
people,  as  well  as  the  numerous  body  whose  salaries  or 
profits  depended  upon  ecclesiastical  expenditure,  were 
devoted  to  the  priests  and  the  Papacy.  In  anticipation 
of  disturbances,  the  Government  ordered  companies  of 
soldiers  to  patrol  the  city.  A  collision  occurred  on  the 
28th  December,  1797,  between  the  patrols  and  a  band 
of  revolutionists,  who,  being  roughly  handled  by  the 
populace  as  well  as  by  the  soldiers,  made  their  way  for 
protection  to  the  courtyard  of  the  Palazzo  Corsini,  where 
Joseph  Bonaparte  resided.  Here,  in  the  midst  of  a 
confused  struggle.  General  Duphot,  a  member  of  the 
Embassy,  was  shot  by  a  Papal  soldier.* 

The  French  had  now  the  pretext  against  the  Papal 

^  Botta,  lib.  xiU.    Letters  of  Mr.  J.  Denham  and  others  in  Beoords } 
Sicily,  vol.  44i. 

T  OP  TKK 

TJKIVERSITY 


164  MODERN  EUBOFE.  179& 

Government  whicli   they  desired.      Joseph   Bonaparte 

instantly  left  tlie  city,  and  orders  were  sent  to  Berthier, 

chief   of   the    staff  in  northern  Italy,   to  march  upon 

Eome.     Berthier  advanced  amid  the  accla- 

Berthier    enters  ,.  pjij  tji  p    ^^ 

Rome,  Feb.  10,     mations  01  the  towns  and  the  curses  oi  tne 

1798. 

peasantry,  and  entered  Eome  on  the  10th 
of  Fehruary,  1798.  Events  had  produced  in  the  capital 
a  much  stronger  inclination  towards  change  than  existed 
on  the  approach  of  Bonaparte  a  year  before.  The 
treaty  of  Tolentino  had  shaken  the  prestige  of  Papal 
authority;  the  loss  of  so  many  well-known  works  of 
art,  the  imposition  of  new  and  unpopular  taxes,  had 
excited  as  much  hatred  against  the  defeated  government 
as  against  the  extortionate  conquerors ;  even  among  the 
clergy  and  their  retainers  the  sale  of  a  portion  of  the 
Church-lands  and  the  curtailment  of  the  old  Papal 
splendours  had  produced  alienation  and  discontent. 
There  existed  too  within  the  Italian  Church  itself  a 
reforming  party,  lately  headed  by  Eicci,  bishop  of 
Pistoia,  which  claimed  a  higher  degree  of  independence 
for  the  clergy,  and  condemned  the  assumption  of  uni- 
versal authority  by  the  Eoman  See.  The  ill-judged 
exercise  of  the  Pope's  temporal  power  during  the  last 
six  years  had  gained  many  converts  to  the  opinion  that 
the  head  of  the  Church  would  best  perform  his  office  if 
emancipated  from  a  worldly  sovereignty,  and  restored  to 
his  original  position  of  the  first  among  the  bishops.  Thiis, 
on  its  approach  to  Eome,  the  Eepublican  army  found 
the  city  ripe  for  revolution.  On  the  15th  of  February 
an  excited  multitude  assembled  in  the  Forum,  and,  after 


1798.  BOMAN  BEPVBLIO.  165 

planting  the  tree  of  liberty  in  front  of  the  Capitol, 
renounced  the  authority  of  the  Pope,  and  declared  that 
the  Eoman  people  constituted  itself  a  free  ^^^^  ^^^^^ 
Eepublic.  The  resolution  was  conveyed  to  ^°' ^®^- ^'^' *^*- 
Berthier,  who  recognised  the  Eoman  Commonwealth, 
and  made  a  procession  through  the  city  with  the 
solemnity  of  an  ancient  triumph.  The  Pope  shut  himself 
up  in  the  Vatican.  His  Swiss  guard  was  removed,  and 
replaced  by  one  composed  of  French  soldiers,  at  whose 
hands  the  Pontiff,  now  in  his  eighty-first  year,  suffered 
unworthy  insults.  He  was  then  required  to  renounce 
his  temporal  power,  and,  upon  his  refusal,  was  removed 
to  Tuscany,  and  afterwards  beyond  the  Alps  to  Valence, 
where  in  1799  he  died,  attended  by  a  solitary  ecclesiastic. 
In  the  liberated  capital  a  course  of  spoliation  began, 
more  thorough  and  systematic  than  any  that  the  French 
had  yet  effected.  The  riches  of  Eome  brought  all  the 
brokers  and  contractors  of  Paris  to  the  spot.  The 
museums,  the  Papal  residence,  and  the  palaces  of  many 
of  the  nobility  were  robbed  of  every  article  that  could 
be  moved ;  the  very  fixtures  were  cut  away,  when  worth 
the  carriage.  On  the  first  meeting  of  the  National 
Institute  in  the  Vatican  it  was  found  that  the  doors  had 
lost  their  locks  ;  and  when,  by  order  of  the  French, 
masses  were  celebrated  in  the  churches  in  expiation  of 
the  death  of  Duphot,  the  patrols  who  were  placed  at  the 
gates  to  preserve  order  rushed  in  and  seized  the  sacred 
vessels.  Yet  the  general  robbery  was  far  less  the  work 
of  the  army  than  of  the  agents  and  contractors  sent  by 
the  Government.     In  the  midst  of  endless  peculation 


166  MODERN  JSUBOPK  1798 

tlie  soldiers  were  in  want  of  their  pay  and  their  food. 
A  sense  of  tlie  dishonour  done  to  France  arose  at  length 
in  the  suhordinate  ranks  of  the  army ;  and  General 
Massena,  who  succeeded  Berthier,  was  forced  to  quit 
his  command  in  consequence  of  the  protests  of  the 
soldiery  against  a  system  to  which  Massena  had  con- 
spicuously given  his  personal  sanction.  It  remained 
to  embody  the  recovered  liberties  of  Eome  in  a 
Bepublican  Constitution,  which  was,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  a  reproduction  of  the  French  Directory  and 
Councils  of  Legislature,  under  the  practical  control  of 
the  French  general  in  command.  What  Rome  had  given 
to  the  Revolution  in  the  fashion  of  classical  expressions 
was  now  more  than  repaid.  The  Directors  were  styled 
Consuls ;  the  divisions  of  the  Legislature  were  known  as 
the  Senate  and  the  Tribunate  ;  the  Prgetorship  and  the 
Qusestorship  were  recalled  to  life  in  the  Courts  of 
Justice.  That  the  new  era  might  not  want  its  classical 
memorial,  a  medal  was  struck,  with  the  image  and  super- 
scription of  Roman  heroism,  to  "  Berthier,  the  restorer 
of  the  city,"  and  to  "  Graul,  the  salvation  of  the  human 


race." 


It  was  in  the  midst  of  these  enterprises  in  Switzer- 
land and  Central  Italy  that  the  Directory 
E^t,  May,  assembled  the  forces  which  Bonaparte  was 
to  lead  to  the  East.  The  port  of  embar- 
kation was  Toulon;  and  there,  on  the  9th  of  May, 
1798,  Bonaparte  took  the  command  of  the  most  for- 
midable armament  that  had  ever  left  the  French  shores. 
G-reat  Britain  was  still  but  feebly  represented  in  the 


1798.  BATTLE    OF   THE   NILE.  167 

Mediterranean,  a  detachment  from  St.  Vincent's  fleet  at 
Cadiz,  placed  under  the  command  of  Nelson,  being  the 
sole  British  force  in  these  waters.  Heavy  reinforce- 
ments were  at  hand ;  but  in  the  meantime  Nelson  had 
been  driven  by  stress  of  weather  from  his  watch  upon 
Toulon.  On  the  19th  of  May  the  French  armament  put 
out  to  sea,  its  destination  being  still  kept  secret  from  the 
soldiers  themselves.  It  appeared  before  Malta  on  the 
16th  of  June.  By  the  treachery  of  the  knights  Bona- 
parte was  put  in  possession  of  this  stronghold,  which  he 
could  not  even  have  attempted  to  besiege.  After  a 
short  delay  the  voyage  was  resumed,  and  the  fleet 
reached  Alexandria  without  having  fallen  in  with  the 
English,  who  had  now  received  their  reinforcements. 
The  landing  was  safely  effected,  and  Alexandria  fell  at 
the  first  assault.  After  five  duys  the  army  advanced 
upon  Cairo.  At  the  foot  of  the  Pyramids  the  Mame- 
luke cavalry  vainly  threw  themselves  upon  Bonaparte's 
soldiers.  They  were  repulsed  with  enormous  loss  on 
their  own  side  and  scarcely  any  on  that  of  the  French. 
Their  camp  was  stormed ;  Cairo  was  occupied ;  and  there 
no  longer  existed  a  force  in  Egypt  capable  of  offering 
any  serious  resistance  to  the  invaders. 

But  the  fortune  which  had  brought  Bonaparte's  army 
safe  into  tlie  Egyptian  capital  was  destined  to  be  pur- 
chased by  the  utter  destruction  of  his  fleet.  Nelson  had 
passed  the  French  in  the  night,  when,  after  much  per- 
plexity, he  decided  on  sailing  in  the  direction  of  Egypt. 
Arriving  at  Alexandria  before  his  prey,  he  had  hurried 
off  in  an  imaginary  pursuit  to  Khodes  and  Crete.     At 


168  MODERN  EUROPE.  1798. 

length  lie  received  information  whicli  led  liim  to  visit 
Alexandria  a  second  time.  He  found  the  Prench  fleet, 
numbering  thirteen  ships  of  the  line  and  four  frigates, 
Battle  of  the  ^^  auchor  lu  AbouMr  Bay.*  His  own  fleet 
Nile,  Aug.  1.  ^^g  slightly  inferior  in  men  and  guns,  but 
he  entered  battle  with  a  presentiment  of  the  com- 
pleteness of  his  victory.  Other  naval  battles  have  been 
fought  with  larger  forces  ;  no  destruction  was  ever  so 
complete  as  that  of  the  Battle  of  the  Mle  (August  1): 
Two  ships  of  the  line  and  two  frigates,  out  of  the 
seventeen  ?ail  that  met  IN'elson,  alone  escaped  from  his 
hands.  Of  eleven  thousand  officers  and  men,  nine  thou- 
sand were  taken  prisoners,  or  perished  in  the  engage- 
ment. The  army  of  Bonaparte  was  cut  off"  from  all 
hope  of  support  or  return ;  the  Eepublic  was  deprived 
of  communication  with  its  best  troops  and  its  greatest 
general. 

A    coalition   was    now    gathering    against   France 
superior  to  that  of  1793  in  the  support  of 

Coalition  of  1798.        _,  .  -,       -,         r\  t^  •  Vi 

Russia  and  the  Ottoman  Empire,  although 
Spain  was  now  on  the  side  of  the  Republic,  and  Prussia, 
in  spite  of  the  warnings  of  the  last  two  years,  refused 
to  stir  from  its  neutrality.  The  death. of  the  Empress 
Catherine,  and  the  accession  of  Paul,  had  caused  a  most 
serious  change  in  the  prospects  of  Europe.  Hitherto 
the  policy  of  the  Russian  Court  had  been  to  embroil  the 
Western  Powers  with  one  another,  and  to  confine  its 
efforts  against  the  French  Republic  to  promises  and  as- 
surances ;  with  Paul,  after  an  interval  of  total  reaction, 
•  Nelson  Despatches,  iii.  48. 


ma  NELSON  AT  NAPLES,  109 

the  professions  became  realities.*  No  monarch  entered 
so  cordially  into  Pitt's  schemes  for  a  renewal  of  the 
European  league;  no  ally  had  joined  the  English 
minister  with  a  sincerity  so  like  his  own.  On  the  part 
of  the  Ottoman  Government,  the  pretences  of  friendship 
with  which  Bonaparte  disguised  the  occupation  of 
Egypt  were  taken  at  their  real  worth.  War  was  de- 
clared by  the  Porte  ;  and  a  series  of  negotiations,  carried 
on  during  the  autumn  of  1798,  united  Eussia,  England, 
Turkey,  and  Naples  in  engagements  of  mutual  support 
against  the  French  Eepublic. 

A  Eussian  army  set  out  on  its  long  march  towards 
the  Adriatic :  the  levies  of  Austria  prepared  for  a  cam- 
paign in  the  spring  of  1799 ;  but  to  the  English  Grovern- 
ment  every  moment  that  elapsed  before  actual  hostilities 
was  so  much  time  given  to  uncertainties ;  and  the  man  who 
had  won  the  Battle  of  the  Nile  ridiculed  the  precaution 
which  had  hitherto  suffered  the  French  to  spread  their 
intrigues  through  Italy,  and  closed  the  ports  of  Sicily  and 
Naples  to  his  own  most  urgent  needs.  Towards  the  end 
of  September,  Nelson  appeared  in  the  Bay  ^^^^^  ^  ^^ 
of  Naples,  and  was  received  with  a  delirium  ^^^  ^^*"'  "** 
that  recalled  the  most  effusive  scenes  in  the  French  Ee- 
volution.f     In  the  city  of  Naples,  as  in  the  kingdom 

•  Bernhardi,  Geschichte  Russlands,  ii,  2,  382. 

t  "  Quel  bonheur,  quelle  gloire,  quelle  consolation  pour  cette  grande  et 
illustre  nation !  Que  je  voos  sols  obligee,  reconnaissante !  tTai  plenr^  ei 
embrasse  mes  enfaus,  mon  mari.  Si  jamais  on  fait  un  portrait  da  brave 
Nelson  je  le  veux  avoir  dans  ma  chanibre.  Hip,  Hip,  Hip,  Ma  cli^re 
Miladi  je  suis  folle  de  joye."  Queen  of  Naples  to  Lady  Hamilton,  Sept.  4, 
1798  ;  Records :  Sicily,  vol.  44.  The  news  of  the  overwhelming  victory 
of  the  Nile  seems  literally  to  have  driven  people  out  of  their  senses  al 


170  MODERN  EUROPE.  1798. 

generally,  the  poorest  classes  were  tlie  fiercest  enemies 
of  reform,  and  the  steady  allies  of  the  Queen  and  the 
priesthood  against  that  section  of  the  better-educated 
classes  which  had  begun  to  hope  for  liberty.  The 
system  of  espionage  and  persecution  with  which  the 
sister  of  Marie  Antoinette  avenged  upon  her  own 
subjects  the  sufferings  of  her  kindred  had  grown  more 
oppressive  with  every  new  victory  of  the  Revolution. 
In  the  summer  of  1798  there  were  men  languishing 
for  the  fifth  year  in  prison,  whose  offences  had  never 
been  investigated,  and  whose  relatives  were  not  allowed 
to  know  whether  they  were  dead  or  alive.  A  mode  of 
expression,  a  fashion  of  dress,  the  word  of  an  informer, 
consigned  innocent  persons  to  the  dungeon,  with  the 
possibility  of,  torture.  In  the  midst  of  this  tyranny  of 
suspicion,  in  the  midst  of  a  corruption  which  made  the 
naval  and  military  forces  of  the  kingdom  worse  than 
useless.  King  Ferdinand  and  his  satellites  were  unwearied 
in  their  theatrical  invocations  of  the  Virgin  and  St. 
Januarius  against  the  assailants  of  divine  right  and  the 
conquerors  of  Rome.  A  Court  cowardly  almost  beyond 
the  example  of  Courts,  a  police  that  had  trained  every 
Neapolitan  to  look  upon  his  neighbour  as  a  traitor,  an 

Naples.  "  Lady  Hamilton  fell  apparently  dead,  and  is  not  yet  (Sept.  25) 
perfectly  recovered  from  her  severe  bruises."  Nelson  Despatches,  3, 130. 
On  Nelson's  arrival,  "  up  flew  her  ladyship,  and  exclaiming,  '  O  God,  is  it 
possible  ? '  she  fell  into  my  arms  more  dead  than  alive."  It  has  been  urged 
lA  extenuation  of  Nelson's  subsequent  cruelties  that  the  contagion  of  this 
frenzy,  following  the  effects  of  a  severe  wound  in  the  head,  had  deprived 
his  mind  of  its  balance.  "  My  head  is  ready  to  split,  and  I  am  always  so 
sick."  Aug.  10.  "  It  required  aU  the  kindness  of  my  friends  to  set  me 
up."  Sept.  25. 


1798.  MAOK  IN  ITALY.  171 

administration  that  had  turned  one  of  the  hardiest 
races  in  Europe  into  soldiers  of  notorious  and  disgrace- 
ful cowardice — such  were  the  allies  whom  Nelson,  ill- 
fitted  for  politics  by  his  sailor-like  inexperience  and 
facile  vanity,  heroic  in  his  tenderness  and  fidelity,  in  an 
evil  hour  encouraged  to  believe  themselves  invincible 
because  they  possessed  his  own  support.  On  the  14th  of 
November,  1798,  King  Ferdinand  published  a  proclama- 
tion, which,  without  declaring  war  on  the  iVench,  an- 
nounced that  the  King  intended  to  occupy  the  Papal 
States  and  restore  the  Papal  government.  The  manifesto 
disclaimed  all  intention  of  conquest,  and  offered  a  free 
pardon  to  all  compromised  persons.  Ten  days  later  the 
Neapolitan  army  crossed  the  frontier,  led  by  the 
Austrian  general,  Mack,  who  passed  among  his  admirers 
for  the  greatest  soldier  in  Europe.^ 

The  mass  of  the  French  troops,  about  twelve 
thousand  in  number,  lay  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Ancona ;  Eome  and  the  intermediate  stations  were  held 

*  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  despatch,  Nov.  28,  in  Records  :  Sicily,  voL  44,  where 
there  are  originals  of  most  of  the  Neapolitan  proclamations,  &c.,  of  this  time. 
Mack  had  been  a  famous  character  since  the  campaign  of  1793.  Elgin's 
letters  to  Lord  Grenville  from  the  Netherlands,  private  as  well  as  public, 
are  full  of  extravagant  praise  of  him.  In  July,  1796,  Graham  writes  from  the 
Italian  army  :  "  In  the  opinion  of  all  here,  the  greatest  general  in  Europe 
is  the  Quartermaster  Mack,  who  was  in  England  in  1793.  Would  to  God 
he  was  marching,  and  here  now."  Mack,  on  the  other  hand,  did  not  grudge 
flattery  to  the  English : — '*  Je  perdrais  partout  espoir  ot  patience  si  je 
n'avais  pas  vu  pour  mon  bonheur  et  ma  consolation  I'adorable  Triumvirat  ** 
(Pitt,  Grenville,  Dundas)  "qui  surveille  a  Londres  nos  affaires.  Soyez, 
mon  cher  ami,  I'organe  de  ma  profonde  v^n^ration  envers  ces  Miuistros 
incomparables."  Mack  to  Elgin,  23  Feb.  1794.  The  British  Government 
was  constantly  pressing  Thugut  to  make  Mack  commander-in-chief. 
Thugut,  who  had  formed  a  shrewd  notion  of  Mack's  real  quality,  gained 
much  obloquy  by  his  steady  refusal. 


172  MODERN  EUROPE,  ms. 

by  small  detaclimeiits.  Had  Mack  pushed  forward 
towards  the  Upper  Tiber,  his  inroad,  even  if  it  failed  to 
crush  the  separated  wings  of  the  French  army,  must 
have  forced  them  to  retreat;  but,  instead  of  moving 
with  all  his  strength  through  Central  Italy,  Mack 
led  the  bulk  of  his  army  upon  Eome,  where  there 
was  no  French  force  capable  of  making  a  stand,  and 
sent^  weak  isolated  columns  towards  the  east  of  the 
peninsula,  where  the  French  were  strong  enough  to 
make  a  good  defence.  On  the  approach  of  the  Neapoli- 
tans to  Eome,  Championnet,  the  French  commander, 
evacuated  the  city,  leaving  a  garrison  in  the  Castle  of 
St.  Angelo,  and  fell  back  on  Civita  Castellana,  thirty 
miles  north  of  the  capital.     The  King  of  Naples  entered 

Eerdinand  enters      ^^^^^     ^^    ^^^     ^^^'^     NoVCmbcr.        The     rCS- 

Rome,Nov.29.  ^^^.^^^^^  ^^  rcligiou  was  celebrated  by  the 
erection  of  an  immense  cross  in  the  place  of  the  tree 
of  liberty,  by  the  immersion  of  several  Jews  in  the 
Tiber,  by  the  execution  of  a  number  of  compromised 
persons  whose  pardon  the  King  had  promised,  and  by  a 
threat  to  shoot  one  of  the  sick  French  soldiers  in  the 
hospital  for  every  shot  fired  by  the  guns  of  St.  Angelo.* 
Intelligence  was  despatched  to  the  exiled  Pontiff  of  the 
discomfiture  of  his  enemies.  "  By  help  of  the  divine  grace," 
wrote  King  Ferdinand,  "  and  of  the  most  miraculous  St. 
Januarius,  we  have  to-day  with  our  army  entered  the 
sacred  city  of  Eome,  so  lately  profaned  by  the  impious, 
who  now  fly  terror-stricken  at  the  sight  of  the  Cross 

•  Signed  by  Mack.     CoUetta,  p.   176.     Mack's  own  account  of  the 
campaign  is  in  Yivenot,  Rastadter  Congress,  p.  83. 


1798.  TEE  FRENCH   INVADE   NAPLES.  173 

and  of  my  arms.  Leave  then,  your  Holiness,  yonr  too 
modest  abode,  and  on  tlie  wings  of  cherubim,  like  the 
virgin  of  Loreto,  come  and  descend  upon  the  Vatican, 
to  purify  it  by  your  sacred  presence."  A  letter  to  the 
King  of  Piedmont,  who  had  already  been  exhorted  by 
Ferdinand  to  encourage  his  peasants  to  assassinate  French 
soldiers,  informed  him  that  "  the  Neapolitans,  guided  by 
Greneral  Mack,  had  sounded  the  hour  of  death  to  the 
French,  and  proclaimed  to  Europe,  from  the  summit  of 
the  Capitol,  that  the  time  of  the  Kings  had  come." 

The  despatches  to  Piedmont  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  enemy,  and  the  usual  modes  of  locomotion  would 
scarcely  have  brought  Pope  Pius  to  Rome  in  time  to 
witness  the  exit  of  his  deliverer.  Ferdinand's  rhapsodies 
were  cut  short  by  the  news  that  his  columns  advancing 
into  the  centre  and  east  of  the  Papal  States  had  all  been 
beaten  or  captured.  Mack,  at  the  head  of  the  main 
army,  now  advanced  to  avenge  the  defeat  upon  the 
French  at  Civita  Castellana  and  Terni.    But 

1  .       -,.  ...  1  'It*    1  Mack     defeated 

his  dispositions  were  as  unskiliul  as  ever :     bychampiounet, 

^  ^  Dec.  6— 18. 

wherever  his  troops  encountered  the  enemy 
they  were  put  to  the  rout ;  and,  as  he  had  neglected 
to  fortify  or  secure  a  single  position  upon  his  line  of 
march,  his  defeat  by  a  handful  of  French  soldiers  on  the 
north  of  Eome  involved  the  loss  of  the  country  almost 
up  to  the  gates  of  Naples.  On  the  first  rumour  of 
Mack's  reverses  the  Republican  party  at  Rome  declared 
for  France.  King  Ferdinand  fled ;  Championnet  re- 
entered Rome,  and,  after  a  few  days'  delay,  advanced 
into  Neapolitan  territory.      Here,  however,  he  found 


174  MODERN  EUROPE.  1798. 

himself  attacked  by  an  enemy  more  formidable  than  the 
army  which  had  been  organised  to  expel  the  French 
from  Italy.  The  Neapolitan  peasantry,  who,  in  soldiers' 
uniform  and  under  the  orders  of  Mack,  could  scarcely 
be  brought  within  sight  of  the  French,  fought  with 
courage  when  an  appeal  to  their  religious  passions  col- 
lected them  in  brigand-like  bands  under  leaders  of  their 
own.  Divisions  of  Championnet's  army  sustained  severe 
losses  ;  they  succeeded,  however,  in  effecting  their  junc- 
tion upon  the  Volturno ;  and  the  stronghold  of  Graeta, 
being  defended  by  regular  soldiers  and  not  by  brigands, 
surrendered  to  the  French  at  the  first  summons. 

Mack  was  now  concentrating  his  troops  in  an 
entrenched  camp  before  Capua.  The  whole  country 
was  rising  against  the  invaders ;  and,  in  spite  of  lost 
battles  and  abandoned  fortresses,  the  ^N'eapolitan  Govern- 
ment, if  it  had  possessed  a  spark  of  courage,  might  still 
have  overthrown  the  French  army,  which  numbered 
only  18,000  men.  But  the  panic  and  suspicion  which 
the  Grovernment  had  fostered  among  its  subjects  were 
now  avenged  upon  itself.  The  cry  of  treachery  was 
raised  on  every  side.  The  Court  dreaded  a  Eepublican 
rising ;  the  priests  and  the  populace  accused  the  Court 
of  conspiracy  with  the  French  ;  Mack  protested  that  the 
soldiers  were  resolved  to  be  beaten ;  the  soldiers  swore 
that  they  were  betrayed  by  Mack.  On  the  night  of  the 
21st  of  December  the  Royal  Family  secretly  went  on 
board  Nelson's  ship  the  Vanguard,  and  after  a  short 
interval  they  set  sail  for  Palermo,  leaving  the  capital  in 
charge   of  Prince  Pignatelli,  a  courtier  whom  no  one 


I7«a  THE   LAZZABOm   DEFEND   NAPLES.  175 

was  willing  to  obey  *  Order  was,  however,  maintained 
by  a  civic  guard  enrolled  by  the  Municipality,  until  it  be- 
came known  that  Mack  and  Pignatelli  had  concluded  an 
armistice  with  the  French,  and  surrendered  Capua  and 
the  neighbouring  towns.  Then  the  populace  broke  into 
wild  uproar.  The  prisons  were  thrown  open ;  and  with 
the  arms  taken  from  the  arsenal  the  lazzaroni  formed 
themselves  into  a  tumultuous  army,  along  with 
thousands  of  desperate  men  let  loose  from  the  gaols  and 
the  galleys.  The  priests,  hearing  that  negotiations  for 
peace  were  opened,  raised  the  cry  of  treason  anew ;  and, 
with  the  watchword  of  the  Queen,  "  All  the  gentlemen 
are  Jacobins ;  only  the  people  are  faithful,"  they  hounded 
on  the  mob  to  riot  and  murder.  On  the  morning  of 
January  15th  hordes  of  lazzaroni  issued  from  the  gates 
to  throw  themselves  upon  the  French,  who  were  now 
about  nine  miles  from  the  city;  others  dragged  the 
guns  down  from  the  forts  to  defend  the  streets.  The 
Eepublican  party,  however,  and  that  considerable  body 
among  the  upper  class  which  was  made  Eepublican  by 

.  •Nelson,  iii.,  210;  Hamilton's  despatch,  Dec.  28,1798,  in  Records: 
Sicily,  vol.  44.  "  It  was  impossible  to  prevent  a  suspicion  getting  abroad  of 
the  intention  of  tlie  Royal  Family  to  make  their  escape.  However,  the  secret 
was  so  well  kept  that  we  contrived  to  get  their  Majesties'  treasure  in  jewels 
and  money,  to  a  very  considerable  extent,  on  board  of  H.M.  ship  the  Van" 
guard  the  20th  of  December,  and  Lord  Nelson  went  on  the  next  night  by  a 
secret  passage  into  the  Palace,  and  brought  off  in  his  boats  their  Sicilian 
Majesties  and  all  the  Royal  Family.  It  was  not  discovered  at  Naples, 
until  very  late  at  night,  that  the  Royal  Family  had  escaped.  .  .  .  On  the 
morning  of  Christmas  Day,  some  hours  before  we  got  into  Palermo,  Prince 
Albert,  one  of  their  Majesties'  sons,  six  years  of  age,  was,  either  from 
fright  or  fatigue,  taken  with  violent  convulsions,  and  died  in  the  arms  of 
Lady  Hamilton,  the  Queen,  the  Princesses,  and  women  attendants  being  in 
such  confusion  as  to  be  incapable  of  affording  any  assistance." 


176  MODERN  EUROPE.  im 

the  cliaos  into  which  the  Court,  with  its  allies,  the 
priests,  and  the  populace,  had  thrown  Naples,  kept  up 
communication  with  Championnet,  and  looked  forward 
to  the  entrance  of  the  French  as  the  only  means  of 
averting  destruction  and  massacre.  By  a  stratagem 
carried  out  on  the  night  of  the  20th  they  gained 
possession  of  the  fort  of  St.  Elmo,  while  the  French 
were  already  engaged  in  a  bloody  assault  upon  the 
suburbs.  On  the  23rd  Championnet  ordered  the  attack 
to  be  renewed.  The  conspirators  within  St.  Elmo 
hoisted  the  French  flag  and  turned  their  guns  upon  the 
populace ;  the  fortress  of  the  Carmine  was  stormed  by 
the  French ;  and,  before  the  last  struggle  for  life  and 
death  commenced  in  the  centr/i  of  the  city,  the  leaders 
of  the  lazzaroni  listened  to  words  of  friend- 
Naples,  Jan.  23,      ship  which  Championnet  addressed  to  them 

1799.  ^  ^ 

in  their  own  language,  and,  with  the  inco- 
herence of  a  half-savage  race,  escorted  his  soldiers  with 
cries  of  joy  to  the  Church  of  St.  Januarius,  which 
Championnet  promised  to  respect  and  protect. 

Championnet  used  his  victory  with  a  discretion  and 
forbearance  rare  amongst  French  conquerors.  He 
humoured  the  superstition  of  the  populace;  he  en- 
couraged the  political  hopes  of  the  enlightened.  A 
vehement  revulsion  of  feeling  against  the  fugitive  Court 
and  in  favour  of  Eepublican  government  followed  the 
creation  of  a  National  Council  by  the  French  general, 
parthenopean  ^^^  ^^^  irouical  homagc  to  thc  patron  saint. 
Repubuc.  rpj^^  Kingdom  of  Naples  was  converted 
into   the    Parthenopean    Eepublic.     New    laws,    new 


17».  TEE    SECOND    COALITION.  17'/ 

institutions,  discussed  in  a  representative  assembly,  ex- 
cited hopes  and  interests  unknown  in  Naples  before. 
But  the  inevitable  incidents  of  a  French  occupation, 
extortion  and  impoverishment,  with  all  their  bitter 
effects  on  the  mind  of  the  people,  were  not  long  de- 
layed. In  every  country  district  the  priests  were 
exciting  insurrection.  The  agents  of  the  new  Grovem- 
ment,  men  with  no  experience  in  public  affairs,  carried 
confusion  wherever  they  went.  Civil  war  broke  out  in 
fifty  different  places ;  and  the  barbarity  of  native  leaders 
of  insurrection,  like  Fra  Diavolo,  was  only  too  well 
requited  by  the  French  columns  which  traversed  the 
districts  in  revolt. 

The  time  was  ill  chosen  by  the  French  Government 
for  an  extension  of  the  area  of  combat  to 


southern  Italy.     Already  the  first  division     tna  and  rt^ 

•^  ^  March,  1799. 

of  the  Eussian  army,  led  by  Suvaroff,  had 
reached  Moravia,  and  the  Court  of  Vienna  was  only 
awaiting  its  own  moment  for  declaring  war.  So  far 
were  the  newly-established  Grovernments  in  Eome  and 
Naples  from  being  able  to  assist  the  French  upon  the 
Adige,  that  the  French  had  to  send  troops  to  Rome 
and  Naples  to  support  the  new  Governments.  The  force 
which  the  French  could  place  upon  the  frontier  was 
inferior  to  that  which  two  years  of  preparation  had 
given  to  Austria  :  the  Russians,  who  were  expected  to 
arrive  in  Lombardy  in  April,  approached  with  the  con- 
fidence of  men  who  had  given  to  the  French  none  of 
their  recent  triumphs.  Nor  among  the  leaders  was 
personal  superiority  any  longer  markedly  on  the  side 
M 


178  MODERN  EUROPE.  1799. 

of  the  French,  as  in  the  war  of  the  First  Coalition. 
Suvaroff  and  the  Archduke  Charles  were  a  fair  match 
for  any  of  the  Eepublican  generals,  except  Bonaparte, 
who  was  absent  in  Egypt.  The  executive  of  France 
had  deeply  declined.  Carnot  was  in  exile ;  the  work  of 
organisation  which  he  had  pursued  with  such  energy 
and  disinterestedness  flagged  under  his  mediocre  and 
corrupt  successors.  Skilful  generals  and  brave  soldiers 
were  never  wanting  to  the  Republic ;  but  no  single  con- 
trolling will,  no  storm  of  national  passion,  inspired  the  Go- 
vernment with  the  force  which  it  had  possessed  under  the 
Convention,  and  which  returned  to  it  under  Napoleon. 

A  new  character  was  given  to  the  war  now  breaking 
out  by  the  inclusion  of  Switzerland  in  the  area  of 
combat.  In  the  war  of  the  first  Coalition,  Switzerland 
had  been  neutral  territory;  but  the  events  of  1798  had 
left  the  French  in  possession  of  all  Switzerland  west  of 
the  Rhine,  and  an  Austrian  force  subsequently  occupied 
the  Grisons.  The  line  separating  the  combatants  now  ran 
without  a  break  from  Mainz  to  the  Adriatic.  The  French 
armies  were  in  continuous  communication  with  one  an- 
other, and  the  movements  of  each  could  be  modified  ac- 
cording to  the  requirements  of  the  rest.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  disaster  sustained  at  any  one  point  of  the  line 
endangered  every  other  point ;  for  no  neutral  territory 
intervened,  as  in  1796,  to  check  a  lateral  movement  of 
the  enemy,  and  to  protect  the  communications  of  a 
French  army  in  Lombardy  from  a  victorious  Austrian 
force  in  southern  Germany.  The  importance  of  the 
Swiss  passes  in  this  relation  was  understood  and  even 


17M.  BATTLE    OF  8T00KA0H,  179 

overrated  by  the  French  Government;  and  an  energy 
was  thrown  into  their  mountain  warfare  which  might 
have  produced  greater  results  upon  the  plains. 

Three  armies  formed  the  order  of  battle  on  either 
side.  Jourdan  held  the  French  command  upon  the 
Ehine;  Massena  in  Switzerland;  Scherer,  the  least 
capable  of  the  Eepublican  generals,  on  the  Adige.  On 
the  side  of  the  Allies  the  Archduke  Charles  commanded 
in  southern  Grermany ;  in  Lombardy  the  Austrians  were 
led  by  Kray,  pending  the  arrival  of  Suvaroff  and  his 
corps  ;  in  Switzerland  the  command  was  given  to  Hotze, 
a  Swiss  officer  who  had  gained  some  distinction  in 
foreign  service.  It  was  the  design  of  the  French  to 
push  their  centre  under  Massena  through  the  mountains 
into  the  Tyrol,  and  by  a  combined  attack  of  the  central 
and  the  southern  army  to  destroy  the  Austrians  upon 
the  upper  Adige,  while  Jourdan,  also  in  communication 
with  the  centre,  drove  the  Archduke  down  the  Danube 
upon  Vienna.  Early  in  March  the  campaign  opened. 
Massena  assailed  the  Austrian  positions  east  of  the 
head-waters  of  the  Ehine,  and  forced  back  the  enemy 
into  the  heart  of  the  Grisons.  Jourdan  crossed  the 
Ehine  at  Strasburg,  and  passed  the  Black  Forest  with 
40,000  men.  His  orders  were  to  attack  the  Archduke 
Charles,  whatever  the  Archduke's  superiority  of  force. 
The  French  and  the  Austrian  armies  met  at  Stockach, 
near  the  head  of  the  Lake  of  Constance.  The  Archduke 
(March  25.)  Overwhelming  numbers  gave  JoS^an  *lt 
the  Archduke  a  complete  victory.  Jourdan  '^' 
was  not  only  stopped  in  his  advance,  but  forced  to 
M  2 


180  MODERN  EUROPE.  1799. 

retreat  beyond  the  EHne.  Whatever  might  be  the  for- 
tune of  the  armies  of  Switzerland  and  Italy,  all  hope  of 
an  advance  upon  Vienna  by  the  Danube  was  at  an  end. 
Freed  from  the  invader's  presence,  the  Austrians  now 
spread  themselves  over  Baden,  up  to  the  gates  of  Eas- 
tadt,  where,  in  spite  of  the  war  between  France  and 
Austria,  the  envoys  of  the  minor  German  States  still 
continued  their  conferences  with  the  French  agents. 
On  the  28th  of  April  the  French  envoys,  now  three  in 
number,  were  required  by  the  Austrians  to  depart 
within  twenty-four  hours.  An  escort,  for  which  they 
applied,  was  refused.  Scarcely  had  their  carriages 
passed  throue^h  the  city   spates  when  they 

Murder  of    the       ^  ^  ./      &  J 

S^^tadt^ApS     were  attacked  by  a  squadron  of  Austrian 

28 

hussars.  Two  of  the  French  envoys  were 
murdered ;  the  third  left  for  dead.  Whether  this 
frightful  violation  of  international  law  was  the  mere  out- 
rage of  a  drunken  soldiery,  as  it  was  represented  to  be 
by  the  Austrian  Government;  whether  it  was  to  any 
extent  occasioned  by  superior  civil  orders,  or  connected 
with  French  emigrants  living  in  the  neighbourhood, 
remains  unknown.  Investigations  begun  by  the  Arch- 
duke Charles  were  stopped  by  the  Cabinet,  in  order  that 
a  more  public  inquiry  might  be  held  by  the  Diet.  This 
inquiry,  however,  never  took  place.  In  the  year  1804 
all  papers  relating  to  the  Archduke's  investigation  were 
removed  by  the  Government  from  the  military  archives. 
They  have  never  since  been  discovered.* 

*   See  HeKert,   Der  Rastatter  Gresandteiimord,  aud    Sybel's  article 
thereon,  in  Hist.  Zeitsclirift,  voL  32. 


1780.  MA88ENA   AT  ZUEIOH.  181 

The  outburst  of  wrath  with  which  the  French  people 
learnt  the  fate  of  their  envoys  would  have  cost  Austria 
dear  if  Austria  had  now  been  the  losing  party  in  the 
war;  but,  for  the  present,  everything  seemed  to  turn 
against  the  Eepublic.  Jourdan  had  scarcely  been  over- 
thrown in  Q-ermany  before  a  ruinous  defeat  ^^^  ^  ^^^^^ 
at  Magnano,  oi*  the  Adige,  drove  back  the  "^^^  ^^"^  '^' 
army  of  Italy  to  .within  a  few  miles  of  Milan ;  while 
Massena,  deprived  of  the  fruit  of  his  own  victories  by 
the  disasters  of  his  colleagues,  had  to  abandon  the  eastern 
half  pf  Switzerland,  and  to  retire  upon  the  line  of  the 
river  Limnat,  Lucerne,  and  the  Gothard.  Charles  now 
moved  from  Germany  into  Switzerland.  Massena  fixed 
his  centre  at  Zurich,  and  awaited  the  Archduke's  assault. 
For  five  weeks  Charles  remained  inactive :  at  length,  on 
the  4th  of  June,  he  gave  battle.  After  two  days' 
struggle  against  greatly  superior  forces,  Massena  was 
compelled  to  evacuate  Zurich.  He  retreated,  however, 
no  farther  than  to  the  ridge  of  the  XJetliberg,  a  few 
miles  west  of  the  city;  and  here,  fortifying  his  new 
position,  he  held  obstinately  on,  while  the  Austrians 
established  themselves  in  the  central  passes  of  Switzer- 
land, and  disaster  after  disaster  seemed  to  be  annihilating 
the  French  arms  in  Italy. 

Suvaroff,    at    the    head  of    17,000    Eussians,   had 
arrived  in  Lombardy  in  the  middle  of  April,     ffis  first 
battle  was  fought,  and  his  first  victory  won, 
at  the  passage  of  the  Adda  on  the  25th  of    E^.^aJSEI 
April.     It  was  followed  by  the  surrender  of 
Milan  and  the  dissolution  of  the  Cisalpine  Republic. 


182  MODERN  EUROPE.  1799. 

Moreau,  who  now  held  the  French  command,  fell  back 
upon  Alessandria,  intending  to  cover  both  Grenoa  and 
Turin  ;  but  a  sudden  movement  of  Suvaroff  brought  the 
Russians  into  the  Sardinian  capital  before  it  was  even 
known  to  be  in  jeopardy.  The  French  general,  cut  off 
from  the  roads  over  the  Alps,  threw  himself  upon  the 
Apennines  above  Genoa,  and  waited  for  the  army  which 
had  occupied  l^aples,  and  which,  under  the  command  of 
Macdonald,  was  now  hurrying  to  his  support,  gathering 
with  it  on  its  march  the  troops  that  lay  scattered  on  the 
south  of  the  Po.  Macdonald  moved  swiftly  through 
central  Italy,  and  crossed  the  Apennines  above  Pistoia 
in  the  beginning  of  June.  His  arrival  at  Modena  with 
20,000  men  threatened  to  turn  the  balance  in  favour  of 
the  French.  Suvaroff,  aware  of  his  danger,  collected  all 
the  troops  within  reach  with  the  utmost  despatch,  and 
pushed  eastwards  to  meet  Macdonald  on  the  Trebbia. 
Moreau  descended  from  the  Apennines  in  the  same  direc- 
tion ;  but  he  had  underrated  the  swiftness  of  the  Eussian 
general ;  and,  before  he  had  advanced  over  half  the  dis- 
tance, Macdonald  was  attacked  by  Suvaroff  on  the  Trebbia, 
and  overthrown  in  three  days  of  the  most  desperate 
fighting  that  had  been  seen  in  the  war.     (June  18.)^ 

All  southern  Italy  now  rose  against  the  Govern- 
ments established  by  the  French.  Cardinal  Euifo,  with 
a  band  of  fanatical  peasants,  known  as  tbe  Army  of  the 
Faith,  made   himself  master   of   Apulia  and  Calabria 

•  Danilevsky-Miliutin,  ii.  214.  Despatch  of  Lord  W.  Bentiuck  from 
the  allied  head-quarters  at  Piacenza,  June  23,  in  Records  :  Italian  States, 
'vol.  68.  Bentinck  arrived  a  few  days  before  this  battle :  his  despatches 
cover  the  whole  North-Italian  campaign  from  this  time. 


1799.  NELSON  AT  NAPLES.  183 

amid  scenes  of  savage  cruelty,  and  appeared  before  Naples, 
where  the  lazzaroni  were  ready  to  unite  with 

•^  Naples 

the  hordes  of  the  Faithful  in  murder  and 
pillage.  Confident  of  support  within  the  city,  and  as- 
sisted by  some  English  and  Eussian  vessels  in  the  har- 
bour, Euffo  attacked  the  suburbs  of  Naples  on  the 
morning  of  the  13th  of  June.  Massacre  and  outrage  con- 
tinued within  and  without  the  city  for  five  days.  On  the 
morning  of  the  19th,  the  Cardinal  proposed  a  suspension 
of  arms.  It  was  accepted  by  the  Eepublicans,  who  were 
in  possession  of  the  forts.  Negotiations  followed.  On 
the  28rd  conditions  of  peace  were  signed  by  Ruffo  on 
behalf  of  the  King  of  Naples,  and  by  the  representatives 
of  Great  Britain  and  of  Russia  in  guarantee  for  their 
faithful  execution.  It  was  agreed  that  the  Republican 
garrison  should  march  out  with  the  honours  of  war ; 
that  their  persons  and  property  should  be  respected ; 
that  those  who  might  prefer  to  leave  the  country  should 
be  conveyed  to  Toulon  on  neutral  vessels ;  and  that  all 
who  remained  at  home  should  be  free  from  molestation. 
The  garrison  did  not  leave  the  forts  that  night.  On 
the  following  morning,  while  they  were  embarking  on 
board  the  polaccas  which  were  to  take  them  to  Toulon, 
Nelson's  fleet  appeared  in  the  Bay  of  Naples.  Nelson 
declared  that  in  treating  with  rebels  Cardinal  RufFo  had 
disobeyed  the  King's  orders,  and  he  pronounced  the 
capitulation  null  and  void.  The  polaccas,  with  the  Repub- 
licans crowded  on  board,  were  attached  to  the  stems  of 
the  English  ships,  pending  the  arrival  of  King  Ferdinand. 
On  the  29th  of  June,  Admiral  Caracciolo,  who  had  taken 


184  MOVEBN  DUBOPK  1799. 

office  Tinder  the  new  G-overnment,  and  on  its  fall  had  at- 
tempted to  escape  in  disguise,  was  brought  a  captive  be- 
fore Nelson.  !N'elson  ordered  him  to  be  tried  by  a 
Neapolitan  court-martial,  and,  in  spite  of  his  old  age, 
his  rank,  and  his  long  service  to  the  State,  caused  him 
to  be  hanged  from  a  Neapolitan  ship's  yard-arm,  and  his 
body  to  be  thrown  into  the  sea.  Some  days  later,  King 
Ferdinand  arrived  from  Palermo,  and  Nelson  now  handed 
over  all  his  prisoners  to  the  Bourbon  authorities.  A 
reign  of  terror  followed.  Innumerable  persons  were 
thrown  into  prison.     Courts-martial,  or  com- 

Eeign  of  Terror.  .      . 

missions  administering  any  law  that  pleased 
themselves,  sent  the  flower  of  the  Neapolitan  nation  to 
the  scaffold.  Above  a  hundred  sentences  of  death  were 
carried  out  in  Naples  itself :  confiscation,  exile,  and  im- 
prisonment struck  down  thousands  of  families.  It  was 
peculiar  to  the  Neapolitan  proscriptions  that  a  Grovern- 
ment  with  the  names  of  religion  and  right  incessantly 
upon  its  lips  selected  for  extermination  both  among  men 
and  women  those  who  were  most  distinguished  in 
character,  in  science,  and  in  letters,  whilst  it  chose  for 
promotion  and  enrichment  those  who  were  known  for 
deeds  of  savage  violence.  The  part  borne  by  Nelson  in  this 
work  of  death  has  left  a  stain  on  his  glory  which  time 
cannot  efface."^ 

*  Nelson  Despatches,  iii.,  447 ;  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Despatch  of  July  14, 
in  Records  :  Sicily,  vol.  45.  ITelfert,  Konigin  Karolina,  p.  38.  Details  of 
the  proscription  in  CoUetta,  v.,  6.  According  to  Hamilton,  some  of  the 
Republicans  in  the  forts  had  actually  gone  to  their  homes  before  Nelson 
pronounced  the  capitulation  void.  "  "When  we  anchored  in  the  Bay,  the 
24th  of  June,  the  capitulation  of  the  castles  had  in  some  measure  taken 
place.      Fourteen  large  polacks  had  taken  on  board  out  of  the  castles 


1799.        •  SUVABOFF   AND    THE    AUSTlilANS.  185 

It  was  on  the  advance  of  the  Army  of  Naples  under 
Macdonald  that  the  French  rested  their  last  hope  of 
recovering  Lombardy.  The  battle  of  the  Trebbia 
scattered  this  hope  to  the  winds,  and  left  it  only  too 
doubtful  whether  France  could  be  saved  from  invasion. 
Suvaroff  himself  was  eager  to  fall  upon  Moreau  before 
Macdonald  could  rally  from  his  defeat,  and  to  drive  him 
westwards  along  the  coast-road  into  France.  It  was  a 
moment  when  the  fortune  of  the  Eepublic  hung  in  the 
scales.  Had  Suvaroff  been  permitted  to  follow  his  own 
counsels,  France  would  probably  have  seen  the  remnant 
of  her  Italian  armies  totally  destroyed,  and  the  Russians 
advancing  upon  Lyons  or  Marseilles.  The  Republic 
was  saved,  as  it  had  been  in  1793,  by  the  dissensions  of 
its  enemies.  It  was  not  only  for  the  purpose  of  resisting 
French  aggression  that  Austria  had  renewed  the  war, 
but  for  the  purpose  of  extending  its  own  ^^^^eeign- 
dominion  in  Italy.  These  designs  were  con-  "^itaiy. 
cealed  from  Russia ;  they  were  partially  made  known  by 

the  most  conspicuous  and  criminal  of  the  Neapolitan  rebels  that 
had  chosen  to  go  to  Toulon;  the  others  had  already  been  permitted 
to  return  to  their  homes."  If  this  is  so,  Nelson's  pretext  that  the 
capitulation  had  not  been  executed  was  a  mere  afterthought.  Helfert 
is  mistaken  in  calling  the  letter  or  procLmuition  of  July  8th  repudiating 
the  treaty,  a  forgery.  It  is  perfectly  genuine.  It  was  published 
by  Nelson  in  the  King's  name,  and  is  enclosed  in  Hamilton's  despatch. 
Hamilton's  exultations  about  himself  aud  his  wife,  and  their  share  in  those 
events,  are  sorry  reading.  "  In  short.  Lord  Nelson  and  I.  with  Emma, 
have  carried  affairs  to  this  happy  crisis.  Emma  is  really  the  Queen's  bosom 
friend.  .  .  You  may  imagine,  when  we  three  agree,  what  real  business 
is  done.  .  .  At  least  I  shall  end  my  diplomatieal  career  gloriously,  as 
you  wlU  see  by  what  the  King  of  Naples  writes  from  this  ship  to  his 
Minister  in  London,  owing  the  recovery  of  his  kingdom  to  the  King's 
fleet,  and  Lord  Nelson  and  mo."  (Aug.  4,  id.)  Hamilton  states  tho  number 
of  persons  in  prison  at  Naples  on  Sept.  12  to  be  above  eight  thousand. 


186  MOBEEN  EUEOPE.  1799. 

Thugut  to  tlie  Britisli  ambassador,  under  the  most  strin- 
gent obligation  to  secrecy.  On  tbe  I7tb  of  August, 
1799,  Lord  Minto  acquainted  his  Government  with 
the  intentions  of  the  Austrian  Court.  *'  The  Emperor 
proposes  to  retain  Piedmont,  and  to  take  all  that  part  of 
Savoy  which  is  important  in  a  military  view.  I  have 
no  doubt  of  his  intention  to  keep  Nice  also,  if  he  gets 
it,  which  will  make  the  Yar  his  boundary  with  France. 
The  whole  territory  of  the  Grenoese  Eepublic  seems  to 
be  an  object  of  serious  speculation.  .  .  The  Papal 
Legations  will,  I  am  persuaded,  be  retained  by  the 
Emperor  .  .  I  am  not  yet  master  of  the  designs  on 
Tuscany."  *  This  was  the  sense  in  which  Austria 
understood  the  phrase  of  defending  the  rights  of  Europe 
against  Erench  aggression.  It  was  not,  however,  for 
this  that  the  Czar  had  sent  his  army  from  beyond  the 
Carpathians.  Since  the  opening  of  the  campaign 
Suvaroff  had  been  in  perpetual  conflict  with  the  military 
Council  of  Vienna,  f     Suvarofl"  was  bent  upon  a  ceaseless 

*  Castlereagh,  iv. ;  Records:  Austria,  56.  Lord  Minto  had  just 
succeeded  Sir  Morton  Eden  as  ambassador.  The  English  Government 
was  willing  to  grant  the  House  of  Hapsburg  almost  anything  for  the  sake 
"  of  strengthening  that  barrier  which  the  military  means  and  resources  of 
Vienna  can  alone  oppose  against  the  future  enterprises  of  France." 
Grenville  to  Minto,  May  13,  1800.  Though  they  felt  some  regard  for  the 
rights  of  the  King  of  Piedmont,  Pitt  and  Grenville  were  just  as  ready 
to  hand  over  the  Republic  of  Genoa  to  the  Hapsburgs  as  Bonaparte  had 
been  to  hand  over  Yenice ;  in  fact,  they  looked  forward  to  the  destruction 
of  the  Genoese  State  with  avowed  pleasure,  because  it  easily  fell  under  the 
influence  of  France.  Their  principal  anxiety  was  that  if  Austria  "  should 
retain  Yenice  and  Genoa  and  possibly  acquire  Leghorn,"  it  should  grant 
England  an  advantageous  commercial  treaty.  Grenville  to  Minto,  Feb.  8, 
1800  ;  Castlereagh,  v.  3—11. 

t  Lord  Mulgrave  to  Grenville,  Sept.  12,  1799 ;  Records :  Army  of 
Switzerland,  vol.  80.     "  Suvaroff  opened  himself  to  me  in  the  most  uure- 


178a  BUVAEOFF  AND    THE   AU8TUIANS.  187 

pursuit  of  the  enemy;  the  Austrian  Council  insisted 
upon  the  reduction  of  fortresses.  What  at  first  appeared 
as  a  mere  difi^erence  of  military  opinion  appeared  in  its 
true  political  character  when  the  allied  troops  entered 
Piedmont.  The  Czar  desired  with  his  whole  soul  to 
crush  the  men  of  the  Revolution,  and  to  restore  the 
governments  which  France  had  overthrown.  As  soon 
as  his  troops  entered  Turin,  Suvaroff  proclaimed  the 
restoration  of  the  House  of  Savoy,  and  summoned  all 
Sardinian  officers  to  fight  for  their  King.  He  was  in- 
terrupted by  a  letter  from  Vienna  requiring  him  to 
leave  political  affairs  in  the  hands  of  the  Viennese 
Ministry.-^     The  Eussians  had  already  done  as  much  in 

served  manner.  He  began  by  stating  that  he  had  been  called  at  a  very 
advanced  period  of  life  from  his  retirement,  whore  his  ample  fortune  and 
honours  placed  him  beyond  the  allurement  of  any  motives  of  interest. 
Attachment  to  his  sovereign  and  zeal  for  his  God  inspired  him  with  the 
hope  and  the  expectation  of  conquests.  He  now  found  himself  under  very 
different  circumstances.  He  found  himself  surrounded  by  the  parasites  or 
spies  of  Thugut,  men  at  his  devotion,  creatures  of  his  power :  an  army 
bigoted  to  a  defensive  system,  afraid  even  to  pursue  their  successes  when 
that  system  had  permitted  them  to  obtain  any ;  he  had  to  encounter  the 
further  check  of  a  Government  at  Vienna  averse  to  enterprise,  &c. 

*  Miliutin,  2.20,  3.186;  Minto,  Aug.  10,  1799;  Records:  Austria, 
voL  56.  "  I  had  no  sooner  mentioned  this  topic  (Piedmont)  than  I 
perceived  I  had  touched  a  very  delicate  point.  M.  de  Thugut's  manner 
changed  instantly  from  that  of  coolness  and  civility  to  a  great  show  of 
warmth  attended  with  some  sharpness.  He  became  immediately  loud  and  ani- 
mated, and  expressed  chagrin  at  the  invitation  sent  to  the  King  of  Sardinia. 
.  .  He  considers  the  conquest  of  Piedmont  as  one  made  by  Austria  of  an 
enemy's  country.  He  denies  that  the  King  of  Sardinia  can  be  considered 
as  an  ally  or  as  a  friend,  or  even  as  a  neuter ;  and,  besides  imputing  a 
thousand  instances  of  ill-faith  to  that  Court,  relies  on  the  actual  alliance 
made  by  it  with  the  French  Republic  by  which  the  King  of  Sardinia  had 
appropriated  to  himself  part  of  the  Emperor's  dominions  in  Lombardy,  an 
offence  which,  I  perceive,  wiU  not  be  easily  forgotten.  .  .  I  mention  these 
circumstances  to  show  the  degree  of  passion  which  the  Court  of  Vienna 
mixes   with    this    discussion."      Minto   answered    Thugut's    luvectiTe 


188  MOBEBN  EUROPE.  1799. 

Italy  as  tlie  Austrian  Cabinet  desired  them  to  do, 
and  the  first  wish  of  Thugut  was  now  to  free 
himself  from  his  troublesome  ally.  Suvaroff  raged 
against  the  Austrian  Government  in  every  despatch, 
and  tendered  his  resignation.  His  complaints  inclined 
the  Czar  to  accept  a  new  military  scheme,  which  was 
supported  by  the  English  Grovernment  in  the  hope 
of  terminating  the  contention  between  SuvarojBT  and 
the  Austrian  Council.  It  was  agreed  at  St.  Petersburg 
that,  as  soon  as  the  French  armies  were  destroyed,  the 
reduction  of  the  Italian  fortresses  should  be  left  exclusively 
New  Plan  of  the  ^^  ^^^  Austriaus  ;  and  that  Suvaroff,  uniting 
^'  with  a  new  Russian  army  now  not  far  dis- 

tant, should  complete  the  conquest  of  Switzerland,  and 
then  invade  France  by  the  Jura,  supported  on  his  right 
by  the  Archduke  Charles.  An  attack  was  to  be  made 
at  the  same  time  upon  Holland  by  a  combined  British 
and  E-ussian  force. 

If  executed  in  its  original  form,  this  design  would 
have  thrown  a  formidable  army  upon  France  at  the  side 
of  Franche  Comt6,  where  it  is  least  protected  by  for- 
tresses. But  at  the  last  moment  an  alteration  in  the 
plan  was  made  at  Vienna.     The  prospect  of  an  Anglo- 

witli  the  odd  remark  "  that  perhaps  in  the  present  extraordinary 
period  the  most  rational  object  of  this  war  was  to  restore  the  integrity 
of  the  moral  principle  both  in  civil  and  political  life,  and  that  this 
principle  of  justice  should  take  the  lead  in  his  mind  of  those  con- 
siderations of  temporary  convenience  which  in  ordinary  times  might 
not  have  escaped  his  notice."  Thugut  then  said  "  that  the  Emperor  of 
Russia  had  desisted  from  his  measure  of  the  King  of  Sardinia's  immediate 
recall,  leaving  the  time  of  that  return  to  the  Emperor."  On  the  margin 
-Lf  the  despatch,  against  this  sentence,  is  written  in  pencil,  in  Lord  Greo^ 
ville's  handwriting,  "  I  am  persuaded  this  is  not  true," 


178G.  DESIGNS    OF  AUSTRIA.  189 

Eussian  victory  in  Holland  again  fixed  the  thoughts  of 
the  Austrian  Minister  upon  Belgium,  which  had  been  so 
lightly  abandoned  five  years  before,  and  which  Thugut 
now  hoped  to  re-occupy  and  to  barter  for  Bavaria  or  some 
other  territory.  "The  Emperor,''  he  wrote,  "  cannot  turn 
a  deaf  ear  to  the  appeal  of  his  subjects.  He  cannot  consent 
that  the  Netherlands  shall  be  disposed  of  without  his  own 
concurrence."*  The  efiect  of  this  perverse  and  mischievous 
resolution  was  that  the  Archduke  Charles  received  orders 
to  send  the  greater  part  of  his  army  from  Switzerland  to  the 
Lower  Ehine,  and  to  leave  only  25,000  men  to  support 
the  new  Eussian  division  which,  under  Greneral  Korsa- 
koff, was  approaching  from  the  north  to  meet  Suvaroff. 
The  Archduke,  as  soon  as  the  new  instructions  reached 
him,  was  filled  with  the  presentiment  of  disaster,  and 
warned  his  Government  that  in  the  general  displacement 
of  forces  an  opportunity  would  be  given  to  Massena,  who 
was  still  above  Ziirich,  to  strike  a  fatal  blow.  Every 
despatch  that  passed  between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg 
now  increased  the  Czar's  suspicion  of  Austria.  The 
Pope  and  the  King  of  Naples  were  convinced  that 
Thugut  had  the  same  design  upon  their  own  territories 
which  had  been  shown  in  his  treatment  of  Piedmont. f 

*  Miliutin,  3. 117.  And  so  almost  verbatim  in  a  conversation  described 
in  Eden's  despatch,  Aug.  3  ;  Records  :  Austria,  vol.  55.  "  M.  de  Thugut's 
answer  was  evidently  dictated  by  a  suspicion  rankling  in  his  mind  that  the 
Netherlands  might  be  made  a  means  of  aggrandisement  for  Prussia.  His 
jealousy  and  aversion  to  that  Power  are  at  this  moment  more  inveterate 
than  I  have  before  seen  them.  It  is  probable  that  he  may  have  some  idea 
of  establishing  there  the  Great  Duke  of  Tuscany." 

t  Thugut's  territorial  policy  did  actually  make  him  propose  to  abolish 
the  Papacy  not  only  as  a  temporal  Power,  but  as  a  religious  institution. 
**  Baron  Thugut  argued  strongly  on  the  possibility  of  doing  without  a  Pope, 


190  MODERN  EUROFE.  1799. 

They  appealed  to  the  Czar  for  protection.  The  Czar 
proposed  a  European  Congress,  at  which  the  Powers 
might  learn  one  another's  real  intentions.  The  proposal 
was  not  accepted  by  Austria ;  but,  while  disclaiming  all 
desire  to  despoil  the  King  of  Sardinia,  the  Pope,  or  the 
King  of  [N^aples,  Thugut  admitted  that  Austria  claimed 
an  improvement  of  its  Italian  frontier,  in  other  words, 
the  annexation  of  a  portion  of  Piedmont,  and  of  the 
northern  part  of  the  Eoman  States.  The  Czar  replied 
that  he  had  taken  up  arms  in  order  to  check  one  aggres- 
sive Government,  and  that  he  should  not  permit  another 
to  take  its  place. 

For  the  moment,  however,  the  allied  forces  continued 
to  co-operate  in  Italy  against  the  French  army  on  the 
Apennines  covering  Genoa.  This  army  had  received 
reinforcements,  and  was  now  placed  under  the  command 

and  of  each  sovereign  taking  on  himself  the  function  of  head  of  the 
National  Church,  as  in  England.  I  said  that,  as  a  Protestant,  I  could  not 
be  supposed  to  think  the  authority  of  the  Bishop  of  Rome  necessary ;  but 
that  in  the  present  state  of  religious  opinion,  and  considering  the  only 
alternative  in  those  matters,  viz.,  the  subsistence  of  the  Roman  Catholic 
faith  or  the  extinction  of  Christianity  itself,  I  preferred,  though  a 
Protestgjit,  the  Pope  to  the  Goddess  of  Reason.  However,  the  mind 
of  Baron  Thugut  is  not  open  to  any  reasoning  of  a  general  nature 
when  it  is  put  in  competition  with  conquest  or  acquisition  of  territory." 
Minto  to  G-renville,  Oct.  22,  1799 ;  Records  :  Austria,  vol.  57.  The  sus- 
picions of  Austria  current  at  the  Neapolitan  Court  are  curiously 
shown  in  the  Nelson  Correspondence.  Nelson  writes  to  Minto  (Aug.  20) 
at  Vienna :  "  For  the  sake  of  the  civilised  world,  let  us  work  together,  and 
as  the  best  act  of  our  lives  manage  to  hang  Thugut.  .  .  As  you  are  with 
Thugut,  your  penetrating  mind  will  discover  the  villain  in  all  his  actions. 
.  .  .  That  Thugut  is  caballing  .  .  .  Pray  keep  an  eye  upon  the 
rascal,  and  you  will  soon  j[ind  what  I  say  is  true.  Let  us  hang  these  three 
miscreants,  and  all  will  go  smooth."  Suvaroff  was  not  more  complimentary. 
"  How  can  that  desk- worm,  that  night-owl,  direct  an  army  from  his  dusky 
lest,  even  if  he  had  the  sword  of  Scanderbeg?"  (Sept.  3.) 


UMi  8UVAE0FF  ENTERS   SWITZERLAND.  191 

of  Joubert,  one  of  the  youngest  and  most  spirited  of  the 
Eepublican  generals.  Joubert  determined  to  attack  the 
Eussians  before  the  fall  of  Mantua  should  add  the 
besieging  army  to  Suvaroff's  forces  in  the  field.  But 
the  information  which  he  received  from  Lombardy  mis- 
led him.  In  the  second  week  of  August  he  was  still 
unaware  that  Mantua  had  fallen  a  fortnight  before.  lie 
descended  from  the  mountains  to  attack  Suvaroflf  at 
Tortona,  with  a  force  about  equal  to  Suvaroif's  own. 
On  reaching  Novi  he  learnt  that  the  army  of  Mantua 
was  also  before  him.  (Aug.  15.)  It  was  Battle  of  novi, 
too  late  to  retreat ;  Joubert  could  only  give  ^"^'  ^^' 
to  his  men  the  example  of  Eepublican  spirit  and  devo- 
tion. Suvaroff  himself,  with  Kray,  the  conqueror  of 
Mantua,  began  the  attack :  the  onset  of  a  second  Aus- 
trian corps,  at  tbe  moment  when  the  strength  of  the 
Eussians  was  failing,  decided  the  day.  Joubert  did  not 
live  to  witness  the  close  of  a  defeat  which  cost  France 
eleven  thousand  men.* 

The  allied  Governments  had  so  framed  their  plans 
that  the  most  overwhelming  victory  could  produce  no 
result.    Instead  of  entering  France,  Suvaroff    ^      „ 

o  '  Duvaroff  goes  in- 

was  compelled  to  turn  back  into  Switzerland,  ^  Switzerland, 
while  the  Austrians  continued  to  besiege  the  fortresses 
of  Piedmont.  In  Switzerland  Suvaroff  had  to  meet  an 
enemy  who  was  forewarned  of  his  approach,  and  who 

•  Milintin,  iii.  37 ;  Bentinck,  Aug.  16,  from  the  battle-field ;  Records : 
Italiau  States,  vol.  58.  His  letter  ends :  "  I  must  apologise  to  your  Lord- 
ship for  the  appearance  of  this  despatch"  (it  is  on  thin  Italian  paper  and 
almost  illegible):  "  we"  (i.e.,  Suvaroff *8  staff)  "  have  had  the  misfortune 
to  have  had  our  bagg»ge  plundered  by  the  Cossacks.** 


192  MODERN  EUBOFE.  1799. 

had  employed  every  resource  of  military  skill  and  daring 
to  prevent  tlie  union  of  tlie  two  Eussian  armies  now 
advancing  from  tlie  south  and  the  north.  Before  Suvaroff 
could  leave  Italy,  a  series  of  admirably -planned  attacks 
had  given  Massena  the  whole  network  of  the  central 
Alpine  passes,  and  closed  every  avenue  of  com- 
munication between  Suvaroff  and  the  army  with 
which  he  hoped  to  co-operate.  The  folly  of  the  Aus- 
trian Cabinet  seconded  the  French  general's  exertions. 
No  sooner  had  Korsakoff  and  the  new  Eussian  division 
reached  Schaffhausen  than  the  Archduke  Charles,  forced 
by  his  orders  from  Vienna,  turned  northwards  (Sept. 
3),  leaving  the  Eussians  with  no  support  but  Hotze's 
corps,  which  was  scattered  over  six  cantons.*  Korsakoff 
advanced  to  Zurich ;  Massena  remained  in  his  old  posi- 
tion on  the  Uetliberg.  It  was  now  that  Suvaroff  began 
his  march  into  the  Alps,  sorely  harassed  and  delayed  by 
the  want  of  the  mountain -teams  which  the  Austrians 
had  promised  him,  and  fflled  with  the  apprehension  that 
Korsakoff  would  suffer  some  irreparable  disaster  before 
his  own  arrival. 


•  Every  capable  soldier  saw  the  ruinous  miscliief  of  the  Archduke's 
withdrawal.  "  Not  only  are  all  prospects  of  our  making  any  progress  in 
Switzerland  at  an  end,  but  the  chance  of  maintaining  the  position  now 
occupied  is  extremely  precarious.  The  jealousy  and  mistrust  that  exists 
between  the  Austrians  and  Russians  is  inconceivable.  I  shall  not  pretend 
to  offer  an  opinion  on  what  might  be  the  most  advantageous  arrangement 
for  the  army  of  Switzerland,  but  it  is  certain  that  none  can  be  so  bad  as 
that  which  at  present  exists."  Colonel  Crauford,  English  military  envoy, 
Sept.  5,  1799 ;  Records :  Army  of  Switzerland,  vol.  79.  The  subsequent 
operations  of  Korsakoff  are  described  in  despatches  of  Colonel  Bamsay 
and  Lord  Mulgrave,  id.  vol.  80,  81.  Conversations  with  the  Archdulw 
Charles  in  those  of  Mr.  Wickham,  id.  voL  77. 


17».  RETREAT   OF  8UVAR0FF,  193 

Two  roads  lead  from  the  Italian  lakes  to  central 
Switzerland ;  one,  starting  from  tlie  head  of  Lago  Mag- 
giore  and  crossing  the  Q-othard,  ends  on  the  shore  of 
Lake  Lucerne ;  the  other,  crossing  the  Spliigen,  runs 
from  the  Lake  of  Como  to  Reichenau,  in  the  valley 
of  the  Rhine.  The  Gothard  in  1799  was  not  practi- 
cable for  cannon ;  it  was  chosen  by  Suvaroff,  however,  for 
his  own  advance,  with  the  object  of  falling  upon  Mas- 
sena's  rear  with  the  utmost  possible  speed.  He  left 
Bellinzona  on  the  21st  of  September,  fought  his  way  in 
a  desperate  fashion  through  the  French  outposts  that 
guarded  the  defiles  of  the  Grothard,  and  arrived  at  Altorf 
near  the  Lake  of  Lucerne.  Here  it  was  discovered  that  the 
westward  road  by  which  Suvaroff  meant  to  strike  upon 
the  enemy's  communications  had  no  existence.  Aban- 
doning this  design,  Suvaroff  made  straight  for  the 
district  where  his  colleague  was  encamped,  by  a 
shepherd's  patli  leading  north-eastwards  across  heights 
of  7,000  feet  to  the  valley  of  the  Muotta.  Over  this 
desolate  region  the  Russians  made  their  way ;  and  the 
resolution  which  brought  them  as  far  as  the  Muotta 
would  have  brought  them  past  every  other  obstacle  to 
the  spot  where  they  were  to  meet  their  countrymen.  But 
the  hour  was  past.  While  Suvaroff  was  stUl  struggling 
in  the  mountains,  Massena  advanced  against  second Batue of 
Zurich,  put  Korsakoff's  army  to  total  rout,  ziiriS>,8ept.'26. 
and  drove  it,  with  the  loss  of  all  its  baggage  and  of  a 
great  part  of  its  artillery,  outside  the  area  of  hostilities. 

The  first  rumours  of  the  catastrophe  reached  Suvaroff 
on  the  Muotta;  he  still  pushed  on  eastwards,  and, 
N 


194  MODERN  EVBOFE.  1799. 

thougli  almost  without  ammunition,  overthrew  a  corps 
commanded  by  Massena  in  person,  and  cleared  the  road 
over  the  Pragel  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  arriving  in 
Glarus  on  the  1st  of  October.  Here  the  full  extent  of 
Korsakoff's  disaster  was  jnade  known  to  him.  To 
advance  or  to  fall  back  was  ruin.  It  only  remained  for 
Retreat  of  Suvaroff  s  army  to  make  its  escape  across  a 
suvarofp.  ^-^^  ^^^  suow-covcrcd  mountain- tract  into 

the  valley  of  the  Ehine,  where  the  river  flows  below  the 
northern  heights  of  the  Grrisons.  This  exploit  crowned 
a  campaign  which  filled  Europe  with  astonishment.  The 
Alpine  traveller  of  to-day  turns  with  some  distrust  from 
narratives  which  characterise  with  every  epithet  of  horror 
and  dismay  scenes  which  are  the  delight  of  our  age  ;  but 
the  retreat  of  Suvaroff's  army,  a  starving,  footsore  multi- 
tude, over  what  was  then  an  untrodden  wilderness  of  rock, 
and  through  fresh-fallen  autumn  snow  two  feet  deep, 
had  little  in  common  with  the  boldest  feats  of  Alpine 
hardihood.*     It  was  achieved  with  loss  and  suficring ; 

*  The  despatches  of  Colonel  Clinton,  English  attache  with  Savaroff,  are 
in  singular  contrast  to  the  highly-coloured  accounts  of  this  retreat  common 
in  histories.  Of  the  most  critical  part  he  only  says :  "  On  the  6th  the  army 
passed  the  Panix  mountain,  which  the  snow  that  had  fallen  during  the  last 
week  had  rendered  dangerous,  and  several  horses  and  mules  were  lost  on 
the  march."  He  expresses  the  poorest  opinion  of  Suvaroff  and  his  ofl&cers : 
"  The  Marshal  is  entirely  worn  out  and  incapable  of  any  exertion :  he  will 
not  suffer  the  subject  of  the  indiscipline  of  his  army  to  be  mentioned  to 
him.  He  is  popular  with  his  army  because  he  puts  no  check  whatever  on  its 
licentiousness.  His  honesty  is  now  his  only  remaining  good  quality." 
Records :  Army  of  Switzerland,  vol.  80.  -  The  elaborate  plan  for  SuvarofE's 
and  Korsakoff's  combined  movements,  made  as  if  Switzerland  had  been  an 
open  country  and  Massena's  army  a  flock  of  sheep,  was  constructed  by  the 
Austrian  colonel  Weyrother,  the  same  person  who  subsequently  planned 
the  battle  of  Austerlitz.  On  learning  the  plan  from  Suvaroft',  Lord 
Mulgrave,  who  was  no  great   genius,   wrote  to  London  demonstrating 


17».  EXPEDITION   TO   HOLLAND,  Vdh 

it  brought  the  army  from  a  position  of  the  utmost 
danger  into  one  of  security;  but  it  was  followed  by 
no  renewed  attack.  Proposals  for  a  combination 
between  SuvarofP  and  the  Archduke  Charles  resulted 
only  in  mutual  taunts  and  menaces.  The  co-operation 
of  Eussia  in  the  wat  was  at  an  end.  The  French 
remained  masters  of  the  whole  of  the  Swiss  territory  that 
they  had  lost  since  the  beginning  of  the  campaign. 

In  the  summer  months  of  1799  the  Czar  had  relieved 
his  irritation  against  Austria  by  framing  in  British  and 
concert  with  the  British  Cabinet  the  plan     ti°oTJgain8t 

-*-  Holland,   Aug., 

for  a  joint  expedition  against  Holland.  It  ^^^• 
was  agreed  that  25,000  English  and  17,000  Eussian 
troops,  brought  from  the  Baltic  in  British  ships,  should 
attack  the  French  in  the  Batavian  Eepublic,  and  raise 
an  insurrection  on  behalf  of  the  exiled  Stadtholder. 
Throughout  July  the  Kentish  coast-towns  were  alive 
with  the  bustle  of  war;  and  on  the  13th  of  August  the 
first  English  division,  numbering  12,000  men,  set  sail 
from  Deal  under  the  command  of  Sir  Ealph  Abercromby. 
After  tossing  ofi*  the  Dutch  coast  for  a  fortnight,  the 
troops  landed  at  the  promontory  of  the  Helder.  A  Dutch 
corps  was  defeated  on  the  sand-hiUs,  and  the  English 
captured  the  fort  of  the  Helder,  commanding  the  Texel 
anchorage.  Immediately  afterwards  a  movement  in 
favour  of  the  Stadtholder  broke  out  among  the  officers 
of  the  Dutch  fleet.  The  captains  hoisted  the  Orange 
flag,  and  brought  their  ships  over  to  the  English. 

its  certain  failure,  and  predicting  almost  exactly  the  eyents  that  took 
place. 

N  2 


196  MODERN  EUROPE.  1799. 

This  was  fhe  first  and  tlie  last  result  of  the  expedi- 
tion. The  Russian  contingent  and  a  second  English 
division  reached  Holland  in  the  middle  of  September, 
and  with  them  came  the  Duke  of  York,  who  now  took 
the  command  out  of  the  hands  of  Abercromby.  On  the 
other  side  reinforcements  daily  arri\^d  from  France,  until 
the  enemy's  troops,  led  by  Greneral  Brune,  were  equal  in 
strength  to  the  invaders.  A  battle  fought  at  Alkmaar 
on  the  19th  of  September  gave  the  Allies  some  partial 
successes  and  no  permanent  advantage ;  and  on  the  3rd 
of  October  the  Duke  of  York  gained  one  of  those  so- 
called  victories  which  result  in  the  retreat  of  the  con- 
querors. Never  were  there  so  many  good  reasons  for  a 
bad  conclusion.  The  Eussians  moved  too  fast  or  too 
slow ;  the  ditches  set  at  nought  the  rules  of  strategy ; 
it  was  discovered  that  the  climate  of  Holland  was 
unfavourable  to  health,  and  that  the  Dutch  had  not  the 
slightest  inclination  to  get  back  their  Stadth older.  The 
result  of  a  series  of  mischances,  every  one  of  which 
would  have  been  foreseen  by  an  average  midshipman  in 
Nelson's  fleet,  or  an  average  sergeant  in  Massena's 
army,  was  that  York  had  to  purchase  a  retreat  for  the 
allied  forces  at  a  price  equivalent  to  an  unconditional 
surrender.  He  was  allowed  to  re-embark  on  con- 
sideration that  Grreat  Britain  restored  to  the  Fi'ench 
8,000  French  and  Dutch  prisoners,  and  handed  over  in 
perfect  repair  all  the  military  works  which  our  own 
soldiers  had  erected  at  the  Helder.  Bitter  complaints 
were  raised  among  the  Russian  officers  against  York's 
conduct  of  the  expedition.    He  was  accused  of  sacrificing 


17WL  EXPEDITION   TO    HOLLAND.       .  197 

the  Eussian  regiments  in  battle,  and  of  courting  a  general 
defeat  in  order  not  to  expose  his  own  men.  The  accusa- 
tion was  groundless.  Where  York  was,  treachery  or 
bad  faith  was  superfluous.  York  in  command,  the 
feeblest  enemy  became  invincible.  Incompetence  among 
the  hereditary  chiefs  of  the  English  army  had  become 
part  of  the  order  of  nature.  The  Ministry,  when  taxed 
with  failure,  obstinately  shut  their  eyes  to  the  true  cause 
of  the  disaster.  Parliament  was  reminded  that  defeat 
was  the  most  probable  conclusion  of  any  military 
operations  that  we  might  undertake,  and  that  England 
ought  not  to  expect  success  when  Prussia  and  Austria 
had  so  long  met  only  with  misfortune.  Under  the 
command  of  Nelson,  English  sailors  were  indeed  mani- 
festing that  kind  of  superiority  to  the  seamen  of  other 
nations  which  the  hunter  possesses  over  his  prey ;  yet 
this  gave  no  reason  why  foresight  and  daring  should 
count  for  anything  ashore.  If  the  nation  wished  to  see 
its  soldiers  undefeated,  it  must  keep  them  at  home  to 
defend  their  country.  Even  among  the  Opposition  no 
voice  was  raised  to  protest  against  the  system  which 
sacrificed  English  life  and  military  honour  to  the  dignity 
of  the  Eoyal  Family.  The  coUapse  of  the  Anglo- 
Russian  expedition  was  viewed  with  more  equanimity 
in  England  than  in  Eussia.  The  Czar  dismissed  his 
unfortunate  generals.  York  returned  home,  to  run 
horses  at  Newmarket,  to  job  commissions  with  his 
mistress,  and  to  earn  his  column  at  St.  James's  Park. 

It  was  at  this  moment,  when  the  tide  of  military  success 
was  already  turning  in  favour   of  the  Republic,  that 


198  ♦  MODERN  EUROPE.  17QSK 

the    revolution    took    place     whicli   made   Bonaparte 

Unpopularity  of     absolutc  rulcr  of  France.     Since  the  attack 

the  Directory.      ^£  ^|^^  QoverDment  upon  the  Royalists  in 

Fructidor,  1797,  the  Directory  and  the  factions  had 
come  no  nearer  to  a  system  of  mutual  concession,  or  to 
a  peaceful  acquiescence  in  the  will  of  a  parliamentary 
majority.  The  Directory,  assailed  both  by  the  extreme 
Jacobins  and  by  the  Constitutionalists,  was  still  strong 
enough  to  crush  each  party  in  its  turn.  The  elections 
of  1798,  which  strengthened  the  Jacobins,  were  an- 
nulled with  as  little  scruple  as  the  Royalist  elections  in 
the  preceding  year ;  it  was  only  when  defeat  in  Grermany 
and  Italy  had  brought  the  Grovernment  into  universal 
discredit  that  the  Constitutionalist  party,  fortified  by  the 
return  of  a  large  majority  in  the  elections  of  1799,  dared 
to  turn  the  attack  upon  the  Directors  themselves.  The 
excitement  of  foreign  conquest  had  hitherto  shielded  the 
abuses  of  Grovernment  from  criticism ;  but  when  Italy 
was  lost,  when  generals  and  soldiers  found  themselves 
without  pay,  without  clothes,  without  reinforcements, 
one  general  outcry  arose  against  the  Directory,  and  the 
nation  resolved  to  have  done  with  a  Gfovernment  whose 
outrages  and  extortions  had  led  to  nothing  but  military 
ruin.  The  disasters 'of  France  in  the  spring  of  1799, 
which  resulted  from  the  failure  of  the  Grovernment  to  raise 
the  armies  to  their  proper  strength,  were  not  in  reality 
connected  with  the  defects  of  the  Constitution.  They 
were  caused  in  part  by  the  shameless  jobbery  of  indi- 
vidual members  of  the  Administration,  in  part  by  the 
absence  of  any  agency,  like  that  of  the  Conventional 


1799.  FEANOE   IN  1799.  1^9 

Commissioners  of  1793,  to  enforce  the  control  of  the 
central  Grovernment  over  the  local  authorities,  left 
isolated  and  independent  by  the  changes  of  1 789.  Faults 
enough  belonged,  however,  to  the  existing  political 
order;  and  the  Constitutionalists,  who  now  for  the 
second  time  found  themselves  with  a  majority  in  the 
Councils,  were  not  disposed  to  prolong  a  system  which 
from  the  first  had  turned  their  majorities  into  derision. 
A  party  grew  up  around  the  Abbe  Siey^s  intent  upon 
some  change  which  should  give  France  a  government 
really  representing  its  best  elements.  What  piansof  si6y*«, 
the  change  was  to  be  few  could  say ;  but  it 
was  known  that  Si^y^s,  who  had  taken  a  leading  part  in 
1789,  and  had  condemned  the  Constitution  of  1795  from 
the  moment  when  it  was  sketched,  had  elaborated  a 
scheme  which  he  considered  exempt  from  every  error 
that  had  vitiated  its  predecessors.  As  the  first  step  to 
reform,  Si^yes  himself  was  elected  to  a  Directorship  then 
falling  vacant.  Barras  attached  himself  to  Siey^s  ;  the 
three  remaining  Directors,  who  were  Jacobins  and 
popular  in  Paris,  were  forced  to  surrender  their  seats. 
Si^y^s  now  only  needed  a  soldier  to  carry  out  his  plans. 
His  first  thought  had  turned  on  Joubert,  but  Joubert 
was  killed  at  Novi.  Moreau  scrupled  to  raise  his  hand 
against  the  law ;  Bernadotte,  a  general  distinguished 
both  in  war  and  in  administration,  declined  to  play  a 
secondary  part.  Nor  in  fact  was  the  support  of  Si^y^s 
indispensable  to  any  popular  and  ambitious  soldier  who 
was  prepared  to  attack  the  Government.  Sidyes  and 
his  friends   ofiered  the  alliance  of  a  party  weighty  in 


200  MODERN  EUBOFE,  1799. 

cliaracter  and  antecedents  ;  but  there  were  other  well- 
known  names  and  powerful  interests  at  the  command  of 
an  enterprising  leader,  and  all  France  awaited  the  down- 
fall of  a  Government  whose  action  had  resulted  only  in 
disorder  at  home  and  defeat  abroad. 

Such  was  the  political  situation  when,  in  the  summer 
of  1799,  Bonaparte,  baffled  in  an  attack  upon  the  Syrian 
fortress  of  St.  Jean  d'Acre,  returned  to  Egypt,  and  re- 
ceived the  first  tidings  from  Europe  which  had  reached 
him  since  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  He  saw  that  his 
opportunity  had  arrived.  He  determined  to  leave  his 
army,  whose  ultimate  failure  was  inevitable,  and  to  offer 
to  France  in  his  own  person  that  sovereignty  of  genius 
and  strength  for  which  the  whole  nation  was  longing. 
On  the  7th  of  October  a  despatch  from  Bonaparte  was 
read  in  the  Council  of  Five  Hundred,  announcing  a  victory 
over  the  Turks  at  Aboukir.  It  brought  the  first  news 
that  had  been  received  for  many  months  from  the  army 
of  Egypt ;  it  excited  an  outburst  of  joyous  enthusiasm 
for  the  general  and  the  army  whom  a  hated  Grovernment 
was  believed  to  have  sent  into  exile ;  it  recalled  that  suc- 
cession of  victories  which  had  been  unchecked  by  a  single 
defeat,  and  that  Peace  which  had  given  France  a  dominion 
wider  than  any  that  her  Kings  had  won.  While  every 
thought  was  turned  upon  Bonaparte,  the  French  nation 
suddenly  heard  that  Bonaparte  himself  had  landed  on 
the  coast  of  Provence.  "I  was  sitting  that  day,"  says 
Beranger  in  his  autobiography,  "  in  our  reading-room 
with  thirty  or  forty  other  persons.  Suddenly  the  news 
was   brought  in   that   Bonaparte    had    returned   from 


179ft.  RETURN  OF  BONAPARTE.  201 

Egypt.     At  the  words,  every  man  in  the  room  started 
to  his  feet  and  burst  into  one  lon^  shout     „ 

^  Bonaparte     r»> 

of  joy."  The  emotion  portrayed  by  B^ranger  •  ^.^yVt.  ooT 
was  that  of  the  whole  of  France.  Almost 
everything  that  now  darkens  the  early  fame  of  Bona- 
parte was  then  unknown.  His  falsities,  his  cold,  un- 
pitying  heart  were  familiar  only  to  accomplices  and  dis- 
tant sufferers ;  even  his  most  flagrant  wrongs,  such  as 
the  destruction  of  Venice,  were  excused  by  a  political 
necessity,  or  disguised  as  acts  of  righteous  chastisement. 
The  hopes,  the  imagination  of  France  saw  in  Bonaparte 
the  young,  unsullied,  irresistible  hero  of  the  Eepublic. 
His  fame  had  risen  throughout  a  crisis  which  had  de- 
stroyed all  confidence  in  others.  The  stale  placemen  of  the 
factions  sank  into  insignificance  by  his  side  ;  even  sincere 
Eepublicans,  who  feared  the  rule  of  a  soldier,  confessed 
that  it  is  not  always  given  to  a  nation  to  choose  the 
mode  of  its  own  deliverance.  From  the  moment  that 
Bonaparte  landed  at  Frdjus,  he  was  master  of  France. 

Sieyes  saw  that  Bonaparte,  and  no  one  else,  was  the 
man  through  whom  he  could  overthrow  the 
existing  Constitution.*  So  little  sympathy  si6yfe«andBon». 
existed,  however,  between  Si^y^s  and  the 
soldier  to  whom  he  now  offered  his  support,  that  Bona- 
parte only  accepted  Sidy 6s'  project  after  satisfying  him- 
self that  neither  Barras  nor  Bernadotte  would  help 
him  to  supreme  power.  Once  convinced  of  this, 
Bonaparte  closed  with  Sidy^s*  offers.  It  was  agreed 
that  Sidyfes  and  his  friend  Ducos  should  resign  their 

*  Miot  de  Melito,  cL  ix.    Lucien  Bonaparte,  Beyolntion  de  Bnunaire,  p.  SL 


202  MODEHn  ETJUOPE.  179d. 

Directorships,  and  that  the  three  remaining  Directors 
should  be  driven  from  office.  The  Assemblies,  or  any 
part  of  them  favourable  to  the  plot,  were  to  appoint  a 
Triumvirate  composed  of  Bonaparte,  Sieyes,  and  Ducos, 
for  the  purpose  of  drawing  up  a  new  Constitution.  In 
the  new  Constitution  it  was  understood,  though  without 
any  definite  arrangement,  that  Bonaparte  and  Sieyes 
were  to  be  the  leading  figures.  The  Council  of  Ancients 
was  in  great  part  in  league  with  the  conspirators :  the 
only  obstacle  likely  to  hinder  the  success  of  the  plot 
was  a  rising  of  the  Parisian  populace.  As  a  precaution 
against  attack,  it  was  determined  to  transfer  the  meeting 
of  the  Councils  to  St.  Cloud.  Bonaparte  had  secured 
the  support  of  almost  all  the  generals  and  troops  in 
Paris.  His  brother  Lucien,  now  President  of  the 
Council  of  Five  Hundred,  hoped  to  paralyse  the  action 
of  his  own  Assembly,  in  which  the  conspirators  were  in 
the  minority. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  9th  of  November  (18 

Brum  aire),  a  crowd  of  generals  and  officers 

Brumaire  (Nov.     mct  bcforc   Bouapartc's    house.       At   the 

9),  1799.  ^ 

same  moment  a  portion  of  the  Council  of 
Ancients  assembled,  and  passed  a  decree  which  adjourned 
the  session  to  St.  Cloud,  and  conferred  on  Bonaparte 
the  command  over  all  the  troops  in  Paris.  The  decree 
was  carried  to  Bonaparte's  house  and  read  to  the  military 
throng,  who  acknowledged  it  by  brandishing  their  swords. 
Bonaparte  then  ordered  the  troops  to  their  posts, 
received  the  resignation  of  Barras,  and  arrested  the  two 
remaining  Directors  in  the  Luxembourg.     During  the 


17M.  18   BBUMAIBE,  205 

night  there  was  great  agitation  in  Paris.  The  arrest  of 
the  two  Directors  and  the  display  of  military  force  re- 
vealed the  true  nature  of  the  conspiracy,  and  excited 
men  to  resistance  who  had  hitherto  seen  no  great  cause 
for  alarm.  The  Councils  met  at  St.  Cloud  at  two  on 
the  next  day.  The  Ancients  were  ready  for  what 
was  coming ;  the  Five  Hundred  refused  to  listen  to  Bona- 
parte's accomplices,  and  took  the  oath  of  fidelity  to  the 
Constitution.  Bonaparte  himself  entered  the  Council  of 
Ancients,  and  in  violent,  confused  language  declared 
that  he  had  come  to  save  the  Republic  from  unseen 
dangers.  He  then  left  the  Assembly,  and  entered  the 
Chamber  of  the  Five  Hundred,  escorted  by  armed 
grenadiers.  A  roar  of  indignation  greeted  the  appear- 
ance of  the  bayonets.  The  members  rushed  in  a  mass 
upon  Bonaparte,  and  drove  him  out  of  the  hall.  His 
brother  now  left  the  President's  chair  and  joined  the 
soldiers  outside,  whom  he  harangued  in  the  character  of 
President  of  the  Assembly.  The  soldiers,  hitherto  waver- 
ing, were  assured  by  Lucien's  civil  authority  and  his 
treacherous  eloquence.  The  drums  beat ;  the  word  of 
command  was  given  ;  and  the  last  free  representatives 
of  France  struggled  through  doorways  and  windows 
before  the  levelled  and  advancing  bayonets. 

The  Constitution  which  Si6y6s  hoped  now  to  impose 
upon  France  had  been  elaborated  by  its  author  ^^  .^^,  j^  ^^ 
at  the  close  of  the  Roign  of  Terror.  Designed  ^"^^^^o^-^ 
at  that  epoch,  it  bore  the  trace  of  all  those  apprehen- 
sions which  gave  shape  to  the  Constitution  of  1795. 
The  statutory  outrages  of  1793,  the  Royalist  reaction 


204  MOimUN  EUROPE.  1799. 

shown  in  the  events  of  Vend^miaire,  were  the  perils  from 
which  both  Siey^s  and  the  legislators  of  1795  en- 
deavoured to  guard  the  future  of  France.  It  had  be- 
come clear  that  a  popular  election  might  at  any  moment 
return  a  royalist  majority  to  the  Assembly :  the  Con- 
stitution of  1795  averted  this  danger  by  prolonging  the 
power  of  the  Conventionalists ;  Sieyes  overcame  it  by 
extinguishing  popular  election  altogether.  He  gave  to 
the  nation  no  right  but  that  of  selecting  half  a  million 
persons  who  should  be  eligible  to  offices  in  the  Com- 
munes, and  who  should  themselves  elect  a  smaller  body 
of  fifty  thousand,  eligible  to  offices  in  the  Departments. 
The  fifty  thousand  were  in  their  turn  to  choose  five  thou- 
sand, who  should  be  eligible  to  places  in  the  Grovernment 
and  the  Legislature.  The  actual  appointments  were  to 
be  made,  however,  not  by  the  electors,  but  by  the 
Executive.  With  the  irrational  multitude  thus  deprived 
of  the  power  to  bring  back  its  old  oppressors,  priests, 
royalists,  and  nobles  might  safely  do  their  worst.  By 
way  of  still  further  precaution,  Sieyes  proposed  that 
every  Frenchman  who  had  been  elected  to  the  Legis- 
lature since  1789  should  be  inscribed  for  ten  years 
among  the  privileged  five  thousand. 

Such  were  the  safeguards  provided  against  a  Bour- 
bonist  reaction.  To  guard  against  a  recurrence  of  those 
evils  which  France  had  sufiered  from  the  precipitate 
votes  of  a  single  Assembly,  Sieyes  broke  up  the  legisla- 
ture into  as  many  chambers  as  there  are  stages  in  the 
passing  of  a  law.  The  first  chamber,  or  Council  of 
State,  was  to  give  shape  to  measures  suggested  by  the 


1799.  PLANS    OF  SIJSY^S.  20o 

Executive  ;  a  second  chamber,  known  as  the  Tribunate, 
was  to  discuss  the  measures  so  framed,  and  ascertain  the 
objections  to  which  they  were  liable ;  the  third  cham- 
ber, known  as  the  Legislative  Body,  was  to  decide  in 
silence  for  or  against  the  measures,  after  hearing  an  ar- 
gument between  representatives  of  the  Council  and  of 
the  Tribunate.  As  a  last  impregnable  bulwark  against 
Jacobins  and  Bourbon ists  alike,  Si^y^s  created  a  Senate 
whose  members  should  hold  office  for  life,  and  be  em- 
powered to  annul  every  law  in  which  the  Chambers 
might  infringe  upon  the  Constitution. 

It  only  remained  to  invent  an  Executive.  In  the 
other  parts  of  his  Constitution,  Si^y^s  had  borrowed 
from  Eome,  from  Grreece,  and  from  Venice ;  in  his 
Executive  he  improved  upon  the  political  theories  of 
Great  Britain.  He  proposed  that  the  Government 
should  consist  of  two  Consuls  and  a  Great  Elector ;  the 
Elector,  like  an  English  king,  appointing  and  dismissing 
the  Consuls,  but  taking  no  active  part  in  the  administra- 
tion himself.  The  Consuls  were  to  be  respe>3tively  re- 
stricted to  the  affairs  of  peace  and  of  war.  <Trotesque 
under  every  aspect,  the  Constitution  of  Sieyes  vas  TeaWy 
calculated  to  effect  in  all  points  but  one  the  end  which 
he  had  in  view.  His  object  was  to  terminate  the  con- 
vulsions of  Fr«ince  by  depriving  every  element  in  the 
State  of  the  power  to  create  sudden  change.  The 
members  of  his  body  politic,  a  Council  that  could  only 
draft,  a  Tribunate  that  could  only  discuss,  a  Legisla- 
ture that  could  only  vote.  Yes  or  No,  were  impotent 
for  mischief;    and  the  nation  itself  ceased  to  have  a 


206  MODERN  EUROPE.  1799. 

political  existence  as  soon  as  it  had  selected  its  half- 
million  notables. 

So  far,  nothing  conld  have  better  suited  the  views  of 
sifeyfes  and  Booaparte  ;  and  up  to  this  point  Bonaparte 

Bonaparte.  quietly    accepted    Sieyes'  plan.      But   the 

general  had  his  own  scheme  for  what  was  to  follow. 
Si^y^s  might  apportion  the  act  of  deliberation  among 
debating  societies  and  dumb  juries  to  the  full  extent  of 
his  own  ingenuity ;  but  the  moment  that  he  applied  his 
disintegrating  method  to  the  Executive,  Bonaparte 
swept  away  the  flimsy  reasoner,  and  set  in  the  midst  of 
his  edifice  of  shadows  the  reality  of  an  absolute  personal 
rule.  The  phantom  Elector,  and  the  Consuls  who  were 
to  be  the  Elector's  tenants-at-will,  corresponded  very 
little  to  the  power  which  France  desired  to  see  at  its 
head.  "  Was  thete  ever  anything  so  ridiculous  ?  "  cried 
Bonaparte.  "  What  man  of  spirit  could  accept  such  a 
post?  *'  It  was  in  vain  that  Sieyes  had  so  nicely  set  the 
balance.  His  theories  gave  to  France  only  the  pageants 
which  disguised  the  extinction  of  the  nation  beneath  a 
single  will:  the  frame  of  executive  government  which 
the  country  received  in  1799  was  that  which  Bonaparte 
deduced  from  the  conception  of  an  absolute  central 
power.  The  First  Consul  summed  up  all  executive 
authority  in  his  own  person.  By  his  side  there  were 
set  two  colleagues  whose  only  function  was  to  advise. 
A  Council  of  State  placed  the  highest  skill  and  ex- 
perience in  France  at  the  disposal  of  the  chief  magistrate, 
without  infringing  upon  his  sovereignty.  All  offices, 
both  in  the  Ministries  of  State  and  in  the  provinces. 


1799.  THE    CONSULATE.  207 

were  filled  by  the  nominees  of  the  First  Consul.     No 
law  could  be  proposed  but  at  his  desire. 

The  institutions  given  to  France  by  the  National  As- 
sembly of  1789  and  those  given  to  it  in  the  Consulate  ex- 
hibited a  direct  contrast  seldom  found  outside 
the  region  of  abstract  terms.    Local  customs,     institutions  of 

^  ^  ^  '        1791  and  1799. 

survivals  of  earlier  law,  such  as  soften  the 
difference  between  England  and  the  various  democracies 
of  the  United  States,  had  no  place  in  the  sharp-cut  types 
in  which  the  political  order  of  France  was  recast  in  1791 
and  1799.  The  Constituent  Assembly  had  cleared  the 
field  before  it  began  to  reconstruct.  Its  reconstruction 
was  based  upon  the  Eights  of  Man,  identified  with  the 
principle  of  local  self-government  by  popular  election. 
It  deduced  a  system  of  communal  administration  so 
completely  independent  that  France  was  described 
by  foreign  critics  as  partitioned  into  40,000  .  re- 
publics; and  the  criticism  was  justified  when,  in  1793, 
it  was  found  necessary  to  create  a  new  central  Grovern- 
ment,  and  to  send  commissioners  from  the  capital  into 
the  provinces.  In  the  Constitution  of  1791,  judges, 
bishops,  officers  of  the  National  Gruard,  were  all  alike 
subjected  to  popular  election ;  the  Minister  of  War  could 
scarcely  move  a  regiment  from  one  village  to  another 
without  the  leave  of  the  mayor  of  the  commune.  In  the 
Constitution  of  1799  all  authority  was  derived  from 
the  head  of  the  State.  A  system  of  centralisation  came 
into  force  with  which  France  under  her  oentnuisaboa 
kings  had  nothing  to  compare.  All  that  had  ***  "^' 
once  served  as  a  check  upon  monarchical  power,  the  legal 


208  MODERN  UUBOPB.  1799. 

Parliaments,  tlie  Provincial  Estates  of  Brittany  and 
Languedoc,  the  rights  of  lay  and  ecclesiastical  corpora- 
tions, had  vanished  away.  In  the  place  of  the  motley 
of  privileges  that  had  tempered  the  Bonrbon  monarchy, 
in  the  place  of  the  popular  Assemblies  of  the  Eevolu- 
tion,  there  sprang  up  a  series  of  magistracies  as  regular 
and  as  absolute  as  the  orders  of  military  rank."^  Where, 
under  the  Constitution  of  1791,  a  body  of  local  repre- 
sentatives had  met  to  conduct  the  business  of  the  Depart- 
ment, there  was  now  a  Prefet,  appointed  by  the  First 
Consul,  absolute,  like  the  First  Consul  himself,  and 
assisted  only  by  the  advice  of  a  nominated  council, 
which  met  for  one  fortnight  in  the  year.  In  subordina- 
tion to  the  Prefet,  an  officer  and  similar  council  trans- 
acted the  local  business  of  the  Arrondissement.  Even  the 
40,000  Maires  with  their  communal  councils  were  all 
appointed  directly  or  indirectly  by  the  Chief  of  the 
State.  There  existed  in  France  no  authority  that  could 
repair  a  village  bridge,  or  light  the  streets  of  a  town, 
but  such  as  owed  its  appointment  to  the  central 
Grovernment.  Nor  was  the  power  of  the  First  Consul 
limited  to  the  administration.  With  the  exception  of 
the  lowest  and  the  highest  members  of  the  judicature, 
he  nominated  all  judges,  and  transferred  them  at  his 
pleasure  to  inferior  or  superior  posts. 

Such  was  the  system  which,  based  to  a  great 
extent  upon  the  preferences  of  the  French  people, 
fixed  even  more  deeply  in  the  national  character 
the    willingness    to  depend  upon  an   omnipresent,   all- 

*  Law  of  Feb.  17, 1800  (28  Pluviose,  viiL). 


1799.  INSTITUTIONS  OF  THE  CONSULATE.  209 

directing  power.  Through  its  rational  order,  its  regu- 
larity, its  command  of  the  highest  science  and  experience, 
this  system  of  government  could  not  fail  to  confer  great 
and  rapid  benefits  upon  the  country.  It  has  usually 
been  viewed  by  the  French  themselves  as  one  of  the 
finest  creations  of  political  wisdom.  In  comparison 
with  the  self-government  which  then  and  long  after- 
wards existed  in  England,  the  centralisation  of  France 
had  all  the  superiority  of  progress  and  intelligence  over 
torpor  and  self-contradiction.  Yet  a  heavy,  an  incal- 
culable price  is  paid  by  every  nation  which  for  the  sake 
of  administrative  efficiency  abandons  its  local  liberties, 
and  all  that  is  bound  up  with  their  enjoyment.  No 
practice  in  the  exercise  of  public  right  armed  a  later 
generation  of  Frenchmen  against  the  audacity  of  a  com- 
mon usurper :  no  immortality  of  youth  secured  the  insti- 
tutions framed  by  Napoleon  against  the  weakness  and 
corruption  which  at  some  period  undermine  all  despot- 
isms. The  historian  who  has  exhausted  every  term  of 
praise  upon  the  political  system  of  the  Consulate  lived  to 
declare,  as  Chief  of  the  State  himself,  that  the  first  need 
of  France  was  the  decentralisation  of  power.* 

After  ten  years  of  disquiet,  it  was  impossible  that 
any  Government  could  be  more  welcome  to  the  French 
nation  than  one  which  proclaimed  itself  the  g^^  ^  ^^ 
representative,  not  of  party  or  of  opinion,  but  ^^^^^^ 
of  France  itself.  No  section  of  the  nation  had  won  a 
triumph  in  the  establishment  of  the  Consulate;  no 
section  had  suffered  a  defeat.  In  his  own  elevation 
•  M.  ITiiers,  Feb.  21, 1872. 


210  MODERN  EVEOPB.  1799. 

Bonaparte  announced  the  close  of  civil  conflict.  A 
Grovernment  had  arisen  which  summoned  all  to  its  ser- 
vice ;  which  would  employ  all,  reward  all,  reconcile  all. 
The  earliest  measures  of  the  First  Consul  exhibited  the 
policy  of  reconciliation  by  which  he  hoped  to  rally  the 
whole  of  France  to  his  side.  The  law  of  hostages,  under 
which  hundreds  of  families  were  confined  in  retaliation 
for  local  Royalist  disturbances,  was  repealed,  and  Bona- 
parte himself  went  to  announce  their  liberty  to  the 
prisoners  in  the  Temple.  Great  numbers  of  names  were 
struck  oiF  the  list  of  the  emigrants,  and  the  road  to 
pardon  was  subsequently  opened  to  all  who  had  not 
actually  served  against  their  country.  In  the  selection 
of  his  ofiicers  of  State,  Bonaparte  showed  the  same 
desire  to  win  men  of  all  parties,  Cambaceres,  a  regicide, 
was  made  Second  Consul ;  Lebrun,  an  old  official  of 
Louis  XVI.,  became  his  colleague.  In  the  Ministries,  in 
the  Senate,  and  in  the  Council  of  State  the  nation  saw 
men  of  proved  ability  chosen  from  all  callings  in  life  and 
from  all  political  ranks.  No  Grovernment  of  France  had 
counted  among  its  members  so  many  names  eminent  for 
capacity  and  experience.  One  quality  alone  was  indis- 
pensable, a  readiness  to  serve  and  to  obey.  In  that  intel- 
lectual greatness  which  made  the  combination  of  all  the 
forces  of  France  a  familiar  thought  in  Bonaparte's  mind, 
there  was  none  of  the  moral  generosity  which  could 
pardon  opposition  to  himself,  or  tolerate  energy  acting 
under  other  auspices  than  his  own.  He  desired  to  see 
authority  in  the  best  hands ;  he  sought  talent  and  pro- 
moted it,  but  on   the   understanding  that  it  took   its 


1799.  QOVEUNMENT    OF   BONAPAUTE.  211 

direction  from  himself.  Outside  this  limit  ability  was 
his  enemy,  not  his  friend;  and  what  could  not  he 
caressed  or  promoted  was  treated  with  tyrannical  injus- 
tice. While  Bonaparte  boasted  of  the  career  that  he  had 
thrown  open  to  talent,  he  suppressed  the  whole  of  the 
independent  journalism  of  Paris,  and  banished  Mme.  de 
Stael,  whose  guests  continued  to  converse,  when  they 
might  not  write,  about  liberty.  Equally  partial,  equally 
calculated,  was  Bonaparte's  indulgence  towards  the 
ancient  enemies  of  the  Eevolution,  the  Eoyalists  and  the 
priests.  He  felt  nothing  of  the  old  hatred  of  Paris 
towards  the  Vendean  noble  and  the  superstitious  Breton ; 
he  offered  his  friendship  to  the  stubborn  Breton  race, 
whose  loyalty  and  piety  he  appreciated  as  good  qualities  in 
subjects ;  but  failing  their  submission,  he  instructed  his 
generals  in  the  west  of  France  to  burn  down  their  vil- 
lages, and  to  set  a  price  upon  the  heads  of  their  chiefs. 
Justice,  tolerance,  good  faith,  were  things  which  had  no 
being  for  Bonaparte  outside  the  circle  of  his  instruments 
and  allies. 

In  the  foreign  relations  of  France  it  was  not  possible 
for  the   most   unscrupulous  will   to  carry 
asrerression  farther  than  it  had  been  already     parte  sautocmcy 

°°^  ^  •'        ouuide  France. 

carried;  yet  the  elevation  of  Bonaparte 
deeply  affected  the  fortunes  of  all  those  States  whose  lot 
depended  upon  France.  It  was  not  only  that  a  mind 
accustomed  to  regard  all  human  things  as  objects  for  its 
own  disposal  now  directed  an  irresistible  military  force, 
but  from  the  day  when  France  submitted  to  Bonaparte, 
the  political  changes  accompanying  the  advance  of  the 
o  2 


212       >  MODERN  EUROPE.  1799. 

Frencli  armies  took  a  different  cliaracter.  Belgium  and 
Holland,  the  Rhine  Provinces,  the  Cisalpine,  the  Roman, 
and  the  Parthenopean  Republics,  had  all  received,  under 
whatever  circumstances  of  wrong,  at  least  the  forms  of 
popular  sovereignty.  The  reality  of  power  may  have 
belonged  to  French  generals  and  commissioners ;  but, 
however  insincerely  uttered,  the  call  to  freedom  excited 
hopes  and  aspirations  which  were  not  insincere  them- 
selves. The  Italian  festivals  of  emancipation,  the  trees 
of  liberty,  the  rhetoric  of  patriotic  assemblies,  had 
betrayed  little  enough  of  the  instinct  for  self-govern- 
ment ;  but  they  marked  a  separation  from  the  past ;  and 
the  period  between  the  years  1796  and  1799  was  in  fact 
the  birth-time  of  those  hopes  which  have  since  been 
realised  in  the  freedom  and  the  unity  of  Italy.  So  long 
as  Prance  had  her  own  tumultuous  assemblies,  her  elec- 
tions in  the  village  and  in  the  county-town,  it  was 
impossible  for  her  to  form  republics  beyond  the  Alps 
without  introducing  at  least  some  germ  of  republican 
organisation  and  spirit.  But  when  all  power  was  con- 
centrated in  a  single  man,  when  the  spoken  and  the 
written  word  became  an  offence  against  the  State,  when 
the  commotion  of  the  old  municipalities  was  succeeded 
by  the  silence  and  the  discipline  of  a  body  of  clerks  work- 
ing round  their  chief,  then  the  advance  of 

France  ceases  to 

ejjjJjdemoCTacy     Preuch  iulluence  ceased  to  mean  the  sup- 
und^rmonSS     port  of  popular  forccb  against  the  Grovern- 

cal  systems. 

ments.  The  form  which  Bonaparte  had 
given  to  France  was  the  form  which  he  intended  for  the 
clients  of  France.     Hence  in  those  communities  which 


1799.  BULB    OF    UONAPABTE.  213 

directly  received  the  impress  of  the  Consulate,  as  in 
Bavaria  and  the  minor  German  States,  authority,  instead 
of  being  overthrown,  was  greatly  strengthened.  Bona- 
parte carried  beyond  the  Rhine  that  portion  of  the 
spirit  of  the  Eevolution  which  he  accepted  at  home,  the 
suppression  of  privilege,  the  extinction  of  feudal  rights, 
the  reduction  of  all  ranks  to  equality  before  the  law,  and 
the  admission  of  all  to  the  public  service.  But  this 
levelling  of  the  social  order  in  the  client-states  of  France, 
and  the  establishment  of  system  and  unity  in  the  place 
of  obsolete  privilege,  cleared  the  way  not  for  the  supre- 
macy of  the  people,  but  for  the  supremacy  of  the  Crown. 
The  power  which  was  taken  away  from  corporations, 
from  knights,  and  from  ecclesiastics,  was  given,  not  to  a 
popular  Eepresentative,  but  to  Cabinet  Ministers  and 
officials  ranged  after  the  model  of  the  official  hierarchy 
of  France.  What  the  French  had  in  the  first  epoch  of 
their  Revolution  endeavoured  to  impart  to  Europe — the 
spirit  of  Hberty  and  self-government — ^they  had  now 
renounced  themselves.  The  belief  in  popular  right, 
which  made  the  difference  between  the  changes  of  1789 
and  those  attempted  by  the  Emperor  Joseph,  sank  in  the 
storms  of  the  Revolution. 

Yet  the  statesmanship  of  Bonaparte,  if  it  repelled  the 
liberal  and  disinterested  sentiment  of  1789,  was  no  mere 
cunning  of  a  Corsican  soldier,  or  exploit  of  mediaeval 
genius  born  outside  its  age.  Subject  to  the  fullest 
gratification  of  his  own  most  despotic  or  most  malignant 
impulse,  Bonaparte  carried  into  his  creations  the  ideas 
upon  which  the  greatest  European  innovators  before  the 


214  MODERN  EUllOPE.  md. 

Frencli  Eevolution  had.  based  their  work.  What 
Frederick  and  Joseph  had  accomplished,  or  failed  to 
accomplish,  was  realised  in  Western  Germany  when  its 
Bona  arte  le  "  Sovcrcigns  bccamc  the  clients  of  the  First 
SlEeiiS     Consul.      Bonaparte  was    no    child  of   the 

monarchs  of  tiie  . 

18th  century.  Frcncli  Ecvolution ;  he  was  the  last  and  the 
greatest  of  the  autocratic  legislators  who  worked  in  an 
unfree  age.  Under  his  rule  France  lost  what  had  seemed 
to  be  most  its  own;  it  most  powerfully  advanced  the  forms 
of  progress  common  to  itself  and.  the  rest  of  Europe. 
Bonaparte  raised  no  population  to  liberty  :  in  extinguish- 
ing privilege  and  abolishing  the  legal  distinctions  of 
birth,  in  levelling  all  personal  and  corporate  authority 
beneath  the  single  rule  of  the  State,  he  prepared  the  way 
for  a  rational  freedom,  when,  at  a  later  day,  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  State  should  itself  become  the  representative 
of  the  nation's  will. 


CHAPTEE  V. 

Overtures  of  Bonaparte  to  Austria  and  England — The  "War  continues— Massena 
besieged  in  Genoa — Moreau  invades  Southern  Germany — Bonaparte  crosses 
the  St.  Bernard,  and  descends  in  the  rear  of  the  .Austriana— Battle  of 
Marengo — Austrians  retire  behind  the  Mincio — Treaty  between  England 
and  Austria — ^Austria  continues  the  War — Battle  of  Hohenlinden — Peace  of 
Luneville— War  between  England  and  the  Northern  Maritime  League — 
Battle  of  Copenhagen — ^iturder  of  Paul — End  of  the  ]\Iaritime  "War — 
English  Army  enters  Egypt — French  defeated  at  Alexandria — They  capitu- 
late at  Cairo  and  Alexandria — Preliminaries  of  Peace  between  England  and 
France  signed  at  London,  followed  by  Peace  of  Amiens — Pitt's  Irish  Policy 
and  his  retirement — Debates  on  the  Peace — Aggressions  of  Bonaparte  during 
the  Continental  Peace— Holland,  Italy,  Switzerland — Settlement  of  Germany 
under  French  and  Russian  influence — Suppression  of  Ecclesiastical  States 
and  Free  Cities — Its  effects — Stein — France  under  the  Consulate — The 
Civil  Code— The  Concordat. 

The  establishment  of  the  Consulate  gave  France  peace 
from   the   strife   of   parties.      Peace    from 

■•■  Overtures  of 

foreign  warfare  was  not  less  desired  by  the  iustrik"^d  S 
nation ;  and  although  the  Eirst  Consul  him- 
self was  restlessly  planning  the  next  campaign,  it 
belonged  to  his  policy  to  represent  himself  as  the 
mediator  between  France  and  Europe.  Discarding  the 
usual  diplomatic  forms,  Bonaparte  addressed  letters  in 
his  own  name  to  the  Emperor  Francis  and  to  King 
George  III.,  deploring  the  miseries  inflicted  by  war 
upon  nations  naturally  allied,  and  declaring  his  personal 
anxiety  to  enter  upon  negotiations  for  peace.  The  reply 
of  Austria,  which  was  courteously  worded,  produced  an 
offer  on  the  pai't  of  Bonaparte  to  treat  for  peace  upon 


216  MODERN  EUROPE,  im. 

the  basis  of  the  Treaty  of  Campo  Formio.  Such  a 
proposal  was  the  best  evidence  of  Bonaparte's  real 
intentions.  Austria  had  re -conquered  Lombardy,  and 
driven  the  armies  of  the  Eepublic  from  the  Adige  to 
within  a  few  miles  of  Nice.  To  propose  a  peace  which 
should  merely  restore  the  situation  existing  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war  was  pure  irony.  The  Austrian 
Government  accordiogly  declared  itself  unable  to  treat 
without  the  concurrence  of  its  allies.  The  answer  of 
England  to  the  overtures  of  the  First  Consul  was  rough 
and  defiant.  It  recounted  the  causes  of  war  and  distrust 
which  precluded  England  from  negotiating  with  a 
revolutionary  Government;  and,  though  not  insisting 
on  the  restoration  of  the  Bourbons  as  a  condition  of 
peace,  it  stated  that  no  guarantee  for  the  sincerity  and 
good  behaviour  of  Trance  would  be  so  acceptable  to 
Great  Britain  as  the  recall  of  the  ancient  family.^ 

Few  State  papers  have  been  distinguished  by  worse 
faults  of  judgment  than  this  English  manifesto.  It  was 
intended  to  recommend  the  Bourbons  to  France  as  a 
means  of  procuring  peace :  it  enabled  Bonaparte  to 
represent  England  as  violently  interfering  with  the 
rights  of  the  French  people,  and  the  Bourbons  as  seek- 
ing their  restoration  at  the  hand  of  the  enemy  of  their 
country.  The  answer  made  to  Pitt's  Government  from 
Paris  was  such  as  one  high-spirited  nation  which  had 
recently  expelled  its  rulers  might  address  to  another  that 
had  expelled  its  rulers  a  century  before.  France,  it  was 
said,  had  as  good  a  right  to  dismiss  an  incapable  dynasty 

•  Pari.  Hist  xzxiv.  1198.    Ihugut,  Briefe,  iL,  4A&. 


1800.  MOUEAU  INVADES    GERMANY.  217 

as  Great  Britain.  If  Talleyrand's  reply  failed  to  con- 
vince King  Greorge  tliat  before  restoring  the  Bourbons 
he  ought  to  surrender  his  own  throne  to  the  Stuarts,  it 
succeeded  in  transferring  attention  from  the  wrongs 
inflicted  by  France  to  the  pretensions  advanced  by 
England.  That  it  affected  the  actual  course  of  events 
there  is  no  reason  to  believe.  The  French  Government 
was  well  acquainted  with  the  real  grounds  of  war 
possessed  by  England,  in  spite  of  the  errors  by  which 
the  British  Cabinet  weakened  the  statement  of  its  cause. 
What  the  mass  of  the  French  people  now  thought, 
or  did  not  think,  had  become  a  matter  of  very  little 
importance. 

The  war  continued.  Winter  and  the  early  spring 
of  1800  passed  in  France  amidst  vigorous  situation  of  the 
but  concealed  preparations  for  the  campaign  *™"^ 
which  was  to  drive  the  Austrians  from  Italy.  In 
Piedmont  the  Austrians  spent  months  in  inaction, 
which  might  have  given  them  Genoa  and  completed  the 
conquest  of  Italy  before  Bonaparte's  army  could  take 
the  field.  It  was  not  until  the  beginning  of  April  that 
Melas,  their  general,  assailed  the  French  positions  on  the 
Genoese  Apennines;  a  fortnight  more  was  spent  in  moun- 
tain warfare  before  Massena,  who  now  held  the  French 
command,  found  himself  shut  up  in  Genoa  and  blockaded 
by  land  and  sea.  The  army  which  Bonaparte  was  about 
to  lead  into  Italy  lay  in  between  Dijon  and  Geneva,  await- 
ing the  arrival  of  the  First  Consul.  On  the  Ehine,  f5rom 
Strasburg  to  Schaffhausen,  a  force  of  100,000  men  was 
ready  to  cross  into  Germany  under  the  command  of 


218  MODERN  EVBOPB.  I800. 

Moreau,  who  was  charged  with  the  task  of  pushing  the 
Austrians  back  from  the  Upper  Danube,  and  so  rendering 
any  attack  through  Switzerland  upon  the  communica- 
tions of  Bonaparte's  Italian  force  impossible. 

Moreau  invades       ~.,r  •  tt        t*      t     t  A 

South  Germany,     Moreau  s  armv  was  the  nrst  to  move.     An 

April,  1800.  ^  •'  ^  , 

Austrian  force,  not  inferior  to  Moreau's  own, 
lay  within  the  bend  of  the  Ehine  that  covers  Baden  and 
Wiirtemberg.  Moreau  crossed  the  Bhine  at  various 
points,  and  by  a  succession  of  ingenious  manoeu\Tes  led 
his  adversary,  Kray,  to  occupy  all  the  roads  through 
the  Black  Forest  except  those  by  which  the  northern 
divisions  of  the  French  were  actually  passing.  A  series 
of  engagements,  conspicuous  for  the  skill  of  the  French 
general  and  the  courage  of  the  defeated  Austrians,  gave 
Moreau  possession  of  the  country  south  of  the  Danube 
as  far  as  XJlm,  where  Kray  took  refuge  in  his  entrenched 
camp.  Beyond  this  point  Moreau's  instructions  forbade 
him  to  advance.  His  task  was  fulfilled  by  the  severance 
of  the  Austrian  army  from  the  roads  into  Italy. 

Bonaparte's  own  army  was  now  in  motion.     Its  des- 
tination was  still  secret ;  its  very  existence 


crosses  the  Alps,     was  doubtod  bv  the  Austrian  e^enerals.     On 

May,  1800.  '^  ° 

the  8th  of  May  the  First  Consul  himself 
arrived  at  Greneva,  and  assumed  the  command.  The 
campaign  upon  which  this  army  was  now  entering  was 
designed  by  Bonaparte  to  surpass  everything  that  Europe 
had  hitherto  seen  most  striking  in  war.  The  feats  of 
Massena  and  Suvaroff  in  the  Alps  had  filled  his  imagi- 
nation with  mountain  warfare.  A  victory  over  nature 
more  imposing  than  theirs  might,  in  the  present  position 


1800.  BONAFABTE    0B0SSE8   ST,\^ig^^^^^^2l9 

of  the  Austrian  forces  in  Lorabardy,  be  made  the  prelude 
to  a  victory  in  the  field  without  a  parallel  in  its  effects 
upon  the  enemy.  Instead  of  relieving  Genoa  by  an 
advance  along  the  coast-road,  Bonaparte  intended  to 
march  across  the  Alps  and  to  descend  in  the  rear  of  the 
Austrians.  A  single  defeat  would  then  cut  the  Aus- 
trians  off  from  their  communications  with  Mantua,  and 
result  either  in  the  capitulation  of  their  army  or  in  the 
evacuation  of  the  whole  of  the  country  that  they  had 
won.  Bonaparte  led  his  army  into  the  mountains.  The 
pass  of  the  Great  St.  Bernard,  though  not  a  carriage- 
road,  offered  little  difficulty  to  a  commander  supplied 
with  every  resource  of  engineering  material  and  skill ; 
and  by  this  road  the  army  crossed  the  Alps.  The 
cannons  were  taken  from  their  carriages  and  dragged  up 
the  mountain  in  hollowed  trees;  thousands  of  mules 
transported  the  ammunition  and  supplies ;  workshops  for 
repairs  were  established  on  either  slope  of  the  mountain ; 
and  in  the  Monastery  of  St.  Bernard  there  were  stores 
collected  sufficient  to  feed  the  soldiers  as  they  reached 
the  summit  during  six  successive  days  (May  15 — 20). 
The  passage  of  the  St.  Bernard  was  a  triumph  of  orga- 
nisation, foresight,  and  good  management ;  as  a  military 
exploit  it  involved  none  of  the  danger,  none  of  the  suf- 
fering, none  of  the  hazard,  which  gave  such  interest  to 
the  campaign  of  Massena  and  Suvaroff. 

Bonaparte  had  rightly  calculated  upon  the  unreadi- 
ness of  his  enemy.  The  advanced  guard  of  the  French 
army  poured  down  the  valley  of  the  Dora-Baltea  upon 
the  scanty  Austrian  detachments  at  Ivrea  and  Chiusella, 


220  MODERN  EUROPE.  im 

before  Melas,  who  "had  in  vain  been  warned  of  tbe  depar- 
Bonaparte  cuts     ^^^^  ^^  ^^  Trench   from  Greneva,  arrived 

off  the  Austrian  . ,  -,  <»  n  t  i     m       •         i         t  • 

army    from     With  a  lew  thousand  men  at  Turin  to  dis- 

Eastem     Lom- 

bardy.  p^^^  ^]^g  entrance  into  Italy.    Melas  himself, 

on  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  had  followed  a  French 
division  to  Nice,  leaving  Greneral  Ott  in  charge  of  the 
army  investing  Grenoa.  On  reaching  Turin  he  discovered 
the  full  extent  of  his  peril,  and  sent  orders  to  Ott  to 
raise  the  siege  of  Grenoa  and  to  join  him  with  every 
regiment  that  he  could  collect.  Ott,  however,  was 
unwilling  to  abandon  the  prey  at  this  moment  falling 
into  his  grasp.  He  remained  stationary  till  the  5th  of 
June,  when  Massena,  reduced  to  the  most  cruel  extremi- 
ties by  famine,  was  forced  to  surrender  Genoa  to  the 
besiegers.  But  his  obstinate  endurance  had  the  full 
effect  of  a  battle  won.  Ott's  delay  rendered  Melas 
powerless  to  hinder  the  movements  of  Bonaparte,  when, 
instead  of  marching  upon  Genoa,  as  both  French  and 
Austrian s  expected  him  to  do,  he  turned  eastward,  and 
thrust  his  army  between  the  Austrians  and  their  own 
fortresses.  Bonaparte  himself  entered  Milan  (June  2) ; 
Lannes  and  Murat  were  sent  to  seize  the  bridges  over 
the  Po  and  the  Adda.  The  Austrian  detachment  guard- 
ing Piacenza  was  overpowered ;  the  communications  of 
Melas  with  the  country  north  of  the  Po  were  completely 
severed.  Nothing  remained  for  the  Austrian  commander 
but  to  break  through  the  French  or  to  make  his  escape 
to  Genoa. 

The  French  centre  was  now  at  Stradella,  half-way 
between  Piacenza  and  Alessandria.    Melas  was  at  length 


1800  BATTLE   OF  MARENGO.  221 

joined  by  Ott  at  Alessandria,  but  so  scattered  were  the 
Austrian  forces,  that  out  of  80,000  men  Melas  had  not 
more  than  33,000  at  his  command.  -Bonaparte's  forces 
were  equal  in  number;  his  only  fear  was  that  Melas 
might  use  his  last  line  of  retreat,  and  escape  to  Genoa 
without  an  engagement.  The  Austrian  general,  how- 
ever, who  had  shared  with  Suvaroff  the  triumph  over 
Joubert  at  Novi,  resolved  to  stake  everything  upon  a 
pitched  battle.  He  awaited  Bonaparte's  approach  at 
Alessandria.  On  the  12th  of  June  Bonaparte  advanced 
westward  from  Stradella.  His  anxiety  lest  Melas 
might  be  escaping  from  his  hands  increased  with  every 
hour  of  the  march  that  brought  him  no  tidings  of  the 
enemy ;  and  on  the  13th,  when  his  advanced  guard  had 
come  almost  up  to  the  walls  of  Alessandria  without  seeing 
an  enemy,  he  could  bear  the  suspense  no  longer,  and 
ordered  Desaix  to  march  southward  towards  Novi  and 
hold  the  road  to  Genoa.     Desaix  led  off  his     ^    ,     , 

Battle    of    M»- 

division.  Early  the  next  morning  the  ST'  '^"'^  ^^ 
whole  army  of  Melas  issued  from  Ales- 
sandria, and  threw  itself  upon  the  weakened  line  of  the 
French  at  Marengo.  The  attack  carried  everything 
before  it :  at  the  end  of  seven  hours'  fighting,  Melas, 
exhausted  by  his  personal  exertions,  returned  into  Ales- 
sandria, and  sent  out  tidings  of  a  complete  victory.  It 
was  at  this  moment  that  Desaix,  who  had  turned  at  the 
sound  of  the  cannon,  appeared  on  the  field,  and  declared 
that,  although  one  battle  had  been  lost,  another  might 
be  won.  A  sudden  cavalry-charge  struck  panic  into  the 
Austrians,  who  believed  the  battle  ended  and  the  foe 


222  MODERN  EUBOPK  isoo. 

overthrown.  Whole  brigades  threw  down  their  arms 
and  fled;  and  ere  the  day  closed  a  mass  of  fugitives, 
cavalry  and  infantry,  thronging  over  the  marshes  of  the 
Bormida,  was  all  that  remained  of  the  victorious  Aus- 
trian centre.  The  suddenness  of  the  disaster,  the  despe- 
rate position  of  the  army,  cut  off  from  its  communications. 

Conditions  of  overthrew  the  mind  of  Melas,  and  he  agreed  to 
Armistice.  ^^  armistlcc  more  fatal  than  an  unconditional 
surrender.  The  Austrians  retired  behind  the  Mincio, 
and  abandoned  to  the  French  every  fortress  in  Northern 
Italy  that  lay  west  of  that  river.  A  single  battle  had 
produced  the  result  of  a  campaign  of  victories  and  sieges. 
Marengo  was  the  most  brilliant  in  conception  of  all 
Bonaparte's  triumphs.  If  in  its  execution  the  genius 
of  the  great  commander  had  for  a  moment  failed  him, 
no  mention  of  the  long  hours  of  peril  and  confusion  was 
allowed  to  obscure  the  splendour  of  Bonaparte's  victory. 
Every  document  was  altered  or  suppressed  which  con- 
tained a  report  of  the  real  facts  of  the.  battle.  The 
descriptions  given  to  the  French  nation  claimed  only 
new  homage  to  the  First  Consul's  invincible  genius  and 
power.* 

At  Vienna  the  military  situation  was  viewed  more 
calmly  than  in  Melas'  camp.     The  conditions  of  the 

Austria  con-  armisticc  were  generally  condemned,  and 
tinuesthewar.  ^^^  suddcn  chaugc  iu  the  policy  of  Austria 
was  prevented  by  a  treaty  with  England,  binding 
Austria,  in  return  for  British  subsidies,  and  for  a  secret 

•  Memorial  du  Dep6t  de  la  Guerre,  1826,  iv.,  268.  Bentinck's  despatch, 
June  16 ;  Records :  Italian  States,  vol.  59. 


1800.  AUSTRIA  AND  ENGLAND,  223 

promise  of  part  of  Piedmont,  to  make  no  separate  peace 
with  France  before  the  end  of  February,  1801.  This 
treaty  was  signed  a  few  hours  before  the  arrival  of  the 
news  of  Marengo.  It  was  the  work  of  Thugut,  who 
still  maintained  his  influence  over  the  Emperor,  in  spite 
of  growing  unpopularity  and  almost  universal  opposition. 
Public  opinion,  however,  forced  the  Emperor  at  least  to 
take  steps  for  ascertaining  the  French  terms  of  peace. 
An  env9y  was  sent  to  Paris ;  and,  as  there  could  be  no 
peace  without  the  consent  of  England,  conferences  were 
held  with  the  object  of  establishing  a  naval  armistice 
between  England  and  France.  England,  however,  re- 
fused the  concessions  demanded  by  the  First  Consul; 
and  the  negotiations  were  broken  off  in  September. 
But  this  interval  of  three  months  had  weakened  the 
authority  of  the  Minister  and  stimulated  the  intrigues 
which  at  every  great  crisis  paralysed  the  action  of 
Austria.  At  length,  while  Thugut  was  receiving  the 
subsidies  of  Great  Britain  and  arranging  for  the  most 
vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war,  the  Emperor,  concealing 
the  transaction  from  his  Minister,  purchased  a  new 
armistice  by  the  surrender  of  the  fortresses  of  Ulm  and 
Ingolstadt  to  Moreau's  army.* 

*  Thugut,  Briefe  il  227,  281,  393;  Minto*8  despatch,  Sept.  24,  1800; 
Records :  Austria,  toI.  60.  "  The  Emperor  was  in  the  act  of  receiving  a  con- 
siderable subsidy  for  a  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war  at  the  very  moment 
when  he  was  clandestinely  and  in  person  making  the  most  abject  submis- 
sion to  the  common  enemy.  Baron  Thugut  was  all  yesterday  under  the 
greatest  uneasiness  concerning  the  event  which  he  had  reason  to  appre- 
Jiond,  but  which  was  not  yet  certain.  He  still  retained,  however,  a  slight 
hope,  from  the  apparent  impossibility  of  any  one's  committing  such  an 
act  of  infamy  and  folly.  I  never  saw  him  or  any  other  man  so  affected 
as  he  was  when  he  communicated  this  transaction  to  me  to-day.    I  said 


224  MOBERN  SUROPK  isoi. 

A  letter  written  by  Tliugut  after  a  council  lield  on  the 
25tli  of  September  gives  some  indication  of  the  stormy 
scene  which  then  passed  in  the  Emperor's  presence. 
Thugat  tendered  his  resignation,  which  was  accepted ; 
and  Lehrbach,  the  author  of  the  new  armistice,  was 
placed  in  office.  But  the  reproaches  of  the  British 
ambassador  forced  the  weak  Emperor  to  rescind  this 
appointment  on  the  day  after  it  had  been  published  to 
the  world.  There  w^as  no  one  in  Vienna  capable  of  filling 
the  vacant  post;  and  after  a  short  interval  the  old 
Minister  resumed  the  duties  of  his  office,  without,  how- 
ever, openly  resuming  the  title.  The  remainder  of  the 
armistice  was  employed  in  strengthening  the  force  op- 
posed to  Moreau,  who  now  received  orders  to  advance 
upon  Yienna.  The  Archduke  John,  a  royal  strategist  of 
eighteen,  was  furnished  with  a  plan  for  surrounding  the 
Trench  army  and  cutting  it  off  from  its  communications. 
Moreau  lay  upon  the  Isar ;  the  Austrians  held  the  line 

that  these  fortresses  being  demanded  as  pledges  of  sincerity,  the  Emperor 
should  have  given  on  the  same  principle  the  arms  and  ammunition  of  the 
army.  Baron  Thugut  added  that  after  giving  up  the  soldiers'  muskets, 
the  clothes  would  be  required  off  their  backs,  and  that  if  the  Emperor 
took  pains  to  acqujiint  the  world  that  he  would  not  defend  his  crown, 
there  would  not  be  wanting  those  who  would  take  it  from  his  head,  and 
perhaps  his  head  with  it.  He  became  so  strongly  affected  that,  in  laying 
hold  of  my  hand  to  express  the  strong  concern  he  felt  at  the  notion  of 
having  committed  me  and  abused  the  confidence  I  had  reposed  in  his 
counsels,  he  burst  into  tears  and  literally  wept.  I  mention  these  details 
because  they  confirm  the  assurance  that  every  part  of  these  feeble  measures 
has  either  been  adopted  against  his  opinion  or  executed  surreptitiously  and 
contrary  to  the  directions  he  had  given."  After  the  final  coUapse  of 
Austria,  Minto  writes  of  Thugut:  "He  never  for  a  moment  lost  his 
presence  of  mind  or  his  courage,  nor  ever  bent  to  weak  and  unbecoming 
counsels.  And  perhaps  this  can  be  said  of  him  alone  in  this  whole  empire.*' 
Jan  3, 1801,  id. 


law.  BATTLE    OF  HOUENLINBEN.  226 

of  the  Inn.  On  the  termination  of  the  armistice  the 
Austrians  advanced  and  made  some  devious  marches  in 
pursuance  of  the  Archduke's  enterprise,  until  a  general 
confusion,  attributed  to  the  weather,  caused  them  to 
abandon  their  manoeuvres  and  move  straight  against  the 
enemy.  On  the  3rd  of  December  the  Austrians 
plunfjed  into  ihe  snow-blocked  roads  of  the     undeu,  Dec.  s, 

^  ^  ^  ^        ^  1800. 

Forest  of  Hohenlinden,  believing  that  they 
had  nothing  near  them  but  the  rear-guard  of  a  retiring 
French  division.  Moreau  waited  until  they  had  reached 
tlie  heart  of  the  forest,  and  then  fell  upon  them  with 
his  whole  force  in  front,  in  flank,  and  in  the  rear.  The 
defeat  of  the  Austrians  was  overwhelming.  What  re- 
mained of  the  war  was  rather  a  chase  than  a  struggle. 
Moreau  successively  crossed  the  Inn,  the  Salza,  and  the 
Traun  ;  and  on  the  25th  of  December  the  Emperor,  seeing 
that  no  effort  of  Pitt  could  keep  Moreau  out  of  Vienna, 
accepted  an  armistice  at  Steyer,  and  agreed  to  treat 
for  peace  without  reference  to  Great  Britain. 

Defeats  on  the  Mincio,  announced  during  the 
following  days,  increased  the  necessity  for  peace. 
Thugut  was  finally  removed  from  power.  Some  resis- 
tance was  offered  to  the  conditions  proposed  by  Bona- 
parte, but  these  were  directed  more  to  the  establishment 
of  French  influence  in  Germany  than  to  the  humiliation 
of  the  House  of  Hapsburg.  Little  was  taken  from 
Austria  but  what  she  had  surrendered  at  Campo 
Formio.  It  was  not  by  the  cession  of  Italian  or 
Slavonic  provinces  that  the  Government  of  Vienna  paid 
for  Marengo  and  Hohenlinden,  but  at  the  cost  of  that 


223  MODERN  EUROPE.  isoi 

divided  Grerman  race  whose  misfortune  it  was  to  "have 
for  its  head  a  sovereign  whose  interests  in  the  Empire 
and  in  Grermany  were  among  the  least  of  all  his  interests. 
The  Peace  of  Lnneville,*  concluded  between 
viUe,   Feb.  9,"     Fraucc    and   the   Emperor   on   the   9th  of 

1801.  ^       ^ 

Eebruary,  1801,  without  even  a  reference 
to  the  Diet  of  the  Empire,  placed  the  minor  States  of 
Germany  at  the  mercy  of  the  French  Eepublic.  It  left 
to  the  House  of  Hapsburg  the  Venetian  territory  which 
it  had  gained  in  1797;  it  required  no  reduction  of  the 
Hapsburg  influence  in  Italy  beyond  the  abdication  of 
the  Grand  Duke  of  Tuscany ;  but  it  ceded  to  France, 
without  the  disguises  of  1797,  the  German  provinces 
west  of  the  Bhine,  and  it  formally  bound  the  Empire 
to  compensate  the  dispossessed  lay  Sovereigns  in  such  a 
manner  as  should  be  approved  by  France.  The  French 
Bepublic  was  thus  made  arbiter,  as  a  matter  of  right, 
in  the  rearrangement  of  the  maimed  and  shattered 
Empire.  Even  the  Grand  Duke  of  Tuscany,  like  his 
predecessor  in  ejection,  the  Duke  of  Modena,  was  to 
receive  some  portion  of  the  German  race  for  his  subjects, 
in  compensation  for  the  Italians  taken  from  him.  To 
such  a  pass  had  political  disunion  brought  a  nation 
which  at  that  time  could  show  the  greatest  names  in 
Europe  in  letters,  in  science,  and  in  art. 

Austria   having   succumbed,  the  Court  of  Naples, 

which  had  been  the  first  of  the  Allies  to 

Peace    with 

Naples.  declare  war,  was  left  at  the  mercy  of  Bona- 

parte.     Its   cruelties    and    tyranny   called  for   severe 

•  Martens,  vii.,  296. 


1801.  THE   ARMED   NETJTEALITY.  227 

punishment ;  but  the  intercession  of  the  Czar  kept  the 
Bourbons  upon  the  throne,  and  Naples  received  peace 
upon  no  harder  condition  than  the  exclusion  of  English 
vessels  from  its  ports.  England  was  now  left  alone  in 
its  struggle  with  the  Erench  Eepublic.  Nor  was  it  any 
longer  to  be  a  struggle  only  against  France  and  its  de- 
pendencies. The  rigour  with  which  the  English  Govern- 
ment had  used  its  superiority  at  sea,  com-  ^.^^^^  ^^^^ 
bined  with  the  folly  which  it  had  shown  in  ^"^^»^»^ 
the  Anglo-Eussian  attack  upon  Holland,  raised  against 
it  a  Maritime  League  under  the  leadership  of  a  Power 
which  England  had  offended  as  a  neutral  and  exasperated 
as  an  ally.  Since  the  pitiful  Dutch  campaign,  the  Czar 
had  transferred  to  Great  Britain  the  hatred  which  he  had 
hitherto  borne  to  France.  The  occasion  was  skilfuUy 
used  by  Bonaparte,  to  whom,  as  a  soldier,  the  Czar  felt 
less  repugnance  than  to  the  Government  of  advocates 
and  contractors  which  he  had  attacked  in  1799.  The 
First  Consul  restored  without  ransom  several  thousands 
of  Eussian  prisoners,  for  whom  the  Austrians  and  the 
English  had  refused  to  give  up  Frenchmen  in  exchange, 
and  followed  up  this  advance  by  proposing  that  the 
guardianship  of  Malta,  which  was  now  blockaded  by 
the  English,  should  be  given  to  the  Czar.  Paul  had 
caused  himself  to  be  made  Grand  Master  of  the  Maltese 
Order  of  St.  John  of  Jerusalem.  His  vanity  was 
touched  by  Bonaparte's  proposal,  and  a  friendly  relation 
was  established  between  the  French  and  Eussian  Govern- 
ments. England,  on  the  other  hand,  refused  to  place 
Malta  under  Eussian  guardianship,  either  before  or  after 
p  2 


228  MODERN  EUROPE.  isoi. 

its  surrender.  This  completed  the  breach  between  the 
Courts  of  London  and  St.  Petersburg.  The  Czar  seized 
all  the  English  vessels  in  his  ports  and  imprisoned  their 
crews  (Sept.  9).  A  difference  of  long  standing  existed 
between  England  and  the  Northern  Maritime  Powers, 
which  was  capable  at  any  moment  of  being  made  a  cause 
of  war.  The  rights  exercised  over  neutral  vessels  by 
English  ships  in  time  of  hostilities,  though  good  in  inter- 
national law,  were  so  oppressive  that,  at  the  time  of  the 
American  rebellion,  the  Northern  Powers  had  formed  a 
league,  known  as  the  Armed  Neutrality,  for  the  purpose 
of  resisting  by  force  the  interference  of  the  English  with 
neutral  nierchantmen  upon  the  high  seas.  Since  the 
outbreak  of  war  with  France,  English  vessels  had  again 
pushed  the  rights  of  belligerents  to  extremes.  The 
Armed  Neutrality  of  1780  was  accordingly  revived 
under  the  auspices  of  the  Czar.  The  League 
time     Laague"     was  sis^ued  ou  the  16th  of  December,  1800, 

Dec,  1800.  ^     ^ 

by  Russia,  Sweden,  and  Denmark.  Some 
days  later  Prussia  gave  in  its  adhesion.* 

The  points  at  issue  between  Great  Britain  and  the 
Neutrals  were  such  as  arise  between  a  great 

Points  at  issaa  i    -r»  •  .     .  .  t 

naval  Power  intent  upon  ruimng  its  ad- 
versary and  that  larger  part  of  the  world  which  remains 
at  peace  and  desires  to  carry  on  its  trade  with  as  little 
obstruction  as  possible.  It  was  admitted  on  all  sides 
that  a  belligerent  may  search  a  neutral  vessel  in  order 
to  ascertain  that  it  is  not  conveying  contraband  of  war, 

*  Koch,  und  Schoell,  Histoire  des  Trait^s,  vi.,  6.     Nelson  Despatches, 
iv..  299. 


1801.  TEE  ARMED   NEUTRALITY.  229 

and  that  a  neutral  vessel,  attempting  to  enter  a 
blockaded  port,  renders  itself  liable  to  forfeiture ;  but 
beyond  these  two  points  everything  was  in  dispute.  A 
Danish  ship  conveys  a  cargo  of  wine  from  a  Bordeaux 
merchant  to  his  agent  in  New  York.  Is  the  wine  liable 
to  be  seized  in  the  mid-Atlantic  by  an  English  cruiser, 
to  the  destruction  of  the  Danish  carrying-trade,  or  is 
the  Danish  flag  to  protect  French  property  from  a 
Power  whose  naval  superiority  makes  capture  upon  the 
high  seas  its  principal  means  of  offence?  England 
announces  that  a  French  port  is  in  a  state  of  blockade. 
Is  a  Swedish  vessel,  stopped  while  making  for  the 
port  in  question,  to  be  considered  a  lawful  prize, 
when,  if  it  had  reached  the  port,  it  would  as  a 
matter  of  fact  have  found  no  real  blockade  in  ex- 
istence ?  A  Eussian  cargo  of  hemp,  pitch,  and  timber 
is  intercepted  by  an  English  vessel  on  its  way  to  an 
open  port  in  France.  Is  the  staple  produce  of  the 
Eussian  Empire  to  lose  its  market  as  contraband  of  war  ? 
or  is  an  English  man-of-war  to  allow  material  to  pass 
into  France,  without  which  the  repair  of  French  vessels 
of  war  would  be  impossible  ? 

These  were  the  questions  raised  as  often  as  a  firm  of 
shipowners  in  a  neutral  country  saw  their  vessel  come 
back  into  port  cleared  of  its  cargo,  or  heard  that  it  was 
lying  in  the  Thames  awaiting  the  judgment  of  the 
Admiralty  Court.  Great  Britain  claimed  the  right  to 
seize  all  French  property,  in  whatever  vessel  it  might  be 
sailing,  and  to  confiscate,  as  contraband  of  war,  not  only 
muskets,  gunpowder,  and  cannon,  but  wheat,  on  which 


230  MODERN  EUUOFE.  mi. 

the  provisioning  of  armies  depended,  and  hemp,  pitch, 
iron,  and  timber,  ont  of  which  the  navies  of  her  ad- 
versary were  formed.  The  IsTeutrals,  on  the  other  hand, 
demanded  that  a  neutral  flag  should  give  safe  passage  to 
all  goods  on  board,  not  being  contraband  of  war ;  that 
the  presence  of  a  vessel  of  State  as  convoy  should  ex- 
empt merchantmen  from  search;  that  no  port  should  be 
considered  in  a  state  of  blockade  unless  a  competent 
blockading  force  was  actually  in  front  of  it ;  and  that 
contraband  of  war  should  include  no  other  stores  than 
those  directly  available  for  battle.  Considerations  of 
reason  and  equity  may  be  urged  in  support  of  every 
possible  theory  of  the  rights  of  belligerents  and  neu- 
trals ;  but  the  theory  of  every  nation  has,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  been  that  which  at  the  time  accorded  with  its  own 
interests.  When  a  long  era  of  peace  had  familiarised 
Great  Britain  with  the  idea  that  in  the  future  struggles 
of  Europe  it  was  more  likely  to  be  a  spectator  than  a 
belligerent,  Great  Britain  accepted  the  ISTeutrals'  theory 
of  international  law  at  the  Congress  of  Paris  in  1856; 
but  in  1801,  when  the  lot  of  England  seemed  to  be 
eternal  warfare,  any  limitation  of  the  rights  of  a 
belligerent  appeared  to  every  English  jurist  to  contra- 
dict the  first  principles  of  reason.  Better  to  add  a 
general  maritime  war  to  the  existing  dilGficulties  of  the 
country  than  to  abandon  the  exercise  of  its  naval 
War  between  Superiority  in  crippling  the  commerce  of  an 
Northern  Mari-     advcrsarv.    Thc  Declaration  of  armed  Neu- 

time       Powers,  *' 

Jan.,  1801.  trality,    announcing  the    intention    of   the 

Allied  Powers  to  resist  the  seizure  of  French  goods  on 


1801.  DHJATB   OF  PAUL.  231 

board  their  own  merchantmen,  was  treated  in  this 
country  as  a  declaration  of  war.  The  Government  laid 
an  embargo  upon  all  vessels  of  the  allied  neutrals  lying 
in  English  ports  (Jan.  14th,  1801),  and  issued  a  swarm 
of  privateers  against  the  trading  ships  making  for  the 
Baltic.  Negotiations  failed  to  lower  the  demands  of 
either  side,  and  England  prepared  to  deal  with  the 
navies  of  Eussia,  Denmark,  Sweden,  and  Prussia. 

At  the  moment,  the  concentrated  naval  strength  of 
England  made  it  more  than  a  match  for  its  adversaries. 
A  fleet  of  seventeen  ships  of  the  line  sailed  from  Yar- 
mouth on  the  12th  of  March,  under  the  command  of 
Parker  and  Nelson,  with  orders  to  coerce  the  Danes  and 
to  prevent  the  junction  of  the  confederate  navies.  The 
fleet  reached  the  Sound.  The  Swedish  batteries  com- 
manding the  Sound  failed  to  open  fire.  Nelson  kept 
to  the  eastern  side  of  the  channel,  and  brought  his  ships 
safely  past  the  storm  of  shot  poured  upon  them  from 
the  Danish  guns  at  Elsinore.  He  appeared 
before  Copenhagen  at  mid-day  on  the  30th  hageiJl°ApiffT 
of  March.  Preparations  for  resistance  were 
made  by  the  Danes  with  extraordinary  spirit  and  resolu- 
tion. The  whole  population  of  Copenhagen  volunteered 
for  service  on  the  ships,  the  forts,  and  the  floating 
batteries.  Two  days  were  spent  by  the  English  in  ex- 
ploring the  shallows  of  the  channel ;  on  the  morning  of 
the  2nd  of  April  Nelson  led  his  ships  into  action  in  front 
of  the  harbour.  Three  ran  aground ;  the  Danish  fire 
from  land  and  sea  was  so  violent  that  after  some  hours 
Admiral  Parker,  who  watched  the  engagement  from  the 


•232  MODERN  EUEOFK  isoi. 

mid-channel,  gave  the  signal  of  recall.  ]N"elson  laughed 
at  the  signal,  and  continued  the  battle.  In  another 
hour  the  six  Danish  men-of-war  and  the  whole  of  the 
floating  batteries  were  disabled  or  sunk.  The  English 
themselves  had  suffered  most  severely  from  a  resistance 
more  skilful  and  more  determined  than  anything  that 
they  had  experienced  from  the  French,  and  Nelson  gladly 
offered  a  truce  as  soon  as  his  own  victory  was  assured.  The 
truce  was  followed  by  negotiation,  and  the  negotiation 
by  an  armistice  for  fourteen  weeks,  a  term  which  INTelson 
considered  sufficient  to  enable  him  to  visit  and  to  over- 
throw the  navies  of  Sweden  and  Eussia. 

But  an  event  had  already  occurred  more  momentous 

in  its  bearing  upon  the  INTorthern  Confederacy  than  the 

battle  of  Copenhas^en  itself.     On  the  ni^ht 

Murder  of  Paul,  r  t»  & 

March  23.  ^f  ^^^  23rd  of  March  the  Czar  of  Eussia  was 
assassinated  in  his  palace.  Paul's  tyrannical  violence, 
and  his  caprice  verging  upon  insanity,  had  exhausted 
the  patience  of  a  court  acquainted  with  no  mode 
of  remonstrance  but  homicide.  Blood-stained  hands 
brought  to  the  Grand  Duke  Alexander  the  crown  which 
he  had  consented  to  receive  after  a  pacific  abdication. 
Alexander  immediately  reversed  the  policy  of  his  father, 
and  sent  friendly  communications  both  to  the  Grovem- 
ment  at  London  and  to  the  commander  of  the  British 
fleet  in  the  Baltic.  The  maintenance  of  commerce  with 
England  was  in  fact  more  important  to  Eussia  than  the 
protection  of  its  carrying  trade.  Nelson's  attack  was 
averted.  A  compromise  was  made  between  the  two 
Governments,  which   saved  Eussia's  interests  without 


WL  TEE    FBENOH  IN   EGYPT.  233 

depriving  England  of  its  chief  rights  against  France. 
The  principles  of  the  Armed  Neutrality  were  abandoned 
by  the  Government  of  St.  Petersburg  in  so  far  as  they 
related  to  the  protection  of  an  enemy*s  goods  by  the 
neutral   flaff.     Great   Britain  continued  to     „       ^^^ 

o  Peace     between 

seize  French  merchandise  on  board  what-  SiT^^NortiS^ 
ever  craft  it  might  be  found;  but  it  was 
stipulated  that  the  presence  of  a  ship  of  war  should 
exempt  neutral  vessels  from  search  by  privateers,  and 
that  no  port  should  be  considered  as  in  a  state  of 
blockade  unless  a  reasonable  blockading  force  was  ac- 
tually in  front  of  it.  The  articles  condemned  as  con- 
traband were  so  limited  as  not  to  include  the  flax,  hemp, 
and  timber,  on  whose  export  the  commerce  of  Eussia 
depended.  With  these  concessions  the  Czar  was  easily 
brought  to  declare  Eussia  again  neutral.  The  minor 
Powers  of  the  Baltic  followed  the  example  of  St.  Peters- 
burg ;  and  the  naval  confederacy  which  had  threatened 
to  turn  the  balance  in  the  conflict  between  England  and 
the  French  Eepublic  left  its  only  trace  in  the  undeserved 
suffering  of  Denmark. 

Eight  years  of  warfare  had  left  France  unassailable 
in  Western  Europe,  and  England  in  command  of  every 
sea.  No  Continental  armies  could  any  longer  be  raised 
by  British  subsidies:  the  navies  of  the  Baltic,  with 
which  Bonaparte  had  hoped  to  meet  England  on  the 
seas,  lay  at  peace  in  their  ports.  Egypt  ^^^^j^jj^ 
was  now  the  only  arena  remaining  where 
French  and  English  combatants  could  meet,  and  the  dis- 
solution of  the  Northern  Confederacy  had  determined 


234  MODJ^BN  EUROPE.  isoi. 

the  fate  of  Egypt  by  leaving  England  in  undisputed 
command  of  the  approach  to  Egypt  by  sea.  The  French 
army,  vainly  expecting  reinforcements,  and  attacked  by 
the  Turks  from  the  east,  was  caught  in  a  trap.  Soon 
after  the  departure  of  Bonaparte  from  Alexandria,  his 
successor.  General  Kleber,  had  addressed  a  report  to  the 
Directory,  describing  the  miserable  condition  of  the 
force  which  Bonaparte  had  chosen  to  abandon.  The 
report  was  intercepted  by  the  English,  and  the  Govern- 
ment immediately  determined  to  accept  no  capitulation 
which  did  not  surrender  the  whole  of  the  French  army 
as  prisoners  of  war.  An  order  to  this  effect  w^as  sent  to 
the  Mediterranean.  Before,  however,  the  order  reached 
Sir  Sidney  Smith,  the  English  admiral  co-operating  with 
the  Turks,  an  agreement  had  been  already  signed  by  him  at 
El  Arish,  granting  Kleber's  army  a  free  return  to  France. 
(Feb.  24,  1800.)  After  Kleber,  in  fulfilment  of  the 
conditions  of  the  treaty,  had  withdrawn  his  troops  from 
certain  positions,  Sir  Sidney  Smith  found  himself  com- 
pelled to  inform  the  French  General  that  in  the  nego- 
tiations of  El  Arish  he  had  exceeded  his  powers,  and 
that  the  British  Government  insisted  upon  the  surrender 
of  the  French  forces.  Kleber  replied  by  instantly  giving 
battle  to  the  Turks  at  Heliopolis,  and  putting  to  the  rout 
an  army  six  times  as  numerous  as  his  own.  The  posi- 
tion of  the  French  seemed  to  be  growing  stronger  in 
Egypt,  and  the  prospect  of  a  Turkish  re- conquest  more 
doubtful,  when  the  dagger  of  a  fanatic  robbed  the 
French  of  their  able  chief,  and  transferred  the  command 
to  General  Menou,  one  of  the  very  few  French  officers  of 


180L  THE   ENGLISH   OONQUEB   EGYPT.  235 

marked  incapacity  who  held  command  at  any  time 
durin<^  the  war.  The  British  Government,  as  soon  as 
it  learnt  what  had  taken  place  between  Kleber  and  Sir 
Sidney  Smith,  declared  itself  willing  to  be  bound  by 
the  convention  of  El  Arish.  The  offer  was,  however, 
rejected  by  the  French.  It  was  clear  that  the  Turks 
could  never  end  the  war  by  themselves ;  and  the  British 
Ministry  at  last  came  to  understand  that  Egypt  must  be 
re-conquered  by  English  arms. 

On  the  8th  of  March,  1801,  a  corps  of  17,000  men, 
led  by  Sir  Ealph  Abercromby,   landed   at 
Aboukir  Bay.    According^  to  the  plan  of  the     lands  in  Egypt. 

J  or  March,  1801. 

British  Government,  Abercromby 's  attack 
was  to  be  supported  by  a  Turkish  corps  from  Syria,  and 
by  an  Anglo-Indian  division  brought  from  Ceylon  to 
Kosseir,  on  the  Bed  Sea.  The  Turks  and  the  Indian 
troops  were,  however,  behind  their  time,  and  Aber- 
cromby opened  the  campaign  alone.  Menou  had  still 
27,000  troops  at  his  disposal.  Had  he  moved  up  with 
the  whole  of  his  army  from  Cairo,  he  might  have 
destroyed  the  English  immediately  after  their  landing. 
Instead  of  doing  so,  he  allowed  weak  isolated  detach- 
ments of  the  French  to  sink  before  superior  numbers. 
The  English  had  already  gained  confidence  of  victory 
when  Menou  advanced  in  some  force  in  order  to  give 
battle  in  front  of  Alexandria.  The  decisive  engagement 
took  place  on  the  21st  of  March.  The  French  were 
completely  defeated.  Menou,  however,  still  refused  to 
concentrate  his  forces  ;  and  in  the  course  of  a  few  weeks 
13,000  French  troops  which  had  been  left  behind  at 


236  MODERN  EUROPE.  isoL 

Cairo  were  cut  ofF  from  communication  with  tlie  rest  of 
the  army.  A  series  of  attempts  made  by  Admiral  Gan- 
teaume  to  land  reinforcements  from  France  ended  fruit- 
lessly. Towards  the  end  of  June  the  arrival  of  a  Turkish 
force  enabled  the  English  to  surround  the  French  in 
Cairo.  The  circuit  of  the  works  was  too  large  to  be 
successfully  defended;  on  the  other  hand,  the  English 
were  without  the  heavy  artillery  necessary  for  a  siege. 
Under  these  circumstances  the  terms  which  had  origin- 
ally been  offered  at  El  Arish  were  again  proposed  to 
General  Belliard  for  himself  and  the  army 
late  at  Cairo'     of  Cairo.     Thcv  wcre  accepted,   and  Cairo 

June  27, 1801.  •'  \ 

was  surrendered  to  the  English  on  condition 
that  the  garrison  should  be  conveyed  back  to  France 
(June  27).  Soon  after  the  capitulation  General  Baird 
reached  Lower  Egypt  with  an  Anglo-Indian  division. 
Menou  with  the  remainder  of  the  French  army  was  now 
shut  up  in  Alexandria.  His  forts  and  outworks  were 
successively  carried ;  his  flotilla  was  destroyed ;  and  when 
all  hope  of  support  from  France  had  been  abandoned, 
the  army  of  Alexandria,  which  formed  the  remnant 
of  the  troops  with  which  Bonaparte  had  won  his  earliest 
And  at  Alex-  victorics  iu  Italy,  found  itself  compelled  to 
^  '  ""^  '  surrender  the  last  stronghold  of  the  French 
in  Egypt  (Aug.  30).  It  was  the  first  important  success 
which  had  been  gained  by  English  soldiers  over  the 
troops  of  the  Eepublic ;  the  first  compaign  in  which 
English  generalship  had  permitted  the  army  to  show 
itself  in  its  true  quality. 

Peace  was  now  at  hand.      Soon  after  the  Treaty  of 


1801-2.  PRELIMINARIES    OF   LONDON.  237 

Lun^ville  had  withdrawn  Austria  from  the  war,  un- 
official nesrotiations  had  he«:un  between  the 

^  *=   ^  NegotiatioM  f or 

Governments  of  Great  Britain  and  France.  p®*^- 

The  object  with  which  Pitt  had  entered  upon  the  war, 
the  maintenance  of  the  old  European  system  against  the 
aggression  of  France,  was  now  seen  to  be  one  which 
England  must  abandon.  England  had  borne  its  share 
in  the  defence  of  the  Continent.  If  the  Continental 
Powers  could  no  longer  resist  the  ascendancy  of  a  single 
State,  England  could  not  struggle  for  the  Balance  of 
Power  alone.  The  negotiations  of  1801  had  little  in 
common  with  those  of  1796.  Belgium,  which  had  been 
the  burden  of  all  Pitt's  earlier  despatches,  no  longer 
figured  as  an  object  of  contention.  The  frontier  of  the 
Ehine,  with  the  virtual  possession  of  Holland  and 
Northern  Italy,  under  the  title  of  the  Batavian, 
Ligurian,  and  Cisalpine  Eepublics,  was  tacitly  conceded 
to  France.  In  place  of  the  restoration  of  the  Nether- 
lands, the  negotiators  of  1801  argued  about  the  disposal 
of  Egypt,  of  Malta,  and  of  the  colonies  which  Great 
Britain  had  conquered  from  France  and  its  allies.  Events 
decided  the  fate  of  Egypt.  The  restoration  of  Malta  to 
the  Knights  of  St.  John  was  strenuously  demanded  by 
France,  and  not  refused  by  England.  It  was  in  relation 
to  the  colonial  claims  of  France  that  the  two  Govern- 
ments found  it  most  difficult  to  agree.  Great  Britain, 
which  had  lost  no  territory  itself,  had  conquered  nearly 
all  the  Asiatic  and  Atlantic  colonies  of  the  French 
Eepublic  and  of  its  Dutch  and  Spanish  allies.  In  return 
for  the  restoration  of  Ceylon,  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope, 


238  MODERN  EUBOFK  1800. 

Guiana,  Trinidad,  and  various  East  and  West  Indian 
settlements,  France  had  nothing  to  offer  to  Grreat  Britain 
but  peace.  If  peace,  however,  was  to  be  made,  the  only 
possible  settlement  was  by  means  of  a  compromise ;  and 
it  was  finally  agreed  that  England  should  retain  Ceylon 
and  Trinidad,  and  restore  the  rest  of  the  colonies  which 
it  had  taken  from  France,  Spain,  and  Holland.  Pre- 
liminaries of   peace  embodying  these  con- 

Preliminaries  of,.,.  .  tjtt  n        t     i 

London,  Oct  1,     ditious  wcrc  sisrned  at  Jjondon  on  the  1st 


1801. 


'&• 


of  October,  1801.  Hostilities  ceased;  but 
an  interval  of  several  months  between  the  preliminary 
agreement  and  the  conclusion  of  the  final  treaty  was 
employed  by  Bonaparte  in  new  usurpations  upon  the 
Continent,  to  which  he  forced  the  British  Government 
to  lend  a  kind  of  sanction  in  the  continuance  of  the 
negotiations.  The  Government,  though  discontented, 
was  unwilling  to  treat  these  acts  as  new  occasions  of 
Peace  of  Ainiens.  ^'a^'  ^hc  coufercnces  wcrc  at  length 
March  27, 1802.  "bj-Q^gj^t  -fco  a  closc,  aud  the  definitive  treaty 
between  France  and  Great  Britain  was  signed  at  Amiens 
on  the  27th  of  March,  1802.^ 

The  Minister  who,  since  the  first  outbreak  of  war, 
had  so  resolutely  struggled  for  the  freedom  of  Europe, 
Ktt's  retirement.  ^^^  HO  lougcr  iu  powcr  wheu  Great  Britain 
Its  cause.  entered  into  negotiations  with  the  First 
Consul.  In  the  same  week  that  Austria  signed  the 
Peace  of  Lund  villa,  Pitt  had  retired  from  office.  The 
catastrophe  which  dissolved  his  last  Continental  alliance 
may  possibly  have  disposed  Pitt  to  make  way  for  men 

*  De  Clerc^  Traites  de  la  France,  L,  4)84 


180L  PITT  RETIRES.  239 

who  could  treat  for  peace  with  a  better  grace  than  him- 
self, but  the  immediate  cause  of  his  retirement  was  an 
affair  of  internal  policy.  Among  the  few  important 
domestic  measures  which  Pitt  had  not  sacrificed  to 
foreign  warfare,  was  a  project  for  the  Legislative  Union 
of  Grreat  Britain  and  Ireland.  Ireland  had  up  to  this 
time  possessed  a  Parliament  nominally  independent  of 
that  of  Great  Britain.  Its  population,  however,  was 
too  much  divided  to  create  a  really  national  government ; 
and,  even  if  the  internal  conditions  of  the  country  had 
been  better,  the  practical  sovereignty  of  Great  Britain 
must  at  that  time  have  prevented  the  Parliament  of 
Dublin  from  being  more  than  an  agency  of  ministerial 
corruption.  It  was  the  desire  of  Pitt  to  give  to  Ireland, 
in  the  place  of  a  fictitious  independence,  that  real  par- 
ticipation in  the  political  life  of  Great  Britain  which 
has  more  than  recompensed  Scotland  and  Wales  for  the 
loss  of  separate  nationality.  As  an  earnest  of  legislative 
justice,  Pitt  gave  hopes  to  the  leaders  of  the  Irish 
Catholic  party  that  the  disabilities  which  excluded 
Boman  Catholics  from  the  House  of  Commons  and  from 
many  offices  in  the  public  service  would  be  no  longer 
maintained.  On  this  understanding  the 
Catholics  of  Ireland  abstained  from  ofierinsf     land  and  gi^^* 

°        Britain,  1600. 

to  Pitt's  project  a  resistance  which  would 
probably  have  led  to  its  failure.  A  majority  of  mem- 
bers in  the  Protestant  Parliament  of  Dublin  accepted 
the  price  which  the  Ministry  offered  for  their  votes.  A 
series  of  resolutions  in  favour  of  the  Legislative  Union 
of  the  two  countries  was  transmitted  to  England  in  the 


240  MODERN  EUROPE,  mi. 

spring  of  1800  ;  the  Englisli  Parliament  passed  the  Act 
of  Union  in  the  same  summer;  and  the  first  United 
Parliament  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  assembled  at 
London  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  1801. 

Pitt  now  prepared  to   fulfil  his  virtual  promise  to 
the  Irish  Catholics.     A  measure  obliterating 

Pitt    desires    to,,  -it  i?**i  tt*  'j. 

emancipate  the     tho  aucieut  imes  01  Civil  and  relisfious  enmity. 

Catholics.  ^  ... 

and  calling  to  public  life  a  class  hitherto 
treated  as  alien  and  hostile  to  the  State,  would  have 
been  in  true  consonance  with  all  that  was  best  in  Pitt's 
own  statesmanship.  But  the  ignorant  bigotry  of  King 
George  III.  was  excited  against  him  by  men  who  hated 
every  act  of  justice  or  tolerance  to  Eoman  Catholics ; 
and  it  proved  of  greater  force  than  the  genius  of  the 
Minister.  The  old  threat  of  the  King's  personal 
enmity  was  publicly  addressed  to  Pitt's  colleague,  Dun- 
das,  when  the  proposal  for  Catholic  emancipation  was 
under  discussion  in  the  Cabinet ;  and,  with  a  just  re- 
^.,,  £:ard  for  his  own  dignity,  Pitt  withdrew  from 

Pitt  resigns,  O  n         J ' 

Feb.  1801.  ^^^^    ^-^^^    ^     ;^gQ^)^  ^^^^^^  ^^  influcnce 

a  Sovereign  who  believed  his  soul  to  be  staked  on  the 
letter  of  the  Coronation  Oath.  The  ablest  members  of 
Pitt's  Government,  Grenville,  Dundas,  and  Windham, 
retired  with  their  leader.  Addington,  Speaker  of  the 
,^^.  ^  House  of  Commons,  became  Prime  Minister, 

Addington  '  ' 

'^^^^^^-         with  colleagues  as  undistinguished  as  him- 
self.     It  was    under   the   Government  of    Addington 
that  the  negotiations  were  begun  which  resulted  in  the 
signature  of  Preliminaries  of  Peace  in  October,  1 801 . 
Pitt  himself  supported  the  new  Ministry  in  their 


180L  THE  PEACE  OF  1801.  241 

policy  of  peace;  Grenville,  lately  Pitt's  Foreign  Minster, 
unsparingly  condemned  both  the  cession  of  the  con- 
quered colonies  and  the  policy  of  granting  France  peace 
on  any  terms  whatever.  Viewed  by  the  ihePeaoe 
light  of  our  own  knowledge  of  events,  the  ^^'^^^ 
Peace  of  1801  appears  no  more  than  an  unprofitable 
break  in  an  inevitable  war ;  and  perhaps  even  then  the 
signs  of  Bonaparte's  ambition  justified  those  who,  like 
Grenville,  urged  the  nation  to  give  no  truce  to  France, 
and  to  trust  to  Bonaparte's  own  injustice  to  raise  us  up 
allies  upon  the  Continent.  But,  for  the  moment,  peace 
seemed  at  least  worth  a  trial.  The  modes  of  prosecuting 
a  war  of  offence  were  exhausted ;  the  cost  of  the 
national  defence  remained  the  same.  There  were  no 
more  navies  to  destroy,  no  more  colonies  to  seize ;  the 
sole  means  of  injuring  the  enemy  was  by  blockading  his 
ports,  and  depriving  him  of  his  maritime  commerce. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  possibility  of  a  French  invasion 
required  the  maintenance  of  an  enormous  army  and 
militia  in  England,  and  prevented  any  great  reduction 
in  the  expenses  of  the  war,  which  had  already  added 
two  hundred  millions  to  the  National  Debt.  Nothing 
was  lost  by  making  peace,  except  certain  colonies  and 
military  positions  which  few  were  anxious  to  retain. 
The  argument  that  England  could  at  any  moment  re- 
cover what  she  now  surrendered  was  indeed  a  far  sounder 
one  than  most  of  those  which  went  to  prove  that  the 
positions  in  question  were  of  no  real  service.  Tet  even 
on  the  latter  point  there  was  no  want  of  high  authority 
It  was  Nelson  himself  who  assured  the  House  of  Lords 
Q 


242  MOJDEBN  EUROPE,  180L 

that  neitlier  Malta  nor  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  could 
ever  be  of  importance  to  Great  Britain.*  In  the  face 
of  such  testimony,  the  men  who  lamented  that  England 
should  allow  the  adversary  to  recover  any  lost  ground 
in  the  midst  of  a  struggle  for  life  or  death,  passed 
for  obstinate  fanatics.  The  Legislature  reflected  the 
general  feeling  of  the  nation;  and  the  policy  of  the 
Government  was  confirmed  in  the  Lords  and  the  Com- 
mons by  majorities  of  ten  to  one. 

Although  the  Ministry  of  Addington  had  acted  with 
energ^v  both  in  Eo:ypt  and  in  the  Baltic,  it 

Aggressions    of  ^•^  ^-^  ^  ' 

^Th^^co^^  was  generally  felt  that  Pitt's  retirement 
peace.  jj^arted  the  surrender  of  that  resolute  policy 
which  had  guided  England  since  1793.  When  once  the 
Preliminaries  of  Peace  had  been  signed  in  London, 
Bonaparte  rightly  judged  that  Addington  would  waive 
many  just  causes  of  complaint,  rather  than  break  off  the 
negotiations  which  were  to  convert  the  Preliminaries 
into  a  definitive  treaty.  Accordingly,  in  his  instructions 
to  Joseph  Bonaparte,  who  represented  France  at  the 
conferences  held  at  Amiens,  the  Eirst  Consul  wrote 
through  Talleyrand  as  follows  : — "  You  are  forbidden  to 
entertain  any  proposition  relating  to  the  King  of  Sar- 
dinia, or  to  the  Stadtholder,  or  to  the  internal  affairs  of 
Batavia,  of  Helvetia,  or  the  Eepublic  of  Italy.  None  of 
these  subjects  have  anything  to  do  with  the  discussions 
of  England.'*  The  list  of  subjects  excluded  from  the 
consideration  of  England  was  the  list  of  aggressions  by 
which  Bonaparte  intended  to  fiU  up  the  interval  of  Con- 
•  Pari  Hist.  Nov.  3, 1801. 


1802.  THE  BATAVIAN  BEPUBLW.  2-13 

tinental  peace.  In  tlie  Treaty  of  Lun^ville,  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  newly -established  republics  in  Holland, 
Switzerland,  and  Italy  had  been  recognised  by  France. 
The  restoration  of  Piedmont  to  the  House  of  Savoy  had 
been  the  condition  on  which  the  Czar  made  peace.  But 
on  every  one  of  these  points  the  engagements  of  France 
were  made  only  to  be  broken.  So  far  from  bringing 
independence  to  the  client-republics  of  France,  the 
peace  of  Lun6ville  was  but  the  introduction  to  a  series 
of  changes  which  brought  these  States  directly  into  the 
hands  of  the  First  Consul.  The  establishment  of  absolute 
government  in  France  itself  entailed  a  corresponding 
change  in  each  of  its  dependencies,  and  the  creation  of 
an  executive  which  should  accept  the  First  Consul's 
orders  with  as  little  question  as  the  Prefect  of  a  French 
department.  Holland  received  its  new  con-  Holland  sept 
stitution  while  France  was  still  at  war  with  ^^^ 

England.  The  existing  Government  and  Legislature  of 
the  Batavian  Eepublic  were  dissolved  (Sept.,  1801),  and 
replaced  by  a  council  of  twelve  persons,  each  holding  the 
office  of  President  in  turn  for  a  period  of  three  months,  and 
by  a  legislature  of  thirty-five,  which  met  only  for  a  few 
days  in  the  year.  The  power  given  to  the  new  Presi- 
dent during  his  office  was  enough,  and  not  more  than 
enough,  to  make  him  an  effective  servant :  a  three- 
months'  Minister  and  an  Assembly  that  met  and 
parted  at  the  word  of  command  were  not  likely  to 
enter  into  serious  rivalry  with  the  First  Consul.  The 
Dutch  peaceably  accepted  the  constitution  thus  forced 
upon  them;  they  possessed  no  means  of  resistance, 
q2 


244  MODERN  EUROPE,  I802. 

and  their  affairs  excited  but  little  interest  upon  the 
Continent. 

Far  more  striking  was  the  revolution  next  effected 

by  the  First  Consul.      In  obedience  to  orders  sent  from 

Paris  to  the  Legislature  of  the  Cisalpine  Eepublic,  a 

body  of  four  hundred  and  fifty  Italian  repre- 

Bonaparte  made  "^  J  xr 

FSiin^^'itepib-  sentatives  crossed  the  Alps  in  the  middle  of 
winter  in  order  to  meet  the  First  Consul  at 
Lyons,  and  to  deliberate  upon  a  constitution  for  the 
Cisalpine  Eepublic.  The  constitution  had,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  been  drawn  up  by  Talleyrand,  and  sent  to  the 
Legislature  at  Milan  some  months  before.  But  it  was 
not  for  the  sake  of  Italy  that  its  representatives  were 
collected  at  Lyons,  in  the  presence  of  the  First  Consul, 
with  every  circumstance  of  national  solemnity.  It  was 
the  most  striking  homage  which  Bonaparte  could  exact 
from  a  foreign  race  in  the  face  of  all  France ;  it  was  the 
testimony  that  other  lands  besides  France  desired 
Bonaparte  to  be  their  sovereign.  "When  all  the  minor 
offices  in  the  new  Cisal])ine  Constitution  had  been  filled, 
the  Italians  learnt  that  the  real  object  of  the  convo- 
cation was  to  place  the  sceptre  in  Bonaparte's  hands. 
They  accepted  the  part  which  they  found  themselves 
forced  to  play,  and  offered  to  the  First  Consul 
the  presidency  of  the  Cisalpine  State  (Jan.  25,  1802). 
Unlike  the  French  Consulate,  the  chief  magistracy  in 
the  new  Cisalpine  Constitution  might  be  prolonged 
beyond  the  term  of  ten  years.  Bonaparte  had  practically 
won  the  Crown  of  Lombardy;  and  he  had  given  to 
France  the  example  of  a  submission  more  unqualified 


laua.  SWITZERLAND.  245 

than  its  own.  A  single  phrase  rewarded  the  people 
who  had  thus  placed  themselves  in  his  hands.  The 
Cisalpine  Eepublic  was  allowed  to  assume  the  name  of 
Italian  Republic.  The  new  title  indicated  the  national 
hopes  which  had  sprung  up  in  Italy  during  the  past  ten 
years ;  it  indicated  no  real  desire  on  the  part  of  Bona- 
parte to  form  either  a  free  or  a  united  Italian  nation. 
In  the  Cisalpine  State  itself,  although  a  good  adminis- 
tration and  the  extinction  of  feudal  privileges  made 
Bonaparte's  government  acceptable,  patriots  who  asked 
for  freedom  ran  the  risk  of  exile  or  imprisonment.  What 
further  influence  was  exercised  by  France  upon  Italian 
soil  was  not  employed  for  the  consolidation  of  Italy. 
Tuscany  was  bestowed  by  Bonaparte  upon  the  Spanish 
Prince  of  Parma,  and  controlled  by  agents 
of    the    First   Consul.     Piedmont,     which     nexedtoFi^ce^ 

Sept,  1802. 

had  long  been  governed  by  French  gene- 
rals,   was  at   length   definitely  annexed   to  France. 

Switzerland  had  not,  like  the  Cisalpine  Eepublic, 
derived  its  liberty  from  the  victories  of  intervention  in 
French  armies,  nor  could  Bonaparte  claim  Switzerland. 
the  presidency  of  the  Helvetic  State  under  the  title  of 
its  founder.  The  struggles  of  the  Swiss  parties,  how- 
ever, placed  the  country  at  the  mercy  of  France.  Since 
the  expulsion  of  the  Austrians  by  Massena  in  1799,  the 
Antagonism  between  the  Democrats  of  the  town  and  the 
Federalists  of  the  Forest  Cantons  had  broken  out  afresh. 
A  French  army  still  occupied  Switzerland ;  the  Minister 
of  the  First  Consul  received  instructions  to  interfere  with 
all    parties   and   consolidate  none.     In  the  autumn  of 


246  MODERN  EUBOPK  ,  1802. 

1801,  tlie  Federalists  were  permitted  to  dissolve  tlie 
central  Helvetic  Government,  whicli  had  been  created 
by  the  Directory  in  1798.  One  change  followed 
another,  until,  on  the  19th  of  May,  1802,  a  second 
Constitution  was  proclaimed,  based,  like  that  of  1798, 
on  centralising  and  democratic  principles,  and  almost 
extinguishing  the  old  local  independence  of  the  members 
of  the  Swiss  League.  No  sooner  had  French  partisans 
created  this  Constitution,  which  could  only  be  main- 
tained by  force  against  the  hostility  of  Berne  and  the 
Forest  Cantons,  than  the  French  army  quitted  Switzer- 
land. Civil  war  instantly  broke  out,  and  in  the  course 
of  a  few  weeks  the  Grovernment  established  by  the 
French  had  lost  all  Switzerland  except  the  Pays  de 
Yaud.  This  was  the  crisis  for  which  Bonaparte  had 
been  waiting^.       On  the  4th  of  October  a 

Bonaparte    Me-  ^ 

HeivJticLeag^e!  proclamatlou  appeared  at  Lausanne,  an- 
nouncing that  the  First  Consul  had  ac- 
cepted the  office  of  Mediator  of  the  Helvetic  League. 
A  French  army  entered  Switzerland.  Fifty-six  deputies 
from  the  cantons  were  summoned  to  Paris ;  and,  in  the 
beginning  of  1803,  a  new  Constitution,  which  left  the 
central  Government  powerless  in  the  hands  of  France 
and  reduced  the  national  sovereignty  to  cantonal  self- 
administration,  placed  Switzerland  on  a  level  with  the 
Batavian  and  the  Cisalpine  dependencies  of  Bonaparte. 
The  Ehone  Yalley,  with  the  mountains  crossed  by  the 
new  road  over  the  Simp] on,  was  converted  into  a 
separate  republic  under  the  title  of  La  Yalais.  .  The 
new  chief  magistrate  of  the  Helvetic  Confederacy  entered 


1801-a.  SETTLEMENT   OF  GERMANY.  247 

upon  his  office  with  a  pension  paid  out  of  Bonaparte's 
secret  police  fund. 

Such  was  the  nature  of  the  independence  which  the 
Peace  of  Luneville  gave  to  Holland,  to  fletuement  of 
Northern  Italy,  and  to  Switzerland.     The  Germany, 

re-organisation  of  Germany,  wliich  was  provided  for  by 
the  same  treaty,  affected  larger  interests,  and  left  more 
permanent  traces  upon  European  history.  In  the 
provinces  ceded  to  France  lay  the  territory  of  the 
ancient  ecclesiastical  princes  of  the  empire,  the  Electors 
of  Mainz,  Cologne,  and  Treves;  but,  besides  these 
spiritual  sovereigns,  a  variety  of  secular  potentates, 
ranging  from  the  Elector  Palatine,  with  600,000  sub- 
jects, to  the  Prince  of  Wiedrunkel,  with  a  single  village, 
owned  territory  upon  the  left  bank  of  the  Ehine ;  and 
for  the  dispossessed  lay  princes  new  territories  had  now 
to  be  formed  by  the  destruction  of  other  ecclesiastical 
States  in  the  interior  of  Germany.  Affairs  returned  to 
the  state  in  which  they  had  stood  in  1798,  and  the 
comedy  of  Eastadt  was  renewed  at  the  point  where  it 
had  been  broken  off :  the  only  difference  was  that  the 
French  statesmen  who  controlled  the  partition  of 
ecclesiastical  Germany  now  remained  in  Paris,  instead 
of  coming  to  the  Ehine,  to  run  the  risk  of  being  mur- 
dered by  Austrian  hussars.  Scarcely  was  the  Treaty  of 
Luneville  signed  when  the  whole  company  of  intriguers 
who  had  touted  at  Eastadt  posted  off  to  the  French 
capital  with  their  maps  and  their  money-bags,  the 
keener  for  the  work  when  it  became  known  that  by 
common  consent  the  Free  Cities  of  the  Empire  were 


248  MODERN  EUROPE.  isoi^ 

now  to  be  thrown  into  tlie  spoil,  Talleyrand  and  his 
confidant  Matliieu  liad  no  occasion  to  ask  for  bribes,  or 
to  manoeuvre  for  the  position  of  arbiters  in  Germany. 
They  were  overwhelmed  with  importunities.  Solemn 
diplomatists  of  the  old  school  toiled  up  four  flights  of 
stairs  to  the  office  of  the  needy  secretary,  or  danced 
attendance  at  the  parties  of  the  witty  Minister.  They 
hugged  Talleyrand's  poodle  ;  they  vied  with  one 
another  in  gaining  a  smile  from  the  child  whom  he 
brought  up  at  his  house."^  The  shrewder  of  them  for- 
tified their  attentions  with  solid  bargains,  and  made  it 
their  principal  care  not  to  be  outbidden  at  the  auction. 
Thus  the  game  was  kept  up  as  long  as  there  was  a 
bishopric  or  a  city  in  the  market. 

This  was  the  real  process  of  the  Grerman  re- organisa- 
tion. A  pretended  one  was  meanwhile  enacted  by  the 
Diet  of  Eatisbon.  The  Diet  deliberated  during  the 
whole  of  the  summer  of  1801  without  arriving  at  a 
single  resolution.  Not  even  the  sudden  change  of  Eus- 
sian  policy  that  followed  the  death  of  the  Emperor  Paul 
and  deprived  Bonaparte  of  the  support  of  the  Northern 
Maritime  League,  could  stimulate  the  German  Powers  to 
united  action.  The  old  antagonism  of  Austria  and 
Prussia  paralysed  the  Diet.  Austria  sought  a  German 
indemnity  for  the  dethroned  Grand  Duke  of  Tuscany : 
Prussia  aimed  at  extending  its  influence  into  Southern 
Germany  by  the  annexation  of  Wiirzburg   and   Bam- 

*  Gagern,  Mein  Antheil,  i.,  119.  He  protests  that  lie  never  carried 
the  dog.  The  waltz  was  introduced  about  this  time  at  Paris  by  French- 
men returning  from  G-ermany,  which  gave  occasion  to  the  mot  that  the 
French  had  annexed  even  the  national  dance  of  the  Germans. 


1801-81  SETTLEMENT   OF   GERMANY,  249 

berg.  Thus  the  summer  of  1801  was  lost  in  inter- 
minable debate,  until  Bonaparte  regained  the  influence 
over  Russia  which  he  had  held  before  the  death  of  Paul, 
and  finally  set  himself  free  from  all  check  and  restraint 
by  concluding  peace  with  England. 

No  part  of  Bonaparte's  diplomacy  was  more  ably 
conceived  or  more  likely  to  result  in  a  permanent  em- 
pire than  that  which   affected  the  secondary     ^ 

^  «^         German     poucy 

States  of  Germany.  The  rivaliy  of  Austria  °'  Bonaparte. 
and  Prussia,  the  dread  of  Austrian  aggression  felt  in 
Bavaria,  the  grotesque  ambition  of  the  petty  sovereigns 
of  Baden  and  Wiirtemburg,  were  all  understood  and 
turned  to  account  in-  the  policy  which  from  this  time 
shaped  the  French  protectorate  beyond  the  Rhine. 
Bonaparte  intended  to  give  to  Prussia  such  an  increase 
of  territory  upon  the  Baltic  as  should  counterbalance 
the  power  of  Austria ;  and  for  this  purpose  he  was 
willing  to  sacrifice  Hanover  or  Mecklenburg :  but  he 
forbade  Prussia's  extension  to  the  south.  Austria,  so 
far  from  gaining  new  territory  in  Bavaria,  was  to  be 
deprived  of  its  own  outlying  •  possessions  in  Western 
Germany,  and  excluded  from  all  influence  in  this  region. 
Bavaria,  dependent  upon  French  protection  against 
Austria,  was  to  be  greatly  strengthened.  Baden  and  Wiir- 
temberg,  enriched  by  the  spoil  of  little  sovereignties, 
of  Bishoprics  and  Free  Cities,  were  to  look  to  France 
for  further  elevation  and  aggrandisement.  Thus,  while 
two  rival  Powers  balanced  one  another  upon  the  Baltic 
and  the  Lower  Danube,  the  sovereigns  of  central  and 
western  Germany,  owing  everything  to  the  Power  that 


250  MODEUN  EVBOPM.  rm. 

had  humbled  Austria,  would  find  in  submission  to 
France  the  best  security  for  their  own  gains,  and  the 
best  protection  against  their  more  powerful  neighbours. 
One  condition  alone  could  have  frustrated  a  policy 
agreeable  to  so  many  interests,  namely,  the  existence  of 
a  national  sentiment  among  the  Grermans  themselves. 
But  the  peoples  of  Germany  cared  as  little  about  a 
Fatherland  as  their  princes.  To  the  Hessian  and  the 
Bavarian  at  the  centre  of  the  Empire,  Grermany  was 
scarcely  more  tban  it  was  to  the  Swiss  or  the  Dutch, 
who  had  left  the  Empire  centuries  before.  The  inhabi- 
tants of  the  Ehenish  Provinces  had  murmured  for  a 
while  at  the  extortionate  rule  of  the  Directory;  but 
their  severance  from  Germany  and  their  incorporation 
with  a  foreign  race  touched  no  fibre  of  patriotic  regret; 
and  after  the  establishment  of  a  better  order  of  things 
under  the  Consulate  the  annexation  to  France  appears 
to  have  become  highljT-  popular.*  Among  a  race  whose 
members  could  thus  be  actually  conquered  and  annexed 
without  doing  violence  to  their  feelings  Bonaparte  had  no 
difficulty  in  finding  willing  allies.  While  the  Diet 
dragged  on  its  debates  upon  the  settlement  of  the  Em- 
pire, the  minor  States  pursued  their  bargainings  with 
the  French  Government;  and  on  the  14th  of  August, 
1801,    Bavaria    signed   the    first   of   those 

Treaty  between  ^ 

?a^"'fo^^S     treaties  which  made  the  First  Consul  the 
many,  Oct  11,     patrou  of  Westcm  Germany.     Two  months 

1801.  ^  ^ 

later  a  secret  treaty  between   France  and 
Russia  admitted  the  new  Czar,  Alexander,  to  a  share  in 

•  Perthes,  Politische  Zustiinde,  i,  31L 


180J.  END    OF  FREE   CITIES  AND   BISH0PEI03,        251 

the  reorganisation  of  the  Empire.  The  Governments  of 
Paris  and  St.  Petersburg  pledged  themselves  to  united 
action  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  an  equilibrium 
between  Austria  and  Prussia ;  and  the  Czar  further 
stipulated  for  the  advancement  of  his  own  relatives,  the 
Sovereigns  of  Bavaria,  Baden,  and  Wiirtemberg.  The 
relationship  of  these  petty  princes  to  the  Eussian  family 
enabled  Bonaparte  to  present  to  the  Czar,  as  a  graceful 
concession,  the  very  measure  which  most  vitally  advanced 
his  own  power  in  Grermany.  Alexander's  intervention 
made  resistance  on  the  part  of  Austria  hopeless.  One 
after  another  the  German  Sovereigns  settled  with  their 
patrons  for  a  share  in  the  spoil ;  and  on  the  3rd  of  June, 
1802,  a  secret  agreement  between  France  and  Eussia 
embodied  the  whole  of  these  arrangements,  and  disposed 
of  almost  all  the  Free  Cities  and  the  entire  ecclesiastical 
territory  of  the  Empire. 

When  everything  had  thus  been  settled  by  the 
foreigners,  a  Committee,  to  which  the  Diet  of  Eatisbon 
had  referred  the  work  of  re-organisation,  began  its  ses- 
sions, assisted  by  a  French  and  a  Eussian  representative. 
The  Scheme  which  had  been  agreed  upon  between 
France  and  Eussia  was  produced  entire ;  and 
in   spite   of  the  anjj^er  and  the  tlireats  of    accepts  French 


Austria  it  passed  the  Committee  with  no 
greater  dehiy  than  was  inseparable  from  everything  con- 
nected with  German  affairs.  The  Committee  presented 
the  Scheme  to  the  Diet :  the  Diet  only  agitated  itself 
as  to  the  means  of  passing  the  Scheme  without  violating 
those  formalities  which  were  the  breath  of  its  life.     The 


252  MOBTHEN  EUBOPE,  1803. 

proposed  destruction  of  all  the  Ecclesiastical  States,  and 
of  forty -five  out  of  tlie  fifty  Free  Cities,  would  extin- 
guish a  third  part  of  the  members  of  the  Diet  itself. 
If  these  unfortunate  bodies  were  permitted  to  vote  upon 
the  measure,  their  votes  might  result  in  its  rejection  : 
if  unsummoned,  their  absence  would  impair  the  validity 
Df  the  resolution.  By  a  masterpiece  of  conscientious 
End  of  German  pcdautry  it  was  agrccd  that  the  doomed  pre- 
states  and  forty-     latcs  aud  cities  shouM  be  duly  called  to  vote 

five  Free  Cities,  "^ 

March,  1803.  ^^  their  turn,  and  that  upon  the  mention 
of  each  name  the  answer  "  absent "  should  be  returned 
by  an  officer.  Thus,  faithful  to  its  formalities,  the 
Empire  voted  the  destruction  of  its  ancient  Constitu- 
tion ;  and  the  sovereignties  of  the  Ecclesiastics  and 
Free  Cities,  which  had  lasted  for  so  many  centuries, 
vanished  from  Europe  (March,  1808).* 

The  loss  was  small  indeed.  The  internal  condition 
Effect  on  Ger-     ^^  ^^^  pricst-rulcd  districts  was  generally 

"^^'  wretched ;  heavy  ignorance,  beggary,  and  in- 

tolerance reduced  life  to  a  gross  and  dismal  inertia.  Ex- 
cept in  their  patronage  of  music,  the  ecclesiastical  princes 
had  perhaps  rendered  no  single  service  to  Germany. 
The  Free  Cities,  as  a  rule,  were  sunk  in  debt;  the 
management  of  their  affairs  had  become  the  perquisite 
of  a  few  lawyers  and  privileged  families.  For  Germany, 
as  a  nation,  the  destruction  of  these  petty  sovereignties 
was  not  only  an  advantage  but  an  absolute  necessity. 
The  order  by  which  they  were  superseded  was  not  de- 

*  Koch  nnd  Sclioell,  vi.,  247.      Beer,  Zehn  Jalire  Oesterreichischer 
Politik,  p.  35.    Haiisser,  ii.,  398. 


1803.  EFFECT   ON   GERMAN  Y.  253 

vised  in  the  interest  of  Germany  itself ;  yet  even  in  the 
arrangements  imposed  by  the  foreigner  Germany  gained 
centres  from  which  the  institutions  of  modern  political 
life  entered  into  regions  where  no  public  authority  had 
yet  been  known  beyond  the  court  of  the  bishop  or  the 
feudal  officers  of  the  manor  *  Through  the  suppression 
of  the  Ecclesiastical  States  a  Protestant  majority  was 
produced  in  the  Diet.  The  change  bore  witness  to  the 
decline  of  Austrian  and  of  Catholic  energy  during  the 
past  century  ;  it  scarcely  indicated  the  future  supremacy 
of  the  Protestant  rival  of  Austria ;  for  the  real  interests 
of  Germany  were  but  faintly  imaged  in  the  Diet,  and 
the  leadership  of  the  race  was  still  open  to  the  Power 
which  should  most  sincerely  identify  itself  with  the 
German  nation.  The  first  result  of  the  changed 
character  of  the  Diet  was  the  confiscation  of  all  landed 
property  held  by  religious  or  charitable  bodies,  even 
where  these  had  never  advanced  the  slightest  claim  to 
political  independence.  The  Diet  declared  the  whole  of 
the  land  held  in  Germany  by  pious  foundations  to  be 
at  the  disposal  of  the  Governments  for  purposes  of 
religion,  of  education,  and  of  financial  relief.  The  more 
needy  courts  immediately  seized  so  welcome  an  oppor- 
tunity of  increasing  their  revenues.  Germany  lost 
nothing  by  the  dissolution  of  some  hundreds  of  monas- 
teries ;  the  suppression  of  hospitals  and  the  impoverish- 
ment of  Universities  was  a  doubtful  benefit.  Through 
the  destruction  of  the  Ecclesiastical  States  and  the  con- 
fiscation of  Church  lands,  the  support  of  an  army  of 

^  Perthes,  Politisclie  Zustaude,  ii.,  402,  9*>q, 


254  MODERN  EUROPE,  im. 

priests  was  tlirown  upon  tlie  public  revenues.  The 
Elector  of  Cologne,  who  had  been  an  indifferent  civil 
ruler,  became  a  very  prosperous  clergyman  on  £20,000 
a  year.  All  the  members  of  the  annexed  or  disendowed 
establishments,  down  to  the  acolytes  and  the  sacristans, 
were  credited  with  annuities  equal  in  value  to  what  they 
had  lost.  But  in  the  confusion  caused  by  war  the 
means  to  satisfy  these  claims  was  not  always  forth- 
coming ;  and  the  ecclesiastical  revolution,  so  beneficial  on 
the  whole  to  the  public  interest,  was  not  effected  without 
much  severe  and  undeserved  individual  suffering. 

The  movement  of  1803  put  an  end  to  an  order  of 
things  more  curious  as  a  survival  of  the  mixed  religious 
Governments  in  ^ud  political  form  of  the  Holy  Eoman  Em- 
more    absolute     pire  than  important  in  the  actual  state  of 

and  more  regu-       ■*■  ^ 

^-  Europe.     The  temporal  power  now  lost  by 

the  Church  in  Germany  had  been  held  in  such  sluggish 
hands  that  its  effect  was  hardly  visible  except  in  a 
denser  prejudice  and  an  idler  life  than  prevailed  under 
other  Grovernments.  The  first  consequence  of  its  down- 
fall was  that  a  great  part  of  Grermany  which  had 
hitherto  had  no  political  organisation  at  all  gained  the 
benefit  of  a  regular  system  of  taxation,  of  police,  of 
civil  and  of  criminal  justice.  If  harsh  and  despotic,  the 
Grovernments  which  rose  to  power  at  the  expense  of  the 
Church  were  usually  not  wanting  in  the  love  of  order 
and  uniformity.  Officers  of  the  State  administered  a 
fixed  law  where  custom  and  privilege  had  hitherto  been 
the  only  rule.  Appointments  ceased  to  be  bought  or 
inherited ;  trades  and  professions  were  thrown  open ;  the 


1901  THE   KN1QET8,  255 

peasant  was  relieved  of  his  heaviest  feudal  burdens. 
Among  the  newly  consolidated  States,  Bavaria 
was  the  one  where  the  reforming  impulse  of  fo*r^Sr  iiont 
the  time  took  the  strongest  form.  A  new 
dynasty,  springing  from  the  west  of  the  Ehine,  brought 
something  of  the  spirit  of  French  liberalism  into  a 
country  hitherto  unsurpassed  in  Western  Europe  for  its 
ignorance  and  bigotry*  The  Minister  Montgelas,  a 
politician  of  French  enlightenment,  entered  upon  the 
same  crusade  against  feudal  and  ecclesiastical  disorder 
which  Joseph  had  inaugurated  in  Austria  twenty  years 
before.  His  measures  for  subjecting  the  clergy  to  the 
law,  and  for  depriving  the  Church  of  its  control  over 
education,  were  almost  identical  with  those  which  in 
1790  had  led  to  the  revolt  of  Belgium;  and  the 
Bavarian  landowners  now  unconsciously  reproduced  all 
the  mediaeval  platitudes  of  the  University  of  Louvain. 
Montgelas  organised  and  levelled  with  a  remorseless 
common  sense.  Among  his  victims  there  was  a  class 
which  had  escaped  destruction  in  the  recent  changes. 
The  Kjaights  of  the  Empire,  with  their  village  jurisdic- 
tions, were  still  legally  existent ;  but  to  Montgelas  such 
a  class  appeared  a  mere  absurdity,  and  he  g^  ^^^^^  ^ 
sent  his  soldiers  to  disperse  their  courts  and  *^®  Knighta. 
to  seize  their  tolls.  Loud  lamentation  assailed  the 
Emperor  at  Vienna.  If  the  dethroned  bishops  had  be- 
wailed the  approaching  extinction  of  Christianity  in 
Europe,  the  knights  just  as  convincingly  deplored  the 
end  of  chivalry.     Knightly  honour,  now  being  swept 

•  Friedrich,  Qeschichte  des  Vatikaiiischen  Konzils,  L,  27, 174, 


256  1I0D:EBN  EUBOPB.  1304. 

from  tlie  earth,  was  proved  to  be  tlie  true  soul  of 
German  nationality,  the  invisible  support  of  the 
Imperial  throne.  For  a  moment  the  intervention  of 
the  Emperor  forced  Montgelas  to  withdraw  his 
grasp  from  the  sacred  rents  and  turnpikes;  but  the 
threatening  storm  passed  over,  and  the  example  of 
Bavaria  was  gradually  followed  by  the  neighbouring 
Courts. 

It  was  to  the  weak  and  unpatriotic  princes  who 
were  enriched  by  the  French  that  the  knights  fell  vic- 
tims. Among  the  knights  thus  despoiled  by  the  Duke 
of  Nassau  was  the  Eitter  vom  Stein,  a  nobleman  who 
had  entered  the  Prussian  service  in  the  reign  of  Frederick 
the  Grreat,  and  who  had  lately  been  placed  in 

stem    and    the        .  "^  -'■ 

Duke  of  Nassau.  }^{^  officc  iu  thc  newly-acqulrcd  province 
of  Miinster.  Stein  was  thoroughly  familiar  with  the 
advantages  of  systematic  government ;  the  loss  of  his 
native  parochial  j  urisdiction  was  not  a  serious  one  to  a 
man  who  had  become  a  power  in  Prussia ;  and  although 
domestic  pride  had  its  share  in  Stein's  resentment,  the 
protest  now  published  by  him  against  the  aggressions 
of  the  Duke  of  Nassau  sounded  a  different  note  from 
that  of  his  order  generally.  That  a  score  of  farmers 
should  pay  their  dues  and  take  off  their  hats  to  the 
officer  of  the  Duke  of  Nassau  instead  of  to  the  bailiff 
of  the  Eitter  vom  Stein  was  not  a  matter  to  excite 
deep  feeling  in  Europe  ;  but  that  the  consolidation  of 
Germany  should  be  w^orked  out  in  the  interest  of  French 
hirelings  instead  of  in  the  interests  of  the  German 
people   was   justly   treated   by  Stein  as  a  subject  for 


1801-4.  STEIN  AND   THE  DUKE  OF  NASSAU,  257 

patriotic  anger.  In  his  letter  to  tlie  Duke  of  Nassau,* 
Stein  reproached  his  own  despoiler  and  the  whole  tribe 
of  petty  princes  with  that  treason  to  German  interests 
which  had  won  them  the  protection  of  the  foreigner. 
He  argued  that  the  knights  were  a  far  less 
important  obstacle  to  German  unity  than  on  the  Minor 
those  very  princes  to  whom  the  knights 
were  sacrificed ;  and  he  invoked  that  distant  day  which 
should  give  to  Germany  a  real  national  unity,  over 
knights  and  princes  alike,  under  the  leadership  of  a 
single  patriotic  sovereign.  Stein's  appeal  found  little 
response  among  his  contemporaries.  Like  a  sober  man 
among  drunkards,  he  seemed  to  be  scarcely  rational. 
The  simple  conception  of  a  nation  sacrificing  its  internal 
rivalries  in  order  to  avert  foreign  rule  was  folly  to  the 
politicians  who  had  all  their  lives  long  been  outwitting 
one  another  at  Vienna  or  Berlin,  or  who  had  just  become 
persons  of  consequence  in  Europe  through  the  patronage 
of  Bonaparte.  Yet,  if  years  of  intolerable  suffering 
were  necessary  before  any  large  party  in  Germany  rose 
to  the  idea  of  German  union,  the  ground  had  now  at 
least  been  broken.  In  the  changes  that  followed  the 
Peace  of  Luneville  the  fixity  and  routine  of  Ger- 
many received  its  death-blow.  In  all  but  name  the 
Empire  had  ceased  to  exist.  Change  and  re-constitu- 
tion in  one  form  or  another  had  become  familiar  to  all 
men's  minds ;  and  one  real  statesman  at  the  least  was 
already  beginning  to  learn  the  lesson  which  later  events 
were  to  teach  to  the  rest  of  the  German  race. 

•  Pertz,  Leben  Stem,  i.,  257.    Seeley*8  Stein,  i.,  126. 
B 


France. 

1801—1804. 


258  MODERN  EUBOi'K  I801-4. 

Four  years  of  peace  separated  t"he  Treaty  of  Lun^- 
ville  from  the  next  outbreak  of  war  between 
France  and  any  Continental  Power.  They 
were  years  of  extension  of  French  influence  in  every 
neighbouring  State ;  in  France  itself,  years  of  the  con- 
solidation of  Bonaparte's  power,  and  of  the  decline  of 
everything  that  checked  his  personal  rule.  The  legis- 
lative bodies  sank  into  the  insignificance  for  which  they 
had  been  designed;  everything  that  was  suffered  to 
wear  the  appearance,  of  strength  owed  its  vigour  to  the 
personal  support  of  the  First  Consul.  Among  the  insti- 
tutions which  date  from  this  period,  two,  equally  asso- 
ciated with  the  name  of  Napoleon,  have  taken  a 
prominent  place  in  history,  the  Civil  Code 
and  the  Concordat.  Since  the  middle  of  the 
eighteenth  century  the  codification  of  law  had  been  pur- 
sued with  more  or  less  success  by  almost  every  govern- 
ment in  Europe.  In  France  the  Constituent  Assembly 
of  1789  had  ordered  the  statutes,  by  which  it  superseded 
the  old  variety  of  local  customs,  to  be  thus  cast  into  a 
systematic  form.  A  Committee  of  the  Convention  had 
completed  the  draft  of  a  Civil  Code.  The  Directory 
had  in  its  turn  appointed  a  Commission  ;  but  the  pro- 
ject still  remained  unfulfilled  when  the  Directory  was 
driven  from  power.  Bonaparte  instinctively  threw 
himself  into  a  task  so  congenial  to  his  own  systematising 
spirit,  and  stimulated  the  efforts  of  the  best  jurists 
in  France  by  his  personal  interest  and  pride  in  the 
work  of  legislation.  A  Commission  of  lawyers,  ap- 
pointed by  the  First  Consul,  presented  the  successive 


1801-4.  NAFOLEON  AS   A    LEGISLATOR.  259 

chapters  of  a  Civil  Code  to  the  Council  of  State.  In 
the  discussions  in  the  Council  of  State  Bonaparte  him- 
self took  an  active,  thougli  not  always  a  beneficial,  part. 
The  draft  of  each  chapter,  as  it  left  the  Council  of  State, 
was  submitted,  as  a  project  of  Law,  to  the  Tribunate 
and  to  the  Legislative  Body.  For  a  moment  the  free 
expression  of  opinion  in  the  Tribunate  caused  Bonaparte 
to  suspend  his  work  in  impatient  jealousy.  The  Tri- 
bunate, however,  was  soon  brought  to  silence ;  and  in 
March,  1804,  France  received  the  Code  which  has  formed 
from  that  time  to  the  present  tbe  basis  of  its  civil  rights. 
When  Napoleon  declared  that  he  desired  his  fame 
to  rest  upon  the  Civil  Code,  he  showed  his  appreciation 
of  the  power  which  names  exercise  over  mankind.  It 
is  probable  that  a  majority  of  the  inhabitants  of  Western 
Europe  believe  that  Napoleon  actually  invented  the 
laws  which  bear  his  name.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
substance  of  these  laws  was  fixed  by  the  successive  As- 
semblies of  the  Eevolution;  and,  in  the  final  revision 
which  produced  the  Civil  Code,  Napoleon  appears  to 
have  originated  neither  more  nor  less  than  several  of  the 
members  of  his  Council  whose  names  have  long  been 
forgotten.  He  is  unquestionably  entitled  to  the  honour 
of  a  great  legislator,  not,  however,  as  one  Napoieon  m  % 
who,  like "  Solon  or  like  Mahomet,  himself  "^r"^- 
created  a  new  body  of  law,  but  as  one  who  most  vigor- 
ously pursued  the  work  of  consolidating  and  popular- 
ising law  by  the  help  of  all  the  skilled  and  scientific 
minds  whose  resources  were  at  his  command.  Thousfh 
faulty  in  parta,  the  Civil  Code,  through  its  conciseness, 
B  2 


260  MODERN  EUBOPE.  1801-4. 

its  simplicity,  and  its  justice,  enabled  Napoleon  to  carry 
a  new  and  incomparably  better  social  order  into  every 
country  that  became  part  of  bis  Empire.  Four  other 
Codes,  appearing  at  intervals  from  the  year  1804  to  thcj 
year  1810,  embodied,  in  a  corresponding  form,  the  Law 
of  Commerce,  the  Criminal  Law,  and  the  Rules  of  Civil 
and  of  Criminal  Process.*  The  whole  remains  a  monu- 
ment of  the  legal  energy  of  the  period  which  began  in 
1789,  and  of  the  sagacity  with  which  ^N'apoleon  asso- 
ciated with  his  own  rule  all  the  science  and  the  reform- 
ing zeal  of  the  jurists  of  his  day. 
^^ff^a,r  more  distinctively  the  work  of  Napoleon's  own 
mind  was  the  reconciliation  with  the  Church 

The   Concordat. 

of  Eome  effected  by  the  Concordat.  It  was 
a  restoration  of  religion  similar  to  that  restoration  of 
political  order  which  made  the  public  service  the  engine 
of  a  single  ^will.  The  bishops  and  priests,  whose  ap- 
pointment the  Concordat  transferred  from  their  congre- 
gations to  the  Government,  were  as  much  instruments 
of  the  First  Consul  as  his  prefects  and  his  gendarmes. 
The  spiritual  wants  of  the  public,  the  craving  of  the 
poor  for  religious  consolation,  were  made  the  pretext 
for  introducing  the  new  theological  police.     But  the 

*  Tlie  first-hand  account  of  tlie  formation  of  the  Code  Napoleon,  with 
the  Proces- Verbal  of  the  Council  of  State  and  the  principal  reports, 
speeches,  &c.,  made  in  the  Tribunate  and  the  Legislative  Bodies,  is  to  be 
found  in  the  work  of  Baron  Locre,  "  La  Legislation  de  la  France,"  pub- 
lished at  Paris  in  1827.  Locre  was  Secretary  of  the  Council  of  State 
under  the  Consulate  and  the  Empire,  and  possessed  a  quantity  of  records 
which  had  not  been  published  before  1827.  The  Proces- Verbal,  though 
perhaps  not  always  faithful,  contains  the  only  record  of  Napoleon's  own 
share  in  the  discussions  of  the  Council  of  State. 


1801-4.  THE    OONOORDAT.  261 

situation  of  the  Catholic  Church  was  in  reality  no  worse 
in  France  at  the  commencement  of  the  Consulate  than 
its  present  situation  in  Ireland.  The  Republic  had 
indeed  subjected  the  non-juripg  priests  to  the  heaviest 
penalties  ;  but  the  exercise  of  Christian  worship,  which, 
even  in  the  Reign  of  Terror,  had  only  been  interrupted 
by  local  and  individual  fanaticism,  had  long  recovered 
the  protection  of  the  law,  services  in  the  open  air  being 
alone  prohibited."'*"  Since  1795  the  local  authorities 
had  been  compelled  to  admit  the  religious  societies  of 
their  district  to  the  use  of  church-buildings.  Though 
the  coup  d'etat  of  Fructidor,  1797,  renewed  the  prosecu- 

*  The  statement,  so  often  repeated,  that  the  Convention  prohibited 
Christian  worship,  or  "abolished  Christianity,"  in  France,  is  a  fiction. 
Thronghout  the  Reign  of  Terror  the  Convention  maintained  the  State 
Church,  as  established  by  the  Constituent  Assembly  in  1791.  Though  the 
salaries  of  the  clergy  fell  into  arrear,  the  Convention  rejected  a  proposal 
to  cease  paying  them.  The  non-juring  priests  were  condemned  by  the 
Convention  to  transportation,  and  were  liable  to  be  put  to  death  if  they 
returned  to  France.  But  where  churches  were  profaned,  or  constitutional 
priests  molested,  it  was  the  work  of  local  bodies,  or  of  individual  Conven- 
tionalists on  mission,  not  of  the  law.  The  Commune  of  Paris  shut  up 
most,  but  not  all,  of  the  churches  in  Paris.  Other  local  bodies  did  the 
same.  After  the  Reign  of  Terror  ended,  the  Convention  adopted  the 
proposal  which  it  had  rejected  before,  and  abolished  the  State  salary  of 
the  clergy  (Sept.  20th,  1794).  This  merely  placed  all  sects  on  a  level. 
But  local  fanatics  were  still  busy  against  religion ;  and  the  Convention 
accordingly  had  to  pass  a  law  (Feb.  23,  1795),  forbidding  all  interference 
with  Christian  services.  This  law  required  that  worsMp  sliould  not  be 
held  in  a  distinctive  building  (i.e.,  church),  nor  in  the  open  air.  Very 
soon  afterwards  the  Convention  (May  23)  permitted  the  churches  to  be 
used  for  worship.  The  laws  against  non-juring  priests  wore  not  now 
enforced,  and  a  number  of  churches  in  Paris  were  actually  given  up  to 
non-juring  priests.  The  Directory  was  inclined  to  renew  the  persecution 
of  this  class  in  1 796,  but  the  Assemblies  would  not  permit  it ;  and  in 
July,  1797,  the  Council  of  Five  Hundred  passed  a  motion  totally  abolishing 
the  legal  penalties  of  non- jurors.  This  was  immediately  followed  by  the 
coup  d'etat  of  Fructidor. 


2G2  MODERN  EUBOFK  i80i-4. 

tion  of  non-juring  priests,  it  in  no  way  cliecked  the 
activity  of  the  Constitutional  CliurcTi,  now  free  from  all 
connexion  with  the  Civil  Government.  While  the  non- 
juring  priests,  exiled  as  political  offenders,  or  theatri- 
cally adoring  the  sacred  elements  in  the  woods,  pretended 
that  the  age  of  the  martyrs  had  returned  to  France,  a 
Constitutional  Church,  ministering  in  4,000  parishes, 
unprivileged  but  unharassed  by  the  State,  supplied  the 
nation  with  an  earnest  and  respectable  body  of  clergy.* 
But  in  the  eyes  of  the  First  Consul  everything  left 
to  voluntary  association  was  so  much  lost  to  the  central 
power.  In  the  order  of  nature,  peasants  must  obey 
priests,  priests  must  obey  bishops,  and  bishops  must 
obey  the  First  Consul.  An  alliance  with  the  Pope 
offered  to  Bonaparte  the  means  of  supplanting  the 
popular  organisation  of  the  Constitutional  Church  by 
an  imposing  hierarchy,  rigid  in  its  orthodoxy  and 
unquestioning  in  its  devotion  to  himself.  In  return 
for  the  consecration  of  his  own  rule,  Bonaparte  did 
not  shrink  from  inviting  the  Pope  to  an  exercise  of 
authority  such  as  the  Holy  See  had  never  even  claimed 
in  France.  The  whole  of  the  existing  French  Bishops, 
both  the  exiled  non-jurors  and  those  of  the  Constitu- 
tional Church,  were  summoned  to  resign  their  Sees  into 
the  hands  of  the  Pope  ;  against  all  who  refused  to  do  so 
sentence  of  deposition  was  pronounced  by  the  Pontiff, 
without  a  word  heard  in  defence,  or  the  shadow  of  a  fault 
alleged.     The  Sees  were  re-organised,  and  filled  up  by 

*  Gregoire,  Membires,  ii.,  87.     Annales  de  la  Religion,  x.,  441 ;  Pres- 
sense,  L'^glise  et  la  Revolution,  p.  359. 


1801^  EI8E   OF   ULTRAMONTANISM,  (_^ 

nominees  of  the  First  Consul.  The  position  of  the 
great  body  of  the  clergy  was  substantially  altered  in 
its  relation  to  the  Bishops.  Episcopal  power  was  made 
despotic,  like  all  other  power  in  France :  thousands  of 
the  clergy,  hitherto  secure  in  their  livings,  were  placed 
at  the  disposal  of  their  bishop,  and  rendered  liable  to  be 
transferred  at  the  pleasure  of  their  superior 
from  place  to  place.  The  Constitutional  d^tr^  the  Free 
Church  vanished,  but  religion  appeared 
to  be  honoured  by  becoming  part  of  the  State.  ^^^ 
In  its  immediate  action,  the  Napoleonic  Church 
served  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  intended.  For  some 
few  years  the  clergy  unflaggingly  preached,  prayed,  and 
catechised  to  the  glory  of  their  restorer.  In  the  greater 
cycle  of  religious  change,  the  Concordat  of  Besvuta  in 
Bonaparte  appears  in  another  light.  "^How-  ■^*'"*°'°°**^'^«™- 
ever  little  appreciated  at  the  time,  it  was  the  greatest, 
the  most  critical,  victory  which  the  Eoman  See  has  ever 
gained  over  the  more  enlightened  and  the  more  national 
elements  in  the  Catholic  Churc^)  It  converted  the 
Catholicism  of  France  from  a  faith  already  far  more  in- 
dependent than  that  of  F^ndlon  and  Bossuet  into  the 
Catholicism  which  in  our  own  day  has  outstripped  the 
bigotry  of  Spain  and  Austria  in  welcoming  the  dogma 
of  Papal  infallibility.  The  lower  clergy,  condemned  by 
the  State  to  an  intolerable  subjection,  soon  found  their 
only  hope  in  an  appeal  to  Eome,  and  instinctively 
worked  as  the  emissaries  of  the  Koman  See.  The  Bishops, 
who  owed  their  office  to  an  unprecedented  exercise  of 
Papal  po\/er  and  to  the  destruction  of  religious  inde- 


264  MODERN  EUROPE.  i80i-4 

pendence  in  France,  were  not  the  men  who  could  main- 
tain a  struggle  with  the  Papacy  for  the  ancient  Grallican 
liberties.  In  the  resistance  to  the  Papacy  which  had 
been  maintained  by  the  Continental  Churches  in  a  greater 
or  less  degree  during  the  eighteenth  century,  France  had 
on  the  whole  taken  the  most  effective  part ;  but,  from 
the  time  when  the  Concordat  dissolved  both  the  ancient 
and  the  revolutionary  Church  system  of  France,  the 
Grallican  tradition  of  the  past  became  as  powerless  among 
the  French  clergy  as  the  philosophical  liberalism  of  the 
Ee  volution. 

In  Germany  the  destruction  of  the  temporal  power 
sodotheGer-  ^^  ^^^  Church  tcudcd  equally  to  Ultrambn- 
man  changes,  -fcauism.  An  archbishop  of  Cologne  who 
governed  half  a  million  subjects  was  less  likely  to  pros- 
trate himself  before  the  Papal  Chair  than  an  archbishop 
of  Cologne  who  was  only  one  among  a  regiment  of 
churchmen.  The  spiritual  Electors  and  Princes  who 
lost  their  dominions  in  1801  had  understood  by  the 
interests  of  their  order  something  more  tangible  than  a 
body  of  doctrines.  When  not  hostile  to  the  Papacy, 
they  had  usually  treated  it  with  indifference.  The  con- 
ception of  a  Catholic  society  exposed  to  persecution  at 
the  hands  of  the  State  on  account  of  its  devotion  to 
Eome  was  one  which  had  never  entered  the  mind  of 
German  ecclesiastics  in  the  eighteenth  century.  With- 
out the  changes  effected  in  Germany  by  the  Treaty  of 
Luneville,  without  the  Concordat  of  Bonaparte,  Catholic 
orthodoxy  would  never  have  become  identical  with 
Ultramontanism.     In  this  respect  the  opening  years  of 


ibOi-1.  ULTBAM0NTANI8M.  265 

the  present  century  mark  a  turning-point  in  the  relation 
of  the  Church  to  modern  life.  Abeady,  in  place  of  the 
old  monarchical  Governments,  friendly  on  the  whole  to 
the  Catholic  Church,  events  were  preparing  the  way  for 
that  changed  order  with  which  the  century  seems  destined 
to  close ; — an  emancipated  France,  a  free  Italy,  a  secular, 
state-disciplined  Germany,  and  the  Church  in  conspiracy 
against  them  all.  y/y 


^ 


CHAPTEE  VI. 

Engknd  claims  Malta — ^War  renewed — Bonaparte  occnpies  Hanover,  and 
blockades  the  Elbe — Remonstrances  of  Prussia — Cadoudal's  Plot — Murder 
of  the  Duke  of  Enghien — Napoleon  Emperor — Coalition  of  1805 — Prussia 
holds  aloof — State  of  Austria — Failure  of  Napoleon's  attempt  to  gain 
naral  superiority  in  the  Channel — Campaign  in  "Western  Germany — 
Capitulation  of  TJlm — Trafalgar — Treaty  of  Potsdam  between  Prussia  and 
the  Allies — The  French  enter  Vienna — Haugwitz  sent  to  Napoleon  with 
Prussian  Ultimatum — Battle  of  Austerlitz — Haugwitz  signs  a  Treaty  of 
Alliance  with  Napoleon — Peace — Treaty  of  Presburg— End  of  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire — Naples  given  to  Joseph  Bonaparte — Battle  of  Maida — 
The  Napoleonic  Empire  and  Dynasty — Federation  of  the  Rhine — State 
of  Germany — Possibility  of  maintaining  the  Empire  of  1806. 

War  was  renewed  between  France  and  Great  Britain  in 
the  spring  of  1803.  Addington's  Gro vein- 
pares  for  war,  ment,  in  their  desire  for  peace,  had  borne 
with  Bonaparte's  aggressions  during  all  the 
months  of  negotiation  at  Amiens  ;  they  had  met  his 
complaints  against  the  abuse  of  the  English  press  by 
prosecuting  his  Eoyalist  libellers ;  throughout  the  Ses- 
sion of  1802  they  had  upheld  the  possibility  of  peace 
against  the  attacks  of  their  parliamentary  opponents. 
The  invasion  of  Switzerland  in  the  autumn  of  1802,  fol- 
lowing the  annexation  of  Piedmont,  forced  the  Ministry 
to  alter  its  tone.  The  King's  Speech  at  the  meeting  of 
Parliament  in  November  declared  that  the  changes  in 
operation  on  the  Continent  demanded  measures  of  security 
on  the  part  of  Great  Britain.  The  naval  and  military 
forces  of  the  country  were  restored  to  a  war-footing; 


180S.  WAR   RENEWED    WITH   ENGLAND.  267 

the  evacuation  of  Malta  by  Great  Britain,  which  had 
hitherto  been  delayed  chiefly  through  a  misunderstand- 
ing with  Eussia,  was  no  longer  treated  as  a  matter  of 
certainty.  While  the  English  Government  still  wavered, 
a  challenge  was  thrown  down  by  the  First  Consul  which 
forced  them  into  decided  action.  The  Moniteur  published 
on  the  13th  of  January,  1803,  a  report  upon  Egypt  by 
Colonel  Sebastiani,  pointing  in  the  plainest  terms  to  the 
renewal  of  French  attacks  upon  the  East.  The  British 
Government  demanded  explanations,  and  declared  that 
until  satisfaction  was  given  upon  this  point  ^^1^^^  claims 
they  should  retain  possession  of  Malta. 
Malta  was  in  fact  appropriated  by  Great  Britain  as  an 
equivalent  for  the  Continental  territory  added  to  France 
since  the  end  of  the  war.* 

It  would  have  been  better  policy  if,  some  months 
earlier,  Bonaparte  had  been  required  to  withdraw  from 
Piedmont  or  from  Switzerland,  under  pain  of  hostilities 
with  England.  Great  Britain  had  as  little  technical 
right  to  retain  Malta  as  Bonaparte  had  to  annex  Pied- 
mont. The  desire  for  peace  had,  however,  led  Adding- 
ton's  Government  to  remain  inactive  until  Bonaparte's 
aggressions  had  become  accomplished  facts.  It  was  now 
too  late  to  attempt  to  undo  them  :  England  could  only 
treat  the  settlement  of  Amiens  as  superseded,  and  claim 
compensation  on  its  own  side.  Malta  was  the  position 
most  necessary  to  Great  Britain,  in  order  to  prevent 
Bonaparte  from  carrying  out  projects  in  Egypt  and 
Greece  of  which  the  Government  had  evidence  inde- 
•  Papers  presented  to  Farliaraont,  1802 — 3,  p.  96. 


268  MODERN  EUROPE.  i803. 

pendent  of  Sebastiani's  report.  The  value  of  Malta,  so 
lately  denied  by  ^N'elson,  was  now  fully  understood  both 
in  France  and  England.  No  sooner  had  the  English 
Ministry  avowed  its  intention  of  retaining  the  island 
than  the  First  Consul  declared  himself  compelled  to 
take  up  arms  in  behalf  of  the  faith  of  treaties.  Ignoring 
his  own  violations  of  treaty-rights  in  Italy  and  Switzer- 
land, Bonaparte  declared  the  retention  of  Malta  by 
Great  Britain  to  be  an  outrage  against  all  Europe.  He 
assailed  the  British  Ambassador  with  the  utmost  fury 
at  a  reception  held  at  the  Tuileries  on  the  13th  of 
March;    and,   after   a  correspondence  of   two    months. 

Wax  Ma        wMch   probably  marked  his    sense    of  the 
^^^'  power  and  obstinacy  of  his  enemy,  the  con- 

flict was  renewed  which  was  now  to  continue  without  a 
break  until  Bonaparte  was  driven  from  his  throne. 

So  long  as  England  was  without  Continental  allies 
its  warfare  was  limited  to  the  seizure  of  colonies  and 
the  blockade  of  ports :  on  the  part  of  France  nothing 
could  be  effected  against  the  island  Power  except  by 
Bona  arte  and     actual  iuvasiou.    Thcrc  was,  however,  among 

Hanover.  ^^^  commuuitics  of  Grermany  one  which,  in 
the  arguments  of  a  conqueror,  might  be  treated  as  a 
dependency  of  England,  and  made  to  suffer  for  its  con- 
nection with  the  British  Crown.  Hanover  had  hither- 
to by  common  agreement  been  dissociated  from  the 
wars  in  which  its  Elector  engaged  as  King  of  England; 
even  the  personal  presence  of  King  Greorge  II.  at  the 
battle  of  Dettingen  had  been  held  no  ground  for  violating 
its  neutrality.     Bonaparte,  however,  was  untroubled  by 


1803.  TEE  FRENGE   OOOUPY    HANOVEB.  269 

precedents  in  a  case  where  lie  had  so  much  to  gain. 
Apart  from  its  value  as  a  possible  object  of  exchange  in 
the  next  treaty  with  England,  Hanover  would  serve  as  a 
means  of  influencing  Prussia :  it  was  also  worth  so  many 
millions  in  cash  through  the  requisitions  which  might 
be  imposed  upon  its  inhabitants.  The  only  scruple  felt 
by  Bonaparte  in  attacking  Hanover  arose  from  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  forcible  resistance  on  the  part  of  Prussia  to 
the  appearance  of  a  French  army  in  North  Germany. 
Accordingly,  before  the  invasion  began.  General  Duroc 
was  sent  to  Berlin  to  inform  the  King  of  the  First 
Consul's  intentions,  and  to  soothe  any  irritation  that 
might  be  felt  at  the  Prussian  Court  by  assurances  of 
friendship  and  respect. 

It  was  a  moment  of  the  most  critical  importance  to 
Prussia.  Prussia  was  the  recognised  2:uardian     .,     .      , 

O  o  Prussia  i*-ni\ 

of  Northern  Germany ;  every  consideration  ^^»°°^^- 
of  interest  and  of  honour  required  that  its  Government 
should  forbid  the  proposed  occupation  of  Hanover — if 
necessary,  at  the  risk  of  actual  war.  Hanover  in  the 
hands  of  France  meant  the  extinction  of  German  inde- 
pendence up  to  the  frontiers  of  the  Prussian  State.  If, 
as  it  was  held  at  Berlin,  the  cause  of  Great  Britain  was 
an  unjust  one,  and  if  the  connection  of  Hanover  with 
the  British  Crown  was  for  the  future  to  make  that 
province  a  scapegoat  for  the  offences  of  England,  the 
wisest  course  for  Prussia  would  have  been  to  deliver 
Hanover  at  once  from  its  French  and  from  its  English 
enemies  by  occupying  it  with  its  own  forces.  The 
Foreign   Minister,  Count  Haugwitz,  appears   to   have 


270  MODEBlSr  EUROPE,  1803. 

recommended  this  step,  but  his  counsels  were  overruled. 
King  Frederick  William  III.,  who  had  succeeded  his 
father  in  1797,  was  a  conscientious  but  a  timid  and 
spiritless  being.  Public  affairs  were  in  the  hands  of  his 
private  advisers,  of  whom  the  most  influential  were  the 
so-called  cabinet- secretaries,  Lombard  and  Beyme,  men 
credulously  anxious  for  the  goodwill  of  France,  and 
perversely  blind  to  the  native  force  and  worth  which 
still  existed  in  the  Prussian  Monarchy.*  Instead  of 
declaring  the  entry  of  the  French  into  Hanover  to 
be  absolutely  incompatible  with  the  safety  of  the  other 
North  German  States,  King  Frederick  William  endea- 
voured to  avert  it  by  diplomacy.  He  tendered  his 
mediation  to  the  British  Government  upon  condi- 
tion of  the  evacuation  of  Malta ;  and,  when  this 
proposal  was  bluntly  rejected,  he  offered  to  the  First 
Consul  his  personal  security  that  Hanover  should  pay 
a  sum  of  money  in  order  to  be  spared  the  intended 
invasion. 

Such  a  proposal  marked  the  depth  to  which  Prussian 
statesmanship  had  sunk ;  .it  failed  to  affect  the  First 
Consul  in  the  slightest  degree.  While  negotiations 
were  still  proceeding,  a  French  division,  commanded  by 
General  Mortier,  entered  Hanover  (May,  1803).      The 

•  "  The  King  and  his  Ministers  are  in  tha  greatest  distress  and  embar- 
rassment. The  latter  do  not  hesitate  to  avow  it,  and  the  King  has  for  the 
last  week  shown  snch  evident  symptoms  of  dejection  that  the  least  obser- 
vant could  not  but  remark  it.  He  has  expressed  himself  most  feelingly 
upon  the  unfortunate  predicament  in  which  he  finds  himself.  He  would 
welcome  the  hand  that  should  assist  him  and  the  voice  that  should  give  him 
courage  to  extricate  himself." — F.  Jackson's  despatch  from  Berlin,  May  16, 
1803;    Records:  Prussia,  vol.  189. 


uoa.  FBUSaiA   AND   HANOVER,  271 

Hanoverian  army  was  lost  through  the  follies  of  the  civil 
Government ;  the  Duke  of  Cambridge,  com- 

•t  (,  A. .-!•••  I  •  .  French     enter 

mander  or  one  or  its  divisions,  less  ingenious    Hanover,  May, 
than  his  brother  the  Duke  of  York  in  find- 
ing excuses  for  capitulation,  resigned  his  commission, 
and  fled  to  England,  along  with  many  brave  soldiers, 
who  subsequently  found  in  the  army  of  Great  Britain 
the  opportunity  for  honourable  service  which  was  denied 
to  them  at  home.     Hanover  passed  into  the  possession 
of  France,  and  for  two  years  the  miseries  of  French 
occupation  were  felt  to  the  full.      Extortion  consumed 
the  homely  wealth  of  the  country ;  the  games  and  meet- 
ings of  the  people  were  prohibited  ;  French 
spies  violated  the  confidences  of  private  life ;     Hanover,  laos 
law  was  administered  by  foreign  soldiers; 
the  press  existed  only  for  the  purpose  of  French  pro- 
selytism.     It  was  in  Hanover  that  the  bitterness  of  that 
oppression   was    first   felt    which   subsequently  roused 
all  North  Germany  against  a  foreign  master,  and  forced 
upon  the  race  the  long-forgotten  claims  of  patriotism 
and  honour. 

Bonaparte  had  justly  calculated  upon  the  inaction  of 
the  Prussian  Government  when  he  gave  the  order  to 
General  Mortier  to  enter  Hanover ;  his  next  step  proved 
the  growth  of  his  confidence  in  Prussia's  impassivity. 
A  French  force  was  despatched  to  Cuxhaven,  French  blockade 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Elbe,  in  order  to  stop  *^*^^ 
the  commerce  of  Great  Britain  with  the  interior  of 
Germany.  The  British  Government  immediately  in- 
formed the  Court  of  Berlin  that  it  should  blockade  the 


272  MODERN  EUROPE.  1803. 

Elbe  and  the  Weser  against  the  ships  of  all  nations 
unless  the  French  soldiers  withdrew  from  the  Elbe.  As 
the  linen  trade  of  Silesia  and  other  branches  of  Prussian 
industry  depended  upon  the  free  navigation  of  the  Elbe, 
the  threatened  reprisals  of  the  British  Government  raised 
very  serious  questions  for  Prussia.  It  was  France,  not 
England,  that  had  first  violated  the  neutrality  of  the 
river  highway  ;  and  the  King  of  Prussia  now  felt  himself 
compelled  to  demand  assurances  from  Bona- 
strance  of        partc  that  the  interests  of  Germany  should 

Prussia.  ■*■  "^ 

suffer  no  further  injury  at  his  hands.  A 
letter  was  written  by  the  King  to  the  First  Consul,  and 
entrusted  to  the  cabinet- secretary  Lombard,  who  car- 
ried it  to  Napoleon  at  Brussels  (July,  1803).  Lombard, 
the  son  of  French  parents  who  had  settled  at  Berlin  in 
the  reign  of  Frederick  the  Great,  had  risen  from  a 
humble  station  through  his  skill  in  expression  in  the 
two  languages  that  were  native  to  him ;  and  the  accom- 
plishments which  would  have  made  him  a  good  clerk  or  a 
successful  journalist  made  him  in  the  eyes  of  Frederick 
William  a  counsellor  for  kings.  The  history  of  his 
mission  to  Brussels  gives  curious  evidence  both  of  the 
fascination  exercised  by  Napoleon  over  common  minds, 
and  of  the  political  helplessness  which  in  Prussia  could 
now  be  mistaken  for  the  quality  of  a  statesman.  Lom- 
bard failed  to  obtain  from  Napoleon  any  guarantee  or 
securit}^  whatever;  yet  he  wrote  back  in  terras  of  the 
utmost  delight  upon  the  success  of  his  mission.  Napo- 
leon had  infatuated  him  by  the  mere  exercise  of  his 
personal  charm.     "  What  I  cannot  describe,*'  said  Lorn- 


IflOl  MISSION   OF   LOMBARD.  273 

bard,  in  his  report  to  the  King  relating  his  interview 
with  the  First  Consul,*  "is  the  tone  of  goodness  and 
noble  frankness  with  which  he  expressed  his  reverence 
for  your  Majesty's  rights,  and  asked  for  that  confidence 
from  your  Majesty  which  he  so  well  deserves."  "  I  only 
wish,*'  he  cried  at  the  close  of  ]N'apoleon*s  address,  **  that 
I  could  convey  to  the  King,  my  master,  every  one  of 
your  words  and  the  tone  in  which  they  are  uttered;  he 
would  then,  I  am  sure,  feel  a  double  joy  at  the  justice 
with  which  you  have  always  been  treated  at  his  hands/' 
Lombard's  colleagues  at  Berlin  were  perhaps  not  stronger 
men  than  the  envoy  himself,  but  they  were  at  least 
beyond  the  range  of  Napoleon's  voice  and  glance,  and 
they  received  this  rhapsod}^  with  coldness.  They  com- 
plained that  no  single  concession  had  been  made  by  the 
First  Consul  upon  the  points  raised  by  the  King.  Cux- 
haven  continued  in  French  hands ;  the  British  inexor- 
ably blockaded  the  Germans  upon  their  own  neutral 
waters ;  and  the  cautious  statecraft  of  Prussia  proved 
as  valueless  to  Grermany  as  the  obstinate,  speculating, 
warfare  of  Austria. 

There  was,  however,  a  Power  which  watched  the 
advance  of  French  dominion  into  Northern       Alexander 
Germany  with  less  complaisance  than  the       d^i«»««*- 
Germans  themselves.     The  Czar  of  Eussia  had  gradually 

•  Hansser  li.,  472.  There  are  interesting  acconnts  of  Lombard  and 
the  other  leading  porsons  of  Berlin  in  F.  Jackson's  despatches  of  this  date. 
The  charge  of  gross  personal  immorality  made  against  Lombard  is  brought 
against  almost  every  German  public  man  of  the  time  in  the  writings  of 
opponents.  History  and  politics  are,  however,  a  bad  tribunal  of  private 
eharacter. 


274  MODERN  EUEOPK  1804. 

come  to  understand  the  part  allotted  to  him  by  Bona- 
parte since  the  Peace  of  Lundville,  and  was  no  longer 
inclined  to  serve  as  the  instrument  of  French  ambition. 
Bonaparte's  occupation  of  Hanover  changed  the  attitude 
of  Alexander  into  one  of  coldness  and  distrust.  Alex- 
ander saw  and  lamented  the  help  which  he  himself  had 
given  to  Bonaparte  in  Germany:  events  that  now  took 
place  in  France  itself,  as  well  as  the  progress  of  French 
intrigues  in  Turkey,*  threw  him  into  the  arms  of  Bona- 
parte's enemies,  and  prepared  the  way  for  a  new  European 
coalition.     The  First  Consul  had  determined 

about^to  become     to  assumc  the  dio-nitY  of  Emperor.    The  re- 
Emperor.  O       »/  J. 

newal  of  war  with  England  excited  a  new  out- 
burst of  enthusiasm  for  his  person ;  nothing  was  want- 
ing to  place  the  crown  on  his  head  but  the  discovery  of  a 
plot  against  his  life.  Such  a  plot  had  been  long  and 
carefully  followed  by  the  police.  A  Breton  gentleman, 
Georges  Cadoudal,  had  formed  the  design  of  attacking 
the  First  Consul  in  the  streets  of  Paris  in  the  midst  of 
his  guards.  Cadoudal  and  his  fellow-conspirators,  in- 
cluding General  Pichegru,  were  traced  by  the  police 
from  the  coast  of  Normandy  to  Paris:  an  unsuccessful 
attempt  was  made  to  lure  the  Count  of  Artois,  and  other 
royal  patrons  of  the  conspiracy,  from  Great  Britain. 
When   all  the  conspirators   who  could   be  enticed  to 

*  Fonmier,  Gentz  tmd  Cobenzl,  p.  79.  Beer,  Zehn  Jalire,  p.  49. 
The  despatches  of  Sir  J .  Warren  of  this  date  from  St.  Petersburg  (Records: 
Russia,  vol.  175)  are  full  of  plans  for  meeting  an  expected  invasion  of  the 
Morea  and  the  possible  liberation  of  the  Greeks  by  Bonaparte.  They 
give  the  impression  that  Eastern  affairs  were  really  the  dominant  inte- 
rest with  Alexander  in  his  breach  with  France. 


MUBDEB    OF  ENQHIEN,  275 

France  were  collected  within  the  capital,  the  police, 
who  had  watched  every  stage  of  the  movement,  began 
to  make  arrests.  Moreau,  the  last  Eepublican  soldier 
of  France,  was  charged  with  complicity  in  the  plot. 
Pichegru  and  Cadoudal  were  thrown  into  prison,  there 
to  await  their  doom ;  Moreau,  who  probably  wished  for 
the  overthrow  of  the  Consular  Government,  but  had  no 
part  in  the  design  against  Bonaparte's  life,*  was  kept 
under  arrest  and  loaded  with  official  calumny.  One 
sacrifice  more  remained  to  be  made,  in  place  of  the 
Bourbon  d'Artois,  who  baffled  the  police  of  the  First 
Consul  beyond  the  seas.  In  the  territory  of  Baden, 
twelve  miles  from  the  French  frontier,  there  lived  a 
prince  of  the  exiled  house,  the  Duke  of  Enghien,  a 
soldier  under  the  first  Coalition  against  France,  now  a 
harmless  dependent  on  the  bounty  of  England.  French 
spies  surrounded  him ;  his  excursions  into  the  mountains 
gave  rise  to  a  suspicion  that  he  was  concerned  in  Piche- 
gru's  plot.  This  was  enough  to  mark  him  for  destruc- 
tion. Bonaparte  gave  orders  that  he  should  be  seized, 
brought  to  Paris,  and  executed.  On  the  15th  of  March, 
1804,  a  troop  of  French  soldiers  crossed  the 
Rhine  and  arrested  the  Duke  in  his  own    Duke  of  Enghien. 

March  -JO,  IdOi. 

house  at  Ettenheim,  They  arrived  with  him 
at  Paris  on  the  20th.  He  was  taken  to  the  fort  of 
Vincennes  without  entering  the  city.  On  that  same 
night  a  commission  of  six  colonels  sat  in  judgment  upon 
the  prisoner,  whose  grave  was  already  dug,  and  pro- 
nounced sentence  of  death  without  hearing  a  word  of 

•  Miot  de  Melito,  L,  oh.  16.    Savaxy,  iL,  3^ 

b2 


276  MODERN  EUROPE.  im. 

evidence.      At   daybreak    tlie   Duke  was  led  out  and 
shot. 

If  some  barbaric  instinct  made  tbe  slaughter  of  his 
predecessor's  kindred  in  Bonaparte's  own  eyes  the  omen 
of  a  successful  usurpation,  it  was  not  so  with  Europe 
generally.  One  universal  sense  of  horror  passed,  over 
the  Continent.  The  Court  of  Eussia  put  on  mourning ; 
even  the  Diet  of  Eatisbon  showed  signs  of  human  pas- 
sion at  the  indignity  done  to  Germany  by  the  seizure  of 
the  Duke  of  Enghien  on  German  soil.  Austria  kept 
silent,  but  watched  the  signs  of  coming  war.  France 
alone  showed  no  pity.  Before  the  Duke  of  Enghien 
had  been  dead  a  week,  the  Senate  besought  Napoleon  to 
give  to  France  the  security  of  a  hereditary  throne 
Prefects,  bishops,  mayors,  and  councils  with  one  voice 
repeated  the  official  prayer.     A  resolution 

Napoleon  Em-        .       p  «    .  •    i  i  i  i  i    o 

peror,Mayi8,  m  lavour  01  imperial-  rule  was  brought  for- 
ward in  the  Tribunate,  and  passed,  after  a 
noble  and  solitary  protest  on  the  part  of  Carnot.  A 
decree  of  the  Senate  embodied  the  terms  of  the  new 
Constitution;  and  on  the  18th  of  May,  without  waiting 
for  the  sanction  of  a  national  vote.  Napoleon  assumed 
the  title  of  Emperor  of  the  French. 

In  France  itself  the  change  was  one  more  of  the 
name  than  of  the  substance  of  power.  Napoleon  could 
not  be  vested  with  a  more  absolute  authority  than  he 
already  possessed ;  but  the  forms  of  republican  equality 
vanished;  and  although  the  real  social  equality  given 
to  France  by  the  Eevolution  was  beyond  reach  of  change, 
the  nation  had  to  put  up  with  a  bastard  Court  and  a 


1805.  NAPOLEON  EMPEBOn.  277 

fictitious  aristocracy  of  Corsican  princes,  Terrorist  ex- 
cellencies, and  Jacobin  dukes.  The  new  dynasty  was 
recognised  at  Vienna  and  Berlin :  on  the  part  of 
Austria  it  received  the  compliment  of  an  imitation. 
Three  months  after  the  assumption  of  the  Imperial  title 
by  Napoleon,  the  Emperor  Francis  (Emperor  in  Ger- 
many, but  King  in  Hungary  and  Bohemia)  assumed  the 
title  of  Emperor  of  all  his  Austrian  dominions.  Tlie 
true  reason  for  this  act  was  the  virtual  disso- 
lution of  the  Germanic  system  by  the  Peace  of  Austria,  Aug., 
of  Lun6ville,  and  the  probability  that  the 
old  Imperial  dignity,  if  preserved  in  name,  would  soon 
be  transferred  to  some  client  of  Napoleon  or  to  Napoleon 
himself.  Such  an  apprehension  was,  however,  not  one 
that  could  be  confessed  to  Europe.  Instead  of  the 
ruin  of  Germany,  the  grandeur  of  Austria  was  made  the 
ostensible  ground  of  change.  In  language  which  seemed 
to  be  borrowed  from  the  scriptural  history  of  Nebuchad- 
nezzar, the  Emperor  Francis  declared  that,  although  no 
possible  addition  could  be  made  to  his  own  personal 
dignity,  as  Eoman  Emperor,  yet  the  ancient  glory  of  the 
Austrian  House,  the  grandeur  of  the  principalities  and 
kingdoms  which  were  united  under  its  dominion,  re- 
quired that  the  Sovereigns  of  Austria  should  hold  a  title 
equal  to  that  of  the  greatest  European  throne.  A 
general  war  against  Napoleon  was  already  being  pro- 
posed by  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg;  but  for  the 
present  the  Corsican  and  the  Hapsburg  Caesar  exchanged 
their  hypocritical  congratulations.* 

*  A  protest  liauded  in  at  "Vienna  by  Lonis  XVIH.  against  Napoleon's 
title  was  burnt  in  the  presence  of  the  French  ambassador.    The  Austrian 


278  MODERN  EUROPE.  1805. 

Almost  at  the  same  time  that  Bonaparte  ascended 

the  throne,  Pitt  returned  to  power  in  Grreat 

Minister.  May,      Britain.     He  was  summoned  by  the  general 

1804.  ^  ^  .     . 

distrust  felt  in  Addington's  Ministry,  and 
by  the  belief  that  no  statesman  but  himself  could  rally 
the  Powers  of  Europe  against  the  common  enemy.  Pitt 
was  not  long  in  framing  with  Russia  the  plan  of  a  third 
Coalition.  The  Czar  broke  off  diplomatic  intercourse 
with  Napoleon  in  September,  1804,  and  induced  the 
Court  of  Vienna  to  pledge  itself  to  resist  any  further 
extension  of  French  power.  Sweden  entered  into  en- 
gagements with  Grreat  Britain.  On  the  opening  of 
Parliament  at  the  beginning  of  1805,  King  Greorge  III. 
announced  that  an  understanding  existed  between  Grreat 
Britain  and  Eussia,  and  asked  in  general  terms  for  a 
provision  for  Continental  subsidies.  In  April,  a  treaty 
was  signed  at  St.  Petersburg  by  the  representatives  of 
Coalition  of  B^ssia  and  Great  Britain,  far  more  compre- 
^^^*  hensive  and   more  serious  in  its  provisions 

than  any  which  had  yet  united  the  Powers  against 
France.^  Eussia  and  England  bound  themselves  to 
direct  their  efforts  to  the  formation  of  a  European 
League  capable  of  placing  five  hundred  thousand  men 
in  the  field.  Grreat  Britain  undertook  to  furnish  subsidies 
to  every  member  of  the  League  ;  no  peace  was  to  be  con- 
cluded with  France  but  by  common  consent ;  conquests 

title  was  assumed  on  August  10,  but  the  publication  was  delayed  a  day  on 
account  of  the  sad  memories  of  August  10, 1792.  Fournier,  p.  102.  Beer, 
p.  60. 

*  Papers  presented  to  Parliament,  28th  January,  1806,  and  5th  May, 
1815. 


1805.  TEE    TniRV    GOALITIOn.  279 

made  by  any  of  the  belligerents  were  to  remain  un- 
appropriated until  the  general  peace ;  and  at  the  termi- 
nation of  the  war  a  Congress  was  to  fix  certain  disputed 
points  of  international  right,  and  to  establish  a  federa- 
tive European  system  for  their  maintenance  and  en- 
forcement. As  the  immediate  objects  of  the  League, 
the  treaty  specified  the  expulsion  of  the  French  from 
Holland,  Switzerland,  Italy,  and  Northern  Germany; 
the  re-establishment  of  the  King  of  Sardinia  in  Pied- 
mont, with  an  increase  of  territory  ;  and  the  creation  of 
a  solid  barrier  against  any  future  usurpations  of  France. 
The  last  expression  signified  the  union  of  Holland  and 
part  of  Belgium  under  the  House  of  Orange.  In  this 
respect,  as  in  the  provision  for  a  common  disposal  of 
conquests  and  for  the  settlement  of  European  affliirs  by 
a  Congress,  the  Anglo-Eussian  Treaty  of  1805  defined 
the  policy  actually  carried  out  in  1814.  Other  territorial 
changes  now  suggested  by  Pitt,  including  the  annexa- 
tion of  the  Ehenish  Provinces  to  the  Prussian  Monarchy, 
were  not  embodied  in  the  treaty,  but  became  from  this 
time  understood  possibilities. 

England  and  Eussia  had,  however,  some  difficulty  in 
securing  allies.  Although  in  violation  of  his  promises  to 
Austria,  Napoleon  had  accepted  the  title  of  King  of 
Italy  from  the  Senate  of  the  Italian  Eepublic,  and 
had  crowned  himself  with  the  Iron  Crown  of  Lombardy 
(March,  1805),  the  Ministers  at  Vienna  would  have  pre- 
ferred peace,  if  that  had  been  possible ;  and  their 
master  reluctantly  consented  to  a  war  against  Napoleon 
when  war  in  some  form  or  other  seemed   inevitable. 


280  MOBEBN  EUBOPK  im. 

The  policy  of  Prussia  was  doubtful.  For  two  years 
past  Napoleon  had  made  every  effort  to  induce  Prussia 
to  enter  into  alliance  with  himself.  After  the  invasion 
of  Hanover  he  had  doubled  his  attentions  to  the  Court 
of  Berlin,  and  had  spared  nothing  in  the  way  of 
promises  and  assurances  of  friendship  to  win  the  King 

PoUc  of  ^^^^  ^^  ^^^  ^^^^'  ^^^  neutrality  of  Prussia 
^*^^'**  was  of  no  great  service  to  France :  its  sup- 
23ort  would  have  been  of  priceless  value,  rendering  any 
attack  upon  France  by  Eussia  or  Austria  almost  im- 
possible, and  thus  enabling  Napoleon  to  throw  his  whole 
strength  into  the  combat  with  Great  Britain.  In  the 
spring  of  1804,  the  King  of  Prussia,  uncertain  of  the 
friendship  of  the  Czar,  and  still  unconvinced  of  the 
vanity  of  Napoleon's  professions,  had  inclined  to  a  de- 
fensive alliance  with  France.  The  news  of  the  murder 
of  the  Duke  of  Enghien,  arriving  almost  simultaneously 
with  a  message  of  goodwill  from  St.  Petersburg,  led 
him  to  abandon  this  project  of  alliance,  but  caused  no 
breach  with  Napoleon.  Frederick  William  adhered  to 
the  temporising  policy  which  Prussia  had  followed  since 
1795,  and  the  Foreign  Minister,  Haugwitz,  who  had 
recommended  bolder  measures,  withdrew  for  a  time  from 
the  Court."^  Baron  Hardenberg,  who  had  already  acted 
as  his  deputy,  stepped  into  his  place.  Hardenberg,  the 
negotiator  of  the  peace  of  Basle,  had  for  the  last  ten 
years  advocated  a  system  of  neutrality.  A  politician 
quick  to  grasp  new  social  and  political  ideas,  he  was 

*  Hardenberg,  ii.,  50 :  corrected  in   the  articles  on  Hardenberg  and 
Haugwitz  in  the  Deutsch  Allgemeine  Biographie 


1805. 


rOLIOY   OF  PRUSSIA.  281 


without  that  insight  into  the  real  forces  at  work  in 
Europe  which,  in  spite  of  errors  in  detail,  made  the 
political  aims  of  Pitt,  and  of  many  far  inferior  men, 
substantially  just  and  correct.  So  late  as  the  end  of  the 
year  1804,  Hardenherg  not  only  failed  to  recognise  the 
dangers  to  which  Prussia  was  exposed  from  Napoleon's 
ambition,  but  conceived  it  to  be  still  possible  for  Prussia 
to  avert  war  between  Prance  and  the  Allied  Powers  by 
maintaining  a  good  understanding  with  all  parties  alike. 
Hardenberg's  neutrality  excited  the  wrath  of  the  Eus- 
sian  Cabinet.  While  Metternich,  the  Austrian  am- 
bassador at  Berlin,  cautiously  felt  his  way,  the  Czar 
proposed  in  the  last  resort  to  force  Prussia 

Prussia  neutral. 

to  take  up  arms.  A  few  months  more 
passed ;  and,  when  hostilities  were  on  the  point  of 
breaking  out,  Hanover  was  definitely  offered  to  Prussia 
by  Napoleon  as  the  price  of  an  alliance.  Hardenherg, 
still  believing  that  it  lay  within  the  power  of  Prussia,  by 
means  of  a  French  alliance,  both  to  curb  Napoleon  and 
to  prevent  a  European  war,  urged  the  King  to  close 
with  the  offer  of  the  French  Emperor.*  But  the 
King  shrank  from  a  decision  which  involved  the  possi- 
bility of  immediate  war.  The  offer  of  Hanover  was 
rejected,  and  Prussia  connected  itself  neither  with 
Napoleon  nor  his  enemies. 

•  Hardenherg,  v.,  167.  Hardenherg  was  meanwhile  representing 
himself  to  the  British  and  Bnssian  envoys  as  tlie  partisan  of  the  Allies. 
"  He  declared  that  he  saw  it  was  become  impossible  for  this  country  to 
remain  neutral,  and  that  he  should  unequivocally  make  known  his  senti- 
ments to  that  ofPoct  to  the  King.  Ho  added  that  if  the  decision  depended 
upon  himself,  Eussia  need  entertain  no  apprehension  as  to  the  part  he 
should  take."— Jackjion, Sept.  3,  1805;  Records:  Prussia,  vol.  194, 


282  MOBBBN  EUROPE.  1805. 


Pitt,  the  autlior  of  tlie  Coalition  of  1805,  had 
formed  the  most  sanguine  estimate  of  the  armaments 
state  of  Austria  ^^  ^^^  alHes.  Austria  was  said  to  have 
The  army.  entered  upon  a  new  era  since  the  peace  of 
Luneville,  and  to  have  turned  to  the  best  account  all  the 
disasters  of  its  former  campaigns.  There  had  indeed 
been  no  want  of  fine  professions  from  Vienna,  but  Pitt 
knew  little  of  the  real  state  of  affairs.  The  Archduke 
Charles  had  been  placed  at  the  head  of  the  military  ad- 
ministration, and  entrusted  with  extraordinary  powers  ; 
but  the  whole  force  of  routine  and  corruption  was 
ranged  against  him.  He  was  deceived  by  his  subordi- 
nates ;  and  after  three  years  of  reorganisation  he  re- 
signed his  post,  confessing  that  he  left  the  army  no 
nearer  efficiency  than  it  was  before.  Charles  was  re- 
placed at  the  War  Office  by  Greneral  Mack.  Within 
six  months  this  bustling  charlatan  imagined  himself  to 
have  effected  the  reorganisation  of  which  the  Archduke 
despaired,^  while  he  had  in  fact  only  introduced  new 
confusion  into  an  army  already  hampered  beyond  any 
in  Europe  by  its  variety  of  races  and  languages. 

If  the  military  reforms  of  Austria  were  delusive,  its 
PoHticai  condi-  poHtical  rcforms  were  still  more  so.  The 
tion  of  Austria.  Empcror  had  indeed  consented  to  unite  the 
Ministers,  who  had  hitherto  worked  independently,  in  a 
Council  of  State ;  but  here  reform  stopped.  Cobenzl, 
who  was  now  First  Minister,  understood  nothing  but 
diplomacy.      Men  continued   in   office  whose  presence 

•  Gentz,  Schrif  ten,  iii.,  60.     Beer,  132, 141.    Foumier,  104    Springer, 
1,64 


1805.  8TATE   OF  AUSTRIA  283 

was  an  insuperable  bar  to  any  intelligent  action :  even 
in  that  mechanical  routine  which,  in  the  eyes  of 
the  Emperor  Francis,  constituted  the  life  of  the  State, 
everything  was  antiquated  and  self-contradictory.  In 
all  that  affected  the  mental  life  of  the  people  the  years 
that  followed  the  peace  of  Lun^ville  were  distinctly 
retrograde.  Education  was  placed  more  than  ever  in  the 
hands  of  the  priests ;  the  censorship  of  the  press  was 
given  to  the  police  ;  a  commission  was  charged  with  the 
examination  of  all  the  books  printed  during  the  reign  of 
the  Emperor  Joseph,  and  above  two  thousand  works, 
which  had  come  into  being  during  that  brief  period  of 
Austrian  liberalism,  were  suppressed  and  destroyed. 
Trade  regulations  were  issued  which  combined  the  ex- 
travagance of  the  French  Eeign  of  Terror  with  the  ig- 
norance of  the  Middle  Ages.  All  the  grain  in  the 
country  was  ordered  to  be  sold  before  a  certain  date, 
and  the  Jews  were  prohibited  from  carrying  on  the 
corn-trade  for  a  year.  Such  were  the  reforms  described 
by  Pitt  in  the  English  Parliament  as  having  effected 
the  regeneration  of  Austria.  Nearer  home  things  were 
judged  in  a  truer  light.  Mack's  paper-regiments,  the 
helplessness  and  unreality  of  the  whole  system  of  Austrian 
officialism,  were  correctly  appreciated  by  the  men  who 
had  been  most  in  earnest  during  the  last  war.  Even 
Thugut  now  thought  a  contest  hopeless.  The  Arch- 
duke Charles  argued  to  the  end  for  peace,  and  entered 
upon  the  war  with  the  presentiment  of  defeat  and 
ruin. 

The  plans  of  the  Allies  for  the  campaign  of  1805 


284  MODERN  EUROPE.  im. 

covered  an  immense  field."'*'  It  was  intended  that  one 
Plans  of  cam-  Austrian  army  should  operate  in  Lombardy 
paign,  1806.  i;ixider  the  Archduke  Charles,  while  a  second, 
under  General  Mack,  entered  Bavaria,  and  there  awaited 
the  arrival  of  the  E-ussians,  who  were  to  unite  with  it 
in  invading  Trance :  British  and  Eussian  contingents 
were  to  combine  with  the  King  of  Sweden  in  Pomerania, 
and  with  the  King  of  Naples  in  Southern  Italy.  At 
the  head-quarters  of  the  Allies  an  impression  prevailed 
that  Napoleon  was  unprepared  for  war.  It  was  even  be- 
lieved that  his  character  had  lost  something  of  its  energy 
under  the  influence  of  an  Imperial  Court.  Never  was 
there  a  more  fatal  illusion.  The  forces  of  France  had 
never  been  so  overwhelming;  the  plans  of  Napoleon 
had  never  been  worked  out  with  greater  minuteness  and 
certainty.  From  Hanover  to  Strasburg  masses  of 
troops  had  been  collected  upon  the  frontier  in  readiness 
for  the  order  to  march;  and,  before  the  campaign 
opened,  the  magnificent  army  of  Boulogne,  which  had 
been  collected,  for  the  invasion  of  England,  was  thrown 
into  the  scale  against  Austria. 

Events  had  occurred  at  sea  which  frustrated  Napo- 
leon's plan  for  an  attack  upon  Grreat  Britain. 

Failure   of  Na-  •*■  •*■ 

£^?  agZi  This  attack,  which  in  1797  had  been  but 
lightly  threatened,  had,  upon  the  renewal  of 
war  with  England  in  1803,  become  the  object  of  Napo- 
leon's most  serious  efforts.  An  army  was  concentrated 
at  Boulogne  sufficient  to  overwhelm  the  military  forces 
of  England,  if  once  it  could  reach  the  opposite  shore. 

•  itiistow,  Krieg  von  1805,  p.  66. 


1805.  NAPOLEON'S   NAVAL    FAILURE.  285 

Napoleon's  thoughts  were  centred  on  a  plan  for  obtain- 
ing the  naval  superioritj  in  the  channel,  if  only  for  the 
few  hours  which  it  would  take  to  transport  the  army 
from  Boulogne  to  the  English  coast.  It  was  his  design 
to  lure  Nelson  to  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic  by  a 
feigned  expedition  against  the  West  Indies,  and,  during 
the  absence  of  the  English  admiral,  to  unite  all  the 
fleets  at  present  lying  blockaded  in  the  French  ports,  as 
a  cover  for  the  invading  armament.  Admiral  Villeneuve 
was  ordered  to  sail  to  Martinique,  and,  after  there  meet- 
ing with  some  other  ships,  to  re- cross  the  Atlantic  with 
all  possible  speed,  and  liberate  the  fleets  blockaded  in 
Ferrol,  Brest,  and  Rochefort.  The  junction  of  the 
fleets  would  give  Napoleon  a  force  of  fifty  sail  in  the 
British  Channel,  a  force  more  than  sufiicient  to  over- 
power all  the  squadrons  which  Great  Britain  could  pos- 
sibly collect  for  the  defence  of  its  shores.  Such  a  design 
exhibited  all  the  power  of  combination  which  marked 
Napoleon's  greatest  triumphs  ;  but  it  required  of  an  in- 
different marine  the  precision  and  swiftness  of  movement 
which  belonged  to  the  land-forces  of  France ;  it  assumed 
in  the  seamen  of  Great  Britain  the  same  absence  of  re- 
source which  Napoleon  had  found  among  the  soldiers  of 
the  Continent.  In  the  present  instance,  however, 
Napoleon  had  to  deal  with  a  man  as  far  superior  to  all  the 
admirals  of  France  as  Napoleon  himself  was  to  the 
tjenerals  of  Austria  and  Prussia.    Villeneuve     „ , 

^  Nelson  aod 

set  sail  for  the  West  Indies  in  the  spring     IpriT^ISe, 

of  1805,  and  succeeded  in  drawing  Nelson 

after  him;  but,  before  he  could  re-cross  the  Atlantic, 


286  MODERN   EUROPE.  I8O6. 

Nelson,  incessantly  pursuing  tlie  Frencli  squadron  in 
the  West-Indian  seas,  and  at  length  discovering  its  de- 
parture homewards  at  Antigua  (June  13),  had  warned 
the  English  Grovernment  of  Yilleneuve's  movement  hy  a 
message  sent  in  the  swiftest  of  the  English  hrigs.*  The 
Government,  within  twenty-four  hours  of  receiving 
Nelson's  message,  sent  orders  to  Sir  Robert  Calder  in- 
stantly to  raise  the  blockades  of  Ferrol  and  Eochefort, 
and  to  wait  for  Yilleneuve  off  Cape  Finisterre.  Here 
Yilleneuve  met  the  English  fleet  (July  22).  He  was 
worsted  in  a  partial  engagement,  and  retired  into  the 
harbour  of  Ferrol.  The  pressing  orders  of  Napoleon 
forced  the  French  admiral,  after  some  delay,  to  attempt 
that  movement  on  Brest  and  Eochefort  on  which  the 
whole  plan  of  the  invasion  of  England  depended.  But 
Yilleneuve  was  no  longer  in  a  condition  to  meet  the 
English  force  assembled  against  him.  He  put  back 
without  fighting,  and  retired  to  Cadiz.  All  hope  of 
carrying  out  the  attack  upon  England  was  lost. 

It  only  remained  for  Napoleon  to  avenge  himself 

upon  Austria  through  the  army  which  was 

armies  on  Ba^    baulkcd  of  its  Eugflish  prev.     On  the  1st  of 

varia,  Sept.  ^  . 

September,  when  the  Austrians  were  now 
on  the  point  of  crossing  the  Inn,  the  camp  of  Boulogne 
was  broken  up.  The  army  turned  eastwards,  and 
distributed  itself  over  all  the  roads  leading  from  the 
Channel  to  the  Ehine  and  the  Upper  Danube.  Far  on  the 
north-east  the  army  of  Hanover,  commanded  by  Berna- 
dotte,  moved  as  its  left  wing,  and  converged  upon  a 

*  Nelson  Despatches,  vi.,  457. 


1805.  CRITICAL   SITUATION   OF  MACK  287 

point  in  Southern  Germany  half-way  between  the  fron- 
tiers of  France  and  Austria.  In  the  fables  that  long 
disguised  the  true  character  of  every  action  of 
Napoleon,  the  admirable  order  of  march  now  given 
to  the  French  armies  appears  as  the  inspiration 
of  a  moment,  due  to  the  rebound  of  Napoleon's 
genius  after  learning  the  frustration  of  all  his 
naval  plans.  In  reality,  the  employment  of  the 
"Army  of  England"  against  a  Continental  coalition 
had  always  been  an  alternative  present  to  Napoleon's 
mind;  and  it  was  threateningly  mentioned  in  his 
letters  at  a  time  when  Yilleneuve's  failure  was  still 
unknown. 

The  only  advantage  which  the  Allies  derived  from 
the  remoteness  of  the  Channel  army  was 
that  Austria  was  able  to  occupy   Bavaria     vaae  Bavaria, 
without    resistance.      General    Mack,   who 
was  charged  with  this  operation,  crossed  the  Inn  on  the 
8th  of  September.     The  Elector  of  Bavaria  was  known 
to  be  secretly  hostile  to  the  Coalition.     The  design  of 
preventing  his  union  with  the  French  was  a  correct  one ; 
but  in  the  actual  situation  of  the  allied  armies  it  was 
one  that  could  not  be  executed  without  great  risk.    The 
preparations  of  Russia  required  more  time  than  was  al- 
lowed for  them ;  no  Russian  troops  could  reach  the  Inn 
before  the  end  of  October ;  and,  in  consequence,  the  en- 
tire force  operating  in  Western  Germany  did  not  exceed 
seventy  thousand  men.     Any  doubts,  however,  as  to  the 
prudence  of  an  advance  through  Bavaria  were  silenced 
by  the  assurance  that  Napoleon  had  to  brin^j^^^^^  bulk 

Bf<Af. 

OF  THB 


288  MODERN  EUBOFE.   '  im. 

of  his  army  from  tlie  British  Channel.*  In  ignorance 
of  the  real  movements  of  the  French,  Mack  pushed  on 
to  the  western  limit  of  Bavaria,  and  reached  the  river 
Bier,  the  horder  of  Wiirtemberg,  where  he  intended  to 
stand  on  the  defensive  until  the  arrival  of  the  Eussians. 
Here,  in  the  first  days  of  October,  he  became  aware 
of  the  presence  of  French  troops,  not  only  in  front  but  to 
the  east  of  his  own  position.  With  some  misgiving  as  to 
Mack  at  uim  ^^^  situation  of  the  enemy,  Mack  neverthe- 
october.  i^^g  refused  to  fall  back  from  Ulm.  Another 
week  revealed  the  true  state  of  affairs.  Before  the 
Eussians  were  anywhere  near  Bavaria,  the  vanguard 
of  Napoleon's  Army  of  the  Channel  and  the  Army  of 
Hanover  had  crossed  North- Western  Germany,  and 
seized  the  roads  by  which  Mack  had  advanced  from 
Vienna.  Every  hour  that  Mack  remained  in  Ulm 
brought  new  divisions  of  the  French  into  the  Bavarian 
towns  and  villages  behind  him.  Escape  was  only  pos- 
sible by  a  retreat  into  the  Tyrol,  or  by  breaking  through 
the  French  line  while  it  was  yet  incompletely  formed. 
Eesolute  action  might  still  have  saved  the  Austrian 
army ;  but  the  only  energy  that  was  shown  was  shown 
in  opposition  to  the  general.  The  Archduke  Ferdinand, 
who  was  the  titular  commander-in-chief,  cut  his  way 
through  the  French  with  part  of  the  cavalry;  Mack 
remained  in  Ulm,  and  the  iron  circle  closed  around 
him.     At  the  last  moment,  after  the  hopelessness  of  the 

•  "  The  reports  from  General  Mack  are  of  the  most  satisfactory  nature, 
and  the  apprehensions  which  were  at  one  time  entertained  from  the  im- 
mense force  which  Bonaparte  is  bringing  into  Germany  gradually  decrease.*' 
—Sir  A.  Paget's  Despatch  from  Vienna,  Sept.  18;  Becords :  Austria,  yoL  76. 


1805  ULM,  289 

Situation  had  become  clear  even  to  himself,  Mack  was 
seized  by  an  illusion  that  some  great  disaster  had  be- 
fallen the  French  in  their  rear,  and  that  in  the  course  of 
a  few  days  INTapoleon  would  be  in  full  retreat.  "  Let  no 
man  utter  the  word  '  Surrender  * " — he  proclaimed  in  an 
order  of  October  1 5th — "  the  enemy  is  in  the  most  fear- 
ful straits ;  it  is  impossible  that  he  can  continue  more 
than  a  few  days  in  the  neighbourhood.  If  provisions 
run  short,  we  have  three  thousand  horses  to  nourish  us. 
I  myself,"  continued  the  general,  "  will  be  the  first  to 


eat  horseflesh.'*     Two  days  later  the  inevit-     capitulation  of 
able   capitulation  took   place  ;    and   Mack,  ^*^  *^* 


with  25,000  men,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  with- 
out striking  a  blow.  A  still  greater  number  of  the 
Austrians  outside  Ulm  surrendered  in  detachments  * 

*  Riistow,  p.  154.  Schonhals,  Krieg  von,  1805,  p.  33.  Paget's 
despatch,  Oct.  25 ;  Records :  Austria,  voL  75.  "  The  jealousy  and  misunder- 
standing among  the  generals  had  reached  such  a  pitch  that  no  commu- 
nication took  place  between  Ferdinand  and  Mack  but  in  writing.  Mack 
openly  attributed  his  calamities  to  the  ill-will  and  opposition  of  the 
Archduke  and  the  rest  of  the  generals.  The  Archduke  accuses  Mack  of 
ignorance,  of  madness,  of  cowardice,  and  of  treachery.  The  consternation 
which  prevails  here  (Yienna)  is  at  the  highest  pitch.  The  pains  which  are 
taken  to  keep  the  public  in  the  dark  naturally  increase  the  alarm.  Not 
a  single  newspaper  has  been  delivered  for  several  days  past  except  the 
wretched  Vienna  Gazette.  The  Emperor  is  living  at  a  miserable  country- 
house,  in  order,  as  people  say,  that  he  may  effect  his  escape.  Every  bark 
on  the  Danube  has  been  put  in  requisition  by  the  Grovornment.  .  The 
greatest  apprehensions  prevail  on  account  of  the  Russians,  of  whose 
excesses  loud  complaints  are  made.  Their  arrival  here  is  as  much  dreaded 
as  that  of  the  French.  Cobenzl  and  Collenbach  are  in  such  a  state  of  mind 
as  to  render  them  totally  unfit  for  all  business."  Cobenzl  was  nevertheless 
still  able  to  keep  up  his  jocular  style  in  asking  the  ambassador  for  the 
English  subsidies  : — '*  Vous  etes  imilade,  je  le  suis  aussi  un  peu,  mais  ce  qui 
est  encore  plus  malade  que  nous  deax  ce  sent  nos  finances:  ainsi  pour  ramour 
de  Dieu  dcpechoz  vous  de  nous  donner  vos  deux  cent  millo  livres  sterlings, 
Je  Yous  embrasse  de  tout  mou  coBor." — Cobenzl  to  Paget,  enclosed  in  iti 


290  MODERN  EUROPE. 


1805 


All  France  read  with  wonder  Napoleon's  bulletins 
describing   the    capture   of    an    entire   army   and    the 
Trafalgar,         approaching  presentation  of  forty  Austrian 
^^*'  ^^'  standards,  to  the  Senate  at  Paris.     N"o  im- 

perial rhetoric  acquainted  the  nation  with  an  event 
which,  within  four  days  of  the  capitulation  of  Ulm, 
inflicted  a  heavier  blow  on  Trance  than  Napoleon  him- 
self had  ever  dealt  to  any  adversary.  On  the  21st  of 
October  Nelson's  crowning  victory  of  Trafalgar,  won 
over  Yilleneuve  venturing  out  from  Cadiz,  annihilated 
the  combined  fleets  of  France  and  Spain.  Nelson  fell 
in  the  moment  of  his  triumph ;  but  the  work  which  his 
last  hours  had  achieved  was  one  to  which  years  pro- 
longed in  glory  could  have  added  nothing.  He  had 
made  an  end  of  the  power  of  France  upon  the  sea. 
Trafalgar  was  not  only  the  greatest  naval  victory,  it  was 
the  greatest  and  most  momentous  victory  won  either  by 
land  or  by  sea  during  the  whole  of  the  Eevolutionary 
War.  No  victory,  and  no  series  of  victories,  of  Napo- 
leon produced  the  same  effect  upon  Europe.  Austria 
was  in  arms  within  five  years  of  Marengo,  and  within 
four  years  of  Austerlitz ;  Prussia  was  ready  to  retrieve 
the  losses  of  Jena  in  1813  ;  a  generation  passed  after 
Trafalgar  before  France  again  seriously  threatened  Eng- 
land at  sea.  The  prospect  of  crushing  the  British  navy, 
so  long  as  England  had  the  means  to  equip  a  navy, 
vanished :  Napoleon  henceforth  set  his  hopes  on  ex- 
hausting England's  resources  by  compelling 
every  State  on  the  Continent  to  exclude  her 
commerce.     Trafalgar  forced  him  to  impose  his  yoke 


I806w  TBAFALOAB.  291 

upon  all  Europe,  or  to  abandon  the  hope  of  conquering 
Great  Britain.  If  national  love  and  pride  have  idealised 
in  our  great  sailor  a  character  which,  with  its  Homeric 
force  and  freshness,  combined  something  of  the  violence 
and  the  self-love  of  the  heroes  of  a  rude  age,  the  com- 
mon estimate  of  Nelson's  work  in  history  is  not  beyond 
the  truth.  So  long  as  France  possessed  a  navy,  Nelson 
sustained  the  spirit  of  England  by  his  victories ;  his  last 
triumph  left  England  in  such  a  position  that  no  means 
remained  to  injure  her  but  those  which  must  result  in 
the  ultimate  deliverance  of  the  Continent. 

The  consequences  of  Trafalgar  lay  in  the  future; 
the  military  situation  in  Germany  after  Mack's  catas- 
trophe was  such  that  nothing  could  keep  the  army  of 
Napoleon  out  of  Vienna.  In  the  sudden  awakening  of 
Europe  to  its  danger,  one  solitary  gleam  of  hope  ap- 
peared in  the  attitude  of  the  Prussian  Court.  Napoleon 
had  not  scrupled,  in  his  anxiety  for  the  arnval  of  the 
Army  of  Hanover,  to  order  Bemadotte,  its  commander, 
to  march  through  the  Prussian  territory  of  Anspach, 
which  lay  on  his  direct  route  towards  Ulm. 
It  was  subsequently  alleged  by  the  Allies  Prussian  teni- 
that  Bernadotte's  violation  of  Prussian 
neutrality  had  actually  saved  him  from  arriving  too  late 
to  prevent  Mack's  escape ;  but,  apart  from  all  imaginary 
grounds  of  reproach,  the  insult  offered  to  Prussia  by 
Napoleon  was  sufficient  to  incline  even  Frederick  William 
to  decided  action.  Some  weeks  earlier  the  approach  of 
Kussian  forces  to  his  frontier  had  led  Frederick  William 
to  arm;  the  French  had  now  more  than  carried  out 
T  2 


292  MODERN  EUROPE.  1835. 

what  tlie  Eussians  had  only  suggested.  When  the  out- 
rage was  made  known  to  the  King  of  Prussia,  that  cold 
and  reserved  monarch  displayed  an  emotion  which  those 
who  surrounded  him  had  seldom  witnessed."^  The  Czar 
was  forthwith  offered  a  free  passage  for  his  armies 
through  Silesia ;  and,  hefore  the  news  of  Mack's  capitu- 
lation reached  the  Russian  frontier,  Alexander  himself 
was  on  the  way  to  Berlin.  The  result  of  the  delihera- 
Treat  of  Pote-     ^^^^^  of  thc  two  mouarchs  was  the  Treaty  of 

d^  Nov.\  poi^s^am,  signed  on  November  3rd.  By  this 
treaty  Prussia  undertook  to  demand  from  I*^apoleon  an 
indemnity  for  the  King  of  Piedmont,  and  the  evacuation 
of  Germany,  Switzerland,  and  Holland  :  failing  Napo- 
leon's acceptance  of  Prussia's  mediation  upon  these  terms, 
Prussia  engaged  to  take  the  field  with  180,000  men. 

Napoleon  was  now  close  upon  Vienna.  A  few  days 
after  the  capitulation  of  Ulm  thirty  thousand  Russians, 
commanded  by  Greneral  Kutusoff,  had  reached  Bavaria ; 

French  enter       ^^^  Mack's  disastcr  rendered  it  impossible 

Vienna,  Nov.  13.       ^^    ^^^^^^  ^^^    ^.^^  ^^    ^^^    j^^    ^^^   ^^^  j^^^ 

detachments  of  the  Allies  disappeared  as  soon  as  Napo- 
leon's vanguard  approached  the  river.  The  French 
pushed  forth  in  overpowering  strength  upon  the  capital. 
Kutusoff  and  the  weakened  Austrian  army  could  neither 
defend  "Vienna  nor  meet  the  invader  in  the  field.    It  was 

•  Hardenberg,  ii.,  2G8.  Jackson,  Oct.  7.  Records :  Prussia,  voL  195. 
"The  intelligence  was  received  yesterday  at  Potsdam,  while  M.  de  Har- 
denberg was  with  the  King  of  Prussia.  His  Prussian  Majesty  was  very 
violently  affected  by  it,  and  in  the  first  moment  of  anger  ordered  M.  de 
Hardenberg  to  return  to  Berlin  and  immediately  to  dismiss  the  French 
ambassador.  After  a  little  reflection,  however,  he  said  that  that  measure 
should  be  postponed." 


UOB.  OAMPAION  IN  MORAVIA.  2P3 

resolved  to  abandon  tlie  city,  and  to  unite  the  retreating 
forces  on  the  northern  side  of  the  Danube  with  a  second 
Eussian  army  now  entering  Moravia.  On  the  7th  of 
November  the  Court  quitted  Vienna.  Six  days  later 
the  French  entered  the  capital,  and  by  an  audacious 
stratagem  of  Murat's  gained  possession  of  the  bridge 
connecting  the  city  with  the  north  bank  of  the  Danube, 
at  the  moment  when  the  Austrian  gunners  were  about 
to  blow  it  into  the  air*  The  capture  of  this  bridge 
deprived  the  allied  army  of  the  last  object  protecting  it 
from  Napoleon's  pursuit.  Vienna  remained  in  the  pos- 
session of  the  Trench.  All  the  resources  of  a  great 
capital  were  now  added  to  the  means  of  the  conqueror ; 
and  Napoleon  prepared  to  follow  his  retreating  adversary 
beyond  the  Danube,  and  to  annihilate  him  before  he 
could  reach  his  supports. 

The  retreat  of  the  Eussian  army  into  Moravia  was 
conducted  with  great  skill  by  General  KutusofF,  who 
retorted  upon  Murat  the  stratagem  practised  at  the 
bridge  of  Vienna,  and  by  means  of  a  pretended  armistice 
effected  his  junction  with  the  newly-arrived  Eussian 
corps  between  Olmiitz  and  Briinn.     Napo- 

i  ,  j_    IT  i»    1  •  Th®  Allies  and 

leon  s  anger  at  the  escape  of  his  prey  was  Napoieon  in 
shown  in  the  bitterness  of  his  attacks  upon 
Murat.  The  junction  of  the  allied  armies  in  Moravia 
had  in  fact  most  seriously  altered  the  prospects  of  the 
war.  For  the  first  time  since  the  opening  of  the  cam- 
paign, the  Allies  had  concentrated  a  force  superior  in 
numbers  to  anything  that  Napoleon  could  bring  against 
•  Bapp,  M^moires,  p.  58.    Beer,  p.  188. 


294  MODERN  EUROPE.  1805. 

it.  It  was  impossible  for  Napoleon,  while  compelled  to 
protect  himself  on  the  Italian  side,  to  lead  more  than 
70,000  men  into  Moravia.  The  Allies  had  now  80,000 
in  camp,  with  the  prospect  of  receiving  heavy  reinforce- 
ments. The  war,  which  lately  seemed  to  be  at  its  close, 
might  now,  in  the  hands  of  a  skilful  general,  be  but 
beginning.  Although  the  lines  of  Napoleon's  commu- 
nication with  Erance  were  well  guarded,  his  position  in 
the  heart  of  Europe  exposed  him  to  many  perils;  the 
Archduke  Charles  had  defeated  Massena  at  Caldiero  on 
the  Adige,  and  was  hastening  northwards ;  above  all, 
the  army  of  Prussia  was  preparing  to  enter  the  field. 
Every  mile  that  Napoleon  advanced  into  Moravia  in- 
creased the  strain  upon  his  resources ;  every  day  that 
postponed  the  decision  of  the  campaign  brought  new 
strength  to  his  enemies.  Merely  to  keep  the  Erench  in 
their  camp  until  a  Prussian  force  was  ready  to  assail 
their  communications  seemed  enough  to  ensure  the  Allies 
victory  ;  and  such  was  the  counsel  of  KutusofF,  who  made 
war  in  the  temper  of  the  wariest  diplomatist.  But  the 
scarcity  of  provisions  was  telling  upon  the  discipline  of 
the  army,  and  the  Czar  was  eager  for  battle."^  The 
Emperor  Erancis  gave  way  to  the  ardour  of  his  allies. 
Weyrother,  the  Austrian  chief  of  the  staff,  drew  up  the 

*  "  The  scarcity  of  provisions  had  been  very  great  indeed.  Much  dis- 
couragemeut  had  arisen  in  consequence,  and  a  considerable  degree  of 
insubordination,  which,  though  less  easy  to  produce  in  a  Russian  army 
than  in  any  other,  is,  when  it  does  make  its  appearance,  most  prejudicial, 
was  beginning  to  manifest  itself  in  various  ways.  The  bread  waggons 
were  pillaged  on  their  way  to  the  camp,  and  it  became  very  difficult  to 
repress  the  excesses  of  the  troops." — Report  of  General  Ramsay,  Dee.  10 ; 
Records :  Austria,  vol  78. 


1806.  HAUOWITZ  AT  BRUNN.  295 

most  scientific  plans  for  a  great  victory  that  had  ever 
been  seen  even  at  the  Austrian  head-quarters  ;  and 
towards  the  end  of  November  it  was  agreed  by  the  two 
Emperors  that  the  allied  army  should  march  right  round 
Napoleon's  position  near  Briinn,  and  fight  a  battle  with 
the  object  of  cutting  off  his  retreat  upon  Vienna. 

It  was  in  the  days  immediately  preceding  the  in- 
tended battle,  and  after  Napoleon  had  divined  the  plans 
of  his  enemy,  that  Count  Hauerwitz,  bearing 

•^  o  '  o        Haugwitz  comes 

the  demands  of  the  Cabinet  of  Berlin,  TaudsTSa^ 
reached  the  French  camp  at  Briinn."'^  Napo-  ^''' 
leon  had  already  heard  something  of  the  Treaty  of 
Potsdam,  and  was  aware  that  Haugwitz  had  started 
from  Berlin.  He  had  no  intention  of  making  any  of 
those  concessions  which  Prussia  required ;  at  the  same 
time  it  was  of  vital  importance  to  him  to  avoid  the  issue 
of  a  declaration  of  war  by  Prussia,  which  would  nerve 
both  Austria  and  Eussia  to  the  last  extremities.  He 
therefore  resolved  to  prevent  Haugwitz  by  every  possible 
method  from  delivering  his  ultimatum,  until  a  decisive 
victory  over  the  allied  armies  should  have  entirely 
changed  the  political  situation.  The  Prussian  envoy 
himself  played  into  Napoleon's  hands.  Haugwitz  had 
obtained  a  disgraceful  permission  from  his  sovereign  to 
submit  to  all  Napoleon's  wishes,  if,  before  his  arrival, 
Austria  should  be  separately  treating  for  peace  ;  and  be 
had  an  excuse  for  delay  in  the  fact  that  the  military 
preparations  of  Prussia  were  not  capable  of  being  com- 

*  Hardeuberg,  ii.,  345.    Hangwiiz  had  jast  become  joint  Foreign 
Minister  with  Hardenberg. 


296  MODERN  JSUBOPE,  1805 

pleted  before  tlie  middle  of  December.  He  passed  twelve 
days  on  tlie  journey  from  Berlin,  and  presented  bimself 
before  Napoleon  on  tbe  28tb  of  November.  The  Em- 
peror, after  a  long  conversation,  requested  tbat  he  would 
proceed  to  Vienna  and  transact  business  with  Talley- 

Haugwitz  goes  ^^^^'  ^^  ^^^  ^^^^  euough  to  permit  him- 
away  to  Vienna.     ^^|£  ^^  ^^  removed  to  a  distaucc  with  his 

ultimatum  to  Napoleon  undelivered.  When  next  the 
Prussian  Government  heard  of  their  envoy,  he  was 
sauntering  in  Talleyrand's  drawing-rooms  at  Vienna, 
with  the  cordon  of  the  French  Legion  of  Honour  on  his 
breast,  exchanging  civilities  with  officials  who  politely 
declined  to  enter  upon  any  question  of  business. 

Haugwitz  once  removed  to  Vienna,  and  the  Allies 
thus  deprived  of  the  certainty  that  Prussia  would  take 
the  field,  Napoleon  trusted  that  a  single  great  defeat 
would  suffice  to  break  up  the  Coalition.  The  movements 
of  the  Allies  were  exactly  those  which  he  expected  and 
desired.  He  chose  his  own  positions  between  Brtinn 
and  Austerlitz  in  the  full  confidence  of  victory ;  and  on 
Austerutz,  ^^^  momiug  of  the  2nd  of  December,  when 
^*  the  mists  disappeared  before  a  bright  wintry 

sun,  he  saw  with  the  utmost  delight  that  the  Eussian 
columns  were  moving  round  him  in  a  vast  arc,  in  execu- 
tion of  the  turning-movement  of  which  he  had  fore- 
warned his  own  army  on  the  day  before.  Napoleon 
waited  until  the  fo  'emost  columns  were  stretched  far  in 
advance  of  their  supports ;  then,  throwing  Soult's  divi- 
sion upon  the  gap  left  in  the  centre  of  the  allied  line,  he 
cut  the  army  into  halves,  and  crushed  its  severed  divisions 


1805.  AUSTEBLITZ.  297 

at  every  point  along  the  whole  line  of  attack.  The 
Allies,  although  they  outnumbered  Napoleon,  believed 
themselves  to  be  overpow^ed  by  an  army  double  their 
own  size.  The  incoherence  of  the  allied  movements  was 
as  marked  as  the  unity  and  effectiveness  of  those  of  the 
French.  It  was  alleged  in  the  army  that  Kutusoff,  the 
commander-in-chief,  had  fallen  asleep  while  the  Austrian 
Weyrother  was  expounding  his  plans  for  the  battle ;  a 
truer  explanation  of  the  palpable  errors  in  the  allied 
generalship  was  that  the  Bussian  commander  had  been 
forced  by  the  Czar  to  carry  out  a  plan  of  which  he  dis- 
approved. The  destruction  in  the  ranks  of  the  Allies 
was  enormous,  for  the  Eussians  fought  with  the  same 
obstinacy  as  at  the  Trebbia  and  at  Novi.  Austria  had 
lost  a  second  army  in  addition  to  its  capital ;  and  the 
one  condition  which  could  have  steeled  its  Government 
against  all  thoughts  of  peace  —  the  certainty  of  an  im- 
mediate Prussian  attack  upon  Napoleon —  Armistice, 
had  vanished  with  the  silent  disappearance  ^^^** 
of  the  Prussian  envoy.  Two  days  after  the  battle,  the 
Emperor  Francis  met  his  conqueror  in  the  open  field, 
and  accepted  an  armistice,  which  involved  the  withdrawal 
of  the  Eussian  army  from  his  dominions. 

Yet  even  now  the  Czar  sent  appeals  to  Berlin  for 
help,  and  the  negotiation  begun  by  Austria  would  pos- 
sibly have  been  broken  off  if  help  had  been  given.  But 
the  Cabinet  of  Frederick  William  had  itself  determined 
to  evade  its  engagements ;  and  as  soon  as  the  news  of 
Austerlitz  reached  Vienna,  Haugwitz  had  gone  over 
heart  and  soul  to  the  conqueror.    While  negotiations  for 


298  MODERN  EVBOPE.  im. 

peace  were  carried  on  between  France  and  Austria,  a 
parallel  negotiation  was  carried  on  with  the  envoy  of 
Prussia ;  and  even  before  the  Emperor  Francis  gave  way 
to  the  conqueror's  demands,  Haugwitz  signed  a  treaty 
^      .^    .        with  ISTapoleon   at   Schonbrunn,  by  which 

Haugwitz   signs  ■»■  *^ 

SlpoieL,  ^S  Prussia,  instead  of  attacking  Napoleon,  en- 
tered into  an  alliance  with  him,  and  received 
from  him  in  return  the  dominion  of  Hanover  (December 
15,  1805).^  Had  Prussia  been  the  defeated  power  at 
Austerlitz,  the  Treaty  of  Schonbrunn  could  not  have 
more  completely  reversed  the  policy  to  which  King 
Frederick  William  had  pledged  himself  six  weeks  before. 
While  Haugwitz  was  making  his  pact  with  Napoleon, 
Hardenberg  had  been  arranging  with  an  English  envoy 
for  the  combination  of  English  and  Eussian  forces  in 
Northern   Grermany.f      There   were    some    among   the 

*  Haugwitz'  justification  of  himself,  with  Hardenberg's  comments 
upon  it,  is  to  be  seen  in  Hardenberg,  v.,  220.  But  see  also,  for  Harden- 
berg's own  bad  faith,  id.,  i.,  551. 

t  Lord  Harrowby's  despatch  from  Berlin,  Dec.  7  ;  Records  :  Prussia, 
vol.  196.  The  news  of  Austerlitz  reached  Berlin  on  the  night  of  Dec.  7, 
Next  day  Lord  Harrowby  called  on  Hardenberg.  "  He  told  me  that  in  a 
council  of  war  held  since  the  arrival  of  the  first  accounts  of  the  disaster,  it 
had  been  decided  to  order  a  part  of  the  Prussian  army  to  march  into 
Bohemia.  These  events,  he  said,  need  not  interrupt  our  negotiations." 
Then,  on  the  12th  came  the  news  of  the  armistice  :  Harrowby  saw  Harden, 
berg  that  evening.  "  I  was  struck  with  something  like  irritation  in  his 
manner,  with  a  sort  of  reference  to  the  orders  of  the  King,  and  with  an 
expression  which  dropped  from  him  that  circumstances  might  possibly 
arise  in  which  Prussia  could  look  only  to  her  own  defence  and  security.  I 
attributed  this  in  a  great  degree  to  the  agitation  of  the  moment,  and  I 
should  have  pushed  the  question  to  a  point  if  the  entrance  of  Count 
Mettemich  and  M.  d'Alopeus  had  not  interrupted  me.  .  .  Baron  Harden- 
berg assured  us  that  the  mifitary  movements  of  the  Prussian  army  were 
proceeding  without  a  moment's  loss  of  time."  On  the  25th  Haugwitz 
arrived  with  his  treaty.    Hardenberg  then  feigned  illness.    "  Baron  Har- 


wofi.  PEACE   OF  PEJSSBUEa.  299 

King's  advisers  who  declared  that  the  treaty  must  be 
repudiated,  and  the  envoy  disgraced.  But  the  catas- 
trophe of  Austerlitz,  and  the  knowledge  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  Vienna  was  entering  upon  a  separate  negotiation, 
had  damped  the  courage  of  the  men  in  power.  The 
conduct  of  Haugvvitz  was  first  excused,  then  supported, 
then  admired.  The  Duke  of  Brunswick  disgraced  him- 
self by  representing  to  the  French  Ambassador  in  Berlin 
that  the  whole  course  of  Prussian  policy  since  the  begin- 
ning of  the  campaign  had  been  an  elaborate  piece  of 
dissimulation  in  the  interest  of  France.*  The  leaders 
of  the  patriotic  party  in  the  army  found  themselves 
without  influence  or  following;  the  mass  of  the  nation 
looked  on  with  the  same  stupid  unconcern  with  which 
it  had  viewed  every  event  of  the  last  twenty  years. 
The  King  finally  decided  that  the  treaty  by  which 
Haugwitz  had  thrown  the  obligations  of  his  cotmtryto 
the  winds  should  be  ratified,  with  certain  modifications, 
including  one  that  should  nominally  reserve  to  King 
George  III.  a  voice  in  the  disposal  of  Hanover. 

Ten  days  after  the  departure  of  the  Prussian  envoy 
from  Vienna,  peace  was  concluded  between  ^^^^^  ^^  p^^ 
France  and  Austria  by  the  Treaty  of  Pres-  ^'''^'  ^^  "' 
burgt  (December  27).  At  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
Napoleon  had  declared  to  his  army  that  he  would  not 
again  spare  Austria,  as  he  had  spared  her  at  Campo 

denberg  was  too  ill  to  see  me,  or,  as  far  as  I  could  learn,  any  other  person ; 
and  it  has  been  impossible  for  me  to  discover  what  intelligence  is  brooght 
by  Count  Haugwitz." 

•  Lefebvre,  Histoire  des  Cabinets,  ii,  217. 

t  Martens,  viu.,  388 ;  viii..  479.    Beer,  p.,  232. 


300  MODERN  EUROPE,  1805. 

Formio  and  at  Lun^ville ;  and  he  kept  Us  word.  The 
Peace  of  Presburg  left  the  Austrian  State  in  a  condition 
very  different  from  that  in  which  it  had  emerged  from 
the  two  previous  wars.  The  Treaty  of  Campo  Formio 
had  only  deprived  Austria  of  Belgium  in  order  to  re- 
place it  by  Venice ;  the  Settlement  of  Lun^ville  had  only 
substituted  French  for  Austrian  influence  in  Western 
Germany :  the  Treaty  that  followed  the  battle  of  Aus- 
terlitz  wrested  from  the  House  of  Hapsburg  two  of  its 
most  important  provinces,  and  cut  it  off  at  once  from 
Italy,  from  Switzerland,  and  from  the  Rhine.  Venetia 
was  ceded  to  Napoleon's  kingdom  of  Italy ;  the  Tyrol 
was  ceded  to  Bavaria ;  the  outlying  districts  belonging 
to  Austria  in  Western  Germany  were  ceded  to  Baden 
and  to  Wiirtemberg.  Austria  lost  28,000  square  miles 
of  territory  and  3,000,000  inhabitants.  The  Emperor 
recognised  the  sovereignty  and  independence  of  Bavaria, 
Baden,  and  Wtirtemberg,  and  renounced  all  rights  over 
those  countries  as  head  of  the  Germanic  Body.  The 
Electors  of  Bavaria  and  Wiirtemberg,  along  with  a  large 
increase  of  territory,  received  the  title  of  King.  The 
constitution  of  the  Empire  ceased  to  exist 

End  of  the  Holy  .  tj  i  •         i     /»  'j 

Roman  Empire,     evcu   m   uamc.     It  onlv  remamed  tor  its 

Aug.  6,  1806.  -^ 

chief,  the  successor  of  the  Eoman  Caesars,  to 
abandon  his  title  at  Napoleon's  bidding ;  and  on  the  6th 
of  August,  1806,  an  Act,  published  by  Francis  II.  at 
Vienna,  made  an  end  of  the  outworn  and  dishonoured 
fiction  of  a  Holy  Eoman  Empire. 

Though  Eussia  had  not  made  peace  with  Napoleon, 
the  European  Coahtion  was  at  an  end.    Now,  as  in  1801, 


1800.  NAPOLEONIO   DYNASTt,  301 

the  defeat  of  the  Austrian  armies  left  the  Neapolitan 
Monarchy  to  settle  its  account  with  the 
conqueror.  Naples  had  struck  no  blow ;  but  J^h  Bona- 
it  was  only  through  the  delays  of  the  Allies 
that  the  Neapolitan  army  had  not  united  with  an  Eng- 
lish and  a  Eussian  force  in  an  attack  upon  Lombardy. 
What  had  been  pardoned  in  1801  was  now  avenged 
upon  the  Bourbon  despot  of  Naples  and  his  Austrian 
Queen,  who  from  the  first  had  shown  such  bitter  enmity 
to  France.  Assuming  the  character  of  a  judge  over  the 
sovereigns  of  Europe,  Napoleon  pronounced  from  Vienna 
that  the  House  of  Naples  had  ceased  to  reign  (Dec.  27, 
1805).  The  sentence  was  immediately  carried  into  exe- 
cution. Ferdinand  fled,  as  he  had  fled  in  1798,  to  place 
himself  under  the  protection  of  the  navy  of  Great  Britain. 
The  vacant  throne  was  given  by  Napoleon  to  his  own 
brother,  Joseph  Bonaparte.  Ferdinand,  with  the  help 
of  the  English  fleet,  maintained  himself  in  Sicily.  A 
thread  of  sea  two  miles  broad  was  sufficient  barrier  against 
the  Power  which  had  subdued  half  the  Continent ;  and 
no  attempt  was  made  either  by  Napoleon  or  his  brother 
to  gain  a  footing  beyond  the  Straits  of  Messina.  In 
Southern  Italy  the  same  fanatical  movements  took  place 
among  the  peasantry  as  in  the  previous  period  of  French 
occupation.  When  the  armies  of  Austria  and  Russia 
were  crushed,  and  the  continent  lay  at  the  mercy 
of  France,  Great  Britain  imagined  that  it  could  effect 
something  against  Napoleon  in  a  corner  of  Italy,  with 
the  help  of  some  ferocious  villagers.  A  British  force, 
landing  near  Maida,  on  the  Calabrian  coast,  in  the  sum- 


302  MODERN  EUROPE.  1806. 

mer  of  1806,  had  the  satisfaction  of  defeating  the 
Battle  of  Maida.  ^^ench  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  of  ex- 
Juiy6,i806.  citing  a  horde  of  priests  and  brigands  to 
fruitless  barbarities,  and  of  abandoning  them  to  their 
well-merited  chastisement. 

The  elevation  of  Napoleon's  brother  Joseph  to  the 
throne  of  Naples  was  the  first  of  a  series  of 

The        Empire.  •     i  j  t        i  Tk.T  i 

Napoleonic  dy-     apDomtments  now  made    by  Napoleon   m 

nasty  and  titles.  ^  ^  »/  x  ^^ 

the  character  of  Emperor  of  the  West. 
He  began  to  style  himself  the  new  Charlemagne ; 
his  thoughts  and  his  language  were  filled  with 
pictures  of  universal  sovereignty;  his  authority,  as  a 
military  despot  who  had  crushed  his  neighbours,  became 
strangely  confused  in  his  own  mind  with  that  half- sacred 
right  of  the  Caesars  from  which  the  Middle  Ages  derived 
all  subordinate  forms  of  power.  He  began  to  treat  the 
government  of  the  different  countries  of  Western  Europe 
as  a  function  to  be  exercised  by  delegation  from  himself. 
Even  the  territorial  grants  which  under  the  Feudal 
System  accompanied  military  or  civil  office  were  now 
revived;  and  the  commander  of  a  French  army-corps  or 
the  chief  of  the  French  Foreign  Office  became  the  titular 
lord  of  some  obscure  Italian  principality."^  Napoleon's 
own  family  were  to  reign  in  many  lands,  as  the  Bourbons 
and  the  Hapsburgs  had  reigned  before  them,  but  in 
strict  dependence  on  their  head.  Joseph  Bonaparte  had 
not  long  been  installed  at  Naples  when  his  brother  Louis 
was  compelled  to  accept  the  Crown  of  Holland.  Jerome, 
for  whom  no  kingdom  was  at  present  vacant,  was  forced 

*  Correspondance  de  Napoleon,  xii.,  253. 


noo.  IIHENISH   OONFEBERACY,  303 

to  renounce  his  American  wife,  in  order  that  he  might 
marry  the  daughter  of  tlie  King  of  Wiirtemberg. 
Eugene  Beauharnais,  Napoleon's  step-son,  held  the  office 
of  Viceroy  of  Italy ;  Murat,  who  had  married  Napoleon's 
sister,  had  the  German  Duchy  of  Berg.  Bernadotte, 
Talleyrand,  and  Berthier  found  themselves  suzerains  of 
districts  whose  names  were  almost  unknown  to  them.  Out 
of  the  revenues  of  Northern  Italy  a  yearly  sum  was 
reserved  as  an  endowment  for  the  generals  whom  the 
Emperor  chose  to  raise  to  princely  honours. 

More  statesmanlike,  more  practical  than  Napoleon's 
dynastic  policy,  was  his  organisation  of  pederationof 
Western  Germany  under  its  native  princes  t^eEhme. 
as  a  dependency  of  France.  The  object  at  which  all 
French  politicians  had  aimed  since  the  outbreak  of  the 
Revolutionary  War,  the  exclusion  of  both  Austria  and 
Prussia  from  influence  in  Western  Germany,  was  now 
completely  attained.  The  triumph  of  French  states- 
manship, the  consummation  of  two  centuries  of  German 
discord,  was  seen  in  the  Act  of  Federation  subscribed  by 
the  Western  German  Sovereigns  in  the  summer  of  1806. 
By  this  Act  the  Kings  of  Bavaria  and  Wiirtemberg,  the 
Elector  of  Baden,  and  thirteen  minor  princes,  united 
themselves,  in  the  League  known  as  the  Rhenish  Con- 
federacy, under  the  protection  of  the  French  Emperor, 
and  undertook  to  furnish  contingents,  amounting  to 
63,000  men,  in  all  wars  in  which  the  French  Empire 
should  engage.  Their  connection  with  the  ancient  Ger- 
manic Body  was  completely  severed ;  the  very  town  in 
which  the  Diet  of  the  Empire  had  held  its  meetings  was 


304  MODERN  EUROPE.  im. 

annexed  by  one  of  the  members  of  the  Confederacy. 
The  Confederacy  itself,  with  a  population  of  8,000,000, 
became  for  all  purposes  of  war  and  foreign  policy  a  part 
of  France.  Its  armies  were  organised  by  French  officers ; 
its  frontiers  were  fortified  by  French  engineers ;  its 
treaties  were  made  for  it  at  Paris.  In  the  domestic 
changes  which  took  place  within  these  States  the  work 
of  consolidation  begun  in  1801  was  carried  forward  with 
increased  vigour.  Scores  of  tiny  principalities  which 
had  escaped  dissolution  in  the  earlier  movement  were 
now  absorbed  by  their  stronger  neighbours.  Govern- 
ments became  more  energetic,  more  orderly,  more  ambi- 
tious. The  princes  who  made  themselves  the  vassals  of 
Napoleon  assumed  a  more  despotic  power  over  their  own 
subjects.  Old  constitutional  forms  which  had  imposed 
some  check  on  the  will  of  the  sovereign,  like  the  Estates 
of  Wiirtemberg,  were  contemptuously  suppressed;  the 
careless,  ineffective  routine  of  the  last  age  gave  place  to 
a  system  of  rigorous  precision  throughout  the  public  ser- 
vices. Military  service  was  enforced  in  countries  hitherto 
free  from  it.  The  burdens  of  the  people  became  greater, 
but  they  were  more  fairly  distributed.  The  taxes  were 
more  equally  levied ;  justice  was  made  more  regular  and 
more  simple.  A  career  both  in  the  army  and  the  offices 
of  Government  was  opened  to  a  people  to  whom  the  very 
conception  of  public  life  had  hitherto  been  unknown. 

The  establishment  of  German  unity  in 

No      national  -%  n  •  •  i  •   i 

unity  in  Ger-     Qur  owu  dav  after  a  victorious  strug^erle  with 

many.  •'  ^  ~ 

France  renders  it  difficult  to  imagine  the 
voluntary  submission  of  a  great  part  of  the  race  to  a 


U06.  BHENISH    GONPEDEBAOT.  306 

French  sovereign,  or  to  excuse  a  policy  which,  like  that 
of  1806,  appears  the  opposite  of  everything  honourable 
and  patriotic.     But  what  seems  strange  now  was  not 
strange  then.     No  expression  more  truly  describes  the 
conditions  of  that  period  than  one  of  the  great  German 
poet  who  was  himself  so  little  of  a  patriot.    "Germany," 
said  Goethe,  "is  not  a  nation."     Germany  had  indeed 
the  unity  of  race ;  but  all  that  truly  constitutes  a  nation, 
the  sense  of  common  interest,  a  common  history,  pride, 
and  desire,  Germany  did  not  possess  at  all.     Bavaria, 
the  strongest  of  the  western  States,  attached  itself  to 
France  from  a  well-grounded  fear  of  Austrian  aggression. 
To  be  conquered  by  Austria  was  just  as  much  conquest 
for  Bavaria  as  to  be  conquered  by  any  other  Power ;  it 
was  no  step  to  German  unity,  but  a  step  in  the  aggran- 
disement of  the  House  of  Hapsburg.     The  interests  of 
the  Austrian  House  were  not  the  interests  of  Germany 
any  more  than  they  were  the  interests  of  Croatia,  or  of 
Venice,  or  of  Hungary.     Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  had 
Prussia  yet  shown  a  form  of  political  life  sufficiently* 
attractive  to  lead  the  Southern  States  to  desire  to  unite 
with  it.     Frederick's  genius  had  indeed  made  him  the 
hero  of  Germany,  but  his  military  system  was  harsh  and 
tyrannical.     In  the   actual   condition   of   Austria  and 
Prussia,  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  population  of  the 
minor  States  would  have  been  happier  united  to  these 
Powers  than  under  their  own  Governments.    Conquest  in 
any  case  was  impossible,  and  there  was  nothing  to  stimu 
late  to  voluntary  union.     It   followed  that  the  smaller 
States  were  destined  to  remain  without  a  nationality,  until 
V 


306  MODERN  EUROPE.  im. 

the  violence  of  some  foreign  Power  rendered  weakness  an 
intolerable  evil,  and  forced  upon  tlie  better  minds  of 
Grermany  the  thought  of  a  common  Fatherland. 

The  necessity  of  German  unity  is  no  self-evident 
political  truth.  Holland  and  Switzerland  in  past  cen- 
what  German  ^^^'^^^  dctached  themsclvcs  from  the  Empire, 
anity  desirable.  ^^^  bccamc  independent  States,  with  the 
highest  advantage  to  themselves.  Identity  of  blood  is 
no  more  conclusive  reason  for  political  union  between 
Hoi  stein  and  the  Tyrol  than  between  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States  of  America.  The  conditions  which 
determine  both  the  true  area  and  the  true  quality  of 
German  unity  are  in  fact  something  more  complex  than 
an  ethnological  law  or  an  outburst  of  patriotic  indigna- 
tion against  the  French.  Where  local  circumstances 
rendered  it  possible  for  a  German  district,  after  detach- 
ing itself  from  the  race,  to  maintain  a  real  national  life 
and  defend  itself  from  foreign  conquest,  there  it  was 
perhaps  better  that  the  connection  with  Germany  should 
be  severed  :  where,  as  in  the  great  majority  of  minor 
States,  independence  resulted  only  in  military  helpless- 
ness and  internal  stagnation,  there  it  was  better  that 
independence  should  give  place  to  German  unity.  But 
the  conditions  of  any  tolerable  unity  were  not  present 
so  long  as  Austria  was  the  leading  Power.  Less  was  im- 
perilled in  the  future  of  the  German  people  by  the  sub- 
mission of  the  western  States  to  France  than  would 
have  been  lost  by  their  permanent  incorporation  under 
Austria. 

With  the  establishment  of  the  Ehenish  Confederacy 


1808.  TEE   EMPIRE   OF  1806.  807 

and  the  conquest  of  ISTaples,  Napoleon's  empire  reached, 

but  did  not  overpass,  the  limits  within  which 

the  sovereiernty  of  France  miffht  probably     isoe  mitrht  i.ave 

o       •/  ox./         been  permanent. 

have  been  long  maintained.  It  has  been 
usual  to  draw  the  line  between  the  sound  statesmanship 
and  the  hazardous  enterprises  of  Napoleon  at  the  Peace 
of  Luneville :  a  juster  appreciation  of  the  condition  of 
Western  Europe  would  perhaps  include  within  the  range 
of  a  practical,  though  mischievous,  ideal  the  whole  of 
the  political  changes  which  immediately  followed  the 
war  of  1805,  and  which  extended  Napoleon's  dominion 
to  the  Inn  and  to  the  Straits  of  Messina.  Italy  and 
Germany  were  not  then  what  they  have  since  become. 
The  districts  that  lay  between  the  Ehine  and  the  Inn 
were  not  more  hostile  to  the  foreigner  than  those  Ehenish 
Provinces  which  so  readily  accepted  their  union  with 
France.  The  more  enterprising  minds  in  Italy  found 
that  the  Napoleonic  rule,  with  all  its  faults,  was  superior 
to  anything  that  Italy  had  known  in  recent  times.  If 
we  may  judge  from  the  feeling  with  which  Napoleon  was 
regarded  in  Germany  down  to  the  middle  of  the  year 
1806,  and  in  Italy  down  to  a  much  later  date,  the  Empire 
then  founded  might  have  been  permanently  upheld,  if 
Napoleon  had  abstained  from  attacking  other  States. 
No  comparison  can  be  made  between  the  attractive  power 
exercised  by  the  social  equality  of  France,  its  military 
glory,  and  its  good  administration,  and  the  slow  and 
feeble  process  of  assimilation  which  went  on  within  the 
dominions  of  Austria ;  yet  Austria  succeeded  in  uniting 
a  greater  variety  of  races  than  France  sought  to  unite 
V  2 


308  MOVEBN   EUROPE.  I8O6. 

in  1806.  The  limits  of  a  possible  France  were  indeed 
fixed,  and  fixed  more  firmly  than  by  any  geographical 
line,  in  the  history  and  national  character  of  two  other 
peoples.  France  could  not  permanently  overpower 
Prussia,  and  it  could  not  permanently  overpower  Spain. 
But  within  a  boundary-line  drawn  roughly 
siS?  NapoieoSc     from  the  mouth  of  the  Elbe  to  the  head  of 

Empire. 

the  Adriatic,  that  union  of  national  senti- 
ment and  material  force  which  checks  the  formation  of 
empires  did  not  exist.  The  true  turning-point  in  Napo- 
leon's career  was  the  moment  when  he  passed  beyond  the 
policy  which  had  planned  the  Federation  of  the  Ehine, 
and  roused  by  his  oppression  the  one  State  which  was 
still  capable  of  giving  a  national  life  to  Grermany. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Death  of  Pitt— Ministry  of  Fox  and  Grenville — Napoleon  forces  Pmssia  into 
war  with  England,  and  then  offers  Hanover  to  England — Prussia  resolves 
on  war  with  Napoleon— State  of  Prussia — Recline  of  the  Army — Southern 
Germany  with  Napoleon — Austria  neutral — England  and  Russia  abont  to 
help  Prussia,  but  not  immediately — Campaign  of  18U6 — Battles  of  Jena  and 
Auerstadt — Kuin  of  the  Prussian^Army— Cifipitulation  of^ortresses — De- 
mands of  Napoleon — The  War  continues — Berlin  Decree — Exclusion  of 
English  goods  from  the  Coutinout  — Russia  enters  the  war  — Campaign  in 
Poland  and  East  Prussia — Eylau — Titaty  of  Bartenstein--Fricdland — In- 
terview at  JTilsit — Alliance  of  Napoleon  and  Alexander — Secret  Articles^ 
English  expedition  to  Denmark — The  French  enter  Portugal — Prussia  after 
the  Peace  of  Tilsit — Stein's  Edict  of  Emancipation — The  Prussian  Peasant- 
Reform  of  the  Prussian  Army,  and  creation  of  Municipalities  —  Stein's 
other  projects  of  reform,  which  are  not  carried  out. 

Six  weeks  after  the  tidings  of  Austerlitz  reached  Great 
Britain,  the  statesman    who  had  been  the     Death  of  Pitt, 
soul   of  every   European  coalition    against     J*°-23.  isoe. 
France  was  carried  to  the  grave.*     Pitt  passed  away  at 

•  The  story  of  Pitt's  "  Austerlitz  look "  preceding  his  death  is  so  im- 
pressive and  so  well  known  that  I  cannot  resist  giving  the  real  facts  about 
the  reception  of  the  news  of  Austerlitz  in  England.  There  were  four 
Englishmen  who  were  expected  to  witness  the  battle.  Sir  A.  Paget,  ambas- 
sador at  Vienna,  Lord  L.  Grower,  ambassador  with  the  Czar,  Lord  Har- 
riugton  and  General  Ramsay,  military  envoys.  Of  these.  Lord  Harrington 
had  left  England  too  late  to  reach  the  armies ;  Sir  A.  Paget  sat  writing 
despatches  at  Olmutz  without  hearing  the  firing,  and  on  going  out  after  th* 
post  loft,  was  astonished  to  fall  in  with  the  retreating  army ;  Gower  waft 
too  far  in  the  rear:  and  General  Ramsay  unfortunately  went  off  on 
tliat  very  day  to  get  some  new  pjisses.  In  consequence  no  Englishman 
witnessed  tlie  awful  destruction  that  took  place;  and  Paget's  despatch, 
the  first  that  reached  England,  quite  misrepresented  the  battle,  treating 
the  defeat  as  not  a  decisive  one.  Pitt  actually  thouglit  at  first  that  tliA 
effect  of  the  battle  was  favourable  to  his  policy,  and  likely  to  encourag* 


310  MODERN  EUBOPK  1806. 

a  moment  of  the  deepest  gloom.  His  victories  at  sea 
appeared  to  have  effected  nothing ;  his  combinations  on 
land  had  ended  in  disaster  and  ruin.  If  during  Pitt's 
lifetime  a  just  sense  of  the  greatness  and  patriotism  of 
all  his  aims  condoned  the  innumerable  faults  of  his 
/nilitary  administration,  that  personal  ascendancy  which 
might  have  disarmed  criticism  even  after  the  (^'saster  of 
Austerlitz  belonged  to  no  other  member  of  his  Ministry. 
His  colleagues  felt  their  position  to  be  hopeless.  Though 
the  King  attempted  to  set  one  of  Pitt's  subordinates  in 
the  vacant  place,  the  prospects  of  Europe  were  too  dark, 
the  situation  of  the  country  too  serious,  to  allow  a 
Ministry  to  be  formed  upon  the  ordinary  principles  of 
party- organisation  or  in  accordance  with  the  personal 
preferences  of  the  monarch.  The  nation  called  for  the 
union  of  the  ablest  men  of  all  parties  in  the 

Coalition  Minis-  i  p  i  i      •  •  i  f»     <  i 

try  of  Fox  and     work  01  gTOvemment :  and,  m  spite  or  the 

GrenviUe.  ^  >  >  r 

life-long  hatred  of  King  George  to  Mr.  Fox, 
a  Ministry  entered  upon  office  framed  by  Fox  and  Gren- 
viUe conjointly;  Fox  taking  the  post  of  Foreign  Secre- 
tary, with  a  leading  influence  in  the  Cabinet,  and  yielding 

Prussia  in  its  determination  to  figlit.  So  late  as  December  20th  the  following 
instructions  were  sent  to  Harrowby  at  Berlin  :  "  Even  supposing  the  advan- 
tage of  the  day  to  have  been  decidedly  with  Bonaparte,  it  must  have  been  ob- 
tained with  a  loss  which  cannot  have  left  his  force  in  a  condition  to  contend 
with  the  army  of  Prussia  and  at  the  same  time  to  make  head  against  the 
Allies.  If  on  the  other  hand  it  should  appear  that  the  advantage  has  been 
with  the  Allies,  there  is  every  r<3ason  to  hope  that  Prussia  will  come  for- 
ward with  vigour  to  decide  the  contest."  Records :  l^russia,  vol.  196.  It  was 
the  surrender  of  Ulm  which  really  gave  Pitt  the  shock  attributed  to 
Vusterlitz.  The  despatch  then  written — evidently  from  Pitt's  dictation — 
bdrting  the  Emperor  to  do  his  duty,  is  the  most  impassioned  and  soul- 
;  g  thing  in  the  whole  political  correspondence  of  the  time. 


180&  FBUSSIA   AND   NAPOLEON.  8U 

to  Grenville  the  title  of  Premier.  Addington  received 
a  place  in  tlie  Ministry,  and  carried  with  him  the  support 
of  a  section  of  the  Tory  party,  which  was  willing  to 
countenance  a  policy  of  peace. 

Fox  had  from  the  first  given  his  whole  sympathy  to 
the  French  Eevolution,  as  the  cause  of  freedom.  He 
had  ascribed  the  calamities  of  Europe  to  the  intervention 
of  foreign  Powers  in  favour  of  the  Bourbon  monarchy : 
he  had  palliated  the  aggressions  of  the  French  Eepublic 
as  the  consequences  of  unjust  and  unprovoked  attack : 
even  the  extinction  of  liberty  in  France  itself  had  not 
wholly  destroyed  his  faith  in  the  honour  and  the  gene- 
rosity of  the  soldier  of  the  Eevolution.  In  the  brief 
interval  of  peace  which  in  1802  opened  the  Continent  to 
English  travellers,  Fox  had  been  the  guest  of  the  First 
Consul.  His  personal  feeling  towards  the  French  Gro- 
vernment  had  in  it  nothins^  of  that  proud     ^^    , 

<-'  ^  Napoleon  hopes 

and  suspicious  hatred  which  made  negotia-  pox  ""S^h 
tion  so  difficult  while  Pitt  continued  in  power. 
It  was  believed  at  Paris,  and  with  good  reason,  that  the 
first  object  of  Fox  on  entering  upon  office  would  be  the 
restoration  of  peace.  Napoleon  adopted  his  own  plan  in 
view  of  the  change  Hkely  to  arise  in  the  spirit  of  the 
British^  Cabinet.  It  was  his  habit,  wherever  he  saw 
signs  of  concession,  to  apply  more  violent  means  of  inti- 
midation. In  the  present  instance  he  determined  to 
work  upon  the  pacific  leanings  of  Fox  by  adding  Prussia 
to  the  forces  arrayed  against  Great  Britain.  Prussia, 
isolated  and  discredited  since  the  battle  of  Austerlitz, 
might  first  be  driven  into  hostilities  with  England,  and 


312  MODEBN  JEUBOPE.  I8O& 

then  be  made  to  furnisli  tlie  very  satisfaction  demanded 
by  England  as  the  primary  condition  of  peace. 

At  the   moment  when  Napoleon   heard   of  Pitt's 
death,  he  was  expecting  the  arrival  of  Count 

The     King     of  '  r  o 

to"p5uistthe     Haugwitz  at  Paris  for  the  purpose  of  obtain- 

cession  of  Hano-        .  t  r*       i  *  'iij  i  i*i 

ver.  mg  some  modincation  in  the  treaty  which 

he  had  signed  on  behalf  of  Prussia  after  the  battle  of 
Austerlitz.  The  principal  feature  in  that  treaty  had 
been  the  grant  of  Hanover  to  Prussia  by  the  French 
Emperor  in  return  for  its  alliance.  This  was  the  point 
which,  above  all  others  excited  King  Frederick  William's 
fears  and  scruples.  He  desired  to  retain  Hanover,  but 
he  also  desired  to  derive  his  title  rather  from  its  English 
owner  than  from  its  French  invader.  It  was  the  object 
of  Haugwitz'  visit  to  Paris  to  obtain  an  alteration  in  the 
terms  of  the  treaty  which  should  make  the  Prussian 
occupation  of  Hanover  appear  to  be  merely  provisional, 
and  reserve  to  the  King  of  England  at  least  a  nominal 
voice  in  its  ultimate  transfer.  In  full  confidence  that 
Napoleon  would  agree  to  such  a  change,  the  King  of 
Prussia  had  concealed  the  fact  of  its  cession  to  himself 
by  Napoleon,  and  published  an  untruthful  proclamation, 
stating  that,  in  the  interests  of  the  Hanoverian  people 
themselves,  a  treaty  had  been  signed  and  ratified  by  the 
French  and  Prussian  Glovernments,  in  virtue  of  which 
Hanover  was  placed  under  the  protection  of  the  King  of 
Prussia  until  peace  should  be  concluded  between  Great 
Britain  and  France.  The  British  Grovernment  received  as- 
surances of  Prussia's  respect  for  the  rights  of  King  Greorge 
III. :  the  bitter  truth  that  the  treaty  between  France  and 


1808.  PRUSSIA    AND    NAPOLEON.  313 

Prussia  contained  no  single  word  reserving  the  rights  of 
the  Elector,  and  that  the  very  idea  of  qualifying  the 
absolute  cession  of  Hanover  was  an  afterthought,  lay 
hidden  in  the  conscience  of  the  Prussian  Cabinet.  Never 
had  a  Grovernment  more  completely  placed  itself  at  the 
mercy  of  a  pitiless  enemy.  Count  Haugwitz,  on  reach- 
ing Paris,  was  received  by  Napoleon  with  a  storm  of 
invective  against  the  supposed  partisans  of  England  at 
the  Prussian  Court.  Napoleon  declared  that  the  ill 
faith  of  Prussia  had  made  an  end  even  of  that  miserable 
pact  which  had  been  extorted  after  Austerlitz,  and  in- 
sisted that  King  Frederick  William  should  openly  defy 
Great  Britain  by  closing  the  ports  of  Northern  Grermany 
to  British  vessels,  and  by  declaring  himself  endowed  by 
Napoleon  with  Hanover  in  virtue  of  Napo-     ^^    , 

^  ^  Napoleon  forces 

Icon's  own  right  of  conquest.  Haugwitz  ^''*i^ia^ 
signed  a  second  and  more  humiliating  treaty 
embodying  these  conditions ;  and  the  Prussian  Govern- 
ment, now  brought  into  the  depths  of  contempt,  but 
unready  for  immediate  war,  executed  the  orders  of  its 
master."^     A   proclamation,    stating   that   Prussia  had 

•  Hardenberg,  ii.,  463.  Hardenberg,  who,  in  spite  of  his  weak  and 
ambiguous  conduct  up  to  the  end  of  1805,  felt  bitterly  the  disgraceful 
position  in  which  Prussia  had  placed  itself,  now  withdrew  from  office.  "  I 
received  this  morning  a  message  from  Baron  Hardenberg  requesting  me 
to  call  on  him.  He  said  that  he  could  no  longer  remain  in  office  con- 
sistently with  his  honour,  and  that  he  waited  only  for  the  return  of  Count 
Haugwitz  to  give  up  to  him  the  mauageraent  of  his  department.  '  You 
know,'  he  said,  *  my  principles,  and  the  efforts  that  I  have  made  in  favour 
of  the  good  cause ;  judge  then  of  the  pain  that  I  must  experience  when  I 
am  condemned  to  be  accessory  to  this  measure.  You  know,  jjrobably,  that 
I  was  an  advocate  for  the  acquisition  of  Hanover,  but  I  wivshed  it  upon  terms 
honourable  to  both  parties.  I  thought  it  a  necessary  bulwark  to  cover  the 
Prussian  dominions,  and  I  thought  that  the  House  of  Hanover  might  have 


314  MODERN  EUROPE.  I80& 

received  tlie  absolute  dominion  of  Hanover  from  its  con- 
queror Napoleon,  gave  the  lie  to  the  earlier  announce- 
ments of  King  Frederick  William.  A  decree  was 
published  excluding  the  ships  of  England  from  the  ports 
of  Prussia  and  from  those  of  Hanover  itself  (March  28, 
1806).  It  was  promptly  answered  by  the  seizure  of 
four  hundred  Prussian  vessels  in  British  harbours,  and 
by  the  total  extinction  of  Prussian  maritime  commerce 
by  British  privateers.* 

been  indemnified  elsewhere.  But  now,'  lie  added,  *  j'abhorre  les  moyens 
infames  par  lesquels  nous  faisons  cette  acquisition.  Nous  pourrions  rester 
les  amis  de  Bonaparte  sans  etre  ses  esclaves.'  He  apologised  for  this 
language,  and  said  I  must  not  consider  it  as  coming  from  a  Prussian 
Minister,  but  from  a  man  who  unbosomed  himself  to  his  friend.  ...  I 
have  only  omitted  the  distressing  picture  of  M.  de  Hardenberg's  agitation 
during  this  conversation.  He  bewailed  the  fate  of  Prussia,  and  complained 
of  the  hardships  he  had  undergone  for  the  last  three  months,  and  of  the 
want  of  firmness  and  resolution  in  Jlis  Prussian  Majesty.  He  several 
times  expressed  the  hope  that  His  Majesty's  Government  and  that  of 
Russia  would  make  some  allowances  for  the  situation  of  this  country. 
They  had  the  means,  he  said,  to  do  it  an  infinity  of  mischief.  The 
British  navy  might  destroy  the  Prussian  commerce,  and  a  Russian  army 
might  conquer  some  of  her  eastern  provinces ;  but  Bonaparte  would  be  the 
only  gainer,  as  thereby  Prussia  would  be  thrown  completely  into  his 
arms." — F.  Jackson's  despatch  from  Berlin,  March  27,  1806;  Records: 
Prussia,  vol.  197. 

*  On  the  British  envoy  demanding  his  passports,  Haugwitz  entered 
into  a  long  defence  of  his  conduct,  alleging  grounds  of  necessity.  Mr. 
Jackson  said  that  there  could  be  no  accommodation  with  England  till  the 
note  excluding  British  vessels  was  reversed.  "  M.  de  Haugwitz  immediately 
rejoined,  *  I  was  much  surprised  when  I  found  that  that  note  had  been 
delivered  to  you.'  *  How,'  I  said,  *  can  you  be  surprised  who  was  the 
author  of  the  measures  that  gave  rise  to  it  ?  '  The  only  answer  I  received 
was, 'Ah!  ne  dites  pas  cela '  He  observed  that  it  would  be  worth  con- 
sidering  whether  our  refusal  to  acquiesce  in  the  present  state  of  things 
might  not  bring  about  one  still  more  disastrous.  I  smiled,  and  asked  if  I 
was  to  understand  that  a  Prussian  army  would  take  a  part  in  the  threat- 
ened invasion  of  England.  He  replied  that  he  did  not  now  mean  to 
insinuate  any  such  thing,  but  that  it  might  be  impossible  to  answer  for 
events."— !(?.,  April  25. 


1806.        NAPOLEON  OFFERS  HANOVER  TO  ENGLAND,       316 

Scarcely   was   Prussia   committed    to   this   ruinous 
conflict  with  Great  Britain,  when  Napoleon     ^    , 

*■  Napoleon  negtv 

opened  nes^otiations  for  peace  with  Mr.  Fox's     ^aZ,^m^% 

to" 


Government.  The  first  condition  required 
by  Great  Britain  was  the  restitution  of  Hanover  to 
King  George  III.  It  was  unhesitatingly  granted  by 
Napoleon.*  Thus  was  Prussia  to  be  mocked  of  its  prey, 
after  it  had  been  robbed  of  all  its  honour.  For  the 
present,  however,  no  rumour  of  this  part  of  the  negotia- 
tion reached  Berlin.  The  negotiation  itself,  which 
dragged  on  through  several  months,  turned  chiefly  upon 
the  future  ownership  of  Sicily.  Napoleon  had  in  the 
first  instance  agreed  that  Sicily  should  be  left  in  the 
hands  of  Ferdinand  of  Naples,  who  had  never  been 
expelled  from  it  by  the  French.  Finding,  however,  that 
the  Eussian  envoy  d'Oubril,  who  had  been  sent  to  Paris 
with  indefinite  instructions  by  the  Emperor  Alexander, 
was  willing  to  separate  the  cause  of  Eussia  from  that  of 
England,  and  to  sign  a  separate  peace,  Napoleon  retracted 
his  promise  relating  to  Sicily,  and  demanded  that  this 
island  should  be  ceded  to  his  brother  Joseph.  D'Oubril 
signed  Preliminaries  on  behalf  of  Eussia  on  the  20th  of 
July,  and  left  the  English  negotiator  to  obtain  what 
terms  he  could.  Fox  had  been  willing  to  recognise  the 
order  of  things  established  by  Napoleon  on  the  Italian 
mainland;  he  would  even  have  ceded  Sicily,  if  Eussia 
had  urged  this  in  a  joint  negotiation ;  but  he  was  too 
good  a  statesman  to  be  cheated  out  of  Sicily  by  a  mere 
trick.     He  recalled  the  English  envoy  from  Paris,  and 

*  Papers  presented  to  Parliament,  1806,  p.  63. 


316  MODERN  EUROPE.  im 

waited  for  tlie  judgment  of  the  Czar  upon  the  conduct  of 
his  own  representative.  The  Czar  disavowed  d'Oubril's 
negotiations,  and  repudiated  the  treaty  which  he  brought 
back  to  St.  Petersburg.  [N'apoleon  had  thus  completely 
overreached  himself,  and,  instead  of  severing  Grreat 
Britain  and  Eussia  by  separate  agreements,  had  only 
irritated  and  displeased  them  both.  The  negotiations 
went  no  farther ;  their  importance  lay  only  in  the  effect 
which  they  produced  upon  Prussia,  when  Napoleon's  offer 
of  Hanover  to  Grreat  Britain  became  known  at  Berlin. 

From  the  time  when  Haugwitz'  second  treaty  placed 

his  master  at  I^apoleon's  feet,  Prussia  had  been  subjected 

to  an  unbroken  series  of  insults  and  wrongs.     Murat,  as 

Duke  of  Bersr,  had  seized  upon  territory 

Prussia  learns  of  *-'  x  •/ 

^rnlnovJ^S  allotted  to  Prussia  in  the  distribution  of  the 
^'4  ecclesiastical  lands ;  the  establishment  of  a 
North  Grerman  Confederacy  under  Prussian  leadership 
was  suggested  by  Napoleon  himself,  only  to  be  sum- 
marily forbidden  as  soon  as  Prussia  attempted  to  carry 
the  proposal  into  execution.  There  was  scarcely  a 
courtier  in  Berlin  who  did  not  feel  that  the  yoke  of  the 
French  had  become  past  endurance ;  even  Haugwitz 
himself  now  considered  war  as  a  question  of  time.  The 
patriotic  party  in  the  capital  and  the  younger  officers  of 
the  army  bitterly  denounced  the  dishonoured  Grovem- 
ment,  and  urged  the  King  to  strike  for  the  credit  of  his 
country.^     In  the  midst  of  this  deepening  agitation,  a 

*  "  An  order  lias  been  issued  to  the  officers  of  the  garrison  of  Berlin  to 
abstain,  under  severe  penalties,  from  speaking  of  the  state  of  public  affairs. 
This  order  was  given  in  consequence  of  the  very  general  and  loud  expres- 
sions of  dissatisfaction  which  issued  from  all  classes  of  people,  but  parti- 


1806.  PRUSSIA   RESOLVES   ON   WAR.  317 

despatch  arrived  from  Lucchesmi,  the  Prussian  Ambas- 
sador at  Paris  (August  7),  relating  the  offer  of  Hanover 
made  by  Napoleon  to  the  British  Government.  For 
nearly  three  months  Lucchesini  had  caught  no  glimpse 
of  the  negotiations  between  Great  Britain  and  France ; 
suddenly,  on  entering  into  conversation  with  the  English 
envoy  at  a  dinner-party,  he  learnt  the  blow  which 
Napoleon  had  intended  to  deal  to  Prussia.  Lucchesini 
instantly  communicated  with  the  Court  of  Berlin ;  but 
his  despatch  was  opened  by  Talleyrand's  agents  before 
it  left  Paris,  and  the  French  Government  was  thus 
placed  on  its  guard  against  the  sudden  explosion  of 
Prussian  wrath.  Lucchesini's  despatch  had  indeed  all 
the  importance  that  Talleyrand  attributed  to  p^^^^^^  ^g^_ 
it.  It  brought  that  spasmodic  access  of  reso-  °^^  °°  ^^' 
lution  to  the  irresolute  King  which  Bemadotte's  violation 
of  his  territory  had  brought  in  the  year  before.  The 
whole  Prussian  army  was  ordered  to  prepare  for  war; 
Brunswick  was  summoned  to  form  plans  of  a  campaign  ; 
and  appeals  for  help  were  sent  to  Vienna,  to  St.  Peters- 
burg, and  even  to  the  hostile  Court  of  London. 


cnlarly  from  the  military,  at  the  recent  conduct  of  the  Government ;  for  it 
has  been  in  contemplation  to  publish  an  edict  prohibiting  the  public  at 
large  from  discussing  questions  of  state  policy.  The  experience  of  a  very 
few  days  must  convince  the  authors  of  this  measure  of  the  reverse  of  their 
expectation,  the  satires  and  sarcasms  upon  their  conduct  having  become 
more  universal  than  before." — Jackson's  Despatch,  March  22,  id.  "  On 
Thursday  night  the  windows  of  Count  Haugwitz's  house  were  completely 
demolished  by  some  unknown  person.  As  carbine  bullets  were  chiefly 
made  use  of  for  the  purpose,  it  is  suspected  to  have  been  done  by  some  of 
the  garrison.  The  same  thing  had  happened  some  nights  before,  but  the 
Count  took  no  notice  of  it  Now  a  party  of  the  police  patrol  the  street.'* 
Id.,  April  27. 


818  MODERN  UUBOPK  1808. 

The  condition  of  Prussia  at  this  critical  moment  was 
cendition  of  ^^®  which  filled  with  the  deepest  alarm  those 
few  patriotic  statesmen  who  were  not  hlinded 
by  national  vanity  or  by  slavery  to  routine.  The 
foreign  policy  of  Prussia  in  1805,  miserable  as  it  was, 
had  been  but  a  single  manifestation  of  the  helplessness, 
the  moral  deadness  that  ran  through  every  part  of  its 
official  and  public  life.  Early  in  the  year  1806  a  paper 
was  drawn  up  by  Stein,"^  exposing,  in  language  seldom 
used  by  a  statesman,  the  character  of  the  men  by  whom 
Frederick  William  was  surrounded,  and  declaring  that 
nothing  but  a  speedy  change  of  system  could  save  the 
Prussian  State  from  utter  downfall  and  ruin.  (Two 
measures  of  immediate  necessity  were  specified  by  Stein, 
the  establishment  of  a  responsible  council  of  Ministers, 
Ministers  not  in  ^nd  thc  rcmoval  of  Haugwitz  and  all  his 
the  King's  cabi-  fpjg^^dg  fj-OTCi  pow^r.  In  the  existing  system 
of  government:  the  Ministers  were  not  the  monarch's 
confidential  advisers^  The  Ministers  performed  their 
work  in  isolation  from  one  another ;  the  Cabinet,  or  con- 
fidential council  of  the  King,  was  composed  of  persons 
holding  no  public  function,  and  free  from  all  public 
responsibility.  No  guarantee  existed  that  the  policy  of 
the  country  would-be  the  same  for  two  days  together. 
The  Ministers  were  often  unaware  of  the  turn  that 
affairs  had  taken  in  the  Cabinet;  and  the  history  of 
Haugwitz'  mission  to  Austerlitz  showed  that  an  indi- 
vidual might  commit  the  State  to  engagements  the  very 
opposite  of  those  which  he  was  sent  to  contract.  The 
*  Pertz,  i.,  331.    Seeley,  i.,  271. 


IBK,  CONDITION   OF  PRUSSIA.  819 

first  necessity  for  Prussia  was  a  responsible  governing 
council :  with  such  a  council,  formed  from  the  heads  of 
the  actual  Administration,  the  reform  of  the  army  and 
of  the  other  branches  of  the  public  service,  which  was 
absolutely  hopeless  under  the  present  system,  might  be 
attended  with  some  chance  of  success. 

The  army  of  Prussia,  at  an  epoch  when  the  conscrip- 
tion and  the  genius  of  Napoleon  had  revolutionised  the 
art  of  war,  was  nothing  but  the  army  of  Frederick  the 
Great  grown  twenty  years  older.*  It  was  obvious  to  all 
the  world  that  its  commissariat  and  march-  st^teof  the 
ing-regulations  belonged  to  a  time  when  ^^^''^'^^^y- 
weeks  were  allowed  for  movements  now  reckoned  by 
days ;  but  there  were  circumstances  less  conspicuous 
from  the  outside  which  had  paralysed  the  very  spirit  of 
soldiership,  and  prepared  the  way  for  a  military  collapse 
in  which  defeats  in  the  field  were  the  least  dishonourable 
event.  Old  age  had  rendered  the  majority  of  the  higher 
officers  totally  unfit  for  military  service.  In  that  bar- 
rack-like routine  of  officialism  which  passed  in  Prussia 
for  the  wisdom  of  government,  the  upper  ranks  of  the 
army  formed  a  species  of  administrative  corps  in  time  of 
peace,  and  received  for  their  civil  employment 

■  1  -I  •  1        Higher  officers. 

double  the  pay  that  they  could  earn  m  actual 
war.  Aged  men,  with  the  rank  of  majors,  colonels,  and 
generals,  mouldered  in  the  offices  of  country  towns,  and 
murmured  at  the  very  mention  of  a  war,  which  would 
deprive  them  of  half  their  salaries.  Except  in  the  qase 
of  certain  princes,  who  were  placed  in  high  rank  while 
•  Hopfner,  Der  Krieg  von  1806,  i.,  48. 


320  MODERN  EUROPE.  1806. 

young,  and  of  a  few  vigorous  patriarchs  like  Bliiclier,  all 
the  energy  and  military  spirit  of  the  army  was  to  be 
found  in  men  who  had  not  passed  the  grade  of  captain. 
The  higher  officers  were,  on  an  average,  nearly  double 
the  age  of  French  officers  of  corresponding  rank."^     Of 
the  twenty-four  lieutenant-generals,  eighteen  were  over 
sixty ;  the  younger  ones,  with  a  single  exception,  were 
princes.     Five  out  of  the  seven  commanders  of  infantry 
were  over  seventy;  even  the  sixteen  cavalry  generals 
included  only  two  who  had  not  reached  sixty-five.    Thesa 
were  the  men  who,  when  the  armies  of  Prussia  were 
beaten  in  the  field,  surrendered  its  fortresses  with  as 
little  concern  as  if  they  had  been  receiving  the  French 
on  a  visit  of  ceremony.     Their  vanity  was  as  lamentable 
as  their  faint-heartedness.    "  The  army  of  his  Majesty," 
said   General    Eiichel   on    parade,    "possesses    several 
generals  equal  to  Bonaparte."     Faults  of  another  cha- 
racter belonged  to  the  generation  which  had  grown  up 
since  Frederick.     The  arrogance  and  licentiousness  of 
the  younger  officers  was  such  that  their  ruin  on  the 
field  of  Jena  caused  positive  joy  to  a  great  part  of  the 
middle  classes  of  Prussia.     But,  however  hateful  their 
manners,  and  however  rash  their  self-confidence,  the  vices 
of  these  younger  men  had  no  direct  connection  with  the 
disasters  of  1806.     The  gallants  who  sharpened  their 
swords  on  the  window-sill  of  the  French  Ambassador 
received  a  bitter  lesson  from  the  plebeian  troopers  of 

*  A  list  of  all  Prussian  officers  in  1806  of  and  above  the  rank  of  major 
is  given  in  Henckel  von  Donnersmarck,  Erinnerungen,  with  their  years  of 
service.    The  average  of  a  colonel's  service  is  42  years ;  of  a  major's,  35. 


1808.  TEE   PBXrsSIAN  AR^^y^^\,,S^c^^^^J^  ^ 

Murat;  but  they  showed  courage  in  disaster,  and  sub- 
sequently gave  to  their  country  many  officers  of  ability 
and  honour. 

What  was  bad  in  the  higher  grades  of  the  army  was 
not  retrieved  by  any  excellence  on  the  part       common 
of  the  private  soldier.     The  Prussian  army        "^  ^* 
was  recruited  in  part  from  foreigners,  but  chiefly  from 
Prussian   serfs,    who    were   compelled   to   serve.     Men 
remained  with  their  regiments  till  old  age  ;  the  rough 
character  of  the  soldiers  and  the  frequency  of  crimes  and 
desertions   occasioned   the  use  of   brutal  punishments, 
which  made  the  military  service  an  object  of  horror  to 
the  better  part  of  the  middle  and  lower  classes.     The 
soldiers  themselves,  who  could  be '  flogged  and  drilled 
into  high  military  perfection  by  a  great  general  like 
Prederick,  felt  a  surly  indifference  to  their  present  task- 
masters, and  were  ready  to  desert  in  masses  to  their 
homes   as   soon   as   a  defeat  broke  up  the  regimental 
muster  and  roll-call.     A  proposal  made  in  the  previous 
year  to  introduce  that  system  of  general  service  which 
has  since  made  Prussia  so  great  a  military  power  was 
rejected  by  a  committee  of  generals,  on  the  ground  that 
it  "  would  convert  the  most  formidable  army  of  Europe 
into  a  militia."     But  whether  Prussia  entered  the  war 
with  a  militia  or  a  regular  army,  under  the  men  who 
held  command   in   1806  it  could  have  met  with   but 
one  fate.     Neither  soldiery  nor   fortresses  could  have 
saved  a   kingdom  whose  genei'als  knew  only  how  to 
capitulate. 

All  southern  Germany  was  still  in  Napoleon's  hands. 
Y 


322  MODERN  BUBOPE.  I8O6. 

As  tlie  probability  of  a  war  with  Prussia  became  greater 
and   e^reater,  Napoleon  had   tiejlitened  his 

Southern     Qer-  ^  '  ^  ^ 

SoTof  ^PaS;     grasp  upon  the  Confederate  States.     Publi- 
'^*    *  cations    originating    among    the    patriotic 

circles  of  Austria  were  beginning  to  appeal  to  the  Grerman 
people  to  unite  against  a  foreign  oppressor.  An  anony- 
mous pamphlet,  entitled  "  Germany  in  its  Deep  Humi- 
liation/' was  sold  by  various  booksellers  in  Bavaria, 
among  others  by  Palm,  a  citizen  of  Nuremberg.  There 
is  no  evidence  that  Palm  was  even  acquainted  with  the 
contents  of  the  pamphlet ;  but  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Duke  of  Enghien,  two  years  before,  Napoleon  had 
required  a  victim  to  terrify  the  House  of  Bourbon,  so 
now  he  required  a  victim  to  terrify  those  who  among  the 
German  people  might  be  inclined  to  listen  to  the  call 
of  patriotism.  Palm  was  not  too  obscure  for  the  new 
Charlemagne.  The  innocent  and  unoffending  man,  in- 
nocent even  of  the  honourable  crime  of  attempting  to 
save  his  country,  was  dragged  before  a  tribunal  of 
French  soldiers,  and  executed  within  twenty  -  four 
hours,  in  pursuance  of  the  imperative  orders  of 
Napoleon  (August  26).  The  murder  was  an  unneces- 
sary one,  for  the  Bavarians  and  the  Wiirtembergers  were 
in  fact  content  with  the  yoke  they  bore ;  its  only  effect 
was  to  arouse  among  a  patient  and  home-loving  class  the 
doubt  whether  the  German  citizen  and  his  family  might 
not  after  all  have  some  interest  in  the  preservation  of 
national  independence. 

'When,  several  years  later,  the  oppressions  of  Napo- 
leon had  given  to  a  great  part  of  the  German  race  at 


im  BU88IA  AIW  AUSTRIA  823 

least  the  transient  nobleness  of  a  real  patriotism,  the 
story  of  Palm's  death  was  one  of  those  that  kindled  the 
bitterest  sense  of  wrong :  at  the  time,  it  exercised  no 
influence  upon  the  course  of  political  events.  Austria  neutral. 
Southern  Grermany   remained  passive,    and     Russia  can  give 

•^  ■»•  Prussia        no 

supplied  Napoleon  with  a  reserve  of  soldiers  :  p~™p*^«ip- 
Prussia  had  to  look  elsewhere  for  allies.  Its  pros- 
pects of  receiving  support  were  good,  if  the  war 
should  prove  a  protracted  one,  but  not  otherwise. 
Austria,  crippled  by  the  disasters  of  1805,  could  only 
hope  to  renew  the  struggle  if  victory  should  declare 
against  Napoleon.  In  other  quarters  help  might  be 
promised,  but  it  could  not  be  given  at  the  time  and  at 
the  place  where  it  was  needed.  The  Czar  proffered  the 
whole  forces  of  his  Empire ;  King  George  III.  forgave 
the  despoilers  of  his  patrimony  when  he  found  that  they 
really  intended  to  fight  the  Prench ;  but  the  troops  of 
Alexander  lay  far  in  the  East,  and  the  action  of  England 
in  any  Continental  war  was  certain  to  be  dilatory  and  in- 
effective. Prussia  was  exposed  to  the  first  shock  of  the 
war  alone.  In  the  existing  situation  of  the  French  armies, 
a  blow  unusually  swift  and  crushing  might  well  be 
expected  by  all  who  understood  Napoleon's  warfare. 

A  hundred  and  seventy  thousand  French  soldiers, 
with  contingents  from  the  Rhenish  Confede- 

°  Situation     of 

rate  States,  lay  between  the  Main  and  the  SL^^iSJ 
Inn.  The  last  weeks  of  peace,  in  which  the 
Pi-ussian  Government  imagined  themselves  to  be  deceiv- 
ing the  enemy  while  they  pushed  forward  their  own 
preparations,  were  employed  by  Napoleon  in  quietly 
V  2 


32  i  MODERN  EVBOPE,  1806. 

concentrating  this  vast  force  upon  the  Main  (September, 
1806).  Napoleon  himself  appeared  to  be  absorbed  in 
friendly  negotiations  with  Greneral  Knobelsdorff,  the  new 
Prussian  Ambassador  at  Paris.  In  order  to  lull  Napo- 
leon's suspicions,  Haugwitz  had  recalled  Lucchesini  from 
Paris,  and  intentionally  deceived  his  successor  as  to  the 
real  designs  of  the  Prussian  Cabinet.  Knobelsdorff  con- 
fidentially informed  the  Emperor  that  Prussia  was  not 
serious  in  its  preparations  for  war.  Napoleon,  caring 
very  little  whether  Prussia  intended  to  fight  or  not,  con- 
tinued at  Paris  in  the  appearance  of  the  greatest  calm, 
while  his  lieutenants  in  Southern  Germany  executed 
those  unobserved  movements  which  were  to  collect  the 

Erench  on  the  ^^^^^^  ^^J  ^P<^^  ^^^  "^PP^^  ^^^i^'       ^U  thc 

meantime  the  advisers  of  King  Frederick 
William  supposed  themselves  to  have  made  everything 
ready  for  a  vigorous  offensive.  Divisions  of  the  Prussian 
army,  numbering  nearly  130,000  men,  were  concentrated 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Jena,  on  the  Saale.  The  bolder 
Prussians  on  spirits  iu  the  military  council  pressed  for  an 
the  Saale.  immediate  advance  through  the  Thuringian 

Forest,  and  for  an  attack  upon  what  were  supposed  to  be 
the  scattered  detachments  of  the  French  in  Bavaria. 
Military  pride  and  all  the  traditions  of  the  Grreat  Frede- 
rick impelled  Prussia  to  take  the  ofiensive  rather  than 
to  wait  for  the  enemy  upon  the  strong  line  of  the  Elbe. 
Political  motives  pointed  in  the  same  direction,  for  the 
support  of  Saxony  was  doubtful  if  once  the  French  were 
permitted  to  approach  Dresden. 

On  the  23rd  of  September  King  Frederick  William 


1806L  PLANS   OF  TBE   PRUSSIANS,  325 

arrived  at  the  head-quarters  of  the  army,  which  were  now 
at  Naumburg,  on  the  Saale.  But  his  presence  brought 
no  controlling  mind  to  the  direction  of  affairs.  corAxaion  of  the 
Councils  of  war  held  on  the  two  succeeding  PruaaaM. 
days  only  revealed  the  discord  and  the  irresolution  of 
the  military  leaders  of  Prussia.  Brunswick,  the  com- 
mander-in-chief, sketched  the  boldest  plans,  and  shrank 
from  the  responsibility  of  executing  them.  Hohenlohe, 
who  commanded  the  left  wing,  lost  no  opportunity  of 
opposing  his  superior ;  the  suggestions  of  officers  of  real 
ability,  like  Scharnhorst,  chief  of  the  staff,  fell  unnoticed 
among  the  wrangling  of  pedants  and  partisans.  Bruns- 
wick, himself  a  man  of  great  intelligence  though  of 
little  resolution,  saw  the  true  quality  of  the  men  who 
surrounded  him.  "  Riichel,*'  he  cried,  "  is  a  tin  trumpet, 
Mollendorf  a  dotard,  Kalkreuth  a  cunning  trickster. 
The  generals  of  division  are  a  set  of  stupid  journeymen. 
Are  these  the  people  with  whom  one  can  make  war  on 
Napoleon  ?  No.  The  best  service  that  I  could  render 
to  the  King  would  be  to  persuade  him  to  keep  the 
peace."  ■'*■  It  was  ultimately  decided,  after  two  days  of 
argument,  that  the  army  should  advance  through  the 
Thuringian  Forest,  while  feints  on  the  right  and  left 
deceived  the  French  as  to  its  real  direction.  The  diplo- 
matists, however,  who  were  mad  enough  to  tliink  that 
an  ultimatum  which  they  had  just  despatched  to  Paris 
would  bring  Napoleon  on  to  his  knees,  insisted  that  the 
opening  of  hostilities  should  be  deferred  till  the  8th  of 

*  Miiffling,  Aus  Meinem  Leben,  p.  15.    Hopfner,  i.,  157.    Gorrespond- 
ance  de  Kapoleun,  ziii.,  150. 


326  MODEBN  EUROPE,  I8O6. 

October,  when  the  term  of  grace  which  they  had  given 
to  Napoleon  would  expire. 

A  few  days  after  this  decision  had  been  formed, 
intelligence  arrived  at  head -quarters  that  Napoleon  him- 
self was  upon  the  Rhine.  Before  the  ultimatum  reached 
the  hands  of  General  Knobelsdorff  in  Paris,  Napoleon 
had  quitted  the  capital,  and  the  astonished  Ambassador 
could  only  send  the  ultimatum  in  pursuit  of  him  after  he 
had  gone  to  place  himself  at  the  head  of  200,000  men. 
The  news  that  Napoleon  was  actually  in  Mainz  con- 
founded the  diplomatists  in  the  Prussian  camp,  and 
produced  an  order  for  an  immediate  advance.  This  was 
the  wisest  as  well  as  the  boldest  determination  that  had 
yet  been  formed ;  and  an  instant  assault  upon  the  French 
divisions  on  the  Main  might  perhaps  even  now  have 
given  the  Prussian  army  the  superiority  in  the  first  en- 
counter. But  some  fatal  excuse  was  always  at  hand  to 
justify  Brunswick  in  receding  from  his  resolutions.  A 
positive  assurance  was  brought  into  camp  by  Lucchesini 
that  Napoleon  had  laid  his  plans  for  remaining  on  the 
defensive  on  the  south  of  the  Tliuringian  Forest.  If 
this  were  true,  there  might  yet  be  time  to  improve  the 
plan  of  the  campaign ;  and  on  the  4th  of  October,  when 
every  hour  was  of  priceless  value,  the  forward  march  was 
arrested,  and  a  new  series  of  deliberations  began  at  the 
head- quarters  at  Erfurt.  In  the  council 
held  on  the  4th  of  October,  a  total  change 
in  the  plan  of  operations  was  urged  by  Hohenlohe's 
staff.  They  contended,  and  rightly,  that  it  was  the 
design  of  Napoleon  to  pass  the  Prussian  army  on  the 


ErfTirt.  Oct.  4. 


1806.  PEU88IAN  MOVEMENTS.  827 

east  by  the  valley  of  the  Saale,  and  to  cut  it  off  from  the 
roads  to  the  Elbe.  The  delay  in  Brunswick's  movements 
had  in  fact  brought  the  French  within  striking  distance 
of  the  Prussian  communications.  Hohenlohe  urged  the 
King  to  draw  back  the  army  from  Erfurt  to  the  Saale, 
or  even  to  the  east  of  it,  in  order  to  cover  the  roads  to 
Leipzig  and  the  Elbe.  His  theory  of  Napoleon's  move- 
ments, which  was  the  correct  one,  was  adopted  by  the 
council,  and  the  advance  into  the  Thuringian  Forest  was 
abandoned ;  but  instead  of  immediately  marching  east- 
wards with  the  whole  army,  the  generals  wasted  two 
more  days  in  hesitations  and  half-measures.  At  length  it 
was  agreed  that  Hohenlohe  should  take  post  at  Jena,  and 
that  the  mass  of  the  army  should  fall  back  to  Weimar, 
with  the  object  of  striking  a  blow  at  some  undetermined 
point  on  the  line  of  Napoleon's  advance. 

Napoleon,  who  had  just  received  the  Prussian  ulti- 
matum with  unbounded  ridicule  and  contempt,  was  now 
moving  along  the  roads  that  lead  from  Bamberg  and 
Baireuth  to  the  Upper  Saale.  On  the  10th  of  October, 
as  the  division  of  Lannes  was  approaching  Saalfeld,  it 
was  attacked  by  Prince  Louis  Ferdinand  at  the  head  of 
Hohenlohe's  advanced  guard.  The  attack  Encounter  at 
was  made  against  Hohenlohe's  orders.  It  s»*"^^' ^<^^«' 
resulted  in  the  total  rout  of  the  Prussian  force.  Though 
the  numbers  engaged  were  small,  the  loss  of  magazines 
and  artillery,  and  the  death  of  Prince  Louis  Ferdinand, 
the  hero  of  the  war-party,  gave  to  this  first  repulse  the 
moral  effect  of  a  great  military  disaster.  Hohenlohe's 
troops  at  Jena  were  seized  with  panic ;  numbers  of  men 


328  MODERN  ETIBOPB,  18O6. 

threw  away  their  arms  and  dispersed;  the  drivers  of 
artillery- waggons  and  provision-carts  cut  the  traces  and 
rode  off  with  their  horses.  Brunswick,  however,  and 
the  main  body  of  the  army,  were  now  at  Weimar,  close 
at  hand ;  and  if  Brunswick  had  decided  to  fight  a  great 
battle  at  Jena,  the  Prussians  might  have  brought  nearly 
90,000  men  into  action.  But  the  plans  of  the  irresolute 
commander  were  again  changed.  It  was  resolved  to  fall 
back  upon  Magdeburg  and  the  Elbe.  Brunswick  him- 
self moved  northwards  to  Naumburg;  Hohenlohe  was 
ordered  to  hold  the  French  in  check  at  Jena  until  this 
movement  was  completed.  Napoleon  reached  Jena.  He 
had  no  intelligence  of  Brunswick's  retreat,  and  imagined 
the  mass  of  the  Prussian  army  to  be  gathered  round 
Hohenlohe,  on  the  plateau  before  him.  He  sent  Davoust, 
with  a  corps  27,000  strong,  to  outflank  the  enemy  by  a 
march  in  the  direction  of  Naumburg,  and  himseK  pre- 
pared to  make  the  attack  in  front  with  90,000  men, 
a  force  more  than  double  Hohenlohe's  real  army.  The 
attack  was  made  on  the  14th  of  October. 

Napoleon       de-  i         i    t      j 

f«^tsHoheniohe  Hoheulohe  s  army  was  dashed  to  pieces 
by  Napoleon,  and  fled  in  wild  disorder. 
Davoust's  weak  corps,  which  had  not  expected  to  meet 
with  any  important  forces  until  it  fell  upon  Hohenlohe's 
flank,  foimd  itseK  in  the  presence  of  Brunswick's  main 
army,  when  it  arrived  at  Auerstadt,  a  few  miles  to  the 
north.  Fortune  had  given  to  the  Prussian  commander 
an  extraordinary  chance  of  retrieving  what  strategy  had 
lost.  A  battle  conducted  with  common  military  skill 
would  not  only  have  destroyed  Davoust,  but  have  secured, 


1806.  JENA    AND   AUEE8TADT.  329 

at  least  for  the  larger  portion  of  the  Prussian  forces,  a 
safe  retreat  to  Leipzig  or  the  Elbe.  The  French  general, 
availing  himself  of  steep  and  broken  ground,  defeated 
numbers  nearly  double  his  own  through  the  confusion 
of  his  adversary,  who  sent  up  detachment  uavoust  defeatB 
after  detachment  instead  of  throwing  himself  SlSdt,  oct 
upon  Davoust  with  his  entire  strength.  The 
fighting  was  as  furious  on  the  Prussian  side  as  its  con- 
duct was  unskilful.  King  Frederick  William,  who  led 
the  earlier  cavalry  charges,  had  two  horses  killed  under 
him.  Brunswick  was  mortally  wounded.  Many  of  the 
other  generals  were  killed  or  disabled.  There  remained, 
however,  a  sufficient  number  of  unbroken  regiments  to 
preserve  some  order  in  the  retreat  until  the  army  came 
into  contact  with  the  remnant  of  Hohenlohe's  forces, 
flying  for  their  lives  before  the  cavalry  of  Murat.  Then 
all  hope  was  lost.  The  fugitive  mass  struck  panic  and 
confusion  into  the  retreating  columns ;  and  with  the 
exception  of  a  few  regiments  which  gathered  round  well- 
known  leaders,  the  soldiers  threw  away  their  arms  and 
spread  over  the  country  in  headlong  rout.  Ruin  of  the 
There  was  no  line  of  retreat,  and  no  rallying-  ^P"^^**" -^™y- 
point.  The  disaster  of  a  single  day  made  an  end  of  the 
Prussian  army  as  a  force  capable  of  meeting  the  enemy 
in  the  field.  A  great  part  of  the  troops  was  captured 
by  the  pursuing  enemy  during  the  next  few  days.  The 
regiments  which  preserved  their  coherence  were  too  weak 
to  make  any  attempt  to  check  Napoleon's  advance,  and 
could  only  hope  to  save  themselves  by  escaping  to  the 
fortresses  on  the  Oder. 


330  MODERN  ETJBOFE,  1806. 

Two  days  before  the  battle  of  Jena,  an  English 
Haugwitz  and  ^nvoj,  Lord  Morpeth,  had  arrived  at  the 
Lord  Morpeth.  ^ gad- quarter s  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  claim- 
ing the  restoration'  of  Hanover,  and  bearing  an  offer  of 
the  friendship  and  support  of  Grreat  Britain.  At  the 
moment  when  the  Prussian  monarchy  was  on  the  point 
of  being  hurled  to  the  ground,  its  Government  might 
have  been  thought  likely  to  welcome  any  security  that 
it  should  not  be  abandoned  in  its  utmost  need.  Haug- 
witz, however,  was  at  head-quarters,  dictating  lying 
bulletins,  and  perplexing  the  generals  with  ridiculous 
arguments  of  policy  until  the  French  actually  opened 
fire.  When  the  English  envoy  made  known  his  arrival, 
he  found  that  no  one  would  transact  business  with  him. 
Haugwitz  had  determined  to  evade  all  negotiations  until 
the  battle  had  been  fought.  He  was  unwilling  to  part 
with  Hanover,  and  he  hoped  that  a  victory  over  Napo- 
leon would  enable  him  to  meet  Lord  Morpeth  with  a 
bolder  countenance  on  the  following  day.  When  that 
day  arrived.  Ministers  and  diplomatists  were  flying  head- 
long over  the  country.  The  King  made  his  escape  to 
Weimar,  and  wrote  to  Napoleon,  begging  for  an  armis- 
tice ;  but  the  armistice  was  refused,  and  the  pursuit  of 
the  broken  army  was  followed  up  without  a  moment's 
pause.  The  capital  offered  no  safe  halting- place ;  and 
Frederick  William  only  rested  when  he  had  arrived  at 

Graudenz,  upon  the  Vistula.  Hohenlohe's 
Btuwer  of       poor  rcmuaut  of  an  army  passed  the  Elbe  at 

Magdeburg,  and  took  the  road  for  Stettin, 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Oder,  leaving  Berlin  to  its  fate.    The 


1808L  BLUOHEB   AT   LUBECK  831 

retreat  was  badly  conducted ;  alternate  halts  and  strained 
marclies  discouraged  tlie  best  of  the  soldiers.  As  the 
men  passed  their  native  villages  they  abandoned  the 
famishing  and  broken-spirited  columns  ;  and  at  the  end 
of  a  fortnight's  disasters  Prince  Hohenlohe  surrendered 
to  his  pursuers  at  Prenzlau  with  his  main  body,  now 
numbering  only  10,000  men  (Oct.  28). 

Bliicher,  who  had  showed  the  utmost  energy  and  for- 
titude after  the  catastrophe  of  Jena,  was  moving  in  the 
rear  of  Hohenlohe  with  a  considerable  force  which  his 
courage  had  gathered  around  him.  On  learning  of 
Hohenlohe's  capitulation,  he  instantly  reversed  his  line 
of  march,  and  made  for  the  Hanoverian  fortress  of 
Hameln,  in  order  to  continue  the  war  in  the  rear  of  the 
French.  Overwhelming  forces,  however,  cut  off  his 
retreat  to  the  Elbe ;  he  was  hemmed  in  on  the  east  and 
on  the  west;  and  nothing  remained  for  him  Biucherat 
but  to  throw  himself  into  the  neutral  town  of 
Liibeck,  and  fight  until  food  and  ammunition  failed  him. 
The  French  were  at  his  heels.  The  magistrates  of 
Liibeck  prayed  that  their  city  might  not  be  made  into  a 
battle-field,  but  in  vain ;  Bliicher  refused  to  move  into  the 
open  country.  The  town  was  stormed  by  the  French, 
and  put  to  the  sack.  Bliicher  was  driven  out,  desperately 
fighting,  and  pent  in  between  the  Danish  frontier  and 
the  sea.  Here,  surrounded  by  overpowering  numbers, 
without  food,  without  ammunition,  he  capitulated  on 
the  7th  of  November,  after  his  courage  and  resolution 
had  done  everything  that  could  ennoble  both  general 
and  soldiers  in  the  midst  of  overwhelming  calamity. 


332  MODERN  EUROPE.  luoe. 

The  honour  of  entering  the  Prussian  capital  was 
Napoleon  at  giveu  bj  Napolcou  to  Davoust,  whose  victory 
Berlin,  Oct.  27.  ^^  Aucrstadt  had  in  fact  far  surpassed  his 
own.  Davoust  entered  Berlin  without  resistance  on  the 
25th  of  October;  Napoleon  himself  went  to  Potsdam, 
and  carried  off  the  sword  and  the  scarf  that  lay  upon  the 
grave  of  Frederick  the  Grreat.  Two  days  after  Davoust, 
the  Emperor  made  his  own  triumphal  entry  into  the 
capital.  He  assumed  the  part  of  the  protector  of  the 
people  against  the  aristocracy,  ordering  the  formation  of 
a  municipal  body  and  of  a  civic  guard  for  the  city  of 
Berlin.  The  military  aristocracy  he  treated  with  the 
bitterest  hatred  and  contempt.  "I  will  make  that 
noblesse,"  he  cried,  "  so  poor  that  they  shall  beg  their 
bread."  The  disaster  of  Jena  had  indeed  fearfully 
punished  the  insolence  with  which  the  officers  of  the 
army  had  treated  the  rest  of  the  nation.  The  Guards 
were  marched  past  the  windows  of  the  citizens  of  Berlin, 
a  miserable  troop  of  captives ;  soldiers  of  rank  who  re- 
mained in  the  city  had  to  attend  upon  the  French  Emperor 
to  receive  his  orders.  But  calamity  was  only  beginning. 
The  overthrow  of  Jena  had  been  caused  by  faults  of  gene- 
ralship, and  cast  no  stain  upon  the  courage  of  the  officers ; 
the  surrender  of  the  Prussian  fortresses, 
of  Prussian       whlch  bcsTan  on  the  day  when  the  French 


entered  Berlin,  attached  the  utmost  personal 
disgrace  to  their  commanders.  Even  after  the  destruction 
of  the  army  in  the  field,  Prussia's  situation  would  not 
have  been  hopeless  if  the  commanders  of  fortresses  had 
acted  on  the  ordinary  rules  of  military  duty.     Magde- 


iboj  SUEEENDER    OF   PMUSSIAN   F0BTEES8E8.         333 

burg  and  the  strongholds  upon  the  Oder  were  sufficiently 
armed  and  provisioned  to  detain  the  entire  Trench  army, 
and  to  give  time  to  the  King  to  collect  upon  the  Vistula 
a  force  as  numerous  as  that  which  he  had  lost.  But 
whatever  is  weakest  in  human  nature — old  age,  fear, 
and  credulity — seemed  to  have  been  placed  at  the  head 
of  Prussia's  defences.  The  very  object  for  which  for- 
tresses exist  was  forgotten ;  and  the  fact  that  one  army 
had  been  beaten  in  the  field  was  made  a  reason  for 
permitting  the  enemy  to  forestall  the  organisation  of 
another.  Spandau  surrendered  on  the  25th  of  October, 
Stettin  on  the  29th.  These  were  places  of  no  great 
strength  ;  but  the  next  fortress  to  capitulate,  Kiistrin 
on  the  Oder,  was  in  full  order  for  a  long  siege.  It  was 
surrendered  by  the  older  officers,  amidst  the  curses  of  the 
subalterns  and  the  common  soldiers :  the  artillerymen 
had  to  be  dragged  from  their  guns  by  force.  Magde- 
burg, with  a  garrison  of  24,000  men  and  enormous 
supplies,  fell  before  a  French  force  not  numerous  enough 
to  beleaguer  it  (Nov,  8). 

Neither  Napoleon  himself  nor  any  one  else  in  Europe 
could  have  foreseen  such  conduct  on  the  Napoleon's 
part  of  the  Prussian  commanders.  The  '*'^'""'^* 
unexpected  series  of  capitulations  made  him  demand 
totally  different  terms  of  peace  from  those  which  he  had 
ofiered  after  the  battle  of  Jena.  A  week  after  the 
victory,  Napoleon  had  demanded,  as  the  price  of  peace, 
the  cession  of  Prussia's  territory  west  of  the  Elbe,  with 
the  exception  of  the  town  of  Magdeburg,  and  the  with- 
drawal of  Prussia  from  the  affairs  of  Germany.     These 


334  MODERN  BVROTE.  im. 

terms  were  communicated  to  King  Frederick  William; 
lie  accepted  them,  and  sent  Luccliesini  to  Berlin  to  nego- 
tiate for  peace  upon  this  basis.  Lucchesini  had  scarcely 
reached  the  capital  when  the  tidings  arrived  of  Hohen- 
lohe's  capitulation,  followed  by  the  surrender  of  Stettin 
and  Kiistrin.  The  Prussian  envoy  now  sought  in  vain 
to  procure  Napoleon's  ratification  of  the  terms  which 
he  had  himself  proposed.  No  word  of  peace  could  be 
obtained  :  an  armistice  was  all  that  the  Emperor  would 
grant,  and  the  terms  on  which  the  armistice  was  offered 
rose  with  each  new  disaster  to  the  Prussian  arms.  On 
the  fall  of  Magdeburg  becoming  known,  Napoleon 
demanded  that  the  troops  of  Prussia  should  retire  behind 
the  Vistula,  and  surrender  every  fortress  that  they  still 
retained,  with  the  single  exception  of  Konigsberg.  Much 
as  Prussia  had  lost,  it  would  have  cost  Napoleon  a 
second  campaign  to  make  himself  master  of  what  he 
now  asked;  but  to  such  a  depth  had  the  Prussian 
Government  sunk,  that  Lucchesini  actually  signed  a  con- 
vention at  Charlottenburg  (November  16),  surrendering 
to  Napoleon,  in  return  for  an  armistice,  the  entire  list  of 
uncaptured  fortresses,  including  Dantzig  and  Thorn  on 
the  Lower  Vistula,  Breslau,  with  the  rest  of  the  un- 
touched defences  of  Silesia,  Warsaw  and  Praga  in  Prus- 
sian Poland,  and  Colberg  upon  the  Pomeranian  coast.* 
The  treaty,  however,  required  the  Kins^'s 

Frederick  -^  '  .  . 

S^tiJueT'         ratification.    Frederick  William,  timorous  as 
^^^'  he  was,  hesitated  to  confirm  an  agreement 

which  ousted  him  from  his    dominions  as   completely 
*  Hopfner,  ii.,  392.     Hardenberg,  iii.,  230. 


1806.  STEIN  AND  HAUOWITZ.  335 

as  if  the  last  soldier  of  Prussia  had  gone  into  captivity. 
The  patriotic  party,  headed  by  Stein,  pleaded  for  the 
honour  of  the  country  against  the  miserable  Cabinet 
which  now  sought  to  complete  its  work  of  ruin.  As- 
surance^ of  support  arrived  from  St.  Petersburg.  The 
King  determined  to  reject  the  treaty,  and  to  continue 
the  war  to  the  last  extremity.  Haugvvitz  hereupon  ten- 
dered his  resignation,  and  terminated  a  political  career 
disastrous  beyond  any  recoi'ded  in  modern  times.  For  a 
moment,  it  seemed  as  if  the  real  interests  of  the  country 
were  at  length  to  be  recognised  in  the  appointment  of 
Stein  to  one  of  the  three  principal  offices  of  State.  But 
the  King  still  remained  blind  to  the  necessity  of  unity 
in  the  government,  and  angrily  dismissed  Stein  when 
he  refused  to  hold  the  Ministry  if  representatives  of  the 
old  Cabinet  and  of  the  peace-party  were  to  have  places 
beside  him.  The  King's  act  was  ill  calculated  to  serve 
the  interests  of  Prussia,  either  at  home  or  abroad.  Stein 
was  the  one  Minister  on  whom  the  patriotic  party  of 
Prussia  and  the  Governments  of  Europe  could  rely  with 
perfect  confidence.*     His  dismissal  at  this  crisis  proved 

•  "CoTtat  Stein,  the  only  man  of  real  talents  in  the  administration,  haa 
resigned  or  was  dismissed.  He  is  a  considerable  man,  of  great  energy, 
chai'acter,  and  saperiority  of  mind,  who  possessed  the  public  esteem  in  a 
high  degree,  and,  I  have  no  doubt,  desorved  it.  .  .  .  During  the  negotia- 
tion for  an  armistice,  the  expenses  of  Bonaparte's  table  and  household  at 
Berlin  were  defrayed  by  the  King  of  Prussia.  Since  that  period  one  of 
the  Ministers  called  upon  Stein,  who  was  the  chief  of  the  finances,  to  pay 
300,000  crowns  on  the  same  account.  Stein  refused  with  strong  expressions 
of  indignation.  The  King  spoke  to  him  :  he  remonstrated  with  His  Majesty 
in  the  most  forcible  terms,  descanted  on  the  wretched  humiliation  of  such 
mean  conduct,  and  said  that  he  never  xjould  pay  money  on  such  an  account 
unless  he  had  the  order  in  writing  from  His  Majesty.     This  order  was 


336  MODERN  EUROPE.  im, 

the  incurable  poverty  of  Frederick  William's  mental 
nature;  it  also  proved  tliat,  so  long  as  any  hope 
remained  of  saving  the  Prussian  State  by  the  help  of 
the  Czar  of  Eussia,  the  patriotic  party  had  little  chance 
of  creating  a  responsible  government  at  home. 

Throughout  the  month  of  November  Frencli  armies 
overran  Northern  Grermany  :  Napoleon  himself  remained 


„    ,      .       at   Berlin,  and   laid   the  foundations  of  a 

Napoleon  at  ' 

^^^^^-  political  system  corresponding  to  that  which 
he  had  imposed  upon  Southern  Grermany  after  the 
victory  of  Austerlitz,  The  Houses  of  Brunswick  and 
Hesse-Cassel  were  deposed,  in  order  to  create  a  new 
client-kingdom  of  Westphalia ;  Saxony,  with  Weimar 
and  four  other  duchies,  entered  the  Confederation  of  the 
Ehine.  A  measure  more  widely  affecting  the  Continent 
of  Europe  dated  from  the  last  days  of  the  Emperor's 
residence  at  the  Prussian  capital.  On  the  21st  of 
November,  1806,  a  decree  was  published  at  Berlin 
prohibitinsf   the  inhabitants  of  the   entire 

The   Berlin  de-       -^^  ^ 

uS'^^^^i,  European  territory  allied  with  France  from 
carrying  on  any  commerce  with  Great  Britain, 
or  admitting  any  merchandise  that  had  been  produced  in 
Grreat  Britain  or  in  its  colonies."^  The  line  of  coast  thus 
closed  to  the  shipping  and  the  produce  of  the  British  Em- 
pire included  everything  from  the  Vistula  to  the  southern 
point  of  Dalmatia,  with  the  exception  of  Denmark  and 
Portugal  and  the  Austrian  port  of  Trieste.    All  property 

given  a  few  days  after  the  conversation." — ^Hntchinson's  Despatch,  Jan.  1, 
1807;  Records:  Prussia,  voL  200.    ' 
•  Corr.  Nap.  xiii.,  555. 


1808.  THE   BERLIN  DECliEE.  837 

belonging  to  English  subjects,  all  merchandise  of  Britisli 
origin,  whoever  might  be  the  owner,  was  ordered  to  be 
confiscated  :  no  vessel  that  had  even  touched  at  a  British 
port  was  permitted  to  enter  a  Continental  harbour.  It 
was  the  fixed  purpose  of  Napoleon  to  exhaust  Great 
Britain,  since  he  could  not  destroy  its  navies,  or,  accord- 
ing to  his  own  expression,  to  conquer  England  upon  the 
Continent.  All  that  was  most  harsh  and  unjust  in  the 
operation  of  the  Berlin  Decree  fell,  however,  more  upon 
Napoleon's  own  subjects  than  upon  Great  Britain.  The 
exclusion  of  British  ships  from  the  harbours  of  the  allies 
of  France  was  no  more  than  the  exercise  of  a  common 
right  in  war ;  even  the  seizure  of  the  property  of  Eng- 
lishmen, though  a  violation  of  international  law,  bore  at 
least  an  analogy  to  the  seizure  of  French  property  at 
sea ;  but  the  confiscation  of  the  merchandise  of  German 
and  Dutch  traders,  after  it  had  lain  for  weeks  in  their 
own  warehouses,  solely  because  it  had  been  produced  in 
the  British  Empire,  was  an  act  of  flagrant  and  odious 
oppression.  The  first  result  of  the  Berlin  Decree  was  to 
fill  the  trading  towns  of  North  Germany  with  French 
revenue-officers  and  inquisitors.  Peaceable  tradesmen 
began  to  understand  the  import  of  the  battle  of  Jena 
when  French  gendarmes  threw  their  stock  into  the 
common  furnace,  or  dragged  them  to  prison  for  possess- 
ing a  hogshead  of  Jamaica  sugar  or  a  bale  of  Leeds 
cloth.  The  merchants  who  possessed  a  large  quantity 
of  English  or  colonial  wares  were  the  heaviest  sutferers 
by  Napoleon's  commercial  policy :  the  public  found  the 
markets  supplied  by  American  and  Danish  traders,  until, 
w 


338  MODERN  EUEOPK  im. 

at  a  later  period,  tlie  Britisli  G-overnment  adopted  re- 
prisals, and  prevented  the  ships  of  neutrals  from  entering 
any  port  from  which  English  vessels  were  excluded.  Then 
every  cottage  felt  the  stress  of  the  war.  But  if  the  full 
consequences  of  the  Berlin  Decree  were  delayed  until 
the  retaliation  of  Great  Britain  reached  the  dimensions 
of  Napoleon's  own  tyranny,  the  Decree  itself  marked  on 
the  part  of  Napoleon  the  assumption  of  a  power  in 
conflict  with  the  needs  and  habits  of  European  life. 
Like  most  of  the  schemes  of  Napoleon  subsequent 
to  the  victories  of  1806,  it  transgressed  the  limits  of  prac- 
tical statesmanship,  and  displayed  an  ambition  no  longer 
raised  above  mere  tyranny  by  its  harmony  with  forms 
of  progress  and  with  the  better  tendencies  of  the  age. 

Immediately  after  signing  the  Berlin  Decree,  Napo- 
Napoieon  and       ^^^^  quittcd  the  Prussiau  capital  (Nov.  25). 

the  Poles.  rpi^^    ^^^^    ^^j^    ^£     ^.-j^^    ^^^   j^^^    ^^^    cloScd. 

The  Prussian  State  was  overthrown ;  its  territory  as  far 
as  the  Vistula  lay  at  the  mercy  of  the  invader ;  its  king 
was  a  fugitive  at  Konigsberg,  at  the  eastern  extremity 
of  his  dominions.  The  second  act  of  the  war  began 
with  the  rejection  of  the  armistice  which  had  been  signed 
by  Lucchesini,,  and  with  the  entry  of  Eussia  into  the 
field  against  Napoleon.  The  scene  of  hostilities  was 
henceforward  in  Prussian  Poland  and  in  the  Baltic 
Province  lying  between  the  lower  Vistula  and  the 
Russian  frontier.  Napoleon  entered  Poland,  as  he  had 
entered  Italy  ten  years  before,  with  the  pretence  of 
restoring  liberty  to  an  enslaved  people.  Kosciusko's 
name    was    fraudulently    attached    to    a   proclamation 


1806.  NAPOLEON    IN    FllUSSIAN  POLAND,  339 

summoning  the  Polish  nation  to  arms ;  and  although 
Kosciusko  himself  declined  to  place  any  trust  in  the 
betrayer  of  Venice,  thousands  of  his  countrymen  flocked 
to  Napoleon's  standard,  or  anticipated  his  arrival  by 
capturing  and  expelling  the  Prussian  detachments  scat- 
tered through  their  country.  Promises  of  the  restoration 
of  Polish  independence  were  given  by  Napoleon  in 
abundance;  but  the  cause  of  Poland  was  the  last  to 
attract  the  sympathy  of  a  man  who  considered  the 
sacrifice  of  the  weak  to  the  strong  to  be  the  first  prin- 
ciple of  all  good  policy.  To  have  attempted  the  resto- 
ration of  Polish  independence  would  have  been  to  make 
permanent  enemies  of  Russia  and  Prussia  for  the  sake  of 
an  ally  weaker  than  either  of  them.  The  project  was 
not  at  this  time  seriously  entertained  by  Napoleon. 
He  had  no  motive  to  face  a  work  of  such  enormous 
difficulty  as  the  creation  of  a  solid  political  order  among 
the  most  unpractical  race  in  Europe.  He  was  glad  to 
enrol  the  Polish  nobles  among  his  soldiers;  he  knew 
the  value  of  their  enthusiasm,  and  took  pains  to  excite 
it ;  but,  when  the  battle  was  over,  it  was  with  Eussia,  not 
Poland,  that  France  had  to  settle ;  and  no  better  fabe 
remained,  even  for  the  Prussian  provinces  of  Poland,  than 
in  part  to  be  formed  into  a  client-state,  in  part  to  be 
surrendered  as  a  means  of  accommodation  with  the  Czar. 
The  armies  of  Russia  were  at  some  distance  from  the 
Vistula  when,  in  November,  1806,  Napoleon  entered 
Polish  territory.  Their  movements  were  slow,  their  num- 
bers insufficient.  At  the  moment  when  all  tlie  forces  of  the 
Empire  were  required  for  the  struggle  against  Napoleon, 
w  2  ^  •  ' 


340  MODERN  EUROPE.  1807. 

troops  were  being  sent  into  Moldavia  against  the  Sultan. 
Nor  were  tlie  Russian  commanders  anxious 

Campaign  in 

EuS,  SaT*  ^^  ^^^^  what  still  remained  of  the  Prussian 
kingdom.  The  disasters  of  Prussia,  like 
those  of  Austria  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  of 
1805,  excited  less  sympathy  than  contempt;  and  the 
inclination  of  the  Czar's  generals  was  rather  to  carry  on 
the  war  upon  the  frontier  of  their  own  country  than  to 
commit  themselves  to  a  distant  campaign  with  a  despised 
ally.  Lestocq,  who  commanded  the  remnant  of  the 
Prussian  army  upon  the  Vistula,  was  therefore  directed  to 
abandon  his  position  at  Thorn  and  to  move  eastwards. 
The  French  crossed  the  Vistula  higher  up  the  river; 
and  by  the  middle  of  December  the  armies  of  Prance  and 
Eussia  lay  opposite  to  one  another  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Pultusk,  upon  the  Ukra  and  the  !Narew.  The  first 
encounter,  though  not  of  a  decisive  character,  resulted 
in  the  retreat  of  the  Russians.  Heavy  rains  and  fathom- 
less mud  checked  the  pursuit.  War  seemed  almost 
impossible  in  such  a  country  and  such  a  climate;  and 
Napoleon  ordered  his  troops  to  take  up  their  winter 
quarters  along  the  Vistula,  believing  that  nothing  more 
could  be  attempted  on  either  side  before  the  spring. 

But  the  command  of   the  Russian  forces  was  now 
transferred  from  the  aged  and  half -mad  Kamenski,*  who 

*  "  It  is  still  doubtful  wlio  commands,  and  whether  Kamensky  has  or 
has  not  given  up  the  command.  I  wrote  to  him  on  the  first  moment  of  my 
arrival,  but  have  received  no  answer  from  him.  On  the  23rd,  the  day  of 
the  first  attack,  he  took  off  his  coat  and  waistcoat,,  put  all  his  stars  and 
ribbons  over  his  shirt,  and  ran  about  the  streets  of  Pultusk  encouraging 
the  soldiers,  over  whom  he  is  said  to  have  great  influence." — Lord  Hutchia- 
soii's  Despatch,  Jan.  1, 1807 ;  Records :  Prussia,  vol.  200. 


1807.  BATTLE    OF  EYLAU.  3U 

had  opened  the  campaign,  to  a  general  better  qualified 
to  cope  with  Napoleon.  Bennigsen,  the  new  com- 
mander-in-chief, was  an  active  and  daring  soldier. 
Though  a  Grerman  by  birth,  his  soldiership  was  of  that 
dogged  and  resolute  order  which  suits  the  character  of 
Eussian  troops;  and,  in  the  mid-winter  of  1806,  Napo- 
leon found  beyond  the  Vistula  such  an  enemy  as  he  had 
never  encountered  in  Western  Europe.  Bennigsen  con- 
ceived the  design  of  surprising  the  extreme 
left  of  the  French  line,  where  Ney's  division  Beumgaen  ia 
lay  stretched  towards  the  Baltic,  far  to  the 
north-east  of  Napoleon's  main  body.  Forest  and  marsh 
concealed  the  movement  of  the  Eussian  troops,  and 
both  Ney  and  Bernadotte  narrowly  escaped  destruction. 
Napoleon  now  broke  up  his  winter  quarters,  and  marched 
in  great  force  against  Bennigsen  in  the  district  between 
Konigsberg  and  the  mouth  of  the  Vistula.  Bennigsen 
manceuvred  and  retired  until  his  troops  clamoured  for 
battle.  He  then  took  up  a  position  at  Eylau,  and 
waited  for  the  attack  of  the  French.  The 
battle  of  Eylau,  fought  in  the  midst  of  snow- 
storms on  the  8th  of  February,  1807,  was  unlike  any- 
thing that  Napoleon  had  ever  yet  seen.  His  columns 
threw  themselves  in  vain  upon  the  Eussian  infantry. 
Augereau's  corps  was  totally  destroyed  in  the  beginning 
of  the  battle.  The  Eussians  pressed  upon  the  ground 
where -Napoleon  himself  stood ;  and  although  the  supe- 
riority of  the  Emperor's  tactics  at  length  turned  the 
scale,  and  the  French  began  a  forward  movement,  their 
advance  was  stopped  by  the  arrival  of  Lestocq  and  a 


m.  Feb.  8, 

1807. 


342  MODERN  EUBOPE.  1807. 

body  of  13,000  Prussians.  At  the  close  of  tlie  engage- 
ment 30,000  men  lay  wounded  or  dead  in  tlie  snow; 
the  positions  of  the  armies  remained  what  they  had  been 
in  the  morning.  Bennigsen's  lieutenants  urged  him  to 
renew  the  combat  on  the  next  day ;  but  the  confusion 
of  the  Eussian  army  was  such  that  the  Trench,  in  spite 
of  their  losses  and  discouragement,  would  probably  have 
gained  the  victory  in  a  second  battle  ;  ^  and  the  Eussian 
commander  determined  to  fall  back  towards  Konigsberg, 
content  with  having  disabled  the  enemy  and  given 
^Napoleon  such  a  check  as  he  had  never  received  before. 
^N'apoleon,  who  had  announced  his  intention  of  entering 
Konigsberg  in  triumph,  fell  back  upon  the  river  Pas- 
sarge,  and  awaited  the  arrival  of  reinforcements. 

The  warfare  of  the  next  few  months  was  confined  to 

the  reduction  of  the  Prussian  fortresses  which 
coibSf,  ^^       liad  not  yet  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  Prench. 

Dantzig  surrendered  after  a  long  and  difficult 
siege ;  the  little  town  of  Colberg  upon  the  Pomeranian 
coast  prolonged  a  defence  as  honourable  to  its  inhabitants 
as  to  the  military  leaders.  Two  soldiers  of  singularly 
different  character,  each  destined  to  play  a  conspicuous 
part  in  coming  years,  first  distinguished  themselves  in 
the  defence  of  Colberg.  Gneisenau,  a  scientific  soldier 
of  the  highest  order,  the  future  guide  of  Blucher's 
victorious  campaigns,  commanded  the  garrison ;  Schill, 
a  cavalry  officer  of  adventurous  daring,  gathered  round 
him  a  troop  of  hardy  riders,  and  harassed  the  French  with 
an  audacity  as  perplexing  to  his  military  superiors  as 

•  Hutchinson's  letter,  in  Adair,  Mission  to  Yienna,  p.  373. 


1807.  ACTION   OF  ENGLAND.  343 

to  the  enemy.  The  citizens,  led  by  their  burgomaster, 
threw  themselves  into  the  work  of  defence  with  a  vigour 
in  striking  contrast  to  the  general  apathy  of  the  Prussian 
people ;  and  up  to  the  end  of  the  war  Colberg  remained 
uncaptured.  Obscure  as  Colberg  was,  its  inaction  of 
defence  might  have  given  a  new  turn  to  the  ^»^°d- 
war  if  the  Grovernment  of  Great  Britain  had  listened  to 
the  entreaties  of  the  Emperor  Alexander,  and  despatched 
a  force  to  the  Baltic  to  threaten  the  communications  of 
Napoleon.  The  task  was  not  a  difficult  one  for  a  Power 
which  could  find  troops,  as  England  now  did,  to  send  to 
Constantinople,  to  Alexandria,  and  to  Buenos  Ayres; 
but  military  judgment  was  more  than  ever  wanting  to 
the  British  Cabinet.  Fox  had  died  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war ;  his  successors  in  Grenville's  Ministry,  though 
they  possessed  a  sound  theory  of  foreign  policy,*  were 
not  fortunate  in  its  application,  nor  were  they  prompt 
enough  in  giving  financial  help  to  their  allies.  Sud- 
denly, however.  King  George  quarrelled  with  his 
Ministers  upon  the  ancient  question  of  Catholic  Dis- 
abilities, and  drove  them  from  office  (March 
24).    The  country  sided  with  the  Kins:.    A     vine's  Ministry 

_  *^  °  Varoh  84, 1807. 

Ministry  came  into  power,  composed  of  the 
old  supporters  of  Pitt,  men,  with  the  exception  of  Can- 
ning and  Castlereagh,  of  narrow  views  and  poor  capacity, 
headed  by  the  Duke  of  Portland,  who,  in  1793,  had 
given  his  name  to  the  section  of  the  Whig  party  which 

•  For  the  Wliig  foreign  policy,  see  Adair,  p.  11 — 13.  Its  principle  was 
to  relinquish  the  attempt  to  raise  coalitions  of  half-hearted  Governments 
against  Franco  by  means  of  Britisli  subsidies,  but  to  give  help  to  States 
which  of  their  own  free  will  entered  into  war  with  Napoleon. 


344  MODERN  EUBOPK  I807. 

j oined  Pitt.  The  foreign  policy  of  the  new  Cabinet,  which 
concealed  its  total  lack  of  all  other  statesmanship, 
returned  to  the  lines  laid  down  by  Pitt  in  1805.  Nego- 
tiations were  opened  with  Russia  for  the  despatch  of  an 
English  army  to  the  Baltic  ;  arms  and  money  were  pro- 
mised to  the  Prussian  King.  For  a  moment  it  seemed 
as  if  the  Powers  of  Europe  had  never  been  united  in  so 
cordial  a  league.  The  Czar  embraced  the  King  of 
Prussia  in  the  midst  of  his  soldiers,  and  declared  with 
tears  that  the  two  should  stand  or  fall  together.  The 
Treaty  of  Bartenstein,  signed  in  April,  1807, 
gj|tembd^een  pledged  thc  Courts  of  St.  Petersburg,  Stock- 
iwlde^'  Aprii^     holm,  and  Berlin  to  a  joint  prosecution  of 

1807 

the  war,  and  the  common  conclusion  of 
peace.  Great  Britain  joined  the  pact,  and  prepared 
to  fulfil  its  part  in  the  conflict  upon  the  Baltic.  But 
the  task  was  a  difficult  one,  for  Grenville's  Ministry 
had  dispersed  the  fleet  of  transports ;  and,  although 
Canning  determined  upon  the  Baltic  expedition  in  April, 
two  months  passed  before  the  fleet  was  ready  to  sail. 

In  the  meantime  army  upon  army  was  moving  to 
the  support  of  Napoleon,  from  France,  from  Spain,  from 

Holland,  and  from  Southern  Germany.  The 
paiJ^S  E^       fortresses  of  the  Elbe  and  the  Oder,  which 

Prussia    1807.  ^  ' 

ought  to  have  been  his  barrier,  had  become 
his  base  of  operations  ;  and  so  enormous  were  the  forces 
at  his  command,  that,  after  manning  every  stronghold  in 
Central  Europe,  he  was  able  at  the  beginning  of  June  to 
bring  140,000  men  into  the  field  beyond  the  Vistula. 
The  Russians  had  also  received  reinforcements,  but  Ben- 


1M,  BATTLE    OF  PBIEDLAND.  S46 

nigsen's  army  was  still  weaker  than  tliat  of  the  enemy. 
It  was  Bennigsen,  nevertheless,  who  began  the  attack ; 
and  now,  as  in  the  winter  campaign,  he  attempted  to  sur- 
prise and  crush  the  northern  corps  of  Ney.  The  same 
general  movement  of  the  French  army  followed  as  in 
January.  The  Eussian  commander,  outnumbered  by 
the  French,  retired  to  his  fortified  camp  at  Heilsberg. 
After  sustaining  a  bloody  repulse  in  an  attack  upon  this 
position.  Napoleon  drew  Bennigsen  from  his  lair  by 
marching  straight  upon  Konigsberg.  Ben-  ^^^  ^^  ^^^ 
nigsen  supposed  himself  to  be  in  time  to  ^°<^"^'*°®  i^- 
deal  with  an  isolated  corps  ;  he  found  himself  face  to 
face  with  the  whole  forces  of  the  enemy  at  Friedland, 
accepted  battle,  and  was  unable  to  save  his  army  from  a 
severe  and  decisive  defeat  (June  14).  The  victory  of 
Friedland  brought  the  French  into  Konigsberg.  Ben- 
nigsen retired  behind  the  Niemen;  and  on  the  19th  of 
June  an  armistice  closed  the  operations  of  the  hostile 
forces  upon  the  frontiers  of  Eussia.^ 

The  situation  of  Bennigsen's  army  was  by  no  means 
desperate.  His  men  had  not  been  surrounded;  they 
had  lost  scarcely  any  prisoners  ;  they  felt  no  fear  of  the 
French.  But  the  general  exaggerated  the  seriousness  of 
his  defeat.  Like  most  of  his  officers,  he  was  weary  of 
the  war,  and  felt  no  sympathy  with  the  motives  which 
led   the    Emperor   to  fight   for   the  common  cause  of 

*  The  battle  of  Friedland  is  described  in  Lord  Hutchinson's  despatch 
(Records :  Prussia,  vol.  200 — in  which  volume  are  also  Colonel  Sountag's 
repoi-ts,  containing  curious  details  about  the  Russians,  and  some  personal 
matter  about  Napoleon  in  a  letter  from  an  inhabitant  of  Eylan;  also 
Gneisenan's  appeal  to  Mr.  Canning  from  Colberg). 


346  MODERN  EUEOPK  1807. 

Europe.  The  politicians  wlio  surrounded  Alexander 
urged  Mni  to  withdraw  Eussia  from  a  conflict  in  which 
she  had  nothing  to  gain.  The  Emperor  wavered.  The 
tardiness  of  Great  Britain,  the  continued  neutrality  of 
Austria,  cast  a  doubt  upon  the  wisdom  of -his  own  dis- 
interestedness ;  and  he  determined  to  meet  Napoleon, 
and  ascertain  the  terms  on  which  Eussia  might  be 
reconciled  to  the  master  of  half  the  Continent. 

On  the  25  th  of  June  the  two  sovereigns  met  one 

another  on  the  raft  of  Tilsit,  in  the  mid- 
interview  of 

^exS/at  stream  of  the  river  Niemen.  The  con- 
^' '  ""  •  versation,  which  is  alleged  to  have  been 
opened  by  Alexander  with  an  expression  of  hatred  to- 
wards England,  was  heard  by  no  one  but  the  speakers. 
But  whatever  the  eagerness  or  the  reluctance  of  the 
Eussian  monarch  to  sever  himself  from  Great  Britain, 
the  purpose  "of  Napoleon  was  effected.  Alexander  sur- 
rendered himself  to  the  addresses  of  a  conqueror  who 
seemed  to  ask  for  nothing  and  to  offer  everything.  The 
negotiations  were  prolonged ;  the  relations  of  the  two 
monarchs  became  more  and  more  intimate  ;  and  the  issue 
of  the  struggle  for  life  or  death  was  that  Eussia  accepted 
the  whole  scheme  of  Napoleonic  conquest,  and  took  its 
place  by  the  side  of  the  despoiler  in  return  for  its  share 
of  the  prey.  It  was  in  vain  that  the  King  of  Prussia 
had  rejected  Napoleon's  oiffers  after  the  battle  of  Eylau, 
in  fidelity  to  his  engagements  towards  his  ally.  Pro- 
mises, treaties,  and  pity  were  alike  cast  to  the  winds. 
Tlie  unfortunate  Frederick  William  received  no  more 
embraces ;  the  friend  with  whom  he  was  to  stand  or  fall 


1807.  PEACE    OF   TILSIT.  847 

bargained  away  the  larger  half  of  his  dominions  to  Napo- 
leon, and  even  rectified  the  Eussian  frontier  at  his  ex- 
pense. Prussia's  continued  existence  in  any  shape  what- 
ever was  described  as  a  concession  made  by  Napoleon 
to  Alexander.'  By  the  public  articles  of  the  xreatiesofTiiat. 
Treaties  of  Tilsit,  signed  by  France,  Kussia,  '"^^'  ^^' 
and  Prussia  in  the  first  week  of  July,  the  King  of 
Prussia  ceded  to  Napoleon  the  whole  of  his  dominions 
west  of  the  Elbe,  and  the  entire  territory  which 
Prussia  had  gained  in  the  three  partitions  of  Poland, 
with  the  exception  of  a  district  upon  the  Lower  Vistula 
c  nnecting  Pomerania  with  Eastern  Prussia.  Out  of 
the  ceded  territory  on  the  west  of  the  Elbe  a  Kingdom 
of  Westphalia  was  createdfor  Napoleon's  brother  Jerome; 
the  Polish  provinces  of  Prussia,  with  the  exception  of  a 
strip  made  over  to  Alexander,  were  formed  into  the 
Grand-Duchy  of  Warsaw,  and  presented  to  Napoleon's 
vassal,  the  King  of  Saxony.  Eussia  recognised  the 
Napoleonic  client-states  in  Italy,  Holland,  and  Grermany. 
The  Czar  undertook  to  offer  his  mediation  in  the  conflict 
between  France  and  Great  Britain ;  a  secret  article 
provided  that,  in  the  event  of  Great  Britain  and  France 
being  at  war  on  the  ensuing  1st  of  December,  Prussia 
should  declare  war  against  Great  Britain. 

Such  were  the  stipulations  contained  in  the  formal 
Treaties  of  Peace  between  the  three  Powers.  These, 
however,  contained  but  a  small  part  of  the  terms  agreed 
upon  between  the  masters  of  the  east  and  secret  Treaty  of 
of  the  west.  A  secret  Treaty  of  Alliance,  -^ii»n« 
distinct  from  the  Treaty  of  Peace,  was  also  signed  by 


348  MODERN  EUEOPK  180?. 

Napoleon  and  Alexander.  In  the  conversations  which 
won  over  the  Czar  to  the  cause  of  France,  Napoleon  had 
offered  to  Alexander  the  spoils  of  Sweden  and  the  Otto- 
man Empire.  Finland  and  the  Danubian  provinces 
were  not  too  high  a  price  for  the  support  of  a  Power 
whose  arms  could  paralyse  Austria  and  Prussia.  In 
return  for  the  promise  of  this  extension  of  his  Empire, 
Alexander  andertook,  in  the  event  of  Great  Britain  re- 
fusing terms  of  peace  dictated  by  himself,  to  unite  his 
arms  to  those  of  Napoleon,  and  to  force  the  neutral 
maritime  Powers,  Denmark  and  Portugal,  to  take  part 
in  the  struggle  against  England.  The  annexation  of 
Moldavia  and  Wallachia  to  the  Eussian  Empire  was 
provided  for  under  the  form  of  a  French  mediation.  In 
the  event  of  the  Porte  declining  this  mediation,  Napo- 
leon undertook  to  assist  Eussia  to  liberate  all  the  Euro- 
pean territory  subject  to  the  yoke  of  the  Sultan,  with  the 
exception  of  Eoumelia  and  Constantinople.  A  partition 
of  the  liberated  territory  between  France  and  Eussia,  as 
well  as  the  establishment  of  the  Napoleonic  house  in 
Spain,  probably  formed  the  subject  rather  of  a  verbal 
understanding  than  of  any  written  agreement."^ 

Such   was  this  vast  and   threatening   scheme,  con- 
conspiracyofthe    ccivcd  by  the  man  whose  whole  career  had 

twoi^perors.       -i  '   ±       j.       i  ^        c  t 

been  one  consistent  struggle  tor  personal 
domination,  accepted  by  the  man  who  among  the  rulers 
of  the  Continent  had  hitherto  shown  the  greatest  power 
of  acting  for  a  European  end,  and  of  interesting  himself 
in  a  cause  not  directly  his  own.  In  the  imagination  of 
*  Bignon,  vi,  342. 


M07.  PEACE  OF   TILSIT.  349 

Napoleon,  the  national  forces  of  the  western  continent 
had  now  ceased  to  exist.  Austria  excepted,  there  was 
no  State  upon  the  mainland  whose  army  and  navy  were 
not  prospectively  in  the  hands  of  himself  and  his  new 
ally.  The  commerce  of  Great  Britain,  already  excluded 
from  the  greater  part  of  Europe,  was  now  to  he  shut  out 
from,  all  the  rest ;  the  armies  which  had  hitherto  fought 
under  British  subsidies  fot  the  independence  of  Europe, 
the  navies  which  had  preserved  their  existence  by 
neutrality  or  by  friendship  with  England,  were  soon  to 
be  thrown  without  distinction  against  that  last  foe.  If 
even  at  this  moment  an  English  statesman  who  had 
learnt  the  secret  agreement  of  Tilsit  might  have  looked 
without  fear  to  the  future  of  his  country,  it  was  not 
from  any  imperfection  in  the  structure  of  Continental 
tyranny.  The  fleets  of  Denmark  and  Portugal  might  be 
of  little  real  avail  against  English  seamen ;  the  homes  of 
the  English  people  might  still  be  as  secure  from  foreign 
invasion  as  when  Nelson  guarded  the  seas ;  but  it  was 
not  from  any  vestige  of  political  honour  surviving  in 
the  Emperor  Alexander.  Where  Alexander's  action 
was  of  decisive  importance,  in  his  mediation  between 
Erance  and  Prussia,  he  threw  himself  without  scruple 
on  to  the  side  of  oppression.  It  lay  within  his  power 
to  gain  terms  of  peace  for  Prussia  as  lenient  as  those 
which  Austria  had  gained  at  Campo  Formic  and  at 
Luneville  :  he  sacrificed  Prussia,  as  he  allied  himself 
against  the  last  upholders  of  national  independence  in 
Europe,  in  order  that  he  might  himself  receive  Finland 
and  the  Danubian  Provinces. 


350  MODERN  JSUEOFK  iso?. 

Two  days  before  tlie  signature  of  the  Treaty  of 
Tilsit  the  British  troops  which  had  once  been  so  anxiously 
expected  by  the  Czar  landed  in  the  island  of  Eiigen. 
The  struggle  in  which  they  were  intended  to  take  their 
part  was  over.  Sweden  alone  remained  in  arms;  and 
even  the  Quixotic  pugnacity  of  King  Gustavus  was 
unable  to  save  Stralsund  from  a  speedy  capitulation. 
But  the  troops  of  Great  Britain  were  not  destined  to 
_  ,. ,        ,      return    without    strikino:    a    blow.       The 

English  expedi-  ^ 

De^rk  July      ncgotiatious  between   Napoleon  and  Alex- 

1807.         '  * 

ander  had  scarcely  begun,  when  secret 
intelligence  of  their  purport  was  sent  to  the  British 
Government.-^  It  became  known  in  London  that  the 
fleet  of  Denmark  was  to  be  seized  by  Napoleon,  and 
forced  to  fight  against  Great  Britain.  Canning  and  his 
colleagues  acted  with  the  promptitude  that  seldom  failed 
the  British  Government  when  it  could  effect  its  object 
by  the  fleet  alone.  They  determined  to  anticipate  Napo- 
leon's violation  of  Danish  neutrality,  and  to  seize  upon 
the  navy  which  would  otherwise  be  seized  by  Erance 
and  Russia. 

On  the  28th  of  July  a  fleet  with  20,000  men  on 
board  set  sail  from  the  British  coast.     The  troops  landed 


*  Papers  presented  to  Parliament  1808,  p.  106.  The  intelligence 
reached  Canning  on  the  21st  of  July.  Canning's  despatch  to  Brook 
Taylor,  July  22  ;  Records :  Denmark,  vol.  196.  It  has  never  been  known 
who  sent  the  information,  but  it  must  have  been  some  one  very  near  the 
Czar,  for  it  purported  to  give  the  very  words  used  by  Il^apoleon  in  his 
interview  with  Alexander  on  the  raft.  It  is  clear,  from  Canning's  despatch 
of  July  22,  that  this  conversation  and  nothing  else  had  up  till  then  been 
reported.  The  informant  was  probably  one  of  the  authors  of  the  English 
alliance  of  1805. 


1807.  BOMBARDMENT   OF   COTEl^HAQEN.  861 

in  Denmark  in  the  middle  of  August,  and  united  with 
the  corps  which  had  already  been  despatched  to  Kiigen. 
The  Danish  Government  was  summoned  to  place  its 
navy  in  the  hands  of  Great  Britain,  in  order  that  it 
might  remain  as  a  deposit  in  some  British  port  until  the 
conclusion  of  peace.  While  demanding  this  sacrifice  of 
Danish  neutrality,  England  undertook  to  protect  the 
Danish  nation  and  colonies  from  the  hostility  of  Napo- 
leon, and  to  place  at  the  disposal  of  its  Government 
every  means  of  naval  and  military  defence.  Failing  the 
surrender  of  the  fleet,  the  English  declared  that  they 
would  bombard  Copenhagen.  The  reply  given  to  this 
summons  was  such  as  might  be  expected  from  a  cou- 
rageous nation  exasperated  against  Great  Britain  by 
its  harsh  treatment  of  neutral  ships  of  commerce,  and 
inclined  to  submit  to  the  despot  of  the  Continent  rather 
than  to  the  tyrants  of  the  seas.  Negotiations  proved 
fruitless,  and  on  the  2nd  of  September  the 
English  opened  fire  on  Copenhagen.  For  of  Copenhagen. 
three  days  and  nights  the  city  underwent 
a  bombardment  of  cruel  efficiency.  Eighteen  hundred 
houses  were  levelled,  the  town  was  set  on  fire  in  several 
places,  and  a  large  number  of  the  inhabitants  lost  their 
lives.  At  length  the  commander  found  himself  com- 
pelled to  capitulate.  The  fleet  was  handed  over  to  Great 
Britain,  with  all  the  stores  in  the  arsenal  of  Copenhagen. 
It  was  brought  to  England,  no  longer  under  the  terms 
of  a  friendly  neutrality,  but  as  a  prize  of  war. 

The  captors  themselves  were  ashamed  of  their  spoU. 
England  received  an  armament  which  had  been  taken 


352  MODERN  EUBOPK  1807. 

from  a  people  wlio  were  not  our  enemies,  and  by  an 
attack  which  was  not  war,  with  more  misgiving  than 
applause.  In  Europe  the  seemingly  unprovoked  assault 
upon  a  weak  neutral  State  excited  the  utmost  indigna- 
tion. The  British  Ministry,  who  were  prevented  from 
making  public  the  evidence  which  they  had  received  of 
the  intention  of  the  two  Emperors,  were  believed  to  have 
invented  the  story  of  the  Secret  Treaty.  The  Danish 
Government  denied  that  Napoleon  had  demanded  their 
co-operation ;  Napoleon  and  Alexander  themselves  as- 
sumed the  air  of  indignant  astonishment.  But  the 
facts  alleged  by  Canning  and  his  colleagues  were  correct. 
The  conspiracy  of  the  two  Emperors  was  no  fiction. 
The  only  question  still  remaining  open — and  this  is 
indeed  an  essential  one — ^relates  to  the  engagements 
entered  into  by  the  Danish  Grovernment  itself.  Napo- 
leon in  his  correspondence  of  this  date  alludes  to  certain 
promises  made  to  him  by  the  Com-t  of  Denmark,  but  he 
also  complains  that  these  promises  had  not  been  fulfilled ; 
and  the  context  of  the  letter  renders  it  almost  certain 
that,  whatever  may  have  been  demanded  by  Napoleon, 
nothing  more  was  promised  by  Denmark  than  that  its 
ports  should  be  closed  to  English  vessels."*^  Had  the 
British  Cabinet  possessed  evidence  of  the  determination 


•  Napoleon  to  Talleyrand,  July  31, 1807.  Ho  instructs  Talleyrand  to 
enter  into  certain  negotiations  with  the  Danish  Minister,  which  would  be 
meaningless  if  the  Grown  Prince  had  already  promised  to  hand  over  the 
fleet.  The  original  English  documents,  in  Records :  Denmark,  vols.  196, 
197,  really  show  that  Canning  never  considered  that  he  had  any  proof  of 
the  intentions  of  Denmark,  and  that  he  justified  his  action  only  by  the 
inability  of  Denmark  to  resist  Napoleon's  demands. 


1807.  BOMBARDMENT   OF   OOPENHAQBN.  368 

of  the  Danish  Government  to  transfer  its  fleet  to  Napo- 
leon without  resistance,  the  attack  upon  Denmark,  con- 
sidered as  virtually  an  act  of  war,  would  not  have  been 
unjust.  But  beyond  an  alleged  expression  of  Napoleon 
at  Tilsit,  no  such  evidence  was  even  stated  to  have 
reached  London ;  and  the  undoubted  conspiracy  of  the 
Emperors  against  Danish  neutrality  was  no  sufficient 
ground  for  an  action  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  which 
went  so  far  beyond  the  mere  frustration  of  their  designs. 
The  surrender  of  the  Danish  fleet  demanded  by  England 
would  have  been  an  unqualified  act  of  war  on  the  part  of 
Denmark  against  Napoleon ;  it  was  no  mere  guarantee 
for  a  continued  neutrality.  Nor  had  the  British  Govern- 
ment the  last  excuse  of  an  urgent  and  overwhelming 
necessity.  Nineteen  Danish  men-of-war  would  not  have 
turned  the  scale  against  England.  The  memory  of 
Trafalgar  might  well  have  given  a  British  Ministry 
courage  to  meet  its  enemies  by  the  ordinary  methods  of 
war.  Had  the  forces  of  Denmark  been  far  larger  than 
they  actually  were,  the  peril  of  Great  Britain  was  not 
so  extreme  as  to'excuse  the  wrong  done  to  mankind  by 
an  example  encouraging  all  future  belligerents  to  antici- 
pate one  another  in  forcing  each  neutral  state  to  take 
part  with  themselves. 

The  fleet  which  Napoleon  had  meant  to  turn  against 
this  country  now  lay  safe  within  Portsmouth  harbour. 
Denmark,  in  bitter  resentment,  declared  war  against 
Great  Britain,  and  rendered  some  service  to  the  Conti- 
nental League  by  the  attacks  of  its  privateers  upon 
British  merchant-vessels  in  the  Baltic.  The  second 
X 


354  MODERN   EUROPE.  1807. 

neutral  power  wliose   fate   liad   been  decided  by   tbe 

two  Emperors  at  Tilsit  received  tlie  sam- 

mands  upon         moHs  of  NapolcoH  a  few  days  before  tbe  attack 

Portugal.  -^  •^ 

on  Copenhagen.  Tbe  Eegent  of  Portugal 
bimseK  informed  tbe  Britisb  Government  that  be  bad  been 
required  by  ISTapoleon  to  close  bis  ports  to  Britisb  vessels, 
to  declare  war  on  England,  and  to  confiscate  all  Britisb 
property  within  his  dominions.  Placed  between  a  Power 
which  could  strip  him  of  bis  dominions  on  land,  and  one 
which  could  despoil  him  of  everything  he  possessed  beyond 
the  sea,  the  Eegent  determined  to  maintain  his  ancient 
friendship  with  Grreat  Britain,  and  to  submit  to  Napo- 
leon only  in  so  far  as  the  English  Government  would  ex- 
cuse him,  as  acting  under  coercion.  Although  a  nominal 
state  of  war  arose  between  Portugal  and  England,  tbe 
Eegent  really  acted  in  the  interest  of  England,  and  fol- 
lowed the  advice  of  the  British  Cabinet  up  to  tbe  end. 

The  end  was  soon  to  come.  The  demands  of  Napo- 
leon, arbitrary  and  oppressive  as  they  were,  by  no 
means  expressed  his  full  intentions  towards  Portugal. 
He  bad  determined  to  seize  upon  this,  country,  and  to 
employ  it  as  a  means  for  extending  his  ^wn  dominion 
over  tbe  whole  of  the  Spanish  Peninsula.  An  army- 
corps,  under  the  command  of  Junot,  bad  been  already 
placed  in  the  Pyrenees.  On  the  12th  of  October  Napo- 
leon received  tbe  answer  of  the  Eegent  of  Portugal, 
consenting  to  declare  war  upon  England,  and  only 
rejecting  the  dishonourable  order  to  confiscate  all  English 
property.  This  single  act  of  resistance  was  sufficient  for 
Napoleon's  purpose.     He  immediately  recalled  bis  am- 


1807.  THE   FBENOH  ENTER    POBTUQAL.  856 

bassador  from  Lisbon,  and  gave  orders  to  Junot  to  cross 
the  frontier,  and  march  upon  Portugal.  The  King  of 
Spain,  who  was  to  be  Napoleon's  next  victim, 

fi  I  111*  Treaty  of  Pon. 

was  for  the  moment  employed  as  his  accom-  J^^^n^®*Fr^ 
plice.    A  treaty  was  concluded  at  Fontaine-     Jartfuon^of'pi! 

.  tugal,  Oct.  27. 

bleau  between  Napoleon  and  King  Charles 
lY.  for  the  partition  of  Portugal  (Oct.  27).*  In  return 
for  the  cession  of  the  kingdom  of  Etruria,  which  was 
still  nominally  governed  by  a  member  of  the  Spanish 
house,  the  King  of  Spain  was  promised  half  the  Por- 
tuguese colonies,  along  with  the  title  of  Emperor  of 
the  Indies  ;  the  northern  provinces  of  Portugal  were 
reserved  for  the  infant  King  of  Etruria,  its  southern 
provinces  for  Grodoy,  minister  of  Charles  IV. ;  the  central 
districts  were  to  remain  in  the  hands  of  France,  and  to  be 
employed  as  a  means  of  regaining  the  Spanish  colonies 
from  England  upon  the  conclusion  of  a  general  peace. 

Not  one  of  these  provisions  was  intended  to  be  carried 
into  effect.  The  conquest  of  Portugal  was  but  a  part  of 
the  conquest  of  the  whole  peninsula.  But  neither  the 
Spanish  Court  nor  the  Spanish  people  suspected  Napo- 
leon's design.  Junot  advanced  without 
resistance  through  the  intervening  Spanish  Portugal,  not., 
territory,  and  pushed  forward  upon  Lisbon 
with  the  utmost  haste.  The  speed  at  which  Napoleon's 
orders  forced  him  to  march  reduced  his  army  to  utter 
prostration,  and  the  least  resistance  would  have  resulted 
in  its  ruin.  But  the  Court  of  Lisbon  had  determined  to 
quit  a  country  which  they  could  not  hope  to  defend 
•  Cevallos,  p.  73. 

X  2 


356  MODERN  UUBOPR  .  1807. 

against  the  master  of  tlie  Continent.  Already  in  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  the  House  of  Bra- 
ganza  had  been  familiar  with  the  project  of  transferring 
the  seat  of  their  Government  to  Brazil ;  and  now,  with 
the  approval  of  Great  Britain,  the  Eegent  resolved  to 
maintain  the  independence  of  his  family  by  flight  across 
the  Atlantic.  As  Junot's  troops  approached  the  capital, 
the  servants  of  the  palace  hastily  stowed  the  royal  pro- 
perty on  ship-board.  On  the  29th  of  November,  when 
FHghtoftheHouse  ^^^  Freuch  wcrc  now  close  at  hand,  the 
of  Braganza.  gq^adron  which  bore  the  House  of  Braganza 
to  its  colonial  home  dropped  down  the  Tagus,  saluted  by 
the  cafinon  of  the  English  fleet  that  lay  in  the  same 
river.  Junot  entered  the  capital  a  few  hours  later,  and 
placed  himself  at  the  head  of  the  Government  without 
encountering  any  opposition.  The  occupation  of  Por- 
tugal was  described  by  Napoleon  as  a  reprisal  for  the 
bombardment  of  Copenhagen.  It  excited  but  little 
attention  in  Europe  ;  and  even  at  the  Spanish  Court  the 
only  feeling  was  one  of  satisfaction  at  the  approaching 
aggrandisement  of  the  Bourbon  monarchy.  The  full 
signiflcance  of  Napoleon's  intervention  in  the  aflairg  of 
bhe  Peninsula  was  not  discovered  until  some  months 
were  passed. 

Portugal  und  Denmark  had  felt  the  consequences 
of  the  peace  made  at  Tilsit.  Less,  however,  de- 
pended upon  the  fate  of  the  Danish  fleet  and  the  Portu- 
prussiaafterthe     g^^sc  Eoyal  Family  than  upon  the  fate  of 

Peace  of  Tilsit.         p^.^^^-^^    ^^^    ^^^^    ^^^^^^     WrOUgcd  ;0f     aU 

the   victims   sacrificed  ,by  Alexander's  ambition.     The 


1807.  STEIN   MINTSTEll    OF   PRUSSIA.  357 

unfortunate  Prussian  State,  reduced  to  half  its  former 
extent,  devastated  and  impoverished  bj  war,  and  bur- 
dened with  the  support  of  a  French  army,  found  in  the 
crisis  of  its  ruin  the  beginning  of  a  worthier  national 
life.  Napoleon,  in  his  own  vindictive  jealousy,  unwit- 
tingly brought  to  the  head  of  the  Prussian  G-ovemment 
the  ablest  and  most  patriotic  statesman  of  the  Continent. 
Since  the  spring  of  1807  Baron  Hardenberg  had  again 
been  the  leading  Minister  of  Prussia,  and  it  was  to  his 
counsel  that  the  King's  honourable  rejection  of  a  separate 
peace  after  the  battle  of  Eylau  was  due.  Napoleon  could 
not  permit  this  Minister,  whom  he  had  already  branded 
as  a  partisan  of  Great  Britain,  to  remain  in  power :  he 
insisted  upon  Hardenberg's  dismissal,  and  g^^^  Miniater 
recommended  the  King  of  Prussia  to  summon  ^°*"  ^'  ^^' 
Stein,  who  was  as  yet  known  to  Napoleon  only  as  a 
skilful  financier,  likely  to  succeed  in  raising  the  money 
which  the  French  intended  to  extort. 

Stein  entered  upon  office  on  the  5th  of  October,  1807, 
with  almost  dictatorial  power.  The  need  of  the  most 
radical  changes  in  the  public  services,  as  well  as  in  the  social 
order  of  the  Prussian  State,  had  been  brought  home  to 
all  enlightened  men  by  the  disasters  of  the  war ;  and  a 
commission,  which  included  among  its  members  the  his- 
torian Niebuhr,  had  already  sketched  large  measures  of 
reform  before  Hardenberg  quitted  office.  Stein's  appoint- 
ment brought  to  the  head  of  the  State  a  man  immeasur- 
ably superior  to  Hardenberg  in  the  energy  necessary  for 
the  execution  of  great  changes,  and  gave  to  those  who 
were  the  most  sincerely  engaged  in  civil  or  military 


358  MOBEBN  EUROPE.  1807. 

reform  a  leader  unrivalled  in  patriotic  zeal,  in  boldness, 

and  in  purity  of  character.     The  first  great  legislative 

measure  of  Stein  was  the  abolition  of  serfage, 

cipation,  Oct.  9^     aud  of  all  the  lee^al  distinctions  which  fixed 

1807.  ^        ^  ^       ^      ^ 

within  the  limits  of  their  caste  the  noble,  the 
citizen,  and  the  peasant.  In  setting  his  name  to  the 
edict  ^  which,  on  the  9th  of  October,  1807,  made  an  end 
of  the  mediaival  framework  of  Prussian  society,  Stein 
was  indeed  but  consummating  a  change  which  the  pro- 
gress of  neighbouring  States  must  have  foir<jed  upon 
Prussia,  whoever  held  its  government.  The  D^eree  was 
framed  upon  the  report  of  Hardenberg's  Commi|||on,  and 
was  published  by  Stein  within  six  days  after  his  own  entry 
upon  office.  Grreat  as  were  the  changes  involved  in  this 
edict  of  emancipation,  it  contained  no  more  than  was 
necessary  to  bring  Prussia  up  to  the  level  of  the  least 
advanced  of  the  western  Continental  States.  In  Austria 
pure  serfage  had  been  abolished  by  Maria  Theresa  thirty 
years  before ;  it  vanished,  along  with  most  of  the  legal 
distinctions  of  class,  wherever  the  victories  of  France 
carried  a  new  political  order ;  even  the  misused  peasantry 
of  Poland  had  been  freed  from  their  degrading  yoke 
within  the  borders  of  the  newly -founded  Duchy  of  War- 
saw. If  Prussia  was  not  to  renounce  its  partnership  in 
European  progress  and  range  itself  with  its  barbarous 
eastern  neighbour,  that  order  which  fettered  the  peasant 
to  the  soil,  and  limited  every  Prussian  to  the  hereditary 
occupations  of  his  class  could  no  longer  be  maintained. 
It  is  not  as  an  achievement  of  individual  genius,  but  as 

•  Pertz,  ii.,  23.     Seeley,  i.,  430. 


1807.  PRUSSIAN  EDICT   OF  EMANOIPATION.  350 

the  most  vivid  expression  of  the  differences  between  the 
old  and  the  new  Europe,  that  the  fii*st  measure  of  Stein 
deserves  a  closer  examination.  ^ 

The  Edict  of  October  9,  1807,  extinguished  all  per- 
sonal servitude ;  it  permitted  the  noble,  the  citizen,  and 
the  peasant  to  follow  any  calling  ;  it  abolished  the  rule 
which  prevented  land  held  by  a  member  of  one  class 
from  passing  into  the  hands  of  another  class ;  it  em- 
powered families  to  free  their  estates  from  entail.  Taken 
together,  these  enactments  substitute  theyfree  disposition 
of  labour  and  propertylfor  the  outworn  doctrine  which 
Prussia  had  inherited  from  the  feudal  ages,  that  what  a 
man  is  born  that  he  shall  live  and  die.    The     „^   „ 

The  Prussian 

extinction  of  serfage,  though  not  the  most  JS'^^fter^'S^ 
prominent  provision  of  the  Edict,  was  the 
one  whose  effects  were  the  soonest  felt.  In  the  greater 
part  of  Prussia  the  marks  of  serfage,  as  distinct  from 
payments  and  services  amounting  to  a  kind  of  rent,  were 
the  obligation  of  the  peasant  to  remain  on  his  holding, 
and  the  right  of  the  lord  to  take  the  peasant's  children 
as  unpaid  servants  into  his  house.  A  general  relation 
of  obedience  and  command  existed,  as  between  an  here- 
ditary subject  and  master,  although  the  lord  could 
neither  exact  an  arbitrary  amount  of  labour  nor  inflict 
the  cruel  punishments  which  had  been  common  in  Poland 
and  Hungary.  What  the  villein  was  in  England  in  the 
thirteenth  century,  that  the  serf  was  in  Prussia  in  the 
year  1806  ;  and  the  change  which  in  England  gradually 
elevated  the  villein  into  the  free  copyholder  was  that 
change  which,  so  many  centuries  later,  the  Prussian 

or  TH-R 

TTTsi  T^r  T  T3  e  T'T-V 


36a  MOBEBN  EUBOPK  i807. 

legislator  effected  by  one  great  measure.  Stein  made 
tlie  Prussian  peasant  what  tlie  English  copyholder  had 
become  at  the  accession  of  Henry  YII.,  and  what  the 
French  peasant  had  been  before  1789,  a  free  person,  but 
one  bound  to  render  fixed  dues  and  service  to  the  lord  of 
the  manor  in  virtue  of  the  occupation  of  his  land.  These 
feudal  dues  and  services,  which  the  French  peasant,  ac- 
customed for  centuries  before  the  Ee volution  to  consider 
himself  as  the  full  proprietor  of  the  land,  treated  as  a 
mere  grievance  and  abuse,  Stein  considered  to  be  the 
best  form  in  which  the  joint  interest  of  the  lord  and 
the  peasant  could  be  maintained.  It  was  reserved  for 
Hardenberg,  four  years  later,  to  free  the  peasant  from 
all  obligations  towards  his  lord,  and  to  place  him  in 
unshackled  proprietorship  of  two -thirds  of  his  former 
holding,  the  lord  receiving  the  remaining  one-third  in 
compensation  for  the  loss  of  feudal  dues.  Neither  Stein 
nor  Hardenberg  interfered  with  the  right  of  the  lord  to 
act  as  judge  and  police-magistrate  within  the  limits  of 
his  manor  ;  and  the  hereditary  legal  jurisdiction,  which 
was  abolished  in  Scotland  in  1747,  and  in  France  in  1789, 
continued  unchanged  in  Prussia  down  to  the  year  1848. 
The  history  of  Agrarian  Eeform  upon  the  Continent 
shows  how  vast  was  the  interval  of  time  by 

Eelative  position  »/ 

^  pSsamTnd  wMch  somc  of  the  greatest  social  changes  in 
England  h^d  anticipated  the  corresponding 
changes  in  almost  all  other  nations.  But  if  the  Prussian 
peasant  at  the  beginning  of  this  century  remained  in  the 
servile  condition  which  had  passed  out  of  mind  in  Grreat 
Britain  before  the  Eeformation,  the  early  prosperity  of 


1807.  PRUSSIAN  AND   ENGLISH  PEASANTRY.  861 

the  peasant  in  England  was  dearly  purchased  by  a  sub- 
sequent decline  which  has  made  his  present  lot  far 
inferior  to  that  of  the  children  or  grandchildren  of  the 
Prussian  serf.  However  heavy  the  load  of  the  Prussian 
serf,  his  holding  was  at  least  protected  by  law  from 
absorption  into  the  domain  of  his  lord.  Before  suffi- 
cient capital  had  been  amassed  in  Prussia  to  render 
landed  property  an  object  of  competition,  the  forced 
military  service  of  Prederick  had  made  it  a  rule  of  State 
that  the  farmsteads  of  the  peasant  class  must  remain 
undiminished  in  number,  at  whatever  violence  to  the 
laws  of  the  market  or  the  desires  of  great  landlords. 
'No  process  was  permitted  to  take  place  corresponding  to 
that  by  which,  in  England,  after  the  villein  had  become 
the  free  copyholder,  the  lord,  with  or  without  technical 
legal  right,  terminated  the  copyhold  tenure  of  his 
retainer,  and  made  the  land  as  much  his  own  exclusive 
property  as  the  chairs  and  tables  in  his  house.  In 
Prussia,  if  the  law  kept  the  peasant  on  the  land,  it  also 
kept  the  land  for  the  peasant.  Economic  conditions,  in 
the  absence  of  such  control  in  England,  worked  against 
the  class  of  small  holders.  Their  early  enfranchisement 
in  fact  contributed  to  their  extinction.  It  would  perhaps 
have  been  better  for  the  English  labouring  class  to  remain 
bound  by  a  semi-servile  tie  to  their  land,  than  to  gain  a 
free  holding  which  the  law,  siding  with  the  landlord, 
treated  as  terminable  at  the  expiration  of  particular 
lives,  and  which  the  increasing  capital  of  the  rich  made 
its  favourite  prey.  It  is  little  profit  to  the  landless, 
resourceless  English  labourer  to -know  that  his  ancestor 


362  MODERN  EUBOPB.  1807. 

was  a  yeoman  when  the  Prussian  was  a  serf.  Long  as 
the  bondage  of  the  peasant  on  the  mainland  endured, 
prosperity  came  at  last.  The  conditions  which  once  dis- 
tinguished agricultural  England  from*  the  Continent  are 
now  reversed.  Nowhere  on  the  Continent  is  there  a 
labouring  class  so  stripped  and  despoiled  of  all  interest 
in  the  soil,  so  sedulously  excluded  from  all  possibilities 
of  proprietorship,  as  in  England.  In  England  alone  the 
absence  of  internal  revolution  and  foreign  pressure  has 
preserved  a  class  whom  a  life  spent  in  toil  leaves  as  bare 
and  dependent  as  when  it  began,  and  to  whom  the  only 
boon  which  their  country  can  offer  is  the  education 
which  may  lead  them  to  quit  it. 

Besides  the  commission  which  had  drafted  the  Edict 

of  Emancipation,   Stein  found   a  military    commission 

ens^asfed  on  a  plan  for  the  reorsranisation  of 

Kef  orm  of  Pros-  &    O  r  a 

sianarmy.  ^-j^e  Prussiau  army.  The  existing  system 
forced  the  peasant  to  serve  in  the  ranks  for  twenty 
years,  and  drew  the  officers  from  the  nobility,  leaving 
the  inhabitants  of  towns  without  either  the  duty  or  the 
right  to  enter  the  army  at  all.  Since  the  battle  of 
Jena,  no  one  doubted  that  the  principle  of  universal 
liability  to  military  service  must  be  introduced  into 
Prussia ;  on  the  other  hand,  the  very  disasters  of  the 
State  rendered  it  impossible  to  maintain  an  army  on 
anything  approaching  to  its  former  scale.  With  half 
its  territory  torn  from  it,  and  the  remainder  devastated 
by  war,  Prussia  could  barely  afford  to  keep  40,000  sol- 
diers in  arms.  Such  were  the  conditions  laid  before  the 
men  who  were  charged  with  the  construction  of  a  new 


iflW.  PRUSSIAN  MILITARY   REFORM.  363 

Prussian  military  system.  Their  conclusions,  imperfect 
in  themselves,  and  but  partially  carried  out  in  tlie  suc- 
ceeding years,  have  nevertheless  been  the  basis  of  the 
latest  military  organisation  of  Prussia  and  of  Europe 
generally.  The  problem  was  solved  by  the  adoption  of 
a  short  period  of  service  and  the  rapid  draft- 
ing of  the  trained  conscript  into  a  reserve- 
force.  Scharnhorst,  President  of  the  Military  Com- 
mission, to  whom  more  than  to  any  one  man  Prussia 
owed  its  military  revival,  proposed  to  maintain  an  Ac- 
tive Army  of  40,000  men ;  a  Reserve,  into  which  sol- 
diers should  pass  after  short  service  in  the  active 
army;  a  Landwehr,  to  be  employed  only  for  the  in- 
ternal defence  of  the  country ;  and  a  Landsturm,  or 
general  arming  of  the  population,  for  a  species  of  gue- 
rilla warfare.  Scharnhorst*s  project  was  warmly  sup- 
ported by  Stein,  who  held  a  seat  and  a  vote  on  the 
Military  Commission ;  and  the  system  of  short  service, 
with  a  Reserve,  was  immediately  brought  into  action, 
though  on  a  very  limited  scale.  The  remainder  of  the 
scheme  had  to  wait  for  the  assistance  of  events.  The 
principle  of  universal  militaiy  obligation  was  first  pro- 
claimed in  the  war  of  1813,  when^so  the  Landwehr 
was  first  enrolled. 

The  reorganisation  of  the  Prussian  military  system 
and  the  emancipation  of  the  peasant,  though  promoted 
by  Stein's  accession  to  power,  did  not  originate  in  Stein 
himself;  the  distinctive  work  of  Stein  was 

stein's  plans  of 

a  great  scheme  of  political  reform.      Had     powti«ire'o™. 
Stein  remained  longer  in  power,  he  would  have  given 


364  MODERN  EUEOPK  1807. 

to  Prussia  at  least  the  beginnings  of  constitutional 
government.  Events  drove  Mm  from  office  when  but  a 
small  part  of  his  project  was  carried  into  effect ;  but  the 
project  itself  was  great  and  comprehensive.  He  designed 
to  give  Prussia  a  Parliament,  and  to  establish  a  system 
of  self-government  in  its  towns  and  country  districts. 
Stein  had  visited  England  in  his  youth.  The  history 
and  the  literature  of  England  interested  him  beyond 
those  of  any  other  country ;  and  he  had  learnt  from 
England  that  the  partnership  of  the  nation  in  the  work 
of  government,  so  far  from  weakening  authority,  ani- 
mates it  with  a  force  which  no  despotic  system  can  long 
preserve.  Almost  every  important  state-paper  written 
by  Stein  denounces  the  apathy  of  the  civil  population  of 
Prussia,  and  attributes  it  to  their  exclusion  from  all 
exercise  of  public  duties.  He  declared  that  the  nation 
must  be  raised  from  its  torpor  by  the  establishment  of 
representative  government  and  the  creation  of  free  local 
institutions  in  town  and  country.  Stein  was  no  friend 
of  democracy.  Like  every  other  Prussian  statesman  he 
took  for  granted  the  exercise  of  a  vigorous  monarchical 
power  at  the  centre  of  the  State ;  but  around  the  per- 
manent executive  he  desired  to  gather  the  Council  of  the 
Design  for  a         Natiou,  chcckiug   at  least  the   caprices  of 

Parliament,    for^^,.         ,  ,  -,  -,  .  .-,  ..  «.-, 

Municipalities,      (Jabmet-rule,  and  makms:  the  opmion  oi  the 

and  District  °  ^ 

Boards.  peoplc  fclt  by  the  monarch.     Stein's  Parlia- 

ment would  have  been  a  far  weaker  body  than  the 
English  House  of  Commons,  but  it  was  at  least  not 
intended  to  be  a  mockery,  like  those  legislative  bodies 
which  Napoleon  and  his  clients  erected  as  the  disguise 


1807.  PBOJEOTS   OF  STEIN.  365 

of  despotism.  The  transaction  of  local  business  in  the 
towns  and  country  districts,  which  had  hitherto  be- 
longed to  officials  of  the  Crown,  Stein  desired  to  transfer 
in  part  to  bodies  elected  by  the  inhabitants  themselves. 
The  functions  allotted  to  the  new  municipal  bodies 
illustrated  the  modest  and  cautious  nature  of  Stein's 
attempt  in  the  direction  of  self-government,  including 
no  more  than  the  care  of  the  poor,  the  superintendence 
of  schools,  and  the  maintenance  of  streets  and  public 
buildings.  Finance  remained  partly,  police  wholly,  in 
the  hands  of  the  central  Grovernment.  Equally  limited 
were  the  powers  which  Stein  proposed  to  entrust  to  the 
district  councils  elected  by  the  rural  population.  In 
comparison  with  the  self-government  of  England  or 
America,  the  self-government  which  Stein  would  have 
introduced  into  Prussia  was  of  the  most  elementary 
character ;  yet  his  policy  stood  out  in  striking  contrast 
to  that  which  in  every  client-state  of  Napoleon  was 
now  crushing  out  the  last  elements  of  local  independence 
under  a  rigid  official  centralisation. 

Stein  was  indeed  unable  to  transform  Prussia  as  he 
desired.     Of  the  legislative,  the  municipal, 
and    the    district    reforms    which    he   had     refonnaione 

carried  out. 

sketched,  the  municipal  reform  was  the 
only  one  which  he  had  time  to  carry  out  before  being 
driven  from  power;  and  for  forty  years  the  mnnicipSt 
institutions  created  by  Stein  were  the  only  fragment 
of  liberty  which  Prussia  enjoyed.  A  vehement  opposi- 
tion to  reform  was  excited  among  the  landowners,  and 
supported  by  a  powerful  paii;y  at  the  Court.     St^in  was 


366  MODERN  EUBOPK  I8O& 

detested  by  the  nobles  wbose  peasants  he  had  emanci- 
pated, and  by  the  Berlin  aristocracy,  which  for  the  last 
ten  years  had  maintained  the  policy  of  friendship  with 
France,  and  now  declared  the  only  safety  of  the  Prus- 
sian State  to  lie  in  unconditional  submission  to  Napo- 
leon. The  fire  of  patriotism,  of  energy,  of  self-sacrifice, 
which  burned  in  Stein  made  him  no  representative  of 
the  Prussian  governing  classes  of  his  time.  It  was  not 
long  before  the  landowners,  who  deemed  him  a  Jacobin, 
and  the  friends  of  the  French,  who  called  him  a  mad- 
man, had  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  the  Minister  sent 
into  banishment  by  order  of  Napoleon  hirnself  (Dec, 
1808).  Stein  left  the  greater  part  of  \m  work  uncom- 
pleted, but  he  had  not  laboured  in  Y/Lyi.  The  years  of 
his  ministry  in  1807  and  1808  we^^^he  years  that 
gathered  together  everything  that  was  worthiest  in 
Prussia  in  the  dawn  of  a  national  revival,  and  prepared 
the  way  for  that  great  movement  in  which,  after  an 
interval  of  the  deepest  gloom,  Stein  was  himself  to 
light  the  nation  to  its  victory. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Spain  in  1806— Napoleon  uses  the  quarrel  between  Ferdinand  and  Godoy — 
He  affects  to  be  Ferdinand's  protector  —  Dupont's  army  enters  Spain — 
Murat  in  Spain— Charles  abdicates — Ferdinand  King — Savary  brings 
Ferdinand  to  Bayoniie — Napoleon  makes  both  Charles  and  Ferdinand 
resign — Spirit  of  the  Spanish  Nation — Contrast  with  Germany — Kising  of 
aU  Spain — The  Notables  at  Bayonne — Campaign  of  1808 — Capitulation  of 
Baylen — ^WoUesley  lands  in  Portugal — Vimieiro — Convention  of  Cintra — 
Effect  of  the  Spanish  Kisiugon  Europe — War  Party  in  Prussia — Napoleon  and 
Alexander  at  Eifurt — Stoin  resigns,  and  is  proscribed — Napoleon  in  Spain 
— Spanish  Misgovernment — Campaign  on  the  Ebro — Campaign  of  Sir  John 
Moore — Corunna — Napoleon  leaves  Spain — Siege  of  Saragossa — Successes 
of  the  French. 

Spain,  whicli  had  played  so  insIgnificaTit  a  part  through- 
out the  Eevolutionary  War,  was  now  about     Spanish  affairs. 

1793  —  IROfl 

to  become  the  theatre  of  events  that  opened 
a  new  world  of  hope  to  Europe.  Its  king,  the  Bourbon 
Charles  IV.,  was  more  weak  and  more  pitiful  than  any 
sovereign  of  the  age.  Power  belonged  to  the  Queen 
and  to  her  paramour  Grodoy,  who  for  the  last  fourteen 
years  had  so  conducted  the  affairs  of  the  country  that 
every  chauge  in  its  policy  had  brought  with  it  new 
disaster.  In  the  war  of  the  First  Coalition  Spain  had 
joined  the  Allies,  and  French  armies  had  crossed  the 
Pyrenees.  In  1796  Spain  entered  the  service  of  France, 
and  lost  the  battle  of  St.  Vincent.  At  the  Peace  of 
Amiens,  Napoleon  surrendered  its  colony  Trinidad  to 
England ;  on  the  renewal  of  the  war  he  again  forced  it 
into  hostilities  with  Great  Britain,  and  brought  upon  it 


368  MODERN  EUBOPK  1806- 

the  disaster  of  Trafalgar.  This  unbroken  "hnmiliation  of 
the  Spanish  arms,  combined  with  intolerable  oppression 
and  impoverishment  at  home,  raised  so  bitter  an  outcry 
against  Grodoy's  government,  that  foreign  observers,  who 
underrated  the  loyalty  of  the  Spanish  people,  believed 
the  country  to  be  on  the  verge  of  revolution.  At  the 
Court  itself  the  Crown  Prince  Ferdinand,  under  the  in- 
fluence of  his  Neapolitan  wife,  headed  a  party  in  opposi- 
tion to  Grodoy  and  the  supporters  of  French  dominion. 
Godoy,  insecure  at  home,  threw  himself  the 

Spain  in  1806.  n       •     j^       j  i  p    -xr 

more  unreservedly  into  the  arms  oi  JNapo- 
leon,  who  bestowed  upon  him  a  contemptuous  patronage, 
and  flattered  him  with  the  promise  of  an  independent 
principality  in  Portugal.  Izquierdo,  Grodoy's  agent  at 
Paris,  received  proposals  from  Napoleon  which  were 
concealed  from  the  Spanish  Ambassador;  and  during 
the  first  months  of  1806  Napoleon  possessed  no  more 
devoted  servant  than  the  man  who  virtually  held  the 
government  of  S23ain. 

The  opening  of  negotiations  between  Napoleon  and 
Fox's  Ministry  in  May,  1806,  first  shook  this  relation,  of 
confidence  and  obedience.  Peace  between  France  and 
England  involved  the  abandonment  on  the  part  of  Napo- 
leon of  any  attack  upon  Portugal ;  and  Napoleon  now 
began  to  meet  Grodoy's  inquiries  after  his  Portuguese 
principality  with  an  ominous  silence.  The  next  intelli- 
gence received  was  that  the  Spanish  Balearic  Islands 
had  been  offered  by  Napoleon  to  Grreat  Britain,  with 
the  view  of  providing  an  indemnity  for  Ferdinand  of 
Naples,  if  he  should  give  up  Sicily  to  Joseph  Bona- 


.6061  SPAIN  IN  1806.  369 

parte  (July,  1806).  This  contemptuous  appropriation  of 
Spanish  territory,  without  even  the  pretence  of  consult- 
ing the  Spanish  Grovernraent,  excited  scarcely  less  anger 
at  Madrid  than  the  corresponding  proposal  with  regard 
to  Hanover  excited  at  Berlin.  The  Court  began  to  medi- 
tate a  change  of  policy,  and  watched  the  events  which 
were  leading  Prussia  to  arm  for  the  war  of  1806,  A 
few  weeks  more  passed,  and  news  arrived  that  Buenos 
Ayres,  the  capital  of  Spanish  South  America,  had  fallen 
into  the  hands  of  the  English.  This  disaster  produced 
the  deepest  impression,  for  the  loss  of  Buenos  Ayres 
was  believed,  and  with  good  reason,  to  be  but  the  prelude 
to  the  loss  of  the  entire  American  empire  of  Spain. 
Continuance  of  the  war  with  England  was  certain  ruin  ; 
alliance  with  the  enemies  of  Napoleon  was  at  least  not 
hopeless,  now  that  Prussia  was  on  the  point  of  throwing 
its  army  into  the  scale  against  France.  An  agent  was 
despatched  by  the  Spanish  G-overnment  to 
London  (Sept.,  1806) ;  and,  upon  the  com-  joiS^^'iSs^  in 
mencement  of  hostilities  by  Prussia,  a  pro- 
clamation was  issued  by  (xodoy,  which,  without  naming 
any  actual  enemy,  summoned  the  Spanish  people  to 
prepare  for  a  war  on  behalf  of  their  country. 

Scarcely  had  the  manifesto  been  read  by  the  Spaniards 
when  the  Prussian  army  was  annihilated  at  Jena.  The 
dream  of  resistance  to  Napoleon  vanished  away ;  the  only 
anxiety  of  the  Spanish  Government  was  to  escape  from  the 
consequences  of  its  untimely  daring.  Godoy  hastened  to 
explain  that  his  martial  proclamation  had  been  directed 
not  against  the  Emperor  of  the  French,  but  against  the 
J 


370  MODERN  EUBOPE.  iso;. 

Emperor  of  Morocco.  Napoleon  professed  Mmself  satis- 
fied with  this  palpable  absurdity :  it  appeared  as  if  the 
events  of  the  last  few  months  had  left  no  trace  on  his  mind. 
Immediately  after  the  Peace  of  Tilsit  he  resumed  his  nego- 
tiations with  Godoy  upon  the  old  friendly  footing,  and 
brought  them  to  a  conclusion  in  the  Treaty 
tainebieau,  Oct!',  of  Fontaiuebleau  (Oct.,  1807),  which  pro- 
vided for  the  invasion  of  Portugal  by  a 
French  and  a  Spanish  army,  and  for  its  division  into 
principalities,  one  of  which  was  to  be  conferred  upon 
Grodoy  himself.  The  occupation  of  Portugal  was  duly 
effected,  and  Godoy  looked  forward  to  the  speedy  retire- 
ment of  the  French  from  the  province  which  was  to  be 
his  portion  of  the  spoil. 

Napoleon,  however,  had  other  ends  in  view.     Spain, 
not  Portup^al,  was  the  true  prize.    Napoleon 

Napoleon   uses  *='  -*-■'■ 

lerdSlSd^  °^  ^^^  gradually  formed  the  determination  of 
"^  *  taking  Spain  into  his  own  hands,  and  the 
dissensions  of  the  Court  itself  enabled  him  to  appear 
upon  the  scene  as  the  judge  to  whom  all  parties  ap- 
pealed. The  Crown  Prince  Ferdinand  had  long  been  at 
open  enmity  with  Grodoy  and  his  own  mother.  So  long 
as  Ferdinand's  Neapolitan  wife  was  alive,  her  influence 
made  the  Crown  Prince  the  centre  of  the  party  hostile 
to  France;  but  after  her  death  in  1806,  at  a  time  when 
Godoy  himself  inclined  to  join  Napoleon  s  enemies, 
Ferdinand  took  up  a  new  position,  and  allied  himself 
with  the  French  Ambassador,  at  whose  instigation  he 
wrote  to  Napoleon,  soliciting  the  hand  of  a  priilcess  of 
the  Napoleonic  House.*  Godoy,  though  unaware  of 
•  Oevallos,  p.  13.    Baumgarten,  Geschichte  Spaniens,  i.,  131. 


iao7.  TBJE  SPANISH  OOUBT.  371 

the  letter,  discovered  that  Ferdinand  was  engaged  in 
some  intrigue.  King  Charles  was  made  to  believe  that 
his  son  had  entered  into  a  conspiracy  to  dethrone  him. 
The  Prince  was  placed  under  arrest,  and  on  the  30th  of 
October,  1807,  a  royal  proclamation  appeared  at  Madrid, 
announcing  that  Ferdinand  had  been  detected  in  a  con- 
spiracy against  his  parents,  and  that  he  was  about  to 
be  brought  to  justice  along  with  his  accomplices.  King 
Charles  at  the  same  time  wrote  a  letter  to  Napoleon,  of 
whose  connection  with  Ferdinand  he  had  not  the 
slightest  suspicion,  stating  that  he  intended  to  exclude 
the  Crown  Prince  from  the  succession  to  the  throne  of 
Spain.  No  sooner  had  Napoleon  received  the  commu> 
nication  from  the  simple  King  than  he  saw  himself  in 
possession  of  the  pretext  for  intervention  which  he  had 
so  long  desired.  The  most  pressing  orders  were  given 
for   the   concentration    of    troops    on    the     „    , 

•*•  Napoleon  about 

Spanish  frontier ;  Napoleon  appeared  to  be  So£fto7SF«^ 
on  the  point  of  entering  Spain  as  the  de- 
fender of  the  hereditary  rights  of  Ferdinand.  The 
opportunity,  however,  proved  less  favourable  than  Napo- 
leon had  expected.  The  Crown  Prince,  overcome  by 
his  fears,  begged  forgiveness  of  his  father,  and  disclosed 
the  negotiations  which  had  taken  place  between  himself 
and  the  French  Ambassador.  Godoy,  dismayed  at  find- 
ing Napoleon's  hand  in  what  he  had  supposed  to  be  a 
mere  palace-intrigue,  abandoned  all  thought  of  proceed- 
ing further  against  the  Crown  Prince ;  and  a  manifesto 
announced  that  Ferdinand  was  restored  to  the  favour  of 
his  father.  Napoleon  now  countermanded  the  order 
y  2 


372  MODERN  EUBOTB.  1807. 

which  he  had  given  for  the  despatch  of  the  Ehenish 
troops   to   the  Pyrenees,    and   contented  himself  with 
directing  General  Dupont,  the  commander  of  an  army- 
corps  nominally  destined  for  Portugal,   to 
sSri)ec^i807!     cross  the  Spanish  frontier  and  advance  as 
far  as  Yittoria. 
Dupont's  troops  entered  Spain  in  the  last  days  of 
the  year  1807,    and  were   received  with  acclamations. 
It  was  universally  believed  that  IN^apoleon 

Frencli  wel-  "^  -^ 

^"^FerSiSd?  had  espoused  the  cause  of  Ferdinand,  and 
intended  to  deliver  the  Spanish  nation  from 
the  detested  rule  of  Grodoy.  Since  the  open  attack  made 
upon  Ferdinand  in  the  publication  of  the  pretended  con- 
spiracy, the  Crown  Prince,  who  was  personally  as  con- 
temptible as  any  of  his  enemies,  had  become  the  idol  of 
the  people.  For  years  past  the  hatred  of  the  nation 
towards  Godoy  and  the  Queen  had  been  constantly 
deepening,  and  the  very  reforms  which  Godoy  effected 
in  the  hope  of  attaching  to  himself  the  more  enlightened 
classes  only  served  to, complete  his  unpopularity  with  the 
fanatical  mass  of  the  nation.  The  French,  who  gradually 
entered  the  Peninsula  to  the  number  of  80,000,  and 
who  described  themselves  as  the  protectors  of  Ferdinand 
and  of  the  true  Catholic  faith,  were  able  to  spread 
themselves  over  the  northern  provinces  without  exciting 
suspicion.  It  was  only  when  their  commanders,  by  a 
series  of  tricks  worthy  of  American  savages,  obtained 
possession  of  the  frontier  citadels  and  fortresses,  that 
the  wiser  part  of  the  nation  began  to  entertain  some 
doubt  as  to  the  real  purpose  of  their  ally.    At  the  Court 


1808.  TEE   FBENOH  ENTER   SPAIN.  373 

itself  and  among  the  enemies  of  Ferdinand  the  advance 
of  the  French  roused  the  utmost  alarm.  King  Charles 
wrote  to  Napoleon  in  the  tone  of  ancient  friendship ; 
but  the  answer  he  received  was  threatening  and  myste- 
rious. The  utterances  which  the  Emperor  let  fall  in 
the  presence  of  persons  likely  to  report  them  at  Madrid 
were  even  more  alarming,  and  were  intended  to  terrify 
the  Court  into  the  resolution  to  take  flight  from  Madrid. 
The  capital  once  abandoned  by  the  King,  Napoleon 
judged  that  he  might  safely  take  everything  into  }iis 
own  hands  on  the  pretence  of  restoring  to  Spain  the 
government  which  it  had  lost. 

On  the  20th  of  February,  1808,  Murat  was  ordered  to 
quit  Paris  in  order  to  assume  the  command  ^.^^^  ^^  ^ 
in  Spain.  Not  a  word  was  said  by  Napoleon  ^^'  ^'^'^ 
to  him  before  his  departure.  His  instructions  first 
reached  him  at  Bayonne ;  they  were  of  a  military  nature, 
and  gave  no  indication  of  the  ultimate  political  object 
of  his  mission.  Murat  entered  Spain  on  the  1st  of  March, 
knowing  no  more  than  that  he  was  ordered  to  reassure 
all  parties  and  to  commit  himself  to  none,  but  with  full 
confidence  that  he  himself  was  intended  by  Napoleon  to 
be  the  successor  ef  the  Bourbon  dynasty.  It  was  now 
that  the  Spanish  Court,  expecting  the  appearance  of  the 
French  army  in  Madrid,  resolved  upon  that  flight  which 
Napoleon  considered  so  necessary  to  his  own  success. 
The  project  was  not  kept  a  secret.  It  passed  from 
Godoy  to  the  Ministers  of  State,  and  from  them  to  the 
friends  of  Ferdinand.  The  populace  of  Madrid  was  in- 
flamed by  the  report  that  Godoy  wae  about  to  carry  the 


374  MODERN  EUROPE,  isos. 

King  to  a  distance,  in  order  to  prolong  the  misgovern- 
ment  whicli  the  French  had  determined  to  overthrow. 
A  tumultuous  crowd  marched  from  the  capital  to  Aran- 
juez,  the  residence  of  the  Court.  On  the  evening  of  the 
17th  of  March,  the  palace  of  Grodoy  was  stormed  by  the 
mob.  Godoy  himself  was  seized,  and  carried  to  the 
barracks  amid  the  blows  and  curses  of  the 
dicates,  March     populacc.     Tho  tcrrificd  King:,  who  already 

17,1808.  ^    ^  ,  .  .  . 

.  saw  before  him  the  fate  of  his  cousin,  Louis 
XYI.,  first  published  a  decree  depriving  Godoy  of  all  his 
dignities,  and  then  abdicated  in  favour  of  his  son.  On 
the  19th  of  March  Ferdinand  was  proclaimed  King. 

Such  was  the  unexpected  intelligence  that  met  Murat 
as  he  approached  Madrid.  The  dissensions  of  the  Court, 
which  were  to  supply  his  ground  of  intervention,  had 
been  terminated  by  the  Spaniards  themselves :  in  the 
place  of  a  despised  dotard  and  a  menaced  favourite, 
Spain  had  gained  a  youthful  sovereign  around  whom  all 
classes  of  the  nation  rallied  with  the  utmost  enthusiasm. 
Murat's  position  became  a  very  difficult  one  ;  but  he 
supplied  what  was  wanting  in  his  instructions  by  the 
craft  of  a  man  bent  upon  creating  a  vacancy  in  his 
own  favour.  He  sent  his  aide-de-camp,  Monthieu,  to 
visit  the  dethroned  sovereign,  and  obtained  a  protest 
from  King  Charles  IV.,  declaring  his  abdication  to  have 
been  extorted  from  him  by  force,  and  consequently  to  be 
null  and  void.  This  document  Murat  kept 
MaM,  iSrch  secret ;  but  he  carefully  abstained  from  doing 
anj^thing  which  might  involve  a  recognition 
of  Ferdinand's  title.     On  the  23rd  of  March  the  French 


1803.  FERDINAND    KINO.  875 

troops  entered  Madrid.  Nothing  had  as  yet  become 
known  to  the  public  that  indicated  an  altered  policy  on 
the  part  of  the  French;  and  the  soldiers  of  Murat,  as 
the  supposed  friends  of  Ferdinand,  met  with  as  friendly 
a  reception  in  Madrid  as  in  the  other  towns  of  Spain. 
On  the  following  day  Ferdinand  himself  made  his  solemn 
entry  into  the  capital,  amid  wild  demonstrations  of  an 
almost  barbaric  loyalty. 

In  the  tumult  of  popular  joy  it  was  noticed  that 
Murat's  troops  continued  their  exercises  without  the 
least  regard  to  the  pageant  that  so  deeply  stirred  the 
hearts  of  the  Spaniards.  Suspicions  were  aroused ;  the 
enthusiasm  of  the  people  for  the  French  soldiers  began 
to  change  into  irritation  and  ill-will.  The  end  of  the 
long  drama  of  deceit  was  in  fact  now  close  at  hand. 
On  the  4th  of  April  Q-eneral  Savary  arrived  at  Madrid 
with  instructions  independent  of  those  given  to  Murat. 
He  was  charged  to  entice  the  new  Spanish 

^  ■*■  Savary  bnngfs 

sovereign  from  his  capital,  and  to  bring  him,  l^^o^e^^Apro, 
either  as  a  dupe  or  as  a  prisoner,  on  to 
French  soil.  The  task  was  not  a  difficult  one.  Savary 
pretended  that  Napoleon  had  actually  entered  Spain, 
and  that  he  only  required  an  assurance  of  Ferdinand's 
continued  friendship  before  recognising  him  as  the  legi- 
timate successor  of  Charles  IV.  Ferdinand,  he  added, 
could  show  no  greater  mark  of  cordiality  to  his  patron 
than  by  advancing  to  meet  him  on  the  road.  Snared  by 
these  hopes,  Ferdinand  set  out  from  Madrid,  in  company 
with  Savary  and  some  of  his  own  foolish  confidants. 
On  reaching  Burgos  the  party  found  no  signs  of  the 


376  MODERN  JEJUnOPl).  im. 

Emperor.  They  continued  tlieir  journey  to  Yittoria. 
Here  Ferdinand's  suspicions  were  aroused,  and  he  de- 
clined to  proceed  farther.  Savary  hastened  to  Bayonne 
to  report  the  delay  to  Napoleon.  He  returned  with  a 
letter  which  overcame  Ferdinand's  scruples  and  induced 
him  to  cross  the  Pyrenees,  in  spite  of  the  prayers  or 
statesmen  and  the  loyal  violence  of  the  simple  inhabi- 
tants of  the  district.  At  Bayonne  Ferdinand  was  visited 
by  Napoleon,  but  not  a  word  was  spoken  on  the  object 
of  his  journey.  In  the  afternoon  the  Emperor  received 
Ferdinand  and  his  suite  at  a  neighbouring  chateau,  but 
preserved  the  same  ominous  silence.  -When  the  other 
guests  departed,  the  Canon  Escoiquiz,  a  member  of 
Ferdinand's  retinue,  was  detained,  and  learned  from 
Napoleon's  own  lips  the  fate  in  store  for  the  Bourbon 
Monarchy.  Savary  returned  to  Bayonne  with  Ferdinand, 
and  informed  the  prince  that  he  must  renounce  the 
crown  of  Spain."^ 

For  some  days  Ferdinand  held  out  against  Napo- 
leon's demands  with  a  stubbornness  not  often  shown  by 
him  in  the  course  of  his  mean  and  hypocritical  career. 
He  was  assailed  not  only  by  Napoleon  but  by  those 
whose  fall  had  been  his  own  rise ;  for  Grodoy  was  sent 
to  Bayonne  by  Murat,  and  the  old  King  and  Queen 
hurried  after  their  son  iii  order  to  witness  his  humilia- 
tion. Ferdinand's  parents  attacked  him  with  an  inde- 
cency that  astonished  even  Napoleon  himself;  but 
the  Prince  maintained  his  refusal  until  news  arrived 
from  Madrid  which  terrified  him  into  submission.     The 

*  Escoiquiz,  Expose,  p.  57,  107. 


1808  FERDINAND   AT   BAYONNE.  377 

irritation  of  the  capital  had  culminated  in  an  armed 
conflict  between  the  populace  and  the  French  troops. 
On  an  attempt  being  made  by  Murat  to  remove  the 
remaining  members  of  the  royal  family  from  the  palace, 
the  capital  had  broken  into  open  insurrection,  and 
wherever  French  soldiers  were  found  alone 

.  iii'i*ii  1         Attack  on    the 

or  in   small    bodies   they   were  massacred.     French  in  Ma- 

•^  drid.  May  2. 

(May  2.)  Some  hundreds  of  the  French 
perished ;  but  the  victory  of  Murat  was  speedy,  and  his 
vengeance  ruthless.  The  insurgents  were  driven  into 
the  great  central  square  of  the  city,  and  cut  down  by 
repeated  charges  of  cavalry.  When  all  resistance  was 
over,  numbers  of  the  citizens  were  shot  in  cold  blood. 
Such  was  the  intelligence  whjch  reached  Bayonne  in 
the  midst  of  Napoleon's  struggle  with  Ferdinand. 
There  was  no  further  need  of  argument.  Ferdinand 
was  informed  that  if  he  withheld  his  resig-     charies  and 

,.«.,/»  ,  ,  ,  Ferdinand    sur- 

nation    tor    twenty-tour    hours   longer   he     render  their 

•^  Y  rights  to  Napo- 

would  be  treated  as  a  rebel.     He  yielded;     ^®°°- 
and  for  a  couple  of  country  houses  and  two  life-annui- 
ties the  crown  of   Spain  and  the  Indies  was  renounced 
in  favour  of  Napoleon  by  father  and  son. 

The  crown  had  indeed  been  won  without  a  battle. 
That  there  remained  a  Spanish  nation  ready 

••■  **        National  spiritof 

to  fight  to  the  death  for  its  independence  *»»«  spamard.. 
was  not  a  circumstance  which  Napoleon  had  taken  into 
account.  His  experience  had  as  yet  taught  him  of  no 
force  but  that  of  Governments  and  armies.  In  the 
larger  States,  or  groups  of  States,  which  had  hitherto 
been  the  spoil  of  France,  the  sense  of  nationality  scarcely 


378  MODERN  EUROPE.  1808. 

existed.  Italy  had  felt  it  no  disgrace  to  pass  under  the 
rule  of  Napoleon.  The  Grermans  on  both  sides  of  the 
Ehine  knew  of  a  fatherland  only  as  an  arena  of  the 
keenest  jealousies.  In  Prussia  and  in  Austria  the  bond 
of  citizenship  was  far  less  the  love  of  country  than  the 
habit  of  obedience  to  government.  England  and  Eussia, 
where  patriotism  existed  in  the  sense  in  which  it  existed 
in  Spain,  had  as  yet  been  untouched  by  French  armies. 
Judging  from  the  action  of  the  Germans  and  the 
Italians,  Napoleon  might  well  suppose  that  in  settling 
with  the  Spanish  Grovernment  he  had  also  settled  with 
the  Spanish  people,  or,  at  the  worst,  that  his  troops 
might  have  to  fight  some  fanatical  peasants,  like  those 
who  resisted  the  expulsion  of  the  Bourbons  from  Naples. 
But  the  Spanish  nation  was  no  mosaic  of  political 
curiosities  like  the  Holy  Eoman  Empire,  and  no  divided 
and  oblivious  family  like  the  population  of  Italy.  Spain, 
as  a  single  nation  united  under  its  King,  had  once 
played  the  foremost  part  in  Europe  :  when  its  grandeur 
departed,  its  pride  had  remained  behind  :  the  Spaniard, 
in  all  his  torpor  and  impoverishment,  retained  the 
impulse  of  honour,  the  spirited  self-respect,  which  periods 
of  national  ^greatness  leave  behind  them  among  a  race 
capable  of  cherishing  their  memory.  Nor  had  those 
influences  of  a  common  European  culture,  which  directly 
opposed  themselves  to  patriotism  in  Germany,  affected 
the  home-bred  energy  of  Spain.  The  temper  of  mind 
which  could  find  satisfaction  in  the  revival  of  a  form 
of  Greek  art  when  Napoleon's  cavalry  were  scouring 
Germany,   or    which  could   inquire   whether   mankind 


1806.  BPIBIT   OF   THE  SPANIARDS.  379 

would  not  profit  by  the  removal  of  the  barriers  between 
nations,  was  unknown  among  the  Spanish  people.  Their 
feeling  towards  a  foreign  invader  was  less  distant  from 
that  of  African  savages  than  from  that  of  the  civilised 
and  literary  nations  which  had  fallen  so  easy  a  prey  to 
the  French.  Government,  if  it  had  degenerated  into 
everything  that  was  contemptible,  had  at  least  failed 
to  reduce  the  people  to  the  passive  helplessness  which 
resulted  from  the  perfection  of  uniformity  in  Prussia. 
Provincial  institutions,  though  corrupted,  were  not 
extinguished ;  provincial  attachments  and  prejudices 
existed  in  unbounded  strength.  Like  the  passion  of  the 
Spaniard  for  his  native  district,  his  passion  for  Spain 
was  of  a  blind  and  furious  character.  Enlightened  con- 
viction, though  not  altogether  absent,  had  small  place 
in  the  Spanish  war  of  defence.  Eeligious  fanaticism, 
hatred  of  the  foreigner,  delight  in  physical  barbarity, 
played  their  full  part  by  the  side  of  nobler  elements 
in  the  struggle  for  national  independence. 

The   captivity    of  Ferdinand,  and   the   conflict   of 
Murat*s    troops    with   the    inhabitants   of 

^  ^  Rising- of  ^paln, 

Madrid,  had  become  known  in  the  Spanish  May^isce. 
cities  before  the  middle  of  May.  On  the  20th  of  the 
same  month  the  Gaceta  announced  the  abdication  of 
the  Bourbon  family.  Nothing  more  was  wanting  to 
throw  Spain  into  tumult.  The  same  irresistible  impulse 
seized  provinces  and  cities  separated  by  the  whole  breadth 
of  the  Peninsula.  .  Without  communication,  and  with- 
out the  guidance  of  any  central  authority,  the  Spanish 
people  in  every  part  of.  the  kingdom  armed  themselves 


380  MODERN  EUROPE,  isos. 

against  the  usurper.  Carthagena  rose  on  the  22nd. 
Valencia  forced  its  magistrates  to  proclaim  King  Ferdi- 
nand on  the  23rd.  Two  days  later  the  mountain-dis- 
trict of  Asturias,  with  a  population  of  half  a  million, 
formally  declared  war  on  Napoleon,  and  despatched 
envoys  to  Great  Britain  to  ask  for  assistance.  On  the 
26th,  Santander  and  Seville,  on  opposite  sides  of  the 
Peninsula,  joined  the  national  movement.  Corunna, 
Badajoz,  and  Granada  declared  themselves  on  the  Feast 
of  St.  Ferdinand,  the  30th  of  May.  Thtls  within  a 
week  the  entire  country  was  in  arms,  except  in  those 
districts  where  the  presence  of  French  troops  rendered 
revolt  impossible.  The  action  of  the  insurgents  was 
everywhere  the  same.  They  seized  upon  the  arms  and 
munitions  of  war  collected  in  the  magazines,  and  forced 
the  magistrates  or  commanders  of  towns  to  place  them- 
selves at  their  head.  Where  the  latter  resisted,  or  were 
suspected  of  treachery  to  the  national  cause,  they  were 
in  many  cases  put  to  death.  Committees  of  Govern- 
ment were  formed  in  the  principal  cities,  and  as  many 
armies  came  into  being  as  there  were  independent 
centres  of  the  insurrection. 

Napoleon  was  in  the  meantime  collecting  a  body  of 
prelates  and  grandees  at  Bayonne,  under  the 

Napoleon's   As-  ,  „  t  i  •  j  i  i     l'  i* 

sembiy  at  Bay-     pretence  01  consultmsf  the  representatives  oi 

onne,  Jiine,  1808.       ^  ox 

the  Spanish  nation.  Half  the  members  of 
the  intended  Assembly  received  a  personal  summons 
from  the  Emperor ;  the  other  half  were  ordered  to  be 
chosen  by  popular  election.  When  the  order,  however, 
was  issued  from  Bayonne,  the  country  was  already  in 


uoa  UPRISING    OF  SPAIN.  381 

full  revolt  Elections  were  held  only  in  the  districts 
occupied  by  the  French,  and  not  more  than  twenty 
representatives  so  elected  proceeded  to  Bayonne.  The 
remainder  of  the  Assembly,  which  numbered  in  all 
ninety-one  persons,  was  composed  of  courtiers  who  had 
accompanied  the  Eoyal  Family  across  the  Pyrenees,  and 
of  any  Spaniards  of  distinction  upon  whom  the  French 
could  lay  their  hands.  Joseph  Bonaparte  was  brought 
from  Naples  to  receive  the  crown  of  Spain.*  j  ^  ^^^ 
On  the  15th  of  June  the  Assembly  of  the  ^^^^'^^^ 
Notables  was  opened.  Its  discussions  followed  the 
order  prescribed  by  Napoleon  on  all  similar  occasions. 
Articles  disguising  a  central  absolute  power  with  some 
pretence  of  national  representation  were  laid  before  the 
Assembly,  and  adopted  without  criticism.  Except  in 
the  privileges  accorded  to  the  Church,  little  indicated 
that  the  Constitution  of  Bayonne  was  intended  for  the 
Spanish  rather  than  for  any  other  nation.  Its  political 
forms  were  as  valuable  or  as  valueless  as  those  which 
Napoleon  had  given  to  his  other  client  States ;  its  prin- 
ciples of  social  order  were  those  which  even  now  despot- 
ism could  not  dissever  from  French  supremacy — the 
abolition  of  feudal  services,  equality  of  taxation,  admis- 
sion of  all  ranks  to  public  employment.  Titles  of  nobility 
were  preserved,  the  privileges  of  nobility  abolished 
One  genuine  act  of  homage  was  rendered  to  the  national 
character.  The  Catholic  religion  was  declared  to  be  the 
only  one  permitted  in  Spain.  v. 

While  Napoleon  was  thus  emancipating  the  peasants 
*  Miot  de  Molito,  ii.,  ch.  7. 


\ 


382  MODERN  EUROPE.  1808. 

from  the  nobles,  and  reconciling  Ms  supremacy  witli  tlie 
claims  of  the  Church,  peasants  and  townspeople  were 
flocking  to  arms  at  the  call  of  the  priests,  who  so  little 
appreciated  the  orthodoxy  of  their  patron  as  to  identify 
him  in  their  manifestos  with  Calvin,  with  the  Anti- 
christ, and  with  Apollyon.*     The  Emperor  underrated 

the    military  efficiency  of   the  national  re- 
Attempts  of  Na-  *'  "^ 

pressSie^spaS  volt,  aud  contcutcd  himself  with  sending 
his  lieutenants  to  repress  it,  while  he  him- 
self, expecting  a  speedy  report  of  victory,  remained  in 
Bayonne.  Divisions  of  the  French  army  moved  in  all 
directions  against  the  insurgents.  Duponb  was  ordered 
to  march  upon  Seville  from  the  capital,  Moncey  upon 
Valencia ;  Marshal  Bessieres  took  command  of  a  force 
intended  to  disperse  the  main  army  of  the  Spaniards, 
which  threatened  the  roads  from  the  Pyrenees  to  Madrid. 
The  first  encounters  were  all  favourable  to  the  practised 
French  troops ;  yet  the  objects  which  Napoleon  set 
before  his  generals  were  not  achieved.  Moncey  failed  to 
reduce  Valencia ;  Dapont  found  himself  outnumbered  on 
passing  the  Sierra  Morena,  and  had  to  retace  his  steps 
and  halt  at  Andujar,  where  the  road  to  Madrid  leaves 
the  valley  of  the  Gruadalquivir.  Without  sustaining 
any  severe  loss,  the  French  divisions  were  disheartened 
by  exhausting  and  resultless  marches ;  the  Spaniards 
gained  new  confidence  on  each  successive  day  which 
passed  without  inflicting  upon  them  a  defeat.  At  length, 
liowever,  the  commanders  of  the  northern  army  were 
forced  by  Marshal  Bessieres  to  fight  a  pitched  battle  at 

*  Baumgarten,  i.,  242. 


1808.  OAFITULATION   OF   BAYLEN.  888 

Eio  Seco,  on  the  west  of  Valladolid  (July  13th).  Bes- 
sieres  won  a  complete  victory,  and  gained  the  lavish 
praises  of  his  master  for  a  battle  which,  according  to 
Napoleon's  own  conception,  ended  the  Spanish  war  by 
securing  the  roads  from  the  Pyrenees  to  Madrid. 

Never  had  Napoleon  so  gravely  mistaken  the  true 
character  of  a  campaign.  The  vitality  of  the  Spanish 
insurrection  lay  not  in  the  support  of  the  capital, 
which  had  never  passed  out  of  the  hands  of  the  French, 
but  in  the  very  independence  of  the  several  provincial 
movements.  Unlike  Vienna  and  Berlin,  Madrid  might 
be  held  by  the  French  without  the  loss  being  felt  by 
their  adversary;  Cadiz,  Corunna,  Lisbon,  were  equally 
serviceable  bases  for  the  insurrection.  The  victory  of 
Marshal  Bessi^res  in  the  north  preserved  the  communi- 
cation between  France  and  Madrid,  and  it  did  nothing 
more.  It  failed  to  restore  the  balance  of  military  force 
in  the  south  of  Spain,  or  to  affect  the  operations  of  the 
Spanish  troops  which  were  now  closing  round  Dupont 
upon  the  Guadalquivir.  On  the  15th  of  D^p^^t  in  ah- 
July  Dupont  was  attacked  at  Andujar  by 
greatly  superior  forces.  His  lieutenant,  Vedel,  knowing 
the  Spaniards  to  be  engaged  in  a  turning  movement, 
made  a  long  march  northwards  in  order  to  guard  the 
line  of  retreat.  In  his  absence  the  position  of  Baylen, 
immediately  in  Dupont's  rear,  was  seized  by  the  Spanif  h 
general  Keding.  Dupont  discovered  himself  to  be  sur- 
rounded. He  divided  his  army  into  two  columns,  and 
moved  on  the  night  of  the  18th  from  Andujar  towards 
Baylen,  in  the  hope  of  overpowering  Rediug's  division. 


384  MODERN  EUROPE.  I8O8. 

At  daybreak  on  the  lOtli  the  positions  of  Eeding  were 
attacked  by  the  French.  The  struggle  continued  until 
mid- day,  though  the  French  soldiers  sank  exhausted 
with  thirst  and  with  the  burning  heat.  At  length  the 
sound  of  cannon  was  heard  in  the  rear.  Castanos,  the 
Spanish  general  commanding  at  Andujar,  had  discovered 
Dupont's  retreat,  and  pressed  behind  him  with  troops 
Capitulation  of  ^^^^^^  ^^^  unwcaricd  by  conflict.  Further 
Bayien,  July  19.  j^gjg^ance  was  hopelcss.  Dupont  had  to 
negotiate  for  a  surrender.  He  consented  to  deliver  up 
Yedel's  division  as  well  as  his  own,  although  Yeders 
troops  were  in  possession  of  the  road  to  Madrid,  the 
Spanish  commander  promising,  on  this  condition,  that 
the  captives  should  not  be  retained  as  prisoners  of  war 
in  Spain,  but  be  permitted  to  return  by  sea  to  their 
native  country.  The  entire  army  of  Andalusia,  num- 
bering 23,000  men,  thus  passed  into  the  hands  of  an 
enemy  whom  Napoleon  had  not  believed  to  possess  a 
military  existence.  Dupont's  anxiety  to  save  something 
for  France  only  aggravated  the  extent  of  the  calamity  ; 
for  the  Junta  of  Seville  declined  to  ratify  the  terms  of 
the  capitulation,  and  the  prisoners,  with  the  exception 
of  the  superior  officers,  were  sent  to  the  galleys  at  Cadiz. 
The  victorious  Spaniards  pushed  forwards  upon  Madrid. 
King  Joseph,  who  had  entered  the  city  only  a  week 
before,  had  to  fly  from  his  capital.  The  whole  of  the 
French  troops  in  Spain  were  compelled  to  reiire  to  a 
defensive  position  upon  the  Ebro. 

The  disaster  of  Bayien  did  not  come  alone.     Napo- 
leon's attack  upon  Portugal  had  brought  him  within  the 


1808.  CONVENTION   OF   OINTRA.  385 

striking-range  of  Great  Britain.  On  the  1st  of  August 
an  English  army,  commanded  by  Sir  Arthur 
Wellesley,  landed  on  the  Portuguese  coast  in  portj^ai. 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Mondego.  Junot,  the 
first  invader  of  the  Peninsula,  was  still  at  Lisbon ;  his 
forces  in  occupation  of  Portugal  numbered  nearly  30,000 
men,  but  they  were  widely  dispersed,  and  he  was  unable 
to  bring  more  than  13,000  men  into  the  field  against 
the  16,000  with  whom  Wellesley  moved  upon  Lisbon. 
Junot  advantjed  to  meet  the  invader.  A  battle  was 
fought  at  Vimieiro,  thirty  miles  north  of  vimieiro, 
Lisbon,  on  the  21st  of  August.  The  victory  ^'^''^' 
was  gained  by  the  British ;  and  had  the  first  advantage 
been  followed  up,  Junot's  army  would  scarcely  have 
escaped  capture.  But  the  command  had  passed  out 
of  Wellesley's  hands.  His  superior  officer.  Sir  Harry 
Burrard,  took  up  the  direction  of  the  army  immediately 
the  battle  ended,  and  Wellesley  had  to  acquiesce 
in  a  suspension  of  operations  at  a  moment  when  the 
enemy  seemed  to  be  within  his  grasp.  Junot  made  the 
best  use  of  his  reprieve.  He  entered  into  negotiations 
for  the  evacuation  of  Portugal,  and  obtained  the  most 
favourable  terms  in  the  Convention  of  Cintra,  convention  of 
signed  on  the  30th  of  August.  The  French  ^^  ^"*-  ** 
army  was  permitted  to  return  to  France  with  its  arras 
and  baggage.  Wellesley,  who  had  strongly  condemned 
the  inaction  of  his  superior  officers  after  the  battle  of 
the  21st,  agreed  with  them  that,  after  the  enemy 
had  once  been  permitted  to  escape,  the  evacuation  of 
Portugal  was  the  best  result  which  the  English  could  ob- 
2 


386  MODERN  EUROPE.  I8O8. 

tain  *  jTinot's  troops  were  accordingly  conveyed  to  French 
ports  at  the  expense  of  the  British  Government,  to  the 
great  displeasure  of  the  puhlic,  who  expected  to  see  the 
marshal  and  his  army  brought  prisoners  into  Portsmouth. 
The  English  were  as  ill-humoured  with  their  victory  as 
the  French  with  their  defeat.  When  on  the  point  of 
sending  Junot  to  a  court-martial  for  his  capitulation, 
Napoleon  learnt  that  the  British  Grove rnment  had 
ordered  its  own  generals  to  be  brought  to  trial  for  per- 
mitting the  enemy  to  escape  them. 

If  the  Convention  of  Cintra  gained  little  glory  for 
England,  the  tidings  of  the  successful  uprising  of  the 
Spanish  people  against  Napoleon,  and  of  Dupont's  capi- 
Effect  of  Spanish  "tulatiou  at  Baylcu,  created  the  deepest  im- 
BsingonEurope.     pj-gggj^^jj^  {j^  evcry  couutry  of  Europe   that 

still  entertained  the  thought  of  resistance  to  France. 
The  first  great  disaster  had  befallen  Napoleon's  arms. 
It  had  been  inflicted  by  a  nation  without  a  government, 
without  a  policy,  without  a  plan  beyond  that  of  the 
liberation  of  its  fatherland  from  the  foreigner.  What 
Coalition  after  Coalition  had  failed  to  effect,  the  patriot- 
ism and  energy  of  a  single  people  deserted  by  its  rulers 
seemed  about  to  accomplish.  The  victory  of  the  regular 
troops  at  Baylen  was  but  a  part  of  that  great  national 
movement  in  which  every  isolated  outbreak  had  had  its 
share  in  dividing  and  paralysing  the  Emperor's  force. 
The  capacity  of  untrained  popular  levies  to  resist  prac- 
tised troops  might  be  exaggerated  in  the  first  outburst 
of  wonder  and  admiration  caused  by  the  Spanish  rising ; 

•  Welliugton  Despatches,  iii.,  135. 


1808.  OEBMANT  AND    THE    SPANIARDS.  387 

but  the  difference  made  in  the  nature  of  the  struggle  by 
the  spirit  of  popular  resentment  and  determination  was 
one  upon  which  mistake  was  impossible.  A  sudden 
light  broke  in  upon  the  politicians  of  Austria  and 
Prussia,  and  explained  the  powerlessness  of  those  Coali- 
tions in  which  the  wars  had  always  been  the  aflfair  of  the 
Cabinets,  and  never  the  affair  of  the  people.  What  the 
Spanish  nation  had  effected  for  itself  against  Napoleon 
was  not  impossible  for  the  German  nation,  if  once  a 
national  movement  like  that  of  Spain  sprang  up  among 
the  Q-erman  race.  **  I  do  not  see,"  wrote  Bliicher  some 
time  afterwards,  "why  we  should  not  think  ourselves 
as  good  as  the  Spaniards."  The  best  men  in  the 
Austrian  and  Prussian  Governments  began 
to  look  forward  to  the  kindling  of  popular  ^^^^  "^ 
spirit  as  the  surest  means  for  combating 
the  tyranny  of  Napoleon.  Military  preparations  were 
pushed  forward  in  Austria  with  unprecedented  energy 
and  on  a  scale  rivalling  that  of  France  itself.  In 
Prussia  the  party  of  Stein  determined  upon  a  renewal 
of  the  war,  and  decided  to  risk  the  extinction  of  the 
Prussian  State  rather  than  submit  to  the  extortions  by 
which  Napoleon  was  completing  the  ruin  of 
their  country.  It  was  among  the  patriots 
of  Northern  Germany  that  the  course  of  the  Spanish 
struggle  excited  the  deepest  emotion,  and  gave  rise  to  the 
most  resolute  purpose  of  striking  for  European  liberty. 

Since   the   nominal   restoration  of    peace    between 
France  and  Prussia  by  the  cession  of  half  the  Pmssian 
kingdom,  not  a  month  had  passed  without  the  infliction 
z  2 


Napoleon 


388  MOBBBN  EUROPE.  isos. 

of  some  gross  injustice  npon  the  conquered  nation.  The 
evacuation  of  the  country  had  in  the  first  instance  been 
made  conditional  upon  the  payment  of  certain  requisi- 
tions in  arrear.  While  the  amount  of  this  sum  was 
being  settled,  all  Prussia,  except  Konigsberg,  remained 
in  the  hands  of  the  French,  and  157,000  Trench  soldiers 
lived  at  free  quarters  upon  the  unfortunate  inhabitants. 
At  the  end  of  the  year  1807  King  Frederick  Wil- 
liam was  informed  that,  besides  paying  to  Napoleon 
60,000,000  francs  in  money,  and  ceding  domain  lands 
of  the  same  value,  he  must  continue  to  support  40,000 
French  troops  in  five  garrison-towns  upon  the  Oder. 
Such  was  the  dismay  caused  by  this  announcement,  that 
Sg|in  quitted  Konigsberg,  now  the  seat  of  government, 
and  passed  three  months  at  the  head-quarters  of  the 
French  at  Berlin,  endeavouring  to  frame  some  settle- 
ment less  disastrous  to  his  country.  Count  Daru,  ^Napo- 
Jeon's  administrator  in  Prussia,  treated  the  Minister 
with  respect,  and  accepted  his  proposal  for  the  evacua- 
tion of  Prussian  territory  on  payment  of  a  fixed  sum  to 
the  French.  But  the  agreement  required  Napoleon's 
ratification,  and  for  this  Stein  waited  in  vain.^ 

Month  after  month  dragged  on,  and  Napoleon  made 
no  reply.  .  At  length  the  victories  of  the  Spanish  insur- 
rection in  the  summer  of  1808  forced  the  Emperor  to 
draw  in  his  troops  from  beyond  the  Elbe.  He  placed 
a  bold  front  upon  his  necessities,  and  demanded  from 
the  Prussian  Government;  as  the  price  of  evacuation,  a 
still  larger  sum  than  that  which  had  been  named  in  the 
*  Hausser,  iii.,  133.     Seeley,  i.,  480. 


1808  FERMENT  IN  PRUSSIA.  889 

previous  winter:  he  insisted  that  the  Prussian  army 
should  be  limited  to  40,000  men,  and  the  formation  of 
the  Landwehr  abandoned ;  and  he  required  the  support 
of  a  Prussian  corps  of  16,000  men,  in  the  event  of  hos- 
tilities breaking   out   between  France  and 

Austria.     Not  even  on  these  conditions  was     poieon.    Sept., 

i8oa 

Prussia  offered  the  complete  evacuation  of 
her  territory.  Napoleon  still  insisted  on  holding  the 
three  principal  fortresses  on  the  Oder  with  a  garrison 
of  10,000  men.  Such  was  the  treaty  proposed  to  the 
Prussian  Court  (September,  1808)  at  a  time  when  every 
soldierly  spirit  thrilled  with  the  tidings  from  Spain,  and 
every  statesman  was  convinced  by  the  events  of  the  last 
few  months  that  Napoleon's  treaties  were  but  stages 
in  a  progression  of  wrongs.  Stein  and  Scharnhorst 
urged  the  King  to  arm  the  nation  for  a  struggle  as 
desperate  as  that  of  Spain,  and  to  delay  only  until  Napo- 
leon himself  was  busied  in  the  warfare  of  the  Peninsula. 
Continued  submission  was  ruin;  revolt  was  at  least  not 
hopeless.  However  forlorn  the  condition  of  Prussia, 
its  alliances  were  of  the  most  formidable  character. 
Austria  was  arming  without  disguise;  Great  Britain 
had  intervened  in  the  warfare  of  the  Peninsula  with  an 
efficiency  hitherto  unknown  in  its  military  operations ; 
Spain,  on  the  estimate  of  Napoleon  himself,  required  an 
army  of  200,000  men.  Since  the  beginning  of  the 
Spanish  insurrection  Stein  had  occupied 
himself  with  the  organisation  of  a  general  "**"  ^^' 

outbreak  throughout  Northern  Germany.  Eightly  or 
wrongly,   he    believed  the  train  to  be   now    laid,  and 


390  MOBEllN  EUBOPE.  1808. 

encouraged  the  King  of  Prussia  to  count  upon  tlie  sup- 
port of  a  popular  insurrectiou  against  tlie  Frencli  in  all 
the  territories  which  they  had  taken  from  Prussia,  from 
Hanover,  and  from  Hesse. 

In  one  point  alone  Stein  was  completely  misinformed. 
He  believed  that  Alexander,  in  spite  of  the  Treaty  of 
Tilsit,  would  not  be  unwilling  to  see  the  storm  burst 
upon  Napoleon,  and  that  in  the  event  of  another  general 
war  the  forces  of  Russia  would  more  probably  be  em- 
ployed against  France  than  in  its  favour.  The  illusion 
was  a  fatal  one.  Alexander  was  still  the  accomplice  of 
Napoleon.  For  the  sake  of  the  Danubian  Principalities, 
Alexander  was  willing  to  hold  central  Europe  in  check 
while  Napoleon  crushed  the  Spaniards,  and  to  stifle  every 
bolder  impulse  in  the  simple  King  of  Prussia.  Napoleon 
himself  dreaded  the  general  explosion  of  Europe  before 
Spain  was  conquered,  and  drew  closer  to  his  Russian 
ally.  Difficulties  that  had  been  placed  in  the  way  of 
the  Russian  annexation  of  Roumania  vanished.  The 
Czar  and  the  Emperor  determined  to  display  to  all 
Europe  the  intimacy  of   their  union  by  a 

Napoleon      and  l  ^  ^ 

i^EXtoS!?!  festal  meeting  at  Erfurt  in  the  midst  of 
their  victims  and  their  dependents.  The 
whole  tribe  of  vassal  Grerman  sovereigns  was  summoned 
to  the  meeting-place ;  representatives  attended  from  the 
Courts  of  Vienna  and  Berlin.  On  the  7th  of  October 
Napoleon  and  Alexander  made  their  entry  into  Erfurt. 
Pageants  and  festivities  required  the  attendance  of  the 
crowned  and  titled  rabble  for  several  days ;  but  the  only 
serious  business  was  the  settlement  of  a  treaty  confirm- 


1808.  THE  MEETING  AT  EEFUBT.  391 

ing  the  alliance  of  France  and  Russia,  and  the  notifica- 
tion of  the  Czar  to  the  envoy  of  the  King  of  Prussia 
that  his  master  must  accept  the  terms  demanded  by 
!N"apoleon,  and  relinquish  the  idea  of  a  struggle  with 
France.*  Count  Q-oltz,  the  Prussian  envoy,  unwillingly 
signed  the  treaty  which  gave  Prussia  but  a  partial 
evacuation  at  so  dear  a  cost,  and  wrote  to  the  King  that 
no  course  now  remained  for  him  but  to  abandon  himself 
to  unreserved  dependence  upon  France,  and  to  permit 
Stein  and  the  patriotic  party  to  retire  from  the  direction 
of  the  State.  Unless  the  King  could  summon  up  courage 
to  declare  war  in  defiance  of  Alexander,  there  was  in  fact 
no  alternative  left  open  to  him.  ISTapoleon  had  discovered 
Stein's  plans  for  raising  an  insurrection  in  Germany 
several  weeks  before,  and  had  given  vent  to  the  most 
furious  outburst  of  wrath  against  Stein  in  the  presence 
of  the  Prussian  Ambassador  at  Erfurt.  If  the  great 
struggle  on  which  Stein's  whole  heart  and  soul  were  set 
was  to  be  relinquished,  if  Spain  was  to  be  crushed  before 
Prussia  moved  an  arm,  and  Austria  was  to  be  left  to 
fiffht  its  inevitable   battle  alone,  then   the     „  ^ 

*--'  Steiii      resUnia, 

presence  of  Stein  at  the  head  of  the  Prus-     Sed^N^^ 
sian  State  was  only  a  snare  to  Europe,  a 
peril  to  Prussia,  and  a  misery  to  himself.     Stein  asked 
for  and  received  his  dismissal.     (Nov.  24,  1808.) 

Stein's  retirement  averted  the  wrath  of  Napoleon 
from  the  King  of  Prussia ;  but  the  whole  malignity  of 

•  For  the  striking  part  J>layed  at  Erfurt  by  Talleyraud  in  opposition  to 
Napoleon  see  Metternich's  paper  of  December  4,  in  Beer,  p.  516.  It 
seems  that  Napoleon  wished  to  involve  the  Czar  in  active  measures  against 
Austria,  but  was  thwarted  by  Talleyrand. 


392  MODERN  EUROFE,  im. 

that  Corsican  nature  broke  out  against  the  high-spirited 
patriot  as  soon  as  fresh  victories  had  released  Napoleon 
from  the  ill- endured  necessity  of  self-control.  On  the 
1 6th  of  December,  when  Madrid  had  again  passed  into 
the  possession  of  the  French,  an  imperial  order  appeared, 
which  gave  the  measure  of  ISTapoleon's  hatred  of  the 
fallen  Minister.  Stein  was  denounced  as  the  enemy  of 
the  Empire ;  his  property  was  confiscated ;  he  was 
ordered  to  be  seized  by  the  troops  of  the  Emperor  or  his 
allies  wherever  they  could  lay  their  hands  upon  him. 
As  in  the  days  of  Roman  tyranny,  the  west  of  Europe 
could  now  afford  no  asylum  to  the  enemies  of  the  Em- 
peror. Eussia  and  Austria  remained  the  only  refuge  of 
the  exile.  Stein  escaped  into  Bohemia;  and,  as  the 
crowning  humiliation  of  the  Prussian  State,  its  police 
were  forced  to  pursue  as  a  criminal  the  statesman  whose 
fortitude  had  still  made  it  possible  in  the  darkest  days 
for  Prussian  patriots  not  to  despair  of  their  country. 
Central  Europe  secured  by  the  negotiations  with 
Alexander  at  Erfurt,  Napoleon  was  now  able 
to  Spain,  Nov.,     to  place  himsclf  at  the  head  of  the  French 

1808.  ... 

forces  in  Spain  without  fear  of  any  immediate 
attack  from  the  side  of  Grermany.  Since  the  victory  of 
Baylen  the  Spaniards  had  made  little  progress  either 
towards  good  government  or  towards  a  good  military 
administration.  The  provincial  Juntas  had  consented 
to  subordinate  themselves  to  a  central  committee 
chosen  from  among  their  own  members ;  but  this 
new  supreme  authority,  which  held  its  meetings  at 
Aranjuez,    proved  one  of  the  worst  governments  that 


1908  THE    SPANISH  JVNTA.  893 

even    Spain   itself  had    ever   endured.     It    numbered 
thirty    persons,    twenty-eight   of  whom  were   priests, 
nobles,    or    officials.*      Its    qualities    were 
those  entrained  in  Spanish  official  life.      In     mentofaie 

o  r  Spanish  Junta. 

legislation  it  attempted  absolutely  nothing 
but  the  restoration  of  the  Inquisition  and  the  protection 
of  Church  lands  ;  its  administration  was  confined  to  a 
foolish  interference  with  the  better  generals,  and  the 
acquisition  of  enormous  supplies  of  war  from  Great 
Britain,  which  were  either  stolen  by  contractors  or. 
allowed  to  fall  into  the  hsLuds  of  the  French.  While 
the  members  of  the  Junta  discussed  the  titles  of  honour 
which  were  to  attach  to  them  collectively  and  indivi- 
dually, and  voted  themselves  salaries  equal  to  those  of 
Napoleon's  generals,  the  armies  fell  into  a  state  of  desti- 
tution which  scarcely  any  but  Spanish  troops  would 
have  been  capable  of  enduring.  The  energy  of  the 
humbler  classes  alone  prolonged  the  military  existence 
of  the  insurrection ;  the  Q-ovemment  organised  nothing, 
comprehended  nothing.  Its  part  in  the  national  move- 
ment was  confined  to  a  system  of  begging  and  boasting, 
which  demoralised  the  Spaniards,  and  bewildered  the 
agents  and  generals  of  England  who  first  attempted 
the  difficult  task  of  assisting  the  Spaniards  to  help  them- 
selves. When  the  approach  of  army  after  army,  the 
levies  of  Germany,  Poland,  Holland,  and  Italy,  in  addi- 
tion to  Napoleon's  own  veteran  troops  of  Austerlitz  and 
Jena,  gave  to  the  rest  of  the  world  some  idea  of  the 
enormous  force  which  Napoleon  was  about  to  throw  on 

•  Baumgarteu,  i.,  311. 


894  MODERN  EUROPE.  18O8. 

to  Spain,  tlie  Spanisli  Grovernment  could  form  no  better 
design  than  to  repeat  the  movement  of  Baylen  against 
IN'apoleon  himself  on  the  banks  of  the  Ebro. 

The  EmjDeror  for  the  first  time  crossed  the  Pyrenees 
in  the  beginning  of  November,  1808.  The  victory  of 
the  Spaniards  in  the  summer  had  forced  the  invaders 
to  retire  into  the  district  between  the  Ebro  and  the 
Pyrenees,  and  the  Ebro  now  formeJ  the  dividing-line 
between  the  hostile  armies.  It  was  the  intention  of 
Napoleon  to  roll  back  the  extremes  of  the  Spanish  line  to 
the  east  and  the  west,  and,  breaking  through  its  centre, 
to  move  straight  upon  Burgos  and  Madrid.  The 
Spaniards,  for  their  part,  were  not  content  to  act  upon 
the  defensive.  When  Napoleon  arrived  at  Yittoria  on 
the  5th  of  November,  the  left  wing  of 
the'sbi^ NaT,  the  Spanish  army  under  Glenerajl  Blake  had 
already  received  orders  to  move  eastwards 
from  the  upper  waters  of  the  Ebro,  and  to  cut  the 
French  off  from  their  communication  with  the  Pyrenees. 
The  movement  was  exactly  that  which  Napoleon  desired ; 
for  in  executing  it,  Blake  had  only  to  march  far  enough 
eastwards  to  find  himself  completely  surrounded  by 
French  divisions.  A  premature  movement  of  the  French 
generals  themselves  alone  saved  Blake  from  total  de- 
struction. He  was  attacked  and  defeated  at  Espinosa, 
on  the  upper  Ebro,  before  he  had  advanced  far  enough 
to  lose  his  line  of  retreat  (Nov.  10) ;  and,  after  suffering 
great  losses,  he  succeeded  in  leading  ofi*  a  remnant  of 
his  army  into  the  mountains  of  Asturias.  In  the 
centre,  Soult  drove  the  enemy  before  him,  and  captured 


1806.  NAPOLEON  ENTERS   MADRID,  395 

Burgos.  Of  the  army  which  was  to  have  cleared  Spain 
of  the  French,  nothing  now  remained  but  a  corps  on 
the  right  at  Tudela,  commanded  by  Palafox.  The 
destruction  of  this  body  was  committed  by  the  Emperor 
to  Lannes  and  Ney.  Ney  was  ordered  to  take  a  long 
march  southwards  in  order  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the 
Spaniards  ;  he  found  it  impossible,  however,  to  execute 
his  march  within  the  time  prescribed;  and  Palafox, 
beaten  by  Lannes  at  Tudela,  made  good  his  retreat  into 
Saragossa.  A  series* of  accidents  had  thus  saved  the. 
divisions  of  the  Spanish  army  from  actual  capture,  but 
there  no  longer  existed  a  force  capable  of  meeting  the 
enemy  in  the  field.  Napoleon  moved  forward  from 
Burgos  upon  Madrid.  The  rest  of  his  march  was  a 
triumph.  The  batteries  defending  the  mountain-pass 
of  Somo  Sierra  were  captured  by  a  chars:e 

^  **  <~j  Napolieon  enters 

of  Polish  cavalry;  and  the  capital  itself  Madrid. Dec. 4. 
surrendered,  after  a  short  artillery  fire,  on  the  4th  of 
December,  four  weeks  after  the  opening  of  the  campaign. 
An  English  army  was  slowly  and  painfully  making 
its  way  towards  the  Ebro  at  the   time  when 

•^  Campaien  of  Sir 

Napoleon  broke  in  pieces  the  Spanish  line  JoKninoore. 
of  defence.  On  the  14th  of  October  Sir  John  Moore 
had  assumed  the  command  of  20,000  British  troops  at 
Lisbon.  He  was  instructed  to  march  to  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Burgos,  and  to  co-operate  with  the  Spanish 
generals  upon  the  Ebro.  According  to  the  habit  of  the 
English,  no  allowance  was  made  for  the  movements  of 
the  enemy  while  their  own  were  under  consideration  ;  and 
the  mountain-country  which  Moore  had  to  tmvei'se  placed 


396  *  MODEBK  EUROPE.  I8O8. 

additional  obstacles  in  the  way  of  an  expedition  at  least 
a  month  too  late  in  its  starting.  Moore  believed  it  to 
be  impossible  to  carry  his  artillery  over  the  direct  road 
from  Lisbon  to  Salamanca,  and  sent  it  round  by  way  of 
Madrid,  while  he  himself  advanced  through  Ciudad 
Eodrigo,  reaching  Salamanca  on  the  13th  of  November. 
Here,  while  still  waiting  for  his  artillery,  rumours 
reached  him  of  the  destruction  of  Blake's  army  at  Es- 
pinosa,  and  of  the  fall  of  Burgos.  Later  came  the  report 
of  Palafox's  overthrow  at  Tudela.  Yet  eveii  now  Moore 
could  get  no  trustworthy  information  from  the  Spanish 
authorities.  He  remained  for  some  time  in  suspense, 
and  finally  determined  to  retreat  into  Portugal.  Orders 
were  sent  to  Sir  David  Baird,  who  was  approaching  with 
reinforcements  from  Corunna,  to  turn  back  towards  the 
northern  coast.  Scarcely  had  Moore  formed  this  decision, 
when  despatches  arrived  from  Erere,  the  British  agent 
at  Madrid,  stating  that  the  Spaniards  were  about  to 
defend  the  capital  to  the  last  extremity,  and  that  Moore 
would  be  responsible  for  the  ruin  of  Spain  and  the  dis- 
grace of  England  if  he  failed  to  advance  to  its  relief. 
To  the  great  joy  of  his  soldiers,  Moore  gave  orders  for  a 
forward  march.  The  army  advanced  upon  Yalladolid, 
with  the  view  of  attacking  the  French  upon  their  line 
of  communication,  while  the  siege  of  the  capital  engaged 
them  in  front.  Baird  was  again  ordered  southwards. 
It  was  not  until  the  14th  of  December,  ten  days  after 
Madrid  had  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  French,  that 
Moore  received  intelligence  of  its  fall.  Neither  the 
Spanish  Grovernment  nor  the  British   agent  who  had 


Utt.  NAFOLEON  tN  MADRID.  397 

caused  Moore  to  advance  took  the  trouble  to  inform  him 
of  the  surrender  of  the  capital ;  he  learnt  it  from  an 
intercepted  French  despatch.  Erom  the  same  despatch 
Moore  learnt  that  to  the  north  of  him,  at  Saldanha,  on 
the  river  Carrion,  there  lay  a  comparatively  small  Trench 
force  under  the  command  of  Soult.  The  information 
was  enough  for  Moore,  heart-sick  at  the  mockery  to 
which  his  army  had  been  subjected,  and  burning  for 
decisive  action.  He  turned  northwards,  'and  marched 
against  Soult,  in  the  hope  of  surprising  him  before  the 
news  of  his  danger  could  reach  Napoleon  in  the  capital. 
On  the  19th  of  December  a  report  reached  Madrid 
that  Moore  had  suspended  his  retreat  on 
Portugal.  Napoleon  instantly  divined  the  marches  against 
actual  movement  of  the  English,  and  hurried 
from  Madrid  against  Moore  at  the  head  of  40,000  men. 
Moore  had  met  Baird  on  the  20th  at  Mayorga ;  on  the 
23rd  the  united  British  divisions  reached  Sahagun, 
scarcely  a  day's  march  from  Soult  at  Saldanha.  Here 
the  English  commander  learnt  that  Napoleon  himself 
was  on  his  track.  Escape  was  a  question  of  hours. 
Napoleon  had  pushed  across  the  Guadarama  mountains 
in  forced  marches  through  snow  and  storm.  Had  his 
vanguard  been  able  to  seize  the  bridge  orver  the  river 
Esla  at  Benavente  before  the  Jilnglish  crossed  it,  Moore 
would  have  been  cut  off  from  all  possibility  of  escape. 
The  English  reached  the  river  first  and  blew  up  the 
bridge.  This  rescued  them  from  imme-  Eetreat  of  th* 
diate  danger.  The  defence  of  the  river  gave 
Moore's  army  a  start  which  rendered  the  superiority  of 


398  MODERN  EUBQPK  isos. 

Napoleon's  nnm"bers  of  little  effect.  Tor  a  while  Napo- 
leon followed  Moore  towards  the  nortliern  coast.  On 
tlie  1st  of  January,  1809,  lie  wrote  an  order  whicli  showed 
that  he  looked  npon  Moore's  escape  as  now  inevitahle, 
and  on  the  next  day  he  quitted  the  army,  leaving  to  his 
marshals  the  honour  of  toiling  after  Moore  to  the  coast, 
and  of  seizing  some  thousands  of  frozen  or  drunken 
British  stragglers.  Moore  himself  pushed  on  towards 
Corunna  with  a  rapidity  which  was  dearly  paid  for  hy 
the  demoralisation  of  his  army.  The  sufferings  and 
the  excesses  of  the  troops  were  frightful ;  only  the  rear- 
guard, which  had  to  face  the  enemy,  preserved  soldierly 
order.  At  length  Moore  found  it  necessary  to  halt  and 
take  up  position,  in  order  to  restore  the  discipline  of  his 
army.  He  turned  upon  Soult  at  Lugo,  and  offered 
battle  for  two  successive  days  ;  but  the  French  general 
declined  an  engagement ;  and  Moore,  satisfied  with 
having  recruited  his  troops,  continued  his  march  upon 
Corunna.  Soult  still  followed.  On  January  11th  the 
English  army  reached  the  sea ;  but  the  ships  which 
were  to  convey  them  back  to  England  were  nowhere  to 
be  seen.  A  battle  was  inevitable,  and  Moore  drew 
coruima.jan.  ^V  ^^^  troops,  14,000  iu  numbcr,  on  a 
range  of  low  hills  outside  the  town,  to 
await  the  attack  of  the  French.  On  the  16th,  when 
the  fleet  had  now  come  into  harbour,  Soult  gave  battle. 
The  French  were  defeated  at  every  point  of  their 
attack.  Moore  fell  at  the  moment  of  his  victory, 
conscious  that  the  army  which  he  had  so  bravely 
led    had    nothing    more   to   fear.      The    embarkation 


180&  SIR   JOHN  MOORE.  899 

was  effected  that  night ;  on  the  next  day  the  fleet  put 
out  to  sea. 

Napoleon  quitted  Spain  on  the  19th  of  January,  1809, 
leaving  his  brother  Joseph  again  in  possession  of  the 
capital,  and  an  army  of  300,000  men  under 
the  best  sfenerals  of  France  en^asred  with  spain,  Jan.  w, 
the  remnants  of  a  defeated  force  which  had 
never  reached  half  that  number.  No  brilliant  victories 
remained  to  be  won ;  no  enemy  remained  in  the  field 
important  enough  to  require  the  presence  of  Napoleon. 
Difficulties  of  transit  and  the  hostility  of  the  people 
might  render  the  subjugation  of  Spain  a  slower  process 
than  the  subjugation  of  Prussia  or  Italy;  but,  to  all 
appearance,  the  ultimate  success  of  the  Emperor's  plans 
was  certain,  and  the  worst  that  lay  before  his  lieutenants-, 
was  a  series  of  wearisome  and  obscure  exertions  against 
an  inconsiderable  foe.  Yet,  before  the  Emperor  had 
been  many  weeks  in  Paris,  a  report  reached  him  from 
Marshal  Lannes  which  told  of  some  strange  form  of 
military  capacity  among  the  people  whose  armies  were 
so  contemptible  in  the  field.  The  city  of  Saragossa, 
after  successfully  resisting  its  besiegers  in 
the  summer  of  1808,  had  been  a  second  time  ^S,i>L1Sa 
invested  after  the  defeats  of  the  Spanish 
armies  upon  the  Ebro.*  The  besiegers  themselves 
were  suffering  from  extreme  scarcity  when,  on  the  22nd 
of  January,  1809,  Lannes  took  up  the  command.  Lannes 
immediately  called  up  all  the  troops  within  reach,  and 
pressed  the  battering  operations  with  the  utmost  \ngour. 
•  Napier,  ii.  17. 


400  MODERN  EUBOPK  1809. 

On  tlie  29tli,  the  walls  of  Saragossa  were  stormed  in 
four  different  places. 

According  to  all  ordinary  precedents  of  war,  the 
French  were  now  in  possession  of  the  city.  But  the 
besiegers  found  that  their  real  work  was  only  beginning. 
The  streets  were  trenched  and  barricaded ;  every  dwell- 
ing was  converted  into  a  fortress  ;  for  twenty  days  the 
French  were  forced  to  besiege  house  by  house.  In  the 
centre  of  the  town  the  popular  leaders  erected  a  gallows, 
and  there  they  hanged  every  one  who  flinched  from 
meeting  the  enemy.  Disease  was  added  to  the  horrors 
of  warfare.  In  the  cellars,  where  the  women  and 
children  crowded  in  filth  and  darkness,  a  malignant  pes- 
tilence broke  out,  which,  at  the  beginning  of  February, 
raised  the  deaths  to  five  hundred  a  day.  The  dead 
bodies  were  unburied ;  in  that  poisoned  atmosphere  the 
slightest  wound  produced  mortification  and  death.  At 
length  the  powers  of  the  defenders  sank.  A  fourth 
part  of  the  town  had  been  won  by  the  French  ;  of  the 
townspeople  and  peasants  who  were  within  the  walls 
at  the  beginning  of  the  siege,  it  is  said  that  thirty 
thousand  had  perished ;  the  remainder  could  only  pro- 
long their  defence  to  fall  in  a  few  days  more  before 
disease  or  the  enemy.  Even  now  there  were  members 
of  the  Junta  who  wished  to  fight  as  long  as  a  man 
remained,  but  they  were  outnumbered.  On  the  20th  of 
February  what  was  left  of  Saragossa  capitulated.  Its 
resistance  gave  to  the  bravest  of  Napoleon's  soldiers  an 
impression  of  horror  and  dismay  new  even  to  men  who 
had  passed  through  seventeen  years  of  revolutionary 


1809.  8IEQE   OF  8ABA0088A  401 

warfare,  but  it  failed  to  retard  Napoleon's  armies  in  the 
conquest  of  Spain.  No  attempt  was  made  to  relieve  the 
heroic  or  ferocious  city.  Everywhere  the  tide  of  French 
conquest  appeared  to  be  steadily  making  its  advance. 
Soult  invaded  Portugal ;  in  combination  with  him,  two 
armies  moved  from  Madrid  upon  the  southern  and  the 
south-western  provinces  of  Spain.  Oporto  fell  on  the 
28th  of  March;  in  the  same  week  the  Spanish  forces 
covering  the  south  were  decisively  beaten 
at  Ciudad  Eeal  and  at  Medellin  upon  the     the  Spaniards, 

^  March,  1809. 

line  of  the  Guadiana.  The  hopes  of  Europe 
fell.  Spain  itself  could  expect  no  second  Saragossa.  It 
appeared  as  if  the  complete  subjugation  of  the  Peninsula 
could  now  only  be  delayed  by  the  mistakes  of  the  French 
generals  themselves,  and  by  the  untimely  removal  of 
that  controlling  will  which  had  hitherto  made  every 
Tiiovement  a  step  forward  in  conquest. 


A  A 


CHAPTEE  IX. 

Austria  preparing  for  war— The  war  to  be  one  on  behalf  of  the  German  Nation — 
Patriotic  movement  in  Prussia — Expected  Insurrection  in  North  Germany 
— Plans  of  Campaign — Austrian  Manifesto  to  the  Germans — Rising  of  the 
Tyrolese — Defeats  of  the  Archduke  Charles  in  Bavaria — French  in  Vienna 
— Attempts  of  Domberg  and  SchiU — Battle  of  Aspem— Second  Passage  of 
the  Danube — Battle  of  Wagram — Armistice  of  Znaim — Austria  waiting  for 
events — Wellesley  in  Spain — He  gains  the  Battle  of  Talavera,  but  retreats 
— ^Expedition  against  Antwerp  fails — Austria  makes  Peace — ^Treaty  of 
Vienna— Eeal  Effects  of  the  War  of  1809— Austria  after  1809— Metternich 
— ^Marriage  of  Napoleon  with  Marie  LptriserTrrSeverance  of  Napoleon  and 
Alexander — ^Napoleon  annexes  the  Papal  States,  HoUand,  La  Valais,  and  the 
North  German  Coast — The  Napoleonic  Empire :  Its  benefits  and  wrongs — 
The  Czar  withdraws  from  Napoleon's  Commercial  System — War  with  Russia 
imminent — Wellington  in  Portugal:  Lines  of  Torres  Vedras;  Massena's 
Campaign  of  1810,  and  retreat — Soult  in  Andalusia — Wellington's  Cam- 
paign of  1811 — Capture  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  Badajoz— Salamanca. 

]N"apoleon,  qTiitting  Spain  in  tlie  third  week  of  January, 

1809,  travelled  to  Paris  with  the   utmost  haste.     He 

believed  Austria  to  be  on  the  point  of  de- 

Austria  prepax-  ,       .  ,  ,  t  r»    i   • 

tag  for  war,  clariug  War ;  and  on  the  very  day  oi  his 
arrival  at  the  capital  he  called  out  the  con- 
tingents of  the  Ehenish  Federation.  In  the  course  of 
the  r>ext  few  weeks,  however,  he  formed  the  opinion 
that  Austria  would  either  decline  hostilities  altogether, 
or  at  least  find  it  impossible  to  declare  war  before  the 
middle  of  May.  Tor  once  the  efforts  of  Austria  out- 
stripped the  calculations  of  her  enemy.  Count  Stadion, 
the  earnest  and  enlightened  statesman  who  had  held 
power  in  Austria   since  the   Peace  of  Presburg,   had 


1809.  '  AUSTMA  AEMINO,  403 

steadily  prepared  for  a  renewal  of  the  struggle  with 
France.  He  was  convinced  that  Napoleon  would  soon 
enter  upon  new  enterprises  of  conquest,  and  still  farther 
extend  his  empire  at  the  expense  of  Austria,  unless 
attacked  before  Spain  had  fallen  under  his  dominion. 
Metternich,  now  Austrian  Ambassador  at  Paris,  reported 
that  Napoleon  was  intending  to  divide  Turkey  as  soon 
as  he  had  conquered  Spain ;  and,  although  he  advised 
delay,  he  agreed  with  the  Cabinet  at  Vienna  that  Austria 
must  sooner  or  later  strike  in  self-defence.*  Stadion, 
more  sanguine,  was  only  prevented  from. declaring  war 
in  1808  by  the  counsels  of  the  Archduke  Charles  and 
of  other  generals  who  were  engaged  in  bringing  the 
immense  mass  of  new  levies  into  military  formation. 
Charles  himself  attached  little  value  to  the  patriotic 
enthusiasm  which,  since  the  outbreak  of  the  Spanish 
insurrection,  had  sprung  up  in  the  German  provinces  of 
Austria.  He  saw  the  approach  of  war  with  more  appre- 
hension than  pleasure;  but,  however  faint  his  own 
hopes,  he  laboured  earnestly  in  creating  for  Austria  a 
force  far  superior  to  anything  that  she  had  possessed 
before,  and  infused  into  the  mass  of  the  army  that  con- 
fident and  patriotic  spirit  which  he  saw  in  others  rather 
than  felt  in  himself.  By  the  beginning  of  March,  1809, 
Austria  had  200,000  men  ready  to  take  the  field. 

The  war  now  breaking  out  was  to  be  a 
war  for  the  German  nation,  as  the  strui^gfle     to  be »  war  for 
of  the  Spaniards  had  been  a  struggle  for 
Spain.    The  animated  appeals  of  the  Emperor's  generals 

•  Metternich,  il,  147. 

A  a2 


404  MODERN  EUI^OPK  1309. 

formed  a  singular  contrast  to  tlie  silence  with  wMcli  the 
Austrian  Cabinet  had  hitherto  entered  into  its  wars. 
The  Hapsburg  sovereign  now  stood  before  the  world 
less  as  the  inheritor  of  an  ancient  empire  and  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  Balance  of  Power  than  as  the  disin- 
terested champion  of  the  Grerman  race.  On  the  part  of 
the  Emperor  himself  the  language  of  devotion  for  Ger- 
many was  scarcely  more  than  ironical.  Francis  belonged 
to  an  age  and  to  a  system  in  which  the  idea  of  nation- 
ality had  no  existence  ;  and,  like  other  sovereigns,  he  re- 
garded his  possessions  as  a  sort  of  superior  property 
which  ought  to  be  defended  by  obedient  domestic 
dogs  against  marauding  foreign  wolves.  The  same 
personal  view  of  public  affairs  had  hitherto  satisfied 
the  Austrians.  It  had  been  enough  for  them  to  be 
addressed  as  the  dutiful  children  of  a  wise  and  affec- 
tionate father.  The  Emperor  spoke  the  familiar  Vien- 
nese dialect ;  he  was  as  homely  in  his  notions  and  his 
prejudices  as  any  beerseller  in  his  dominions ;  his  sub- 
jects might  see  him  at  almost  any  hour  of  the  day  or 
night ;  and  out  of  the  somewhat  tough  material  of  his 
character  popular  imagination  had  no  difficulty  in 
framing  an  idol  of  parental  geniality  and  wisdom.  Fif- 
teen years  of  failure  and  mismanagement  had,  however, 
impaired  the  beauty  of  the  domestic  fiction;  and 
although  old'fashioned  AustrianS;  like  Haydn,  the 
composer  of  the  Austrian  Hymn,  were  ready  to  go 
down  to  the  grave  invoking  a  blessing  on  their  gracious 
master,  the  Emperor  himself  and  his  confidants  were 
shrewd  enough  to  see  that  the  newly-excited  sense  of 


1809.  POLICY   OF  AUSTRIA,^        -      ^qrH^ 

German  patriotism  would  put  them  in  possession  of 
a  forCe  which  they  could  hardly  evoke  by  the  old 
methods. 

One  element  of  reality  lay  in  the  professions  which 
were  not  for  the  most  part  meant  very  seriously.  There 
was  probably  now  no  statesman  in  Austria 
who  any  longer  felt  a  jealousy  of  the  power 
of  Prussia.  With  Count  Stadion  and  his  few  real  sup- 
porters the  restoration  of  Grermany  was  a  genuine  and 
deeply-cherished  desire ;  with  the  majority  of  Austrian 
politicians  the  interests  of  Austria  herself  seemed  at 
least  for  the  present  to  require  the  liberation  of  North 
Germany.  Thus  the  impassioned  appeals  of  the  Arch- 
duke Charles  to  all  men  of  German  race  to  rise  against 
their  foreign  oppressor,  and  against  their  native  princes 
who  betrayed  the  interests  of  the  Fatherland,  gained 
the  sanction  of  a  Court  hitherto  very  little  inclined  to 
form  an  alliance  with  popular  agitation.  If  the  chaotic 
disorder  of  the  Austrian  Government  had  been  better 
understood  in  Europe,  less  importance  would  have  been 
attached  to  this  sudden  change  in  its  tone.  No  one  in 
the  higher  ranks  at  Vienna  was  bound  by  the  action  of 
his  colleagues.  The  Emperor,  though  industrious,  had 
not  the  capacity  to  enforce  any  coherent  system  of  govern- 
ment. His  brothers  caballed  against  one  another,  and 
against  the  persons  who  ligured  as  responsible  ministers. 
State-papers  were  brought  by  soldiers  to  the  Emperor 
for  his  signature  without  the  knowledge  of  his  ad- 
visers. The  very  manifestos  which  seemed  to  herald 
a  new  era  for  Germany  owed  most  of  their  vigour  to 


406  MODERN'  EUROPE,  1809 

the  literary  men  who  were  entrusted  with  their  com- 
position.^ 

The  answer  likely  to  be  rendered  by  Germany  to 
the  appeal  of  Austria  was  uncertain.    In  the 

Governing  ■*■  ■■■ 

GeJ^'L^'on^tS    Ehenish  Federation  there  were  undoubted 

side  of  Napoleon.         .  ^t  i        i         'n-n  i  i 

Signs  01  discontent  with  ±  rench  rule  among 
the  common  people ;  but  the  official  classes  were  univer- 
sally on  the  side  of  Napoleon,  who  had  given  them  their 
posts  and  their  salaries ;  while  the  troops,  and  especially 
the  officers,  who  remembered  the  time  when  they  had 
been  mocked  by  the  Austrians  as  "  harlequins  ''  and 
"nose-bags,"  were  won  by  the  kindness  of  the  great 
conqueror,  who  organised  them  under  the  hands  of 
his  own  generals,  and  gave  them  the  companionship  of 
his  own  victorious  legions.  Little  coiild  be  expected 
from  districts  where  to  the  mass  of  the  population  the 
old  regime  of  German  independence  had  meant  nothing 
more  than  attendance  at  the  manor-court  of  a  knight,  or 
the  occasional  spectacle  of  a  ducal  wedding,  or  a  deferred 
interest  in  the  droning  jobbery  of  some  hereditary  town- 
councillor.  In  Northern  Germany  there  was  far  more  pros- 
pect of  a  national  insurrection.  There  the  spirit  of  Stein 
and  of  those  who  had  worked  with  him  was  making 
itself  felt,  in  spite  of  the  fall  of  the  Minister.  Scharn- 
horst's  reforms  had  made  the  Prussian  army  a  school  of 
Patriotic  move-     patriotism,  and  the  work  of  statesmen  and 

ment  in  Prussia.  ,  , .  i     t   i  i  ^        i 

soldiers  was  promoted  by  men  who  spoke  to 
the  feelings  and  the  intelligence  of  the  nation.  Literature 
lost  its  indifference  to  nationality  and  to  home.     The 

*  Gentz,  Tagebiicher,  i.,  60. 


1809.  NOBTHEBN  GERMANY.  407 

philosopher  Fichte,  the  poet  Arndt,  the  theologian 
Schleiermacher  pressed  the  claims  of  Germany  and  of  the 
manlier  virtues  upon  a  middle  class  singularly  open  to 
literary  influences,  singularly  wanting  in  the  experience 
and  the  impulses  of  active  public  life.*  In  the  King- 
dom of  Westphalia  preparations  for  an  insurrection 
against  the  French  were  made  by  officers  who  had 
served  in  the  Prussian  and  the  Hessian  armies.  In 
Prussia  itself,  by  the  side  of  many  nobler  agencies,  the 
newly-founded  Masonic  society  of  the  Tugendbund,  or 
League  of  Virtue,  made  the  cause  of  the  Fatherland 
popular  among  thousands  to  whom  it  was  an  agreeable 
novelfcy  to  belong  to  any  society  at  all.  Ko  spontaneous, 
irresistible  uprising,  like  that  which  Europe  had  seen  in 
the  Spanish  Peninsula,  was  to  be  expected  among  the 
unimpulsive  population  of  the  North  German  plains ; 
but  the  military  circles  of  Prussia  were  generally  in 
favour  of  war,  and  an  insurrection  of  the  population 
west  of  the  Elbe  was  not  improbable  in  the  event  of 
Napoleon's  armj^  being  defeated  by  Austria  in  the  field. 
King  Frederick  William,  too  timid  to  resolve  upon  war 
himself,  too  timid  even  to  look  with  satisfaction  upon 
the  bold  attitude  of  Austria,  had  every  reason  for 
striking,  if  once  the  balance  should  incline  against  Napo- 
leon : '  even  against  his  own  inclination  it  was  possible 
that  the  ardour  of  his  soldiers  might  force  him  into  war. 
So  strong  were  the  hopes  of  a  general  rising  in 
Northern  Germany,  that  the  Austrian  Government  to 
some  extent  based  its  plans  for  the  campaign  on  this 
*  SteffeiLs,  ▼!.,  153.    M^moires  da  Boi  Jerome,  iii.,  340. 


408  MODERN  EUEOPE.  isoa 

event.  In  the  ordinary  course  of  hostilities  between 
Plans  df  France  and  Austria  the  line  of  operations 
campaign.  ^  Germany  is  the  valley  of  the  Danube; 
but  in  preparing  for  the  war  of  1809  the  Austrian 
Grovernment  massed  its  forces  in  the  north-west  of  Bo- 
hemia, with  the  object  of  throwing  them  directly  upon 
Central  Germany.  The  Trench  troops  #hich  were  now 
evacuating  Prussia  were  still  on  their  way  westwards  at 
the  time  when  Austria  was  ready  to  open  the  campaign. 
Davoust,  with  about  60,000  men,  was  in  Northern 
Bavaria,  separated  by  a  great  distance  from  the  nearest 
French  divisions  in  Baden  and  on  the  Ehine.  By  a 
sudden  incursion  of  the  main  army  of  Austria  across 
the  Bohemian  mountains^  followed  by  an  uprising  in 
Northern  Germany,  Davoust  and  his  scattered  detach- 
ments could  hardly  escape  destruction.  Such  was  the 
original  plan  of  the  campaign,  and  it  was  probably  a  wise 
one  in  the  present  exceptional  superiority  of  the  Austrian 
preparations  over  those  of  France.  For  the  first  time 
since  the  creation  of  the  Consulate  it  appeared  as  if  the 
opening  advantages  of  the  war  must  inevitably  be  upon 
the  side  of  the  enemies  of  France.  Napoleon  had  under- 
rated both  the  energy  and  the  resources  of  his  adversary. 
By  the  middle  of  March,  when  the  Austrians  were 
ready  to  descend  upon  Davoust  from  Bohemia,  Napo- 
leon's first  troops  had  hardly  crossed  the  Ehine.  For- 
tunately for  the  French  commander,  the  Austrian 
Government,  at  the  moment  of  delivering  its  well- 
planned  blow,  was  seized  with  fear  at  its  own  boldness. 
Recollections  of  Hohenlinden  and  Ulm   filled  anxious 


1800  PROCLAMATION   TO    THE    GERMANS.  409 

minds  with  the  thought  that  the  valley  of  the  Danube 
was  insufficiently  defended ;-  and  on  the  20th  of  March, 
when  the  army  was  on  the  point  of  breaking  into 
Northern  Bavaria,  orders  were  given  to  divert  the  line 
of  march  to  the  south,  and  to  enter  the  Ehenish  Con- 
federacy by  the  roads  of  the  Danube  and  the  Inn. 
Thus  the  fruit  of  so  much  energy,  and  of  the  enemy's 
rare  neglectfulness,  was  sacrificed  at  the  last  moment. 
It  was  not  until  the  9fch  of  April  that  the  Austrian 
movement  southward  was  completed,  and  that  the  army 
lay  upon  the  line  of  the  Inn,  ready  to  attack  Napoleon 
in  the  territory  of  his  principal  German  ally. 

The  proclamations  now  published  by  the  Emperor 
and  the  Archduke  bore  striking  testimony 
to  the  influence  of  the  Spanish  insurrection     festo    to    the 

■*■  Germans. 

in  exciting  the  sense  of  national  right,  and 
awakening  the  Governments  of  Europe  to  the  force 
which  this  placed  in  their  hands.  For  the  first  time  in 
history  a  manifesto  was  addressed  "to  the  German 
nation."  The  contrast  drawn  in  the  Archduke's  ad- 
dress to  his  army  between  the  Spanish  patriots  dying 
in  the  defence  of  their  country,  and  the  German  vassal- 
contingents  dragged  by  Napoleon  into  Spain  to  deprive 
a  gallant  nation  of  its  freedom,  was  one  of  the  most  just 
and  the  most  telling  that  tyranny  has  ever  given  to  the 
leaders  of  a  righteous  cause.*  The  Emperor's  address 
"  to  ilie  German  nation  "  breathed  the  same  spirit.  It 
was  not  difficult  for  the  politicians  of  the  Ehenish 
Federation  to  ridicule  the  sudden  enthusiasm  for  liberty 

•  Beer,  p.  370l    Hansser,  iii,  278. 


410  MODJEEN  BUBOPK  im. 

and  nationality  shown  by  a  Government  which  up  to  the 
present  time  had  dreaded  nothing  so  much  as  the  excite- 
ment of  popular  movements  ;  but,  however  unconcernedly 
the  Emperor  and  the  old  school  of  Austrian  statesmen 
might  adopt  patriotic  phrases  which  they  had  no  inten- 
tion to  remember  when  the  struggle  was  over,  such 
language  was  a  reality  in  the  effect  which  it  produced 
upon  the  thousands  who,  both  in  Austria  and^ 
of  Germany,  now  for  the  first  time  heard 
to  unite  in  defence  of  a  common  FatherlaJ 

The  leading  divisions  of  the  Archduke's 

the  Inn  on  the  9th  of  April.    Besides  the  forces  intended 

for  the  invasion  of  Bavaria,  which  numbered 

vadV'TavaiS;     170,000  mcu,  thc  Austrian  Government  had 

AprH  9,  1809.  ' 

formed  two  smaller  armies,  with  which  the 
Princes  Ferdinand  and  John  were  to  take  up  the  offen- 
sive in  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw  and  in  Northern 
Italy.  On  every  side  Austria  was  first  in  the  field  ;  but 
even  before  its  regular  forces  could  encounter  the  enemy, 
a  popular  outbreak  of  the  kind  that  the  Government  had 
invoked  wrested  from  the  French  the  whole  of  an  im- 
portant province.  While  the  army  crossed 
Ty?oif  April?  thc  luu,  thc  Tyrolcsc  people  rose,  and  over- 
powered the  French  and  Bavarian  detach- 
ments stationed  in  their  country.  The  Tyrol  had  been 
taken  from  Austria  at  the  Peace  of  Presburg,  and 
attached  to  Napoleon's  vassal  kingdom  of  Bavaria.  In 
geographical  position  and  in  relationship  of  blood  the 
Tyrolese  were  as  closely  connected  with  the  Bavarians 
as  with  the  Austrians ;  and  the  annexation  would  pro- 


1800.  EI8INQ    OF   THE    TYROL.  411 

bably  have  caused  no  lasting  discontent  if  the  Bavarian 
Government  had  condescended  to  take  some  account  of 
the  character  of  its  new  subjects.  Under  the  rule  of 
Austria  the  Tyrolese  had  enjoyed  many  privileges. 
They  were  exempt  from  military  service,  except  in  their 
own  militia  ;  they  paid  few  taxes  ;  they  possessed  forms 
of  self-gj^vernment  which  were  at  least  popular  enough 
d  after  they  had  been  lost.  The  people 
hops  and  clergy.  Nowhere  could  the 
a  more  winning  example  of  unbroken 
a  simple  people  and  a  Catholic  Crown. 
Protestantism  and  the  unholy  activities  of  reason  had 
never  brought  trouble  into  the  land.  The  people  be- 
heved  exactly  what  the  priests  told  them,  and  delighted 
in  the  innumerable  holidays  provided  by  the  Church. 
They  had  so  little  cupidity  that  no  bribe  could  induce 
a  Tyrolese  peasant  to  inform  the  French  of  any  move- 
ment; they  had  so  little  intelligence  that,  when  their 
own  courage  and  stout-heai'tedness  had  won  their  first 
battle,  they  persuaded  one  another  that  they  had  been 
led  by  a  Saint  on  a  white  horse.  Grrievances  of  a  sub- 
stantial character  were  not  wanting  under  the  new 
Bavarian    rule;    but   it    was  less    the    in- 

ItBoanaeax*. 

creased  taxation  and  the  enforcement  of  "**^"* 
military  service  that  exasperated  the  people  than  the 
attacks  made  by  the  Government  upon  the  property  and 
rights  of  the  Church.  Montgelas,  the  reforming  Bava- 
rian minister,  treated  the  Tyrolese  bishops  with  as  little 
ceremony  as  the  Swabian  knights.  The  State  laid  claim 
to  all  advowsons;  and  upon  the  refusal  of  the  bishops 


412  MODERN  MUBOPK  1809. 

to  give  up  tlieir  patronage,  tlie  bishops  themselves  were 
banished  and  their  revenues  sequestrated.  A  passion 
for  uniformity  and  common  sense  prompted  the  Govern- 
ment to  revive  the  Emperor  Joseph's  edicts  against 
pilgrimages  and  Church  holidays.  It  became  a  police- 
offence  to  shut  up  a  shop  on  a  saint's  day,  or  to  wear  a 
gay  dress  at  a  festival.  Bavarian  soldiers  closed  the 
churches  at  the  end  of  a  prescribed  number  of  masses. 
At  a  sale  of  Church  property,  ordered  by  the  Govern- 
ment, some  of  the  sacred  vessels  were  permitted  to  fall 
into  the  hands  of  the  Jews. 

These  were  the  wrongs  that  fired  the  simple  Tyrolese. 
They  could  have  borne  the  visits  of  the  tax-gatherer 
and  the  lists  of  conscription ;  they  could  not  bear  that 
their  priests  should  be  overruled,  or  that  their  observ- 
ances should  be  limited  to  those  sufficient  for  ordinary 
Catholics.  Yet,  with  all  its  aspect  of  unreason,  the 
question  in  the  Tyrol  was  also  part  of  that  larger  ques- 
tion whether  Napoleon's  pleasure  should  be  the  rule  of 
European  life,  or  nations  should  have  some  voice  in  the 
disposal  of  their  own  affairs.  The  Tyrolese  were  not 
more  superstitious,  and  they  were  certainly  much  less 
cruel,  than  the  Spaniards.  (^They  fought  for  ecclesias- 
tical absurdities ;  but  their  cause  was  also  the  cause  of 
national  right,  and  the  admiration  which  their  courage 
excited  in  Europe  was  well  deserved. ) 

Early  in   the  year  1809  the  Archduke 

Tyrolese  expel  •'  •' 

S^riprt     Jo^^  ^^^  ^^^  *^®  leaders  of  the  Tyrolese 

1809 

peasantry,  and  planned  the  first  movements 
of  a  national  insurrection.   As  soon  as  the  Austrian  army 


1809.  BI8INQ    OF  THE    TYROL.  413 

crossed  the  Inn,  the  peasants  thronged  to  their  ap- 
pointed meeting-places.  Scattered  detachments  of  the 
Bavarians  were  surrounded,  and  on  the  12th  of  April  the 
main  hody  of  the  Tyrolese,  numbering  about  15,000  men, 
advanced  upon  Innsbruck.  The  town  was  invested ;  the 
Bavarian  garrison,  consisting  of  3,000  regular  troops, 
found  itself  forced  to  surrender  after  a  severe  engage- 
ment. On  the  next  morning  a  French  column,  on  the 
march  from  Italy  to  the  Danube,  approached  Innsbruck, 
totally  unaware  of  the  events  of  the  preceding  day.  The 
Tyrolese  closed  behind  it  as  it  advanced.  It  was  not 
until  the  column  was  close  to  the  town  that  its  com- 
mander, Greneral  Brisson,  discovered  that  Innsbruck  had 
fallen  into  an  enemy's  hands.  Eetreat  was  impossible  ; 
ammunition  was  wanting  for  a  battle ;  and  Brisson  had 
no  choice  but  to  surrender  to  the  peasants,  who  had 
already  proved  more  than  a  match  for  the  Bavarian 
regular  troops.  The  Tyrolese  had  done  their  work 
without  the  help  of  a  single  Austrian  regiment.  In 
five  days  the  weak  fabric  of  Bavarian  rule  had  been 
thrown  to  the  ground.  The  French  only  maintained 
themselves  in  the  lower  valley  of  the  Adige ;  and  before 
the  end  of  April  their  last  positions  at  Trent  and  llove- 
redo  were  evacuated,  and  no  foreign  soldier  remained  on 
Tyrolese  soil. 

The  operations  of  the  Austrian   commanders  upon 
the  Inn  formed  a  melancholy   contrast  to 

*'  Campaign 

the  activity  of  the  mountaineers.     In  spite     chan'^i'^^i'n 
of  the  delay  of  three  weeks  in  opening  the 
campaign,    Davoust  had  still  not  efl'ected  his  junction 


414  MOBEliN  EUROPE.  1809. 

with  the  French  troops  in  Southern  Bavaria,  and  a 
rapid  movement  of  the  Austrians  might  even  now  have 
overwhelmed  his  isolated  divisions  at  Eatishon.  Napo- 
leon himself  had  remained  in  Paris  till  the  last  moment, 
instructing  Berthier,  the  chief  of  the  staff,  to  concen- 
trate the  vanguard  at  Eatishon,  if  hj  the  15th  of 
April  the  enemy  had  not  crossed  the  Inn,  hut  to  draw 
back  to  the  line  of  the  Lech  if  the  enemy  crossed 
the  Inn  before  that  day.*  The  Archdiike  entered 
Bavaria  on  the  9th;  but,  instead  of  retiring  to  the 
Lech,  Berthier  allowed  the  army  to  be  scattered  over  an 
area  sixty  miles  broad,  from  Eatishon  to  points  above 
Augsburg.  Davoust  lay  at  Eatishon,  a  certain  prey  if 
the  Archduke  pushed  forwards  with  vigour  and  thrust 
his  army  between  the  northern  and  the  southern  positions 
of  the  French.  But  nothing  could  change  the  sluggish- 
ness of  the  Austrian  march.  The  Archduke  was  six 
days  in  moving  from  the  Inn  to  the  Isar ;  and  before 
the  order  was  given  for  an  advance  upon  Eatishon, 
Napoleon  himself  had  arrived  at  Donauworth^  and  taken 
the  command  out  of  the  hands  of  his  feeble  lieutenant. 
It  needed  all  the  Emperor's  energy  to  snatch  vic- 
tory from  the  enemy's  grasp.  Davoust  was 
orit^lf  SS  bidden  to  fall  back  from  Eatishon  to  Neu- 
stadt ;  the  most  pressing  orders  were  sent  to 
Massena,  who  commanded  the  right  at  Augsburg,  to 
push  forward  to  the  north-east  in  the  direction  of  his 
colleague,   before  the  Austrians  could  throw  the  mass 

•  Oorrespondance  de  Napoleon,  xviii.,  459,  472.     Gentz,  Tagebiicher, 
i.  120.    Pelet,  Memoirea  sur  la  Guerre  de  1809,  i.,  223. 


1809.  OAMFAIGN   IN  BAVAMIA  415 

of  their  forces  upon  Davoust's  weak  corps.  Both 
generals  understood  the  urgency  of  the  command.  Da- 
voust  set  out  from  Eatisbon  on  the  morning  of  the 
19th.  He  was  attacked  by  the  Archduke,  but  so  feebly 
and  irresolutely  that,  with  all  their  superiority  in  num- 
bers, the  Austrians  failed  to  overpower  the  enemy  at 
any  one  point.  Massena,  immediately  after  receiving 
his  orders,  hurried  from  Augsburg  north-eastwards, 
while  Napoleon  himself  advanced  into  the  mid-space 
between  the  two  generals,  and  brought  the  right  and 
left  wings  of  the  French  army  into  communication  with 
one  another.  In  two  days  after  the  Emperor's  arrival 
all  the  advantages  of  the  Austrians  were  gone :  the 
French,  so  lately  exposed  to  destruction,  formed  a  con- 
centrated mass  in  the  presence  of  a  scattered  enemy. 
The  issue  of  the  campaign  was  decided  by  the  movements 
of  these  two  days.  Napoleon  was  again  at  the  head  of 
150,000  men ;  the  Archduke,  already  baulked  in  his  first 
attack  upon  Davoust,  was  seized  with  unworthy  terror 
when  he  found  that  Napoleon  himself  was  before  him, 
and  resigned  himself  to  anticipations  of  ruin. 

A  series  of  manoeuvres  and  engagements  in  the  finest 
style  of  Napoleonic  warfare  filled  the  next  three  days 
with  French  victories  and  Austrian  disasters.  On  April 
the  20th  the  long  line  of  the  Archduke's  army  was  cut  in 
halves  by  an  attack  at  Abensberg.  The  left  was  driven 
across  the  Isar  at  Landshut;  the  ri^ht,  _^ 
commanded  by  the  Archduke  himself,  was  ^;^^"i^ 
overpowered  at  Eggmtihl  on  the  22nd,  and 
forced  northwards.     The  unbroken  mass  of  the  French 


416  MODERN  EUROPE.  ^ 

array  now  thrust  itself  between  the  two  defeated  wings 
of  the  enemy.  The  only  road  remaining  open  to  the 
Archduke  was  that  through  Eatisbon  to  the  north  of 
the  Danube.  In  five  days,  although  no  engagement  of 
the  first  order  had  taken  place  between  the  French  and 
Austrian  armies,  Charles  had  lost  60,000  men  ;  the 
mass  of  his  army  was  retreating  into  Bohemia,  and  the 
road  to  Vienna  lay  scarcely  less  open  than  after  Mack's 
capitulation  at  TJlm  four  years  before.  A  desperate 
battle  fought  against  the  advancing  French  at  Edels- 
berg  by  the  weak  divisions  that  had  remained  on  the 
south  of  the  Danube,  proved  that  the  disasters  of  the 
campaign  were  due  to  the  faults  of  the  general,  not  to 
the  men  whom  he  commanded.  But  whatever  hopes  of 
ultimate  success  might  still  be  based  on  the  gallant 
temper  of  the  army,  it  was  impossible  to  prevent  the 
fall  of  the  capital.  The  French,  leaving  the  Archduke 
French  enter  ^u  the  uorth  of  the  Dauube,  pressed  forwards 
xenna.  ay  .  ^Yong  the  direct  route  from  the  Inn  to 
Vienna.  The  capital  was  bombarded  and  occupied.  On 
the  13th  of  May  N"apoleon  again  took  up  his  quarters 
in  the  palace  of  the  Austrian  monarchs  where  he  had 
signed  the  Peaxje  of  1806.  The  divisions  which  had 
fallen  back  before  him  along  the  soathem  road  crossed 
the  Danube  at  Vienna,  and  joined  the  Archduke  on  the 
bank  of  the  river  opposite  the  capital. 

The  disasters  of  the  Bavarian  campaign  involved  the 
sacrifice  of  all  that  had  resulted  from  Austrian  victories 
elsewhere,  and  of  all  that  might  have  been  won  by  a 
general  insurrection  in  Northern  Germany.     In  Poland 


1803.  NAPOLEON  ENTERS    VIENNA.  417 

and  in  Italy  the  war  had  opened  favourably  for  Austria. 
Warsaw  had  been  seized ;  Eugene  Beauharnais,  the 
Viceroy  of  Italy,  had  been  defeated  by  the  Archduke 
John  at  Sacile,  in  Yenetia ;  but  it  was  impossible  to 
pursue  these  advantages  when  the  capital  itself  was  on 
the  point  of  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  The 
invading  armies  halted,  and  ere  long  the  Archduke 
John  commenced  his  retreat  into  the  mountains.  In 
Northern  Germany  no  popular  uprising  could  be  ex- 
pected when  once  Austria  had  been  defeated.  The  only 
movements  that  took  place  were  undertaken  by  soldiers, 
and  undertaken  before  the  disasters  in  Bavaria  became 
known.  The  leaders  in  this  military  con-  Attempts  of 
spiracy   were   Dornber^:,  an  officer   in   the     s<'inii  in  Nor- 

^  •'  ^  thern  Germany. 

service  of  King  Jerome  of  Westphalia,  and  ^^^^  ^^• 
Schill,  the  Prussian  cavalry  leader  who  had  so  brilliantly 
distinguished  himself  in  the  defence  of  Colberg.  Dorn- 
berg  had  taken  service  under  Jerome  with  the  design  of 
raising  Jerome's  own  army  against  him.  It  had  been 
agreed  by  the  conspirators  that  at  the  same  moment 
Dornberg  should  raise  the  Hessian  standard  in  West* 
phalia,  and  Schill,  marching  from  Berlin  with  any  part 
of  the  Prussian  army  that  would  follow  him,  should 
proclaim  war  against  the  French  in  defiance  of  the 
Prussian  Government.  Dornberg  had  made  sure  of  the 
support  of  his  own  regiment ;  but  at  the  last  moment 
the  plot  was  discovered,  and  he  was  transferred  to  the 
command  of  a  body  of  men  upon  whom  he  could  not 
rely.  He  placed  himself  at  the  head  of  a  band  of  pea- 
sants, and  raised  the  standard  of  insui-rection.     King 

B  B 


418  MODERN  EXTBOPB.  im. 

Jerome's  troops  met  the  solicitations  of  their  country- 
men with  a  volley  of  bullets.  Dornberg  fled  for  his 
life  ;  and  the  revolt  ended  on  the  day  after  it  had  begun 
(April  23).  Schill,  unconscious  of  Dornberg's  ruin,  and 
deceived  by  reports  of  Austrian  victories  upon  the 
Danube,  led  out  his  regiment  from  Berlin  as  if  for  a 
day's  manoeuvring,  and  then  summoned  his  men  to  fol- 
low him  in  raising  a  national  insurrection  against  Napo- 
leon. The  soldiers  answered  SchilFs  eloquent  \7ords  with 
shouts  of  applause ;  the  march  was  continued  westwards, 
and  Schill  crossed  the  Elbe,  intending  to  fall  upon  the 
communications  of  Napoleon's  army,  already,  as  he 
believed,  staggering  under  the  blows  delivered  by  the 
Archduke  in  the  valley  of  the  Danube. 

On  reaching  Halle,  Schill  learnt  of  the  overthrow  of 
the  Archduke  and  of  Dornberg's  ruin  in  Westphalia. 
All  hope  of  success  in  the  enterprise  on  which  he  had 
quitted  Berlin  was  dashed  to  the  ground.  The  possi- 
bility of  raising  a  popular  insurrection  vanished.  Schill, 
however,  had  gone  too  far  to  recede ;  and  even  now  it  was 
not  too  late  to  join  the  armies  of  Napoleon's  enemies. 
Schill  might  move  into  Bohemia,  or  to  some  point  on 
the  northern  coast  where  he  would  be  within  reach  of 
English  vessels.  But  in  any  case  quick  and  steady  de- 
cision was  necessary;  and  this  Schill  could  not  attain. 
Though  brave  even  to  recklessness,  and  gifted  with 
qualities  which  made  him  the  idol  of  the  public,  Schill 
lacked  the  disinterestedness  and  self-mastery  which  calm 
the  judgment  in  time  of  trial.  The  sudden  ruin  of  his 
hopes  left  him  without  a  plan.     He  wasted  day  after 


1809.  80HILL.  419 

day  in  purposeless  marclies,  while  the  enemy  collected  a 
force  to  overwhelm  him.  His  influence  over  his  men 
became  impaired ;  the  denunciations  of  the  Prussian 
Government  prevented  other  soldiers  from  joining  him. 
At  length  Schill  determined  to  recross  the  Elbe,  and 
to  throw  himself  into  the  coast  town  of  Stralsund, 
in  Swedish  Pomerania.  He  marched  through  Mecklen- 
burg, and  suddenly  appeared  before  Stral-  scwu  at  strai 
sund  at  the  moment  when  the  French  can-  ""^  '  *^  ' 
noneers  in  garrison  were  firing  a  salvo  in  honour  of 
Napoleon's  entry  into  Vienna.  A  hand-to-hand  fight 
gave  Schill  possession  of  the  town,  with  all  its  stores. 
For  a  moment  it  seemed  as  if  Stralsund  might  become 
a  second  Saragossa ;  but  the  French  were  at  hand  before 
it  was  possible  to  create  works  of  defence.  Schill  had 
but  eighteen  hundred  men,  half  of  whom  were  cavalry ; 
he  understood  nothing  of  military  science,  and  would 
listen  to  no  counsels.  A  week  after  his  entry  into 
Stralsund  the  town  was  stormed  by  a  force  four  times 
more  numerous  than  its  defenders.  Capitulation  was 
no  word  for  the  man  who  had  dared  to  make  a  private 
war  upon  Napoleon ;  Schill  could  only  set  the  ex- 
ample of  an  heroic  death.*  The  officers  who  were  not 
so  fortunate  as  to  fall  with  their  leader  were  shot  in 
cold  blood,  after  trial  by  a  French  court-martial.  Six 
hundred  common  soldiers  who  surrendered  were  sent  to 
the  galleys  of  Toulon  to  sicken  among  French  thieves 
and  murderers.      The   cruelty   of  the   conqueror,   the 

*  "  Je  n'ai  jamais  tu  d'affaire  aussi  sanglante  et  ausai  meartri^re." 
Report  of  the  French  (Jenoral,  Memoires  de  Jerome  iy.  109. 

B   B   2 


420  MODERN  EUROPE.  180». 

heroism  of  tlie  conquered,  gave  to  SdiiU's  ill-planned 
venture  the  importance  of  a  great  act  of  patriotic  mar- 
tyrdom. Another  example  had  been  given  of  self- 
sacrifice  in  the  just  cause.  Schill's  faults  were  forgotten ; 
his  memory  deepened  the  passion  with  which  all  the 
braver  spirits  of  Grermany  now  looked  for  the  day  of 
reckoning  with  their  oppressor.* 

Napoleon  had  finished  the  first  act  of  the  war  of 
1809  by  the  occupation  of  Vienna  ;  but  no  peace  was 
possible  until  the  Austrian  army,  which  lay  upon  the 
opposite  bank  of  the  river,  had  been  attacked  and 
beaten.  Four  miles  below  Vienna  the  Danube  is  divided 
into  two  streams  by  the  island  of  Lobau :  the  southern 
stream  is  the  main  channel  of  the  river,  the  northern  is 
only  a  hundred  and  fifty  yards  broad.  It  was  here  that 
Kapoleon  determined  to  make  the  passage.  The  broad 
arm  of  the  Danube,  sheltered  by  the  island  from  the 
enemy's  fire,  was  easily  bridged  by  boats ;  the  passage 
from  the  island  to  the  northern  bank,  though  liable  to 
be  disputed  by  the  Austrians,  was  facilitated  by  the 
narrowing  of  the  stream.  On  the  18th  of  May,  Napoleon, 
supposing  himself  to  have  made  good  the  connection 
between  the  island  and  the  southern  bank,  began  to 
bridge  the  northern  arm  of  the  river.  His  movements 
were  observed  by  the  enemy,  but  no  opposition  was 
offered.  On  the  20th  a  body  of  40,000 
the    Danube,       Freuch  crosscd  to  the  northern  bank,   and 

May  20.  ' 

occupied  the  villages  of  Aspern  and  Essling. 
This   was   the    movement    for    which  the    Archduke 

*  See  Arndt's  Poem  on  Schill.     Gedichte,  i.  328  (ed.  1837). 


MOB.  BATTLE   OF  ASPEBJ^.  421 

Charles,  who  had  now  80,000  men  unSer  Arms,  had  been 
waiting.  Early  on  the  21st  a  mass  of  heavily-laden 
barges  was  let  loose  by  the  Austrians  above  the  island. 
The  waters  of  the  Danube  were  s^wollen  by  the  melting 
of  the  snows,  and  at  midday  the  bridges  of  the  French 
over  the  broad  arm  of  the  river  were  swept  away.  A 
little  later,  dense  Austrian  columns  were  seen  advancing 
upon  the  villages  of  Aspern  and  Essling,  where  the 
French,  cut  off  from  their  supports,  had  to  meet  an 
overpowering  enemy  in  front,  with  an  impassable  river 
in  their  rear.     The  attack  began  at  four  in     BattieofAapem, 

•fcffty  2I22 

the  afternoon;  when  night  fell  the  French 
had  been  driven  out  of  Aspern,  though  they  still 
held  the  Austrians  at  bay  in  their  other  position 
at  Essling.  During  the  night  the  long  bridges 
were  repaired ;  forty  thousand  additional  troops  moved 
across  the  island  to  the  northern  bank  of  the  Danube ; 
and  the  engagement  was  renewed,  now  between  equal 
numbers,  on  the  following  morning.  Five  times  the 
village  of  Aspern  was  lost  and  won.  In  the  midst  of 
the  struggle  the  long  bridges  were  again  carried  away. 
Unable  to  break  the  enemy,  unable  to  hx^ng  up  any 
new  forces  from  Vienna,  Napoleon  Ordered  a  retreat. 
The  ^rmy  was  slowly  withdrawn  into  the  island  of 
Lobau.  There  for  the  next  two  days  it  lay  without 
fopd  and  without  ammunition,  severed  from  Vienna, 
and  exposed  to  certain  destruction  if  the  Archduke 
could  have  thrown  his  army  across  the  narrow  arm  of 
the  river  and  renewed  the  engagement.  Biit  the  Aus- 
trians were  in  no  condition  to  follow  up  their  victory. 


422  MODERN  EUBOPK  1809. 

Their  losses  were  enormous;  their  stores  were  ex- 
hausted. The  moments  in  which  a  single  stroke  might 
have  overthrown  the  whole  fabric  of  Napoleon's  power 
were  spent  in  forced  inaction.  By  the  third  day 
after  the  battle  of  Aspern  the  communications  between 
the  island  and  the  mainland  were  restored,  and  'Ns,- 
poleon's  energy  had  brought  the  army  out  of  immediate 
danger. 

Nevertheless,  although  the  worst  was  averted,  and 
the  Trench  now  lay  secure  in  their  island  fortress,  the 
Effect  on  Eu-  defeat  of  Aspern  changed  the  position  of 
Napoleon  in  the  eyes  of  all  Europe.  The 
belief  in  his  invincibility  was  destroyed ;  he  had  suffered 
a  defeat  in  person,  at  the  head  of  his  finest  troops,  from 
an  enemy  little  superior  in  strength  to  himself.  The 
disasters  of  the  Austrians  in  the  opening  of  the  cam- 
paign were  forgotten ;  everywhere  the  hopes  of  resistance 
woke  into  new  life.  Prussian  statesmen  urged  their 
King  to  promise  his  support  if  Austria  should  gain  one 
more  victory.  Other  enemies  were  ready  to  fall  upon 
Napoleon  without  waiting  for  this  condition.  Eng- 
land collected  an  immense  armament  destined  for  an 
attack  upon  some  point, of  the  northern  coast.  Grer- 
many,  lately  mute  and  nerveless,  -  gave  threatening 
signs.  The  Duke  of  Brunswick,  driven  from  his  inherit- 
ance after  bis  father's  death  at  Jena,  invaded  the  do- 
minions of  Napoleon's  vassal,  the  King  of  Saxony,  and 
Brunswick  in-  expelled  him  from  his  capital.  Popular 
insurrections  broke  out  in  Wiirtemberg  and 
in  Westphalia,  and  proved  the  rising  force  of  national 


18».  EFFECT  OF  A8PERN.  423 

feeling  even  in  districts  where  the  cause  of  Germany 
lately  seemed  so  hopelessly  lost. 

But  Napoleon  concerned  himself  little  with  these 
remoter  enemies.  Every  energy  of  his  mind  was  bent 
to  the  one  great  issue  on  which  victory  depended,  the 
passage  of  the  Danube.  His  chances  of  success  were  ptill 
good,  if  the  French  troops  watching  the  enemy  between 
Vienna  and  the  Adriatic  could  be  brought  up  in  time 
for  the  final  struggle.  The  Archduke  Charles  was  in 
no  hurry  for  a  battle,  believing  that  every  hour  increased 
the  probability  of  an  attack  upon  Napoleon  by  England 
or  Prussia,  or  insurgent  Grermany.  Never  was  the  dif- 
ference between  Napoleon  and  his  ablest  adversaries 
more  strikingly  displayed  than  in  the  work  which  was 
accomplished  by  him  during  this  same  in-  Napoieon'g  pre- 
terval.      He  had   determined   that   in   the     second  passage 

of  the  Danube. 

next  battle  his  army  should  march  across  '^^®' 
the  Danube  as  safely  and  as  rapidly  as  it  could  march 
along  the  streets  of  Vienna.  Two  solid  bridges  were 
built  on  piles  across  the  broad  arm  of  the  river ;  no  less 
than  six  bridges  of  rafts  were  made  ready  to  be  thrown 
across  the  narrow  arm  when  the  moment  arrived  for  the 
attack.  By  the  end  of  June  all  the  outlying  divisions 
of  the  French  army  had  gathered  to  the  great  rallying- 
point ;  a  hundred  and  eighty  thousand  men  were  in  the 
island,  or  ready  to  enter  it ;  every  movement,  every 
position  to  be  occupied  by  each  member  of  this  vast 
mass  in  its  passage  and  advance,  was  fixed  down  to  the 
minutest  details.  Napoleon  had  decided  to  cross  from 
the  eastern,  not  from  the  northern  side  of  the  island. 


424  UODEBN  BUBOFIj.  isog. 

and  thus  to  pass  outside  tlie  fortifications  wMcli  the 
Archduke  had  erected  on  the  former  battle-field.     To- 
wards midnight  on  the  4th  of  July,  in  the 
the   Danube,     mldst  o£  a  violcut  storm,  the  six  bridges 

July  4.  ^  '  o 

were  successively  swung  across  the  river. 
The  artillery  opened  fire.  One  army  corps  after  another, 
each  drawn  up  opposite  to  its  own  bridge,  marched  to 
the  northern  shore,  and  by  sunrise  nearly  the  whole 
of  Napoleon's  force  deployed  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Danube.  The  river  had  been  converted  into  a  great 
highway ;  the  fortifications  which  had  been  erected  by 
the  Archduke  were  turned  by  the  eastward  direction  of 
the  passage.  All  that  remained  for  the  Austrian  com- 
mander was  to  fight  a  pitched  battle  on  ground  that 
was  now  at  least  thoroughly  familiar  to  him.  Charles 
had  taken  up  a  good  position  on  the  hills  that  look  over 
the  village  of  Wagram.  Here,  with  130,000  men,  he 
awaited  the  attack  of  the  French.  The  first  attack  was 
made  in  the  afternoon  after  the  crossing  of  the  river. 
It  failed ;  and  the  French  army  lay  stretched  during 
the  night  between  the  river  and  the  hills,  while  the 
Archduke  prepared  to  •  descend  upon  their  left  on  the 
morrow,  and  to  force  himself  between  the  enemy  and 
the  bridges  behind  them.  / 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  6th  the  two  largest 
armies   that   had   ever   been   brought   face   to  face  in 

Europe  began  their  onslaught.     Spectators 
Wagram  July     from  the  stccplcs  of  Vicnua  saw  the  fire  of 

the  French  little  by  little  receding  on  their 
left,   and   dense   masses   of  the  Austrians  pressing  on 


18W.  BATTLE    OF   WAOBAM.  425 

towards  the  bridges,  on  whose  safety  the  existence  of 
the  French  army  depended.     But  ere  long  the  forward 
movement  stopped.      Napoleon   had  thrown   an   over- 
powering force   against  the  Austrian  centre,  and   the 
Archduke  found  himself  compelled  to  recall  his  victorious 
divisions  and  defend  his  own  threatened  line.  Gradually 
the  superior  numbers  of  the  French  forced  the  enemy 
back.     The  Archduke  John,  who  had  been  ordered  up 
from  Presburg,  failed  to  appear  on  the  field;  and  at 
two  o'clock  Charles  ordered  a  retreat.     The   order   of 
the  Austrians  was  unbroken  ;  they  had  captured  more 
prisoners  than  they  had  lost ;  their  retreat  was  covered 
by  so  powerful  an  artillery  that  the  French  could  make 
no  pursuit.     The  victory  was  no  doubt  Napoleon's,  but 
it  was  a  victory  that  had  nothing  in  common  with  Jena 
and  Austerlitz.     Nothing  was  lost  by  the  Austrians  at 
Wagram  but  their  positions  and  the  reputation  of  their 
general.     The   army  was  still  in  fighting- order,  with 
the  fortresses  of  Bohemia  behind  it.     Whether  Austria 
would  continue  the  war  depended  on  the  action  of  the 
other  European  Powers.     If  Great  Britain  successfully 
landed  an  armament  in  Northern  Germany  or  dealt  any 
overwhelming  blow  in  Spain,  if  Prussia  declared  war  on 
Napoleon,  Austria  might  fight  on.    If  the  other  Powers 
failed,  Austria  must  make  peace.     The  ar-      Armisaoe  of 
mistice  of  Znaitn,  concluded  on  the  12th  of       '""^      '"' 
July,  was  recognised  on  all  sides  as  a  mere  device  to 
gain  time.     There  was  a  pause  in  the  great  struggle  in 
the  central  Continent.     Its  renewal  or  its  termination 
depended  upon  the  issue  of  events  at  a  distance. 


426  MODERN   EUEOFE.  1800. 

For  the  moment  the  eyes  of  all  Europe  were  fixed 

upon  the  British  army  in  Spain.    Sir  Arthur 

vades   Spain.     Welleslev,  who  took  command  at  Lisbon  in 

June,  1809.  •' 

the  spring,  had  driven  Soult  out  of  Oporto, 
and  was  advancing  by  the  valley  of  the  Tagus  upon  the 
Spanish  capital.  Some  appearance  of  additional  strength 
was  given  to  him  by  the  support  of  a  Spanish  army 
under  the  command  of  Greneral  Cuesta.  Wellesley's 
march  had,  however,  been  delayed  by  the  neglect  and 
bad  faith  of  the  Spanish  Grovernment,  and  time  had 
been  given  to  Soult  to  collect  a  large  force  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Salamanca,  ready  either  to  fall  upon  Wel- 
lesley  from  the  north,  or  to  unite  with  another  French 
army  which  lay  at  Talavera,  if  its  commander,  Victor, 
had  the  wisdom  to  postpone  an  engagement.  The 
English  general  knew  nothing  of  Soult's  presence  on 
his  flank:  he  continued  his  march  towards  Madrid 
along  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  and  finally  drew  up  for 
battle  at  Talavera,  when  Victor,  after  retreating  before 
Cuesta  to  some  distance,  hunted  back  his  Spanish  pur- 
suer to  the  point  from  which  he  had  started.*  The  first 
Talavera.  attack  was  made  by  Victor  upon  the  English 
positions  at  evening  on  the  27th  of  July. 
Next  morning  the  assault  was  renewed,  and  the  battle 
became  general.  Wellesley  gained  a  complete  victory, 
but  the  English  themselves  suffered  heavily,  and  the 
army  remained  in  its  position.  Within  the  next  few 
days  Soult  was  discovered  to  be  descending  from  the 
mountains  between  Salamanca  and  the  Tagus.  A  force 
•  Wellington  Despatches,  iv.  533.    Sup.  Desp.  vi.  319.    Napier,  ii  357. 


1809.  TALAVEEA.  427 

superior  to  Wellesley's  own  threatened  to  close  upon 
him  from  the  rear,  and  to  hem  him  in  between  two  fires. 
The  sacrifices  of  Talavera  proved  to  have  been  made  in 
vain.  Wellesley  had  no  choice  but  to  abandon  his 
advance  upon  the  Spanish  capital,  and  to  fall  back  upon 
Portugal  by  the  roads  south  of  the  Tagus.  In  spite  of 
the  defeat  of  Victor,  the  French  were  the  winners  of 
the  campaign.  Madrid  was  still  secure ;  the  fabric 
of  French  rule  in  the  Spanish  Peninsula  was  still  un- 
shaken. The  tidings  of  Wellesley 's  retreat  reached 
Napoleon  and  the  Austrian  negotiators, 
damping  the  hopes  of  Austria,  and  easing    ^^  to  pot- 


Napoleon's  fears.  Austria's  continuance  of 
the  war  now  depended  upon  the  success  or  failure  of 
the  long-expected  descent  of  an  English  army  upon  the 
northern  coast  of  Europe. 

Three  months  before  the  Austrian  Government  de- 
clared war  upon  Napoleon,  it  had  acquainted  Great 
Britain  with  its  own  plans,  and  urged  the  Cabinet  to 
dispatch  an  English  force  to  Northern  Germany.  Such 
a  force,  landing  at  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Aspern, 
would  certainly  have  aroused  both  Prussia  and  the 
country  between  the  Elbe  and  the  Maine.  But  the 
difference  between  a  movement  executed  in  time  and 
one  executed  weeks  and  months  too  late  was  still 
unknown  at  the  English  War  Office.  The  Ministry 
did  not  even  begin  their  preparations  till  the  middle 
of  June,  and  then  they  determined,  in  pursuance  of  a 
plan  made  some  years  earlier,  to  attack  the  French  fleet 
and   docks   at  Antwerp,  and  to  ignore   that   patriotic 


428  MODERN  EUBOFE.      .  1809. 

movement  in  Korthdrn  Grermanj  from  which  they  had 
so  much  to  hope. 

On  the  28th  of  July,  two  months  after  the  battle 
of  Aspern  and  three  weeks  after  the  battle 

English     Expe-  ■*■ 

^twerp.^^jSy!     of  Wagram,  a  fleet  of  thirty-seven  ships  of 

1809 

the  line,  with  innumerable  transports  and 
gunboats,  set  sail  from  Dover  for  the  Schelde.  Forty 
thousand  troops  were  on  board ;  the  commander  of  the 
expedition  was  the  Earl  of  Chatham,  a  court-favourite 
in  whom  Nature  avenged  herself  upon  Great  Britain 
for  what  she  had  given  to  this  countty  in  his  father 
and  his  younger  I)rother.  The  troops  were  landed  on 
the,  island  of  Walcheren.  Instead  of  pushing  forward 
to  Antwerp  with  all  possible  haste,  and  surprising  it 
before  any  preparations  could  be  made  for  its  defence. 
Lord  Chatham  placed  half  his  army  on  the  banks  of 
various  canals,  and  with  the  other  half  proceeded  to 
invest  Flushing.  On  the  16th  of  August  this  unfor- 
tunate town  surrendered,  after  a  bombardment  that  had 
reduced  it  to  a  mass  of  ruins.  During  the  next  ten 
days  the  English  commander  advanced  about  as  many 
miles,  andTthen  discovered  that  for  all  prospect  of  taking 
Antwerp  he  might  as  well  have  remained  in  England. 
Whilst  Chatham  was  groping  about  in  Walcheren,  the 
fortifications  of  Antwerp  were  restored,  the  fleet  carried 
up  the  river,  and  a  mass  of  troops  collected  sufficient 
to  defend  the  town  against  a  regular  siege.  Defeat 
stared  the  English  in  the  face.  At  the  end 
of  August  the  general  recommended  the 
Government  to  recall  the   expedition,   only   leaving  a 


1809.  THE    WALOREEEN   EXPEDITION.  429 

force  of  1 5,000  soldiers  to  occupy  the  marshes  of  Wal- 
cheren.  Chatham's  recommendations  were  accepted; 
and  on  a  spot  so  notoriously  pestiferous  that  Napoleon 
had  refused  to  permit  a  single  French  soldier  to  serve 
there  on  garrison  duty,*  an  English  army-corps,  which 
might  at  least  have  earned  the  same  honour  as  Schill 
and  Brunswick  in  Northern  Grermany,  was  left  to  perish 
of  fever  and  ague.  When  two  thousand  soldiers  were 
in  their  graves,  the  rest  were  recalled  to  England. 

Great   Britain  had  failed  to   weaken  or   to   alarm 
Napoleon;  the  Kin^  of   Prussia   made  no 

-*-  ^  Atistria    makes 

movement  on  hehalf  of  the   losing  cause;  ^*®*^' 

and  the  Austrian  Government  unwillingly  found  itself 
compelled  to  accept  conditions  of  peace.  It  was  not  so 
much  a  deficiency  in  its  forces  as  the  universal  distrust 
of  its  generals  that  made  it  impossible  for  Austria  to 
continue  the  war.  The  soldiers  had  fought  as  bravely 
as  the  French,  but  in  vain.  "If  we  had  a  million 
soldiers,"  it  was  said,  "  we  must  make  peace ;  for  we 
have  no  one  to  command  them."  Count  Stadion,  who 
was  for  carrying  on  the  war  to  the  bitter  end,  despaired 
of  throwing  his  own  energetic  courage  into  the  men 
who  surrounded  the  Emperor,  and  withdrew  from  public 
affairs.  For  week  after  week  the  Emperor  fluctuated 
between  the  acceptance  of  Napoleon's  hard  conditions 
and  the  renewal  of  a  struggle  which  was  likely  to 
involve  his  own  dethronement  as  well  the  total  conquest 
of  the  Austrian  State.     At  length  Napoleon's  demands 

*  OorresiH)iulauee  de  Najwleon :  Decision,  Mai  23,  1606.     Parliameu- 
tary  Papers  1810,  p.  123,  6i)7. 


430  MODERN  EUROPE.  1809. 

were  presented  in  tlie  form  of  an  ultimatum.  In  his 
distress  the  Emperor's  thoughts  turned  towards  the 
Minister  who,  eight  years  before,  had  been  so  strong,  so 
resolute,  when  all  around  him  wavered.  Thugut,  now 
seventy-six  years  old,  was  living  in  retirement.  The 
Emperor  sent  one  of  his  generals  to  ask  his  opinion  on 
peace  or  war.  "  I  thought  to  find  him,"  reported  the 
general,  "  broken  in  mind  and  body ;  but  the  fire  of  his 
spirit  is  in  its  full  force."  Thugut's  reply  did  honour 
to  his  foresight :  "  Make  peace  at  any  price.  The 
existence  of  the  Austrian  monarchy  is  at  stake :  the 
dissolution  of  the  French  Empire  is  not  far  off."  On 
the  14th  of  October  the  Emperor  Francis  accepted  his 
conqueror's  terms,  and  signed  conditions  of  peace.^ 

The  Treaty  of  Vienna,  the  last  which  Napoleon 
Peace  of  Vienna,  sigucd  as  a  couqucror,  took  from  the  Aus- 
trian Empire  50,000  square  miles  of  terri- 
tory and  more  than  4,000,000  inhabitants.  Salzburg, 
with  part  of  Upper  Austria,  was  ceded  to  Bavaria; 
Western  Galicia,  the  territory  gained  by  Austria  in  the 
final  partition  of  Poland,  was  transferred  to  the  Grand- 
Duchy  of  Warsaw;  part  of  Carinthia,  with  the  whole 
of  the  country  lying  between  the  Adriatic  and  the  Save 
as  far  as  the  frontier  of  Bosnia,  was  annexed  to  IN'apo- 
leon's  own  Empire,  under  the  title  of  the  Illyrian  Pro- 
vinces. Austria  was  cut  off  from  the  sea,  and  the 
dominion  of  Napoleon  extended  without  a  break  to  the 
borders  of  Turkey.  Bavaria  and  Saxony,  the  outposts 
of  French,  sovereignty  in  Central  Europe,  were  enriched 
•  Beer,  p.  445.    Gentz,  Tagebucher  I  82, 118. 


1809.  PEACE   OF  VIENNA  idl 

at  the  expense  of  the  Power  which  had  called  Germany 
to  arms ;  Austria,  which  at  the  beginning  of  the  Eevo- 
lutionary  War  had  owned  territory  upon  the  Ehine  and 
exercised  a  predominating  influence  over  all  Italy, 
seemed  now  to  be  finally  excluded  both  from  Germany 
and    the    Mediterranean.       Yet,     however     jje^i  effects  o 

..-•.  ,1  -,  «/»  ,.  I'l  the  war  of  1809. 

striking  the  change  oi  iron  tier  which  gave 
to  Napoleon  continuous  dominion  from  the  Straits  of 
Calais  to  the  border  of  Bosnia,  the  victories  of  France 
in  1809  brought  in  their  train  none  of  those  great 
moral  changes  which  had  hitherto  made  each  French 
conquest  a  stage  in  European  progress.  The  campaign 
of  1796  had  aroused  the  hope  of  national  independence 
in  Italy ;  the  settlements  of  1801  and  1806  had  put  un 
end  to  Feudalism  in  Western  Germany ;  the  victories 
of  1809  originated  nothing  but  a  change  of  frontier 
such  as  the  next  war  might  obliterate  and  undo.  All 
that  was  permanent  in  the  effects  of  the  year  1809  was 
due,  not  to  any  new  creations  of  Napoleon,  but  to  the 
spirit  of  resistance  wliich  France  had  at  length  excited  in 
Europe.  The  revolt  of  the  Tyrol,  the  exploits  of  Bruns- 
wick and  Schill,  gave  a  stimulus  to  German  patriotism 
which  survived  the  defeat  of  Austria.  Austria  itself, 
though  overpowered,  had  inflicted  a  deadly  injury  upon 
Napoleon,  by  withdrawing  him  from  Spain  at  the 
moment  when  he  might  have  completed  its  conquest,  and 
by  enabling  Wellesley  to  gain  a  footing  in  the  Penin- 
sula. Napoleon  appeared  to  have  gathered  a  richer  spoil 
from  the  victories  of  1809  than  from  any  of  his  previous 
wars ;    in  reality  he  had  never  surrounded  himself  with 


432  MODERN  EUROPE.  1809, 

SO  many  dangers.  Russia  was  alienated  by  the  annexa- 
tion of  West  Galicia  to  the  Polish  Grand  Duchy  of 
"Warsaw;  Northern  Germany  had  profited  by  the 
examples  of  courage  and  patriotism  shown  so  largely  in 
1809  on  behalf  of  the  Fatherland;  Spain,  supported  by 
Wellesley's  army,  was  still  far  frOm  submission.  The 
old  indifference  which  had  smoothed  the  way  for  the 
earlier  French  conquests  was  no  longer  the  charac- 
teristic of  Europe.  The  estrangement  of  Eussia,  the 
growth  of  national  spirit  in  Germany  and  in  Spain, 
involved  a  danger  to  Napoleon's  power  which  far  out- 
weighed the  visible  results  of  his  victory. 

Austria  itself  could  only  acquiesce  in  defeat:  nor 
perhaps  would  the  permanent  interests  of  Europe  have 
been  promoted  by  its  success.  The  championship  of 
Germany  which  it  assumed  at  the  beginning  of  the  war 
would  no  doubt  have  resulted  in  the  temporary  establish- 
ment of  some  form  of  German  union  under  Austrian 
leadership,  if  the  event  of  the  war  had  been  different ; 
but  the  sovereign  of  Hungary  and  Croatia  could  never 
be  the  true  head  of  the  German  people  ;  and  the  conduct 
of  the  Austrian  Government  after  the  peace  of  1809  gave 
little  reason  to  regret  its  failure  to  revive  a  Teutonic 
Empire.  No  portion  of  the  Emperor's  subjects  had 
fought  for  him  with  such  determined  loyalty  as  the 
_  ^      Tyrolese.     After  havinsr  been  the  first  to 

Austna  add  the  "^  *-' 

'^^^  throw  off  the  yoke  of  the  stranger,  they  had 

again  and  again  freed  their  country  when  Napoleon's 
generals  supposed  all  resistance  overcome ;  and  in  return 
for  their  efforts  the  Emperor  had  solemnly  assured  them 


1809.  EFFECTS    OF  THE    WAR   OF    1809.  438 

that  he  would  never  accept  a  peace  which  did  not  restore 
them  to  his  Empire.  If  fair  dealing  was  due  anywhere 
it  was  due  from  the  Court  of  Austria  to  the  Tyrolese. 
Yet  the  only  reward  of  the  simple  courage  of  these 
mountaineers  was  that  the  war-party  at  head-quarters 
recklessly  employed  them  as  a  means  of  prolonging 
hostilities  after  the  armistice  of  Znaim,  and  that  up  to 
the  moment  when  peace  was  signed  they  were  left  in 
the  belief  that  the  Emperor  meant  to  keep  his  promise. 
Austria,  however,  could  not  ruin  herself  to  please  the 
Tyrolese.  Circumstances  were  changed ;  and  the  phrases 
of  patriotism  which  had  excited  so  much  rejoicing  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war  were  now  fallen  out  of  fashion 
at  Vienna.  Nothing  more  was  heard  about  the  rights 
of  nations  and  the  deliverance  of  Grermany.  Austria  had 
made  a  great  venture  and  failed  ;  and  the  Grovernment 
rather  resumed  than  abandoned  its  normal  attitude  in 
turning  its  back  upon  the  professions  of  1809. 

Henceforward  the    policy    of   Austria    was  one  of 
calculation,   untinged   by    national  sympa- 
thies.    Trance  had  been  a  cruel  enemy;  yet        after  1809. 
if  there  was  a  prospect  of  winning  something  for  Austria 
by  a  French  alliance,  considerations  of  sentiment  could 
not  be  allowed  to  stand  in  the  way.     A  statesman  who, 
like   Count    Stadion,   had   identified    the   interests    of 
Austria  with  the  liberation  of  Grermany,  was  no  fitting 
helmsman  for  the  State  in  the  shifting  course  that  now 
lay  before  it.     A  diplomatist  was  called  to     jj^j,^^. 
power  who  had  hitherto  by  Napoleon's  own 
desire  represented  the  Austrian  State  at  Paris.     Count 
c  c 


434  MODERN  EUROPE.  1809. 

Metternich,  the  new  Chief  Minister,  was  the  son  of  a 
Ehenish  nobleman  who  had  held  high  office  under 
the  Austrian  crown.  His  youth  had  been  passed 
at  Coblentz,  and  his  character  and  tastes  were 
those  which  in  the  eighteenth  century  had  marked 
the  court-circles  of  the  little  Ehenish  Principalities, 
French  in  their  outer  life,  unconscious  of  the  in- 
stinct of  nationality,  polished  and  seductive  in  that 
personal  management  which  passed  for  the  highest 
type  of  statesmanship.  Metternich  had  been  ambas- 
sador at  Dresden  and  at  Berlin  before  he  went  to  Paris. 
Napoleon  had  requested  that  he  might  be  transferred  to 
the  Court  of  the  Tuileries,  on  account  of  the  marked 
personal  courtesy  shown  by  Metternich  to  the  French 
ambassador  at  Berlin  during  the  war  between  France 
and  Austria  in  1805.  Metternich  carried  with  him 
all  the  friendliness  of  personal  intercourse  which  Na- 
poleon expected  in  him,  but  he  also  carried  with  him 
a  calm  and  penetrating  self-possession,  and  the  convic- 
tion that  Napoleon  would  give  Europe  no  rest  until 
his  power  was  greatly  diminished.  He  served  Austria 
well  at  Paris,  and  in  the  negotiations  for  peace 
which  followed  the  battle  of  Wagram  he  took  a 
leading  part.  After  the  disasters  of  1809,  when  war 
was  impossible  and  isolation  ruin,  no  statesman  could 
so  well  serve  Austria  as  one  who  had  never  confessed 
himself  the  enemy  of  any  Power ;  and,  with  the  full 
approval  of  Napoleon,  the  late  Ambassador  at  Paris  was 
placed  at  the  head  of  the  Austrian  State. 

Metternich's  first  undertaking  gave  singular  evidence 


1800.  NAPOLEONS   AUSTlilAN  MAEEIAQE.  435 

of  the  flexibility  of  system  which  was  henceforward  to 
guard  Austria's  interests.  Before  the  grass  had  grown 
over  the  graves  at  Wagram,  the  Emperor  Francis  was 
persuaded  to  give  his  daughter  in  marriage  to  Napoleon. 
For  some  time  past  Napoleon  had  determined  on 
divorcing  Josephine  and  allying  himself  to  one  of  the 
reigning  houses  of  the  Continent.  His  first  advances 
were  made  at  St.  Petersburg ;  but  the  Czar  hesitated  to 
form  a  connection  which  his  subjects  would  view  as  a 
dishonour ;  and  the  opportunity  was  seized  by  the  less 
fastidious  Austrians  as  soon  as  the  fancies 

Marriage  of 

of  the  imperial  suitor  turned  towards  ^iLSuiaT*^ 
Vienna.  The  Emperor  Francis,  who  had 
been  bullied  by  Napoleon  upon  the  field  of  Austerlitz, 
ridiculed  and  insulted  in  every  proclamation  issued 
during  the  late  campaign,  gave  up  his  daughter  for  what 
was  called  the  good  of  his  people,  and  reconciled  himself 
to  a  son-in-law  who  had  taken  so  many  provinces  for 
his  dowry.  Peace  had  not  been  proclaimed  four  months 
when  the  treaty  was  signed  which  united  the  House  of 
Bonaparte  to  the  family  of  Marie  Antoinette.  The 
Archduke  Charles  represented  Napoleon  in  the  espousals ; 
the  Archbishop  of  Vienna  anomted  the  bride  with  the 
same  sacred  oil  with  whion  he  had  consecrated  the 
banners  of  1809  ;  the  servue  press  which  narrated  the 
wedding  festivities  found^o  space  to  mention  that  the 
Emperor's  bravest  subject,  the  Tyrolese  leader  Hofer, 
was  executed  by  Napoleon  as  a  brigand  in  the  interval 
between  the  contract  and  the  celebration  of  the  marriage. 
Old  Austrian  families,  members  of  the  only  aristocrdcj 
c  c  2 


436  MODERN  EUROPE.  im, 

upon  tlie  Continent  that  still  possessed  political  weight 
and  a  political  tradition,  lamented  the  Emperor's  consent 
to  a  union  which  their  prejudices  called  a  mis-alliance, 
and  their  consciences  an  adultery;  hut  the  ohject  of 
Metternich  was  attained.  The  friendship 
N^pokonand       bctwecn    Frauce    and   Eussia,    which    had 

Alexander. 

inflicted  so  much  evil  on  the  Continent 
since  the  Peace  of  Tilsit,  was  dissolved ;  the  sword  of 
Napoleon  was  turned  away  from  Austria  for  at  least 
some  years  ;  the  restoration  of  the  lost  provinces  of  the 
Hapsburg  seemed  not  impossible,  now  that  Napoleon 
and  Alexander  were  left  face  to  face  in  Europe,  and  the 
alliance  of  Austria  had  become  so  important  to  the  power 
which  had  hitherto  enriched  itself  at  Austria's  expense. 
Napoleon  crowned  his  new  bride,  and  felt  himself  at 
length  the  equal  of  the  Hapsburgs  and  the  Bourbons. 
Except  in  Spain,  his  arms  were  no  longer  resisted  upon 
the  Continent,  and  the  period  immediately  succeeding 

the  Peace  of  Vienna  was  that  which  brought 

Napoleon   an-  *^ 

steS,  ^m^f,  ^^^  Napoleonic  Empire  to  its  widest  bounds. 
Already,  in  the  pride  of  the  first  victories 
of  1809,  Napoleon  had  completed  his  aggressions  upon 
the  Papal  sovereignty  by  declaring  the  Ecclesiastical 
States  to  be  united  to  the  French  Empire  (May  17, 
1809).  The  Pope  retorted  upon  his  despoiler  with 
a  Bull  of  Excommunication ;  but  the  spiritual  terrors 
were  among  the  least  formidable  of  those  then  active  in 
Europe,  and  the  sanctity  of  the  Pontiff  did  not  prevent 
Napoleon's  soldiers  from  arresting  him  in  the  Quirinal, 
and  carrying    him    as    a    prisoner    to    Savona.      Here 


1810.  ANNEXATIONS    OF   1810.  437 

Pius  VTI.  was  detained  for  the  next  three  years.  The 
Eoman  States  received  the  laws  and  the  civil  organisa- 
tion of  France.*  Bishops  and  clergy  who  refused  the 
oath  of  fidelity  to  Napoleon  were  imprisoned  or  exiled ; 
the  monasteries  and  convents  were  dissolved ;  the  car- 
dinals and  great  officers,  along  with  the  archives  and  the 
whole  apparatus  of  ecclesiastical  rule,  were  carried  to 
Paris.  In  relation  to  the  future  of  European  Catholic- 
ism, the  breach  between  Napoleon  and  Pius  VII.  was 
a  more  important  event  than  was  understood  at  the 
time  :  its  immediate  and  visible  result  was  that  there 
was  one  sovereign  the  fewer  in  Europe,  and  one  more 
province  opened  to  the  French  conscription. 

The  next  of  Napoleon's  vassals  who  lost  his  throne 
was  the  King  of  Holland.      Like  Joseph  in  Spain,  and 
like  Murat  in  Naples,  Louis  Bonaparte  had 
made  an  honest   effort   to  e:overn  for  the     nexes  Holland, 

^  July,  1810. 

benefit  of  his  subjects.  He  had  endea- 
voured to  lighten  the  burdens  which  Napoleon  laid  upon 
the  Dutch  nation,  already  deprived  of  its  colonies,  its 
commerce,  and  its  independence ;  and  every  plea  which 
Louis  had  made  for  his  subjects  had  been  treated  by 
Napoleon  as  a  breach  of  duty  towards  himself.  The 
offence  of  the  unfortunate  King  of  Holland  became 
unpardonable  when  he  neglected  to  enforce  the  orders  of 
Napoleon  against  the  admission  of  English  goods.  Louis 
was  summoned  to  Paris,  and  compelled  to  sign  a  treaty, 
ceding  part  of  his  dominions  and  placing  his  custom- 
houses in  the  hands  of  French  officers.      He  returned  to 

*  Correspoudance  de  Napoleon,  xix.,  15,  265. 


438  MOBEUN  EUROPE.  mo. 

Holland,  but  affairs  grew  worse  and  worse.  Frencli 
troops  overran  tlie  country ;  Napoleon's  letters  were  each 
more  menacing  than  the  last ;  and  at  length  Louis  fled 
from  his  dominions  (July  1, 1810),  and  delivered  himself 
from  a  royalty  which  had  proved  the  most  intolerable 
kind  of  servitude.  A  week  later  Holland  was  incor- 
porated with  the  French  Empire. 

Two  more  annexations  followed   before  the  end  of 
the  year.     The  Eepublic  of  the  Yalais  was 

Annexation     of  *'  ■'■ 

Jf  S*"  North     declared  to  have  neglected  the  duty  imposed 

German  coast.  ..  „  ,..■  .,  -,  ,, 

upon  it  01  repairmg  the  road  over  the 
Simplon,  and  forfeited  its  independence.  The  !N"orth- 
Grerman  coast-district,  comprising  the  Hanse  towns, 
Oldenburg,  and  part  of  the  Eangdom  of  Westphalia, 
was  annexed  to  the  French  Empire,  with  the  alleged 
object  of  more  effectually  shutting  out  British  goods 
from  the  ports  of  the  Elbe  and  the  Weser.  Hamburg, 
however,  and  most  of  the  territory  now  incorporated  with 
France,  had  been  occupied  by  French  troops  ever  since 
the  war  of  1806,  and  the  legal  change  in  its  position 
scarcely  made  its  subjection  more  complete.  Had  the 
history  of  this  annexation  been  written  by  men  of  the 
peasant-class,  it  would  probably  have  been  described 
in  terms  of  unmixed  thankfulness  and  praise.  In  the 
Decree  introducing  the  French  principle  of  the  free 
tenure  of  land,  thirty-six  distinct  forms  of  feudal  service 
are  enumerated,  as  abolished  without  compensation.* 

Napoleon's  dominion  had   now   reached   its  widest 
bounds.      The  frontier  of  the  Empire  began  at  Liibeck 
•  Oorresp.  de  Napoleon,  xxiii,  62.    Decret,  9  Dec,  1811. 


1810.  ANNEXATIONS   OF  1810.  439 

on  the  Baltic,  touched  the  Ehine  at  Wesel,  and  followed 
the  river  and  the  Jura  mountains  to  the  foot  of  th© 
Lake  of  Geneva;  then,  crossing  the  Alps  jj^^^^^^j^^ 
above  the  source  of  the  Ehone,  it  ran  with  JSf^De^QiS^ 
the  rivers  Sesia  and  Po  to  a  point  nearly  oppo- 
site Mantua,  mounted  to  the  watershed  of  the  Apennines, 
and  descended  to  the  Mediterranean  at  Terracina.  The 
late  Ecclesiastical  States  were  formed  into  the  two 
Departments  of  the  Tiber  and  of  Trasimene ;  Tuscany, 
also  divided  into  French  Departments,  and  represented 
in  the  French  Legislative  Body,  gave  the  title  of  Arch- 
duchess and  the  ceremonial  of  a  Court  to  Napoleon's 
sister  Eliza ;  the  Kingdom  of  Italy,  formed  by  Lom- 
bardy,  Venice,  and  the  country  east  of  the  Apennines 
as  far  south  as  Ascoli,  belonged  to  Napoleon  himself, 
but  was  not  constitutionally  united  with  the  French 
Empire.  On  the  east  of  the  Adriatic  the  Ulyrian 
Provinces  extended  Napoleon's  rule  to  the  borders  of 
Bosnia  and  Montenegro.  Outside  the  frontier  of  this 
great  Empire  an  order  of  feudatories  ruled  in  Italy, 
in  Germany,  and  in  Poland.  Murat,  King  of  Naples, 
and  the  client-princes  of  the  Confederation  of  the  Ehine, 
holding  all  Germany  up  to  the  frontiers  of  Prussia  and 
Austria,  as  well  as  the  Grand-Duchy  of  Warsaw,  were 
nominally  sovereigns  within  their  own  dominions;  but 
they  held  their  dignities  at  Napoleon's  pleasure,  and  the 
population  and  revenues  of  their  States  were  at  his  service. 
The  close  of  the  year  1810  saw  the  last  changes 
effected  which  Europe  was  destined  to  receive  at  the 
hands  of  Napoleon.     The  fabric  of  his  sovereignty  was 


440  MODERN  EUROPE.  mo. 

raised  upon  the  ruins  of  all  tliat  was  obsolete  and  force- 
less upon  the  western  Continent ;  the  bene- 

Benefits  of         p .  n  ii  i*   i  • 

Napoleon's  fits  as  well  as  the  wrongs  oi  his  supremacy 
were  now  seen  in  their  widest  operation. 
All  Italy,  the  northern  districts  of  Grermany  which  were 
incorporated  with  the  Empire,  and  a  great  part  of  the 
Confederate  Territory  of  the  Ehine,  received  in  the  Code 
llSTapoleon  a  law  which,  to  an  extent  hitherto  unknown 
ill  Europe,  brought  social  justice  into  the  daily  affairs  of 
life.  The  privileges  of  the  noble,  the  feudal  burdens  of 
the  peasant,  the  monopolies  of  the  guilds,  passed  away, 
in  most  instances  for  ever.  The  comfort  and  improve- 
ment of  mankind  were  vindicated  as  the  true  aim  of 
property  by  the  abolition  of  the  devices  which  convert 
the  soil  into  an  instrument  of  family  pride,  and  by  the 
enforcement  of  a  fair  division  of  inheritances  among  the 
children  of  the  possessor.  Legal  process,  both  civil  and 
criminal,  was  brought  within  the  comprehension  of 
ordinary  citizens,  and  submitted  to  the  test  of  publicity. 
These  were  among  the  fruits  of  an  earlier  enliglitenment 
which  Napoleon's  supremacy  bestowed  upon  a  great  part 
of  Europe.  The  price  which  was  paid  for  them  was  the 
Wrongs  of  Na-  supprcssiou  of  cvcry  vestige  of  liberty,  the 
po eon 8 rue.  couscrlption,  aud  the  Continental  blockade. 
On  the  whole,  the  yoke  was  patiently  borne.  The 
Italians  and  the  Germans  of  the  Ehenish  Confederacy 
cared  little  what  Government  they  obeyed  ;  their 
recruits  who  were  sent  to  be  killed  by  the  Austrians 
or  the  Spaniards  felt  it  no  especial  hardship  to  fight 
Napoleon's  battles.     More  galling  was  the  pressure  of 


Commercial 
blockade. 


laia  WB0NQ8  OF  NAPOLEON'S  BULB.  441 

Napoleon's  commercial  system  and  of  the  agencies  by 
whicli  he  attempted  to  enforce  it.  In  the 
hope  of  ruining  the  trade  of  Great  Britain, 
Napoleon  spared  no  severity  against  the  owners  of  any- 
thing that  had  touched  British  hands,  and  deprived  the 
Continent  of  its  entire  supply  of  colonial  produce,  with 
the  exception  of  such  as  was  imported  at  enormous 
charges  by  traders  licensed  by  himself.  The  possession  of 
English  goods  became  a  capital  ofFence.  In  the  great 
trading  towns  a  system  of  permanent  terrorism  was  put  ^ 
in  force  against  the  merchants.  Soldiers  ransacked  their 
houses ;  their  letters  were  opened ;  spies  dogged  their 
steps.  It  was  in  Hamburg,  where  Davoust  exercised  a 
sort  of  independent  sovereignty,  that  the  violence  and 
injustice  of  the  Napoleonic  commercial  system  was  seen 
in  its  most  repulsive  form ;  in  the  greater  part  of  the 
Empire  it  was  felt  more  in  the  general  decline  of  trade 
and  in  a  multitude  of  annoying  privations  than  in  acts 
of  obtrusive  cruelty.*  The  French  were  themselves 
compelled  to  extract  sugar  from  beetroot,  and  to  sub- 
stitute chicory  for  coffee ;  the  Germans,  less  favoured 
by  nature,  and  less  rapid  in  adaptation,  thirsted  and 
sulked.  Even  in  such  torpid  communities  as  Saxony 
political  discontent  was  at  length  engendered  by  bodQy 
discomfort.  Men  who  were  proof  against  all  the  patriotic 
exaltation  of  Stein  and  Fichte  felt  that  there  must  be 
something  wrong  in  a  system  which  sent  up  the  price  of 
coffee  to  five  shillings  a  pound,  and  reduced  the  tobacco- 
nist to  exclusive  dependence  upon  the  market-gardener. 

•  M^moires  de  Jerome,  t.,  185. 


442  MODEBn  EUBOPR  isiO, 

It  was  not,  however,  by  its  effects  upon  Napoleon's 
Grerman  vassals  that  the  Continental  system  contributed 
to  the  fall  of  its  author.  Wliatever  the  discontent  of 
these  communities,  they  obeyed  Napoleon  as  long  as 
he  was  victorious,  and  abandoned  him  only  when  hi° 
cause  was  lost.  Its  real  political  importanc<^  "* 
hostility  which  it  excited  betwe^^  ^ 
The  czax  with-     The  Czar,  whc  ...  co  Napo- 

draws  from  Na-       ,  ,  i      n  -r^  <• 

poieon's    com-     Icou  s  commci  ,,.^^m  at  the   Peace  oi 

mercial   system,  "^ 

Dec.,  1810.  Tilsit,  withdrew  from  it  in  the  year  succeed- 

ing the  Peace  of  Yienna.  The  trade  of  the  Eussian 
Empire  had  been  ruined  by  the  closure  of  its  ports  to 
British  vessels  and  British  goods.  Napoleon  had  broken 
his  promise  to  Eussia  by  adding  West  Galicia  to  the 
Polish  Duchy  of  Warsaw 
sacrifice  the  wealth  of  his 
interest  of  an  insincere  all/,  ^t  me  ^RF^tne  year 
1810  an  order  was  published  at  St.  Petersh^^^ 
ing  the  harbours  of  Eussia  to  all  shi:  ^cutral 

flag,  and  imposing  a  duty  upon  many  v^i  the  products  of 
France.     This  edict  was  scarcely  less  than  ^  '^*- 
lenge  to  the   French  Emperor.  ^    ...^u. 

the  effect  of  his  Continental  prohibitions  upon  English 
traffic.  He  imagined  that  the  command  of  the  Euro- 
pean coast-line,  and  nothing  short  of  this,  would  enable 
him  to  exhaust  his  enemy ;  and  he  was  prepared  to 
risk  a  war  with  Eussia  rather  than  permit  it  to 
frustrate  his  long-cherished  hopes.  Already  in  the 
Austrian  marriage  Napoleon  had  marked  the  sever- 
ance of  his   interest  from  those    of  Alexander.      An 


1810.  PBEPAEATIONS  FOB  WAR   WITH  BU88IA  413 

attempted  compromise  upon  the  affairs  of  Poland 
produced  only  new  alienation  and  distrust,  an  open 
affront  was  offered  to  Alexander  in  the  annexation  of  the 
Duchy  of  Oldenhurg,  whose  sovereign  was  a  memher 
of  his. own  family.  The  last  event  was  immediately 
followed  hy  the  puhlication  of  the  new 
Eussian  tariff.  In  the  spring  of  1811  sia  preparing  for 
Napoleon  had  determined  upon  war.  With 
Spain  still  unsubdued,  he  had  no  motive  to  hurry  on 
hostilities;  Alexander  on  his  part  was  still  less  ready 
for  action ;  and  the  forms  of  diplomatic  intercourse  were 
in  consequence  maintained  for  some  time  longer  at  Paris 
and  St.  Petersburg.  But  the  true  nature  of  the  situa- 
tion was  shown  by  the  immense  levies  that  were  ordered 
iDoth  in  France  and  Eussia ;  and  the  rest  of  the  year 
was  spent  in  preparations  for  the  campaign  which  was 
destined  to  decide  the  fate  of  Europe. 

We  have  seen  that  during  the  period  of  more  than 
two  years  that  elapsed  between  the  Peace  of  Vienna 
and  the  outbreak  of  war  with  Eussia,  Napoleon  had 
no  enemy  in  arms  upon  the  Continent  except  in  the 
Spanish  Peninsula.  Had  the  Emperor  himself  taken 
up  the  command  in  Spain,  he  would  probably  within  a 
few  months  have  crushed  both  the  Spanish 
armies  and  their  English  ally.  A  fatal  error  and  Ptoitug«i. 
in  judgment  made  him  willing  to  look  on 
from  a  distance  whilst  his  generals  engaged  with  this 
lavst  foe.  The  disputes  with  the  Pope  and  the  King  of 
Holland  might  well  have  been  adjourned  for  another 
year ;  but  Napoleon  felt  no  suspicions  that  the  conquest 


444  MODERN  EUBOPK  isio. 

of  tlie  Spanisli  Peninsula  was  too  difficult  a  task  for  his 
marshals ;  nor  perhaps  would  it  have  been  so  if  Welling- 
ton had  been  like  any  of  the  generals  whom  Napoleon 
had  himself  encountered.  The  French  forces  in  the 
Peninsula  numbered  over  300,000  men  :  in  spite  of  the 
victory  of  Talavera,  the  English  had  been  forced  to 
retreat  into  Portugal.  But  the  warfare  of  Wellington 
was  a  different  thing  from  that  even  of  the  best  Austrian 
or  Eussian  commanders.  From  the  time  of  the  retreat 
from  Talavera  he  had  foreseen  that  Portugal  would  be 
invaded  by  an  army  far  outnumbering  his  own  ;  and  he 
planned  a  scheme  of  defence  as  original,  as  strongly 
marked  with  true  military  insight,  as  Napoleon's  own 
most  daring  schemes  of  attack.  Behind  Lisbon  a  rugged 
mountainous  tract  stretches  from  the  Tagus  to  the  sea : 
here,  while  the  English  army  wintered  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Almeida,  Wellington  employed  thousands  of 
Portuguese  labourers  in  turning  the  promontory  into 

^  one  vast  fortress.     No  rumour  of  the  opera- 

Lines  of  Torres       ,.  n  t     j  i      ji  a 

vedras.    1809-     tiou  was  allowcd  to  reach  the  enemy.     A 

1810.  ^  "^ 

double  series  of  fortifications,  known  as  the 
Lines  of  Torres  Yedras,  followed  the  mountain-bastion 
on  the  north  of  Lisbon,  and  left  no  single  point  open 
between  the  Tagus  and  the  sea.  This  was  the  barrier 
to  which  Wellington  meant  in  the  last  resort  to  draw 
his  assailants,  whilst  the  country  was  swept  of  every- 
thmg  that  might  sustain  an  invading  army,  and  the 
irregular  troops  of  Portugal  closed  in  upon  its  rear.* 
In  June,  1810,  Marshal  Massena,  who  had  won  the 

*  Wellington  Supplemeiitary  Despatches,  vi,  41.    Napier,  iii..,  250. 


1811.  TOREW    VEBRAS.  4^ 

highest  distinction  at  Aspem  and  Wagram,  arrived  in 
Spain,  and  took  up  the  command  of  the  army  destined 
for  the  conquest  of  Portugal.  Ciudad  Eodrigo  was  in- 
vested :  Wellington,  too  weak  to  effect  its  relief,  too  wise 
to  jeopardise  his  army  for  the  sake  of  Spanish  praise,  lay 
motionless  while  this  great  fortress  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  invader.  In  Septemher,  the  French,  70,f)00  strong, 
entered  Portugal.  Wellington  retreated  down  the  valley 
of  the  'Mondego,  devastating  the  .country.  At  length  he 
halted  at  Busaco  and  gave  hattle  (Septemher  27).  The 
French  were  defeated ;  the  victory  gave  the  Portuguese 
full  confidence  in  the  English  leader ,  hut  other  roads 
were  open  to  the  invader,  and  Wellino^ton 

-"•  *-*  Massena's  cam- 

continued  his  retreat.  Massena  followed,  ^^iSLgt^"^ 
and  heard  for  the  first  time  of  the  fortifica- 
tions of  Torres  Yedras  when  he  was  within  five  days' 
march  of  them.  On  nearing  the  mountain-harrier,  Mas- 
sena searched  in  vain  for  an  unprotected  point.  Fifty 
thousand  English  and  Portuguese  regular  troops,  hesides 
a  nmjtitude  of  Portuguese  militia,  were  collected  he- 
hind  the  lines  ;  with  the  present  numher  of  the  French 
an  assault  was  hopeless.  Massena  waited  for  reinforce- 
ments. It  was  with  the  utmost  diflficulty  that  he 
could  keep  his  army  from  starving ;  at  length,  when  the 
country  was  utterly  exhausted,  he  commented  his  retreat 
(Nov.  14).  Wellington  descended  from  the  heights,  hut 
his  marching  force  was  still  too  weak  to  risk  a  pitched 
battle.  Massena  halted  ai;^d  took  post  at  Santarem,  oti 
the  Tagus.  Here,  and  in  the  neighbouring  vaUey  of  the 
Zezere,  he  maintained  himself  during  the  winter.     But 


446  MODERN  EUROPE.  mo. 

in  Marcli,  1811,  reinforcements  arrived  from  England: 
Wellington  moved  forward  against  Ms  enemy,  and  the 

retreat  of  tlie  Erencli  began  in  real  earnest. 
Massena.         Masscna  made   his  way   northwards,  hard 

pressed  hj  the  English,  and  devastating  the 
coTintrj  with  merciless  severity  in  order  to  retard  pur- 
suit. Eire  and  ruin  marked  the  track  of  the  retreating 
army ;  but  such  were  the  sufferings  of  the  Erench  them- 
selves, both  during  the  invasion  and  the  retreat,  that 
when  Massena  re-entered  Spain,  after  a  campaign  in 
which  only  one  pitched  battle  had  been  fought,  his  loss 
exceeded  30,000  men. 

Other  Erench  armies,  in  spite  of  a  most  destructive 

guerilla  warfare,  were  in  the  meantime  com- 
spain  as  far  as     plctiug  the  couqucst  of  thc  south  and  the 

east  of  Spain.  Soult  captured  Seville,  and 
began  to  lay  siege  to  Cadiz.  Here,  at  the  end  of  1810, 
an  order  reached  him  from  Napoleon  to  move  to  the  sup- 
port of  Massena.  Leaving  Victor  in  command  at  Cadiz, 
Soult  marched  northwards,  routed  the  Spaniards,  and  con- 
quered the  fortress  of  Badajoz,  commanding  the  southern 
road  into  Portugal.  Massena,  however,  was  already  in 
retreat,  and  Soult's  own  advance  was  cut  short  by  intelli- 
gence that  Grraham,  the  English  general  in  Cadiz,  had 
broken  out  upon  the  besi'^gers  and  inflicted  a  heavy  defeat. 
Soult  returned  to  Cadiz  and  resumed  the  blockade.  "Wel- 
lington, thus  freed  from  danger  of  attack  from  the  south, 
and  believing  Massena  to  be  thoroughly  disabled,  con- 
sidered that  the  time  had  come  for  a  forward  movement 
into  Spain.     It  was  necessary  for  him  to  capture  the 


1811.  WELTANQTO^S    CA^tPAIGN  OF  1811.  447 

fortresses  of  Almeida  and  Ciudad  Eodrigo  on  the  northern 
road,  and  to  secure  liis  own  communications 
with  Portuo^al  by  wresting  back  Badaioz  campaign  of 
from  the  French.  He  left  a  small  force  to 
/  besiege  Almeida,  and  moved  to  Elvas  to  make  arrange- 
ments with  Beresford  for  the  siege  of  Badajoz.  But 
before  the  English  commander  had  deemed  it  possible, 
the  energy  of  Massena  had  restored  his  troops  to  effi- 
ciency ,  and  the  two  armies  of  Massena  and  Soult  were 
now  ready  to  assail  the  English  on  the  north  and  the 
south.  Massena  marched  against  the  corps  investing 
Almeida.  Wellington  hastened  back  to  meet  him,  and 
fought  a  battle  at  Fuentes  d*Onoro.  The  French  were 
defeated;  Almeida  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  English. 
In  the  south,  Soult  advanced  to  the  relief  of  Badajoz. 
He  was  overthrown  by  Beresford  in  the  l>loody  engage- 
ment of  Albuera  (May  1 6th) ;  but  his  junction  with  the 
army  of  the  north,  which  was  now  transferred:  from 
Massena  to  Marmont,  forced  the  English  to  raise  the 
siege ;  and  Wellington,  after  audaciously  offering  battle 
to  the  combined  French  armies,  retired  within  the  Portu- 
guese frontier,  and  marched  northwards  with  the  design 
of  laying  siege  to  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  Again  outnumbered 
by  the  French,  he  was "  compelled  to  retire  to  canton- 
ments on  the  Coa. 

Throughout  the  autumn  months,  which  were  spent 
in  forced  inaction,  Wellington  held  patiently  to  his 
belief  that  the  French  would  be  unable  to  keep  their 
armies  long  united,  on  account  of  the  scarcity  of  food. 
His  cidculations  wore  correct,  and  at  the  close  of  the 


44.8  MOBEBN  JEUBOPB.  ^l. 

year    1811    tlie    Englisli  were   again   superior  in   the 

field.      Wellington   moved   against  Cindad 

audad  Eodrigo.     Eodris^o,   and    took    it    by   storm    on    the 

Jan.  19, 1812.  ^    '  •' 

19th  of  January,  1812.  The  road  into 
Spain  was  opened ;  it  only  remained  to  secure  Portugal 
itseK  by  the  capture  of  Badajoz.  Wellington  crossed  the 
Tagus  on  the  8th  of  March,  and  completed  the  invest- 
ment of  Badajoz  ten  days  later.  It  was  necessary  to  gain 
possession  of  the  city,  at  whatever  cost,  before  Soult 
could  advance  to  its  relief.     On  the  night  of  the  6th  of 

April  Wellington  gave  orders  for  the  assault, 
of  Badajoz.       Thc  fuTy  of  the  attack,  the  ferocity  of  the 

English  soldiers  in  the  moment  of  their 
victory,  have  made  the  storm  of  Badajoz  conspicuous 
amongst  the  most  terrible  events  of  war.  But  the  pur- 
pose of  Wellington  was  effected ;  the  base  of  the  English 
army  in  Portugal  was  secured  from  all  possibility  of 
attack;  and  at  the  moment  when  Napoleon  was  sum- 
moning his  veteran  regiments  from  beyond  the  Pyrenees 
for  the  invasion  of  Russia,  the  English  commander, 
master  of  the  frontier  fortresses  of  Spain,  was  preparing 
to  overwhelm  the  weakened  armies  in  the  Peninsula,  and 
to  drive  the  French  from  Madrid. 

It  was  in  the  summer  of  1812,  when  Napoleon  was 

now  upon  the  point  of  opening  the  Eussian 
vades    Spain.      Campaign,  that  Wellington  advanced  against 

Marmont's  positions  in  the  north  of  Spain 
and  the  French  lines  of  communication  with  the  capital. 
Marmont  fell  back  and  allowed  Wellington  to  pass  Sala- 
manca ;  but  ^n  reaching  the  Douro  he  turned  upon  his 


1812.  WELLINGTON'S  MOVEMENTS  IN  THE  PENINSULA.  4,19 

adversary,  and  by  a  succession  of  swift  and  skilful  marches 
brought  the  English   into  some  danger  of     saiamanca. 
losing  their  communications  with  Portugal. 
Wellington  himself  now  retreated  as  far  as  Salamanca, 
and  there  gave  battle  (July  22).     A   decisive  victory- 
freed  the   English  army   from   its   peril,   and   annihi- 
lated all  the  advantages  gained  by  Marmont's  strategy 
and  speed.     The  French  were  so  heavily  defeated  that 
they  had  to  fall  back  on  Burgos.     Wellington  marched 
upon  Madrid.     At  his  approach  King  Joseph  fled  from 
the  capital,  and  ordered  Soult  to  evacuate  Andalusia,  and 
to  meet  him  at  Valencia,  on  the  eastern  coast.     Wel- 
lington entered  Madrid  amidst  the  wild  rejoicing  of  the 
Spaniards,  and  then  turned  northwards  to  complete  the 
destruction  of  the  army  which  he  had  beaten  at  Sala- 
manca.    But  the  hour  of  his  final  success  was  not  yet 
come.     His  advance  upon  Madrid,  though   wise  as  a 
political  measure,  had  given  the  French  northern  army 
time  to  rally.     He  was  checked  by  the  obstinate  defence 
of  Burgos  ;  and  finding  the  French  strengthened  by  the 
very  abandonment   of  territory  which   his 
victory  had  forced   upon  them,  he  retired     retL^  to^porw 
to  Portugal,  giving  to  King  Joseph  a  few 
months'  more  precarious  enjoyment  of  his  vassal-sove- 
reignty before  his  final  and  irrevocable  ovei^throw. 

In  Spain  itseK  the  struggle  of  the  nation  for  its  inde- 
pendence had  produced  a  political  revolution 

*■  •"••*■  The  irar  excites 

as  little  foreseen  by  the   Spaniards  as   by     io";^t*^'"li 
Napoleon  himself  when  the  conflict  began. 
When,  in  1808,  the  people  had  taken  up  arms  for  its 
D  D 


450  MODEBN  EUROPE.  I8I2, 

native  dynasty,  tlie  voices  of  those  who  demanded  a  reform 
in  the  abuses  of  the  Bourbon  government  had  scarcely  been 
heard  amid  the  tumult  of  loyal  enthusiasm  for  Ferdinand. 
There  existed,  however,  a  group  of  liberally-minded  men 
in  Spain ;  and  as  soon  as  the  iavasion  of  the  French  and 
the  subsequent  successes  of  the  Spaniards  had  overthrown 
both  the  old  repressive  system  of  the  Bourbons  and  that 
which  Napoleon  attempted  to  put  in  its  place,  the  opinions 
of  these  men,  hitherto  scarcely  known  outside  the  circle 
of  their  own  acquaintances,  suddenly  became  a  power  in 
the  country  through  the  liberation  of  the  press.  Jovel- 
lanos,  an  upright  and  large-minded  statesman,  who  had 
suffered  a  long  imprisonment  in  the  last  reign  in  conse- 
quence of  his  labours  in  the  cause  of  progress,  now  repre- 
sented in  the  Central  Junta  the  piirty  of  constitutional 
reform.  The  Junta  itself  acted  with  but  little  insight  or 
sincerity.  A  majority  of  its  members  neither  desired  nor 
understood  the  great  changes  in  government  which  Jovel- 
lanos  advocated ;  yet  the  Junta  itself  was  an  irregular  and 
revolutionary  body,  and  was  forced  to  appeal  to  the  nation 
in  order  to  hold  its  ground  against  the  old  legal  Councils 
of  the  monarchy,  which  possessed  not  only  a  better  formal 
right,  but  all  the  habits  of  authority.  The  victories  of 
Napoleon  at  the  end  of  1808,  and  the  threateniug  attitude 
both  of  the  old  official  bodies  and  of  the  new  provincial 
governments  which  had  sprung  up  in  every  part  of  the 
kingdom,  extorted  from  the  Junta  iu  the  spring  of  1809 
a  declaration  in  favour  of  the  assembling  of  the  Cortes,  or 
National  Parliament,  in  the  following  year.  Once  made, 
the  declaration  could  not  be  nullified  or  withdrawn.     It 


180&-10.  LIBERAL  MOVEMENT  IN  SPAIN.  451 

was  in  vain  that  the  Junta,  alarmed  at  the  progress  of 
popular  opinions,  restored  the  censorship  of  the  press,  and 
attempted  to  suppress  the  liberal  journals.  The  current 
of  political  agitation  swept  steadily  on;  and  before  the 
end  of  the  year  1809  the  conflict  of  parties,  which  Spain 
was  henceforward  to  experience  in  common  with  the 
other  Mediterranean  States,  had  fairly  begun.* 

The  Spanish  Liberals  of  1809  made  the  same  attack 
upon  despotic  power,  and  upheld  the  same  ^  ^^^  Liberal, 
theories  of  popular  right,  as  the  leaders  of  the  ^^"^^  ^sio. 
French  nation  twenty  years  before.  Against  them  was 
ranged  the  whole  force  of  Spanish  officialism,  soon  to  be 
supported  by  the  overwhelming  power  of  the  clergy.  In 
the  outset,  however,  the  Liberals  carefully  avoided  in- 
fringing on  the  pre  rogatives  of  the  Church.  Thus  accom- 
modating its  policy  to  the  Catholic  spirit  of  the  nation, 
the  party  of  reform  gathered  strength  throughout  the  year 
1809,  as  disaster  after  disaster  excited  the  wrath  of  the 
people  against  both  the  past  and  the  present  holders  of 
power.  It  was  determined  by  the  Junta  that  the  Coiies 
should  assemble  on  the  1st  of  March,  1810.  According 
to  the  ancient  usage  of  Spain,  each  of  the  Three  Estates, 
the  Clergy,  the  Nobles,  and  the  Commons,  would  have 
been  represented  in  the  Cortes  by  a  separate  assembly. 
The  opponents  of  reform  pressed  for  the  maintenance  of 
this  mediaeval  order ,  the  Liberals  declared  for  a  single 
Chamber;  the  Junta,  guided  by  JoveUanos,  adopted  a 
middle  course,  and  decided  that  the  higher  clergy  and 
nobles  should  be  jointly  represented  by  one  Chamber,  the 

•  Baumgarteu,  Goscbichte  Spauiens,  i  405,         * 
DD   2 


452  MODEBJSr  ETJBOFE.  I810. 

Commons  by.  a  second.  Writs  of  election  liad  already 
been  issued,  wben  the  Junta,  driven  to  Cadiz  by  tbe 
advance  of  the  French  armies,  and  assailed  alike  by 
Liberals,  by  reactionists,  and  by  city  mobs,  ended  its 
ineffective  career,  and  resigned  its  powers  into  tbe  hands 
of  a  Eegency  composed  of  five  persons  (Jan.  30,  1810). 
Had  the  Eegency  immediately  taken  steps  to  assemble 
the  Cortes,  Spain  would  probably  have  been  content  with 
the  moderate  reforms  which  two  Chambers,  formed  ac- 
cording to  the  plans  of  Jovellanos,  would  have  been  likely 
to  sanction.  The  Eegency,  howevel*,  preferred  to  keep 
power  in  its  own  hands,  and  ignored  the  promise  which 
the  Junta  had  given  to  the  nation.  Its  policy  of  obstruc- 
tion, which  was  continued,  for  months  after  the  time  when 
the  Cortes  ought  to  have  assembled,  threw  the  Liberal 
party  into  the  han^s  of  men  of  extremes,  and  prepared  the 
way  for  revolution  instead  of  reform.  It  was  only  when 
the  report  reached  Spain  that  Ferdinand  was  about  to 
marry  the  daughter  of  King  Joseph,  and  to  accept  the 
succession  to  the  Spanish  crown  from  the  usurper  himself, 
that  the  Eegency  consented  to  convoke  the  Cortes.  But 
it  was  now  no  longer  possible  to  create  an  Upper  House 
to  serve  as  a  check  upon  the  popular  Assembly.  A  single 
Chamber  was  elected,  and  elected  in  great  part  within  the 
walls  of  Cadiz  itself ;  for  the  representatives  of  districts 
where  the  presence  of  French  soldiery  rendered  election 
impossible  were  chosen  by  refugees  from  those  districts 
within  Cadiz,  amid  the  tumults  of  political  passion  which 
stir  a  great  city  in  time  of  war  and  revolution. 

On  the  24th  of  September,  1810,  the  Cortes  opened. 


1812.  THE  00BTE8  IN  1812.  463 

Its  first  act  was  to  declare  the  sovereignty  of  the  people, 
its  next  act  to  declare  the  freedom  of  the  Press.  In  every 
debate  a  spirit  of  bitter  hatred  towards  the  old  system  of 
government  and  of  deep  distrust  towards  Ferdinand  him- 
self revealed  itself  in  the  speeches  of  the 
Liberal   deputies,   althouo^h  no  one  in   the     made  by  the 

■^  '  O  Cortes,  1812. 

Assembly  dared  to  avow  the  least  want  of 
loyalty  towards  the  exiled  House.  The  Liberals  knew 
how  passionate  was  the  love  of  the  Spanish  people  for 
their  Prince;  but  they  resolved  that,  if  Ferdinand  re- 
turned to  his  throne,  he  should  return  without  the  power 
to  revive  the  old  abuses  of  Bourbon  rule.  In  this  spirit 
the  Assembly  proceeded  to  frame  a  Constitution  for  Spain. 
The  Crown  was  treated  as  the  antagonist  and  corrupter  of 
the  people ;  its  administrative  powers  were  jealously  re- 
duced ;  it  was  confronted  by  an  Assembly  to  be  elected 
every  two  years,  and  the  members  of  this  Assembly  were 
prohibited  both  from  holding  office  under  the  Crown,  and 
from  presenting  themselves  for  re-election  at  the  end  of 
their  two  years'  service.  To  a  Eepresentative  Body  thus 
excluded  from  all  possibility  of  gaining  any  practical  ac- 
quaintance with  public  affairs  was  entrusted  not  only 
the  right  of  making  laws,  but  the  control  6f  every 
branch  of  government.  The  executive  was  reduced  to  a 
mere  cypher. 

Such  was  the  Constitution  which,  under  the  fire  of 
the  French  artillery  now  encompassing  Cadiz,  the  Cortes 
of  Spain  proclaimed  in  the  spring  of  the  year  1812.  Its 
principles  had  excited  the  most  vehement  opposition 
within  the  Assembly  itself;  by  the  nation,  or  at  least 


454  I^OBEBN  EUROPE.  I812. 

that  part  of  it  wliicli  was  in  communication  witli  Cadiz, 

it  appeared  to  be  received  with  enthusiasm. 

against  the^con-     Thc  Libcrals,  who  had  triumphed  over  their 

stitution.  -^ 

opponents  in  the  debates  in  the  Assembly, 
believed  that  their  own  victory  was  the  victory  of 
the  Spanish  people  over  the  forces  of  despotism.  But 
before  the  first  rejoicings  were  over,  ominous  signs  ap- 
peared of  the  strength  of  the  opposite  party,  and  of  the 
incapacity  of  the  Liberals  themselves  to  form  any  effec- 
tive Government.  The  fanaticism  of  the  clergy  was 
excited  by  a  law  partly  ratifying  the  suppression  of 
monasteries  begun  by  Joseph  Bonaparte  ;  the  enactments 
of  the  Cortes  regarding  the  censorship  of  religious  writ- 
ings threw  the  Church  into  open  revolt.  In  declaring 
the  freedom  of  the  Press,  the  Cortes  had  expressly 
guarded  themselves  against  extending  this  freedom  to 
religious  discussion ;  the  clergy  now  demanded  the  res- 
toration of  the  powers  of  the  Inquisition,  which  had 
been  in  abeyance  since  the  beginning  of  the  war.  The 
Cortes  were  willing  to  grant  to  the  Bishops  the  right 
of  condemning  any  writing  as  heretical,  and  they  were 
willing  to  enforce  by  means  of  the  ordinary  tribunals  the 
law  which  declared  the  Catholic  religion  to  be  the  only 
one  permitted  in  Spain ;  but  they  declined  to  restore  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Holy  Office  (Feb.,  1813).  Without 
this  engine  for  the  suppression  of  all  mental  independ- 
ence the  priesthood  of  Spain  conceived  its  cause  to  be 
lost.  The  anathema  of  the  Church  went  out  against  the 
new  order.  Uniting  with  the  partisans  of  absolutism, 
whom  Wellington,  provoked  by  the  extravagances  of  the 


1812.  SPANISU  CONSTITUTION  OF  1812.  455 

Liberals,  now  took  under  his  protection,  tlie  clergy  excited 
an  ignorant  people  against  its  own  emancipators,  and 
awaited  the  time  when  the  return  of  Ferdinand,  and  a 
combination  of  all  the  interests  hostile  to  reform,  should 
overthrow  the  Constitution  which  the  Liberals  fondly 
imagined  to  have  given  freedom  to  Spain. 


CHAPTEK  X. 

War  approaching  "between  France  and  Russia — ^Policy  of  Prussia — Hardenberg's 
Ministry — Prussia  forced  into  Alliance  with  Napoleon — Austrian  Alliance — 
Napoleon's  Preparations —He  enters  Eussia — Alexander  and  Bernadotte—- 
Plan  of  the  Russians  to  fight  a  battle  at  Drissa  frustrated — They  retreat  on 
Witepsk — Sufferings  of  the  French— French  enter  Smolensk© — ^Battle  of 
Borodino — Evacuation  of  Moscow — Moscow  fired — The  Retreat  from  Moscow 
— The  French  at  Smolensk© — Advance  of  Russian  Armies  from  North  and 
South — Battle  of  Krasnoi — Passage  of  the  Beresina — The  French  reach  the 
Niemen— York's  Convention  with  the  Russians — The  Czar  and  Stein — 
Russian  Army  enters  Prussia — Stein  raises  East  Prussia — Treaty  of  Kalisch 
— Prussia  declares  War— Enthusiasm  of  the  Nation — Idea  of  German 
Unity — The  Landwehr. 

War  between  France  and  Eussia  was  known  to  be  im- 
minent as  early  as  tbe  spring  of  1^11.  The  approach  of 
the  conflict  was  watched  with  the  deepest  anxiety  by  the 
two  States  of  central  Europe  which  still  retained  some 
degree  of  independence.  The  Grovernments  of  Berlin  and 
,    ,  .       ^     Yienna  had  been  drawn  toerether  by  misfor- 

Austria   and  o  j 

Prussia  in  1811.  ^^^^^^  rjr^^  ^^^^  ultimate  dcliverance  formed 
the  secret  hope  of  both ;  but  their  danger  was  too  great  to 
permit  thjem  to  combine  in  open  resistance  to  Napoleon  s 
will.  In  spite  of  a  tacit  understanding  between  the  two 
powers,  each  was  compelled  for  the  present  to  accept  the 
conditions  necessary  to  secure  its  own  existence.  The 
situation  of  Prussia  in  especial  %as  one  of  the  utmost 
danger.  Its  territory  lay  directly  between  the  French 
Empire  ^nd  Eussia ;  its  fortresses  Were  in  the  hands  of 
Napoleon;  its  resources  were  certain  to  be  seized  by  one 


1811,  POLICY  OF  HABDENBEEO.  457 

or  other  of  the  hostile  armies.  Neutrality  was  impossi- 
ble, however  much  desired  by  Prussia  itseK;  and  the 
only  question  to  be  decided  by  the  Government  was 
whether  Prussia  should  enter  the  war  as  the  ally  of 
France  or  of  Eussia.  Had  the  party  of  Stein  been  in 
power,  Prussia  would  have  taken  arms  against  Napoleon 
at  every  risk.  Stein,  however,  was  in  exile ;  his  friends, 
though  strong  in  the  army,  were  not  masters  of  the 
Government;  the  foreign  policy  of  the  country  was 
directed  by  a  statesman  who  trusted  more  to  time  and 
prudent  management  than  to  desperate  resolves.  Har- 
denberg  had  been  recalled  to  office  in  1810,  Hardenbeig'. 
and  permitted  to  resume  the  great  measures  ^^i^^^**^- 
of  civil  reform  which  had  been  broken  off  two  years  be- 
fore. The  machinery  of  Government  was  reconstructed 
upon  principles  that  had  been  laid  down  by  Stein ;  agrarian 
reform  was  carried  still  farther  by  the  abolition  of  pea- 
sant's service,  and  the  partition  of  peasant's  land  between 
the  occupant  and  his  lord ;  an  experiment,  though  a  very 
ill-managed  one,  was  made  in  the  forms  of  constitu- 
tional Government  by  the  convocation  of  three  succes- 
sive assemblies  of  the  Notables.  On  the  part  of  the 
privileged  orders  Hardenberg  encountered  the  most  bitter 
opposition ;  his  own  love  of  absolute  power  prevented 
him  from  winning  popular  confidence  by  any  real  ap- 
proach towards  a  Representative  System.  Nor  was  the 
foreign  policy  of  the  Minister  of  a  character  to  excite 
enthusiasm.  A  true  patriot  at  heart,  he  seemed  at  times 
to  be  destitute  of  patriotism,  when  he  was  in  fact  only 
destitute  of  the  power  to  reveal  his  real  motives. 


458  MOBEliN  EUEOFE.  18U. 

Convinced  that  Prussia  could  not  remain  neutral  in 
the  coming  war,  and  believing  some  relief  from  its  pre- 
sent burdens  to  be  absolutely  necessary,  Hardenberg 
determined  in  the  first  instance  to  offer  Prussia's  support 

to  Napoleon,  demanding  in  return  for  it  a 
foreigTpoSjy.       reduction  of  the  payments  still  due  to  France, 

and  the  removal  of  the  limits  imposed  upon 
the  Prussian  army.*  The  offer  of  the  Prussian  alliance 
reached  Napoleon  in  the  spring  of  1811 :  he  maintained 
an  obstinate  silence.  While  the  Prussian  envoy  at  Paris 
vainly  waited  for  an  audience,  masses  of  troops  advanced 
from  the  Ehine  towards  the  Prussian  frontier,  and  the 
French  garrisons  on  the  Oder  were  raised  far  beyond 
their  stipulated  strength.  In  July  the  envoy  returned 
from  Paris,  announcing  that  Napoleon  declined  even  to 
enter  upon  a  discussion  of  the  terms  proposed  by  Har- 
denberg. King  Frederick  William  now  wrote  to  the 
Czar,  proposing  an  alliance  between  Prussia  and  Eussia. 
It  was  not  long  before  the  report  of  Hardenberg's  mili- 
tary preparations  reached  Paris.  Napoleon  announced 
that  if  they  were  not  immediately  suspended  he  should 
order  Davoust  to  march  on  Berlin ;  and  he  presented  a 
counter-proposition  for  a  Prussian  alliance,  which  was 
in  fact  one  of  unqualified  submission.  The  Government 
had  to  decide  between  accepting  a  treaty  which  placed 
Prussia  among  Napoleon's  vassals,  or  certain  war.  Har- 
denberg, expecting  favourable  news  from  St.  Petersburg, 
pronounced  in  favour  of  war;  but  the  Czar,  though 
anxious  for  the  support  of  Prussia,  had  determined  on  a 

*  Hardenberg  (Ranke),  iv.  268.    Hausser,  iii.  535.     Seeley.  ii.  447. 


1812.  PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE.  459 

defensive  plan  of  operations,  and  declared  that  he  could 
send  no  troops  heyond  the  Kussian  frontier. 

Prussia  was  thus  left  to  face  Napoleon  alone.  Har- 
denberg  shrank  from  the  responsibility  of  ^^^^^^  ^^^^^^^ 
proclaiming  a  war  for  life  or  death,  and  a     SIl^r'^^FS*, 

1812. 

treaty  was  signed  which  added  the  people  of 
Frederick  the  Great  to  that  inglorious  crowd  which 
fought  at  Napoleon's  orders  against  whatever  remained 
of  independence  and  nationality  in  Europe.*  (Feb.  24th, 
1812.)  Prussia  undertook  to  supply  Napoleon  with 
20,000  men  for  the  impending  campaign,  and  to  raise  no 
levies  and  to  give  no  orders  to  its  troops  without  Napo- 
leon's consent.  Such  was  the  bitter  termination  of  all 
those  patriotic  hopes  and  efforts  which  had  carried  Prus- 
sia through  its  darkest  days.  Hardenberg  himself  might 
make  a  merit  of  bending  before  the  storm,  and  of  preserv- 
ing for  Prussia  the  means  of  striking  when  the  time 
should  come ;  but  the  simpler  instincts  of  the  patriotic 
party  felt  his  submission  to  be  the  very  surrender  of 
national  existence.  Stein  in  his  exile  denounced  the 
Minister  with  unsparing  bitterness.  Scharnhorst  re- 
signed his  post ;  many  of  the  best  officers  in  the  Prussian 
army  quitted  the  service  of  Bang  Frederick  William  in 
order  to  join  the  Russians  in  the  last  struggle  for  Euro- 
pean liberty. 

The  alliance  which  Napoleon  pressed  upon  Austria 
was  not  of  the  same  humiliating  chiiracter  as  that  which 

•  Martens,  Nouveau  Eecueil  i.  417.  A  copy,  or  the  original,  of  this 
Treaty  was  captnred  by  tho  Russians  with  other  of  Napoleon's  papers 
during  the  retreat  from  Moscow,  and  a  draft  of  it  sent  to  London,  which 
i*emaius  in  the  Records. 


460  MOBEBN  ETJBOFE.  I812. 

Prussia  was  forced  to  accept.      Botli  Metternicli  and 
the  Emperor  Francis  would  liave  preferred 

Alliance  of  Aus-        .  .  1       i       p  ii  1 

tria  with  Napo-  to  remain  neutral,  tor  the  country  was 
suffering  fi'om  a  fearful  State -bankruptcy, 
and  the  Grovernment  had  been  compelled  to  reduce  its 
paper  money,  in  which  all  debts  and  salaries  were 
payable,  to  a  fifth  of  its  nominal  value.  Napoleon, 
however,  insisted  on  Austria's  co-operation.  The 
family-relations  of  the  two  Emperors  pointed  to  a  close 
alliance,  and  the  reward  which  Napoleon  held  out  to 
Austria,  the  restoration  of  the  lUyrian  provinces,  was 
one  of  the  utmost  value.  Nor  was  the  Austrian  con- 
tingent to  be  treated,  like  the  Prussian,  as  a  mere  French 
army-corps.  Its  operations  were  to  be  separate  from 
those  of  the  French,  and  its  command  was  to  be  held 
by  an  Austrian  general,  subordinate  only  to  Napoleon 
himself.  On  these  terms  Metternich  was  not  unwilling 
to  enter  the  campaign.  He  satisfied  his  scruples  by 
inventing  a  strange  diplomatic  form  in  which  Austria 
was  still  described  as  a  neutral,  although  she  took  part 
in  the  war,*  and  felt  as  little  compunction  in  uniting 
with  France  as  in  explaining  to  the  Courts  of  St. 
Petersburg  and  Berlin  that  the  union  was  a  hypocritical 
one.  The  Sovereign  who  was  about  to  be  attacked  by 
Napoleon,  and  the  Sovereigns  who  sent  their  troops 
4)0  Napoleon's  support,  perfectly  well  understood  one 
another's  position.  The  Prussian  corps,  watched  and 
outnumbered  by  the  French,  might  have  to  fight  the 
Russians  because  they  could  not  help  it ;  the  Austrians, 

*  Metternich,  i.,  122. 


1812.  NAPOLEON  ON  THE  NIEMBN.  461 

directed  by  their  own  commander,  would  do  no  serious 
liarm  to  the  Eussians  so  long  as  the  Kussians  did  no 
harm  to  them.  Should  the  Czar  succeed  in  giving  a 
good  account  of  his  adversary,  he  would  have  no 
difficulty  in  coming  to  a  settlement  with  his  adversary's 
forced  allies. 

The  Treaties  which  gave  to  Napoleon  the  hollow 
support  of  Austria  and  Prussia  were  signed 
early  in  the  year  1812.  During  the  next  Nai>oieon*f?r  in- 
three  months  all  Northern  Germany  was 
covered  with  enormous  masses  of  troops  and  waggon- 
trains,  on  their  way  from  the  Ehine  to  the  Vistula. 
No  expedition  had  ever  been  organised  on  anything 
approaching  to  the  scale  of  the  invasion  of  Eussia. 
In  all  the  wars  of  the  Trench  since  1793  the  enemy's 
country  had  furnished  their  armies  with  supplies,  and 
the  generals  had  trusted  to  their  own  exertions  for 
everything  but  guns  and  ammunition.  Such  a  method 
could  not,  however,  be  followed  in  an  invasion  of 
Eussia.  The  country  beyond  the  Niemen  was  no  weU- 
stocked  garden,  like  Lombardy  or  Bavaria.  Provisions 
for  a  mass  of  450,000  men,  with  all  the  means  of  trans- 
port for  carr3ring  them  far  into  Eussia,  had  to  be 
collected  at  Dantzig  and  the  fortresses  of  the  Vistula. 
No  mercy  was  shown  to  the  unfortunate  coimtries 
whose  position  now  made  them  Napoleon's  harvest- 
field  and  storehouse.  Prussia  was  forced  to  supplement 
its  military  assistance  with  colossal  grants  of  supplies. 
The  whole  of  Napoleon's  troops  upon  the  march  through 
Germany  lived  at  the  expense  of  the  towns  and  villages 


462  MODEIiN  EUROPE.  I812. 

tliroiigli  whicli  they  passed;  in  "Westphalia  sucli  was 
tlie  ruin  caused  by  military  requisitions  tliat  King 
Jerome  wrote  to  Napoleon,  warning  him  to  fear  the 
despair  of  men  who  had  nothing  more  to  lose.* 

At  length  the  vast  stores  were  collected,  and  the 

invading  army  reached  the  Vistula.     Napoleon  himself 

quitted   Paris   on  the    9th  of   May,   and  received  the 

homage  of  the  Austrian  and  Prussian  Sove- 

Eussian frontier.     reisTus  at  Drcsdcn.    The  eastward  movement 

June,  1812.  » 

of  the  army  continued.  The  Polish  and 
East  Prussian  districts  which  had  been  the  scene  of 
the  combats  of  1807  were  again  traversed  by  French 
columns.  On  the  23rd  of  June  the  order  was  given  to 
cross  the  Niemen  and  enter  Eussian  territory.  Out  of 
600,000  troops  whom  Napoleon  had  organised  for  this 
campaign,  450,000  were  actually  upon  the  frontier.  Of 
these,  380,000  formed  the  central  army,  under  Napoleon's 
own  command,  at  Kowno,  on  the  Niemen ,  to  the  north, 
at  Tilsit,  there  was  formed  a  corps  of  32,000,  which 
included  the  contingent  furnished  by  Prussia;  the 
Austrians,  under  Schwarzenburg,  with  a  small  French 
division,  lay  to  the  south,  on  the  borders  of  Gralicia. 
Against  the  main  army  of  Napoleon,  the  real  invading 
force,  the  Eussians  could  only  bring  up  150,000  men. 
These  were  formed  into  the  First  and  Second  Armies  of 
the  West.  The  First,  or  Northern  Army,  with  which 
the  Czar  himself  was  present,  numbered  about  100,000, 
under  the  command  of  Barclay  de  Tolly ;  the  Second 
Army,  half  that  strength,  was  led  by  Prince  Bagration. 

•  Memoires  de  Jerome,  v.  247. 


lfii2.  RUSSIAN  PLANS.        '  463 

In  Soutliern  Poland  and  on  the  Lower  Niemen  the 
Frencli  auxiliary  corps  were  faced  by  weak  divisions. 
In  all,  the  Eussians  had  only  220,000  men  to  oppose 
to  more  than  double  that  number  of  the  enemy.  The 
principal  reinforcements  which  they  had  to  expect  were 
from  the  armies  hitherto  engaged  with  the  Turks  upon 
the  Danube.  Alexander  found  it  necessary  to  make 
peace  with  the  Porte  at  the  cost  of  a  part  of  the  spoils 
of  Tilsit.  The  Danubian  provinces,  with  the  exception 
of  Bessarabia,  were  restored  to  the  Sultan,  in  order  that 
Eussia  might  withdraw  its  forces  from  the 
south.  Bernadotte,  Crown  Prince  of  Sweden,  ^g^o^^ 
who  was  threatened  with  the  loss  of  his 
own  dominions  in  the  event  of  Napoleon's  victory, 
concluded  an  alliance  with  the  Czar.  In  return  for  the 
co-operation  of  a  Swedish  army,  Alexander  undertook, 
with  an  indifference  to  national  right  worthy  of  Napo- 
leon himseK,  to  wrest  Norway  from  Denmark,  and  to 
annex  it  to  the  Swedish  crown. 

The  head-quarters  of  the  Eussian  army  were  at  Wilna 
when  Napoleon  crossed  the  Niemen.  It  was  unknown 
whether  the  French  intended  to  advance  upon  Moscow 
or  upon  St.  Petersburg ;  nor  had  any  systematic  plan  of 
the  campaign  been  adopted  by  the  Czar.  The  idea  of 
falling  back  before  the  enemy  was  indeed  familiar  in 
Eussia  since  the  war  between  Poter  the  Great  and  Charles 
XII.  of  Sweden,  and  there  was  no  want  of  good  counsel 
in  favour  of  a  defensive  warfare ;  *  but  neither  the  Czar 

•  Bogdanowitsch,  L  72 ;  Chambray,  1 186.     Sir  B.  Wilson,  Invasion  of 
Russia,  p.  15. 


464  MOBEEN  EUBOFE.  1813 

nor  any  one  of  liis  generals  understood  tlie  simple  tlieor  j 
of  a  retreat  in  wliicb.  no  battles  at  all  slionld  be  fongbt. 
Tbe  most  tbat  was  understood  by  a  defensive  system 
was  tbe  occupation  of  an  entrencbed  position  for  battle, 
and  a  retreat  to  a  second  line  of  entrencbments  before 
tbe  engagement  was  repeated.  Tbe  actual  course  of  tbe 
campaign  was  no  result  of  a  profound  design ;  it  resulted 
from  tbe  disagreement  of  tbe  generals'  plans,  and  tbe 
frustration  of  tbem  all.     It  was  intended  in 

Eussians  intend        .,        pi'i  jpii  ^     l_l:^         j    t\    • 

to     fight    at     tbe  nrst  mstance  to  n^ht  a  battle  at  Drissa, 

Drissa.  " 

on  tbe  river  Dwina.  In  tbis  position,  wbicb 
•was  supposed  to  cover  tbe  roads  botb  to  Moscow  and 
St.  Petersburg,  a  great  entrencbed  camp  bad  been 
formed,  and  bere  tbe  Eussian  army  was  to  make  its 
first  stand  against  Napoleon.  Accordingly,  as  soon  as 
tbe  Trencb  crossed  tbe  Niemen,  botb  Barclay  and 
Bagration  were  ordered  by  tbe  Czar  to  fall  back  upon 
Drissa.  But  tbe  movements  of  tbe  Frencb  army  were 
too  rapid  for  tbe  Eussian  commanders  to  effect  tbeir 
junction.  Bagration,  wbo  lay  at  some  distance  to  tbe 
soutb,  was  cut  off  from  bis  colleague,  and  forced  to 
retreat  along  tbe  eastern  road  towards  Witepsk.    Barclay 

readied  Drissa  in  safety,  but  be  knew  bim- 

Eussian    armies  *' 

?e'tJelton'wi£  sclf  to  bc  unablc  to  bold  it  alone  against 
^^^^'  300,000    men.      He    evacuated    tbe    lines 

witbout  waiting  for  tbe  approacb  of  tbe  Frencb,  and 
fell  back  in  tbe  direction  taken  by  tbe  second  army. 
Tbe  first  movement  of  defence  bad  tbus  failed,  and  tbe 
Czar  now  quitted  tbe  camp,  leaving  to  Barclay  tbe  com- 
mand of  tbe  wbole  Eussian  forces. 


laa.  THE  MAliGH   TUIiOUGH  EUSSIA.  465 

Napoleon  entered   Wilna,   the  capital   of    Russian 
Poland,  on  the  28th  of  June.     The  last  Russian  detach- 
ments had  only  left  it  a  few  hours  before ;  but  the  French 
were  in  no  condition  for  immediate  pursuit. 
Before  the  army  reached  the  Niemen  the     French    tnna. 

*'  port. 

unparalleled  difficulties  of  the  campaign  had 
become  only  too  clear.  The  vast  waggon-trains  broke 
down  on  the  highways.  The  stores  were  abundant,  but 
the  animals  which  had  to  transport  them  died  of  exhaus- 
tion. No  human  genius,  no  perfection  of  foresight  and 
care,  could  have  achieved  the  enormous  task  which  Napo- 
leon had  ]^idertaken.  In  spite  of  a  year's  preparations 
the  French  suffered  from  hunger  and  thirst  from  the 
moment  that  they  set  foot  on  Russian  soil.  Thirty 
thousand  stragglers  had  left  the  army  before  it  reached 
Wilna ;  twenty-five  thousand  sick  were  in  the  hospitals ; 
the  transports  were  at  an  unknown  distance  in  the  rear. 
ALt  the  end  of  six  days'  march  from  the  Niemen,  Napo- 
leon found  himself  compelled  to  halt  for  nearly  three 
weeks.  The  army  did  not  leave  Wilna  till  the  16th  of 
July,  when  Barclay  had  already  evacuated  the  camp  at 
Drissa.  When  at  length  a  march  became  possible,  Napo- 
leon moved  upon  the  Upper  Dwina,  hoping  to  intercept 
Barclay  upon  the  road  to  Witepsk ;  but  difficulties  of 
transport  again  brought  him  to  a  halt,  and  the  Russian 
commander  reached  Witepsk  before  his  adversary.  Here 
Barclay  drew  up  for  battle,  supposing  Bagration's  army 
to  be  but  a  short  distance  to  the  south.  In  the  course  of 
the  night  intelligence  arrived  that  Bagration's  army  was 
nowhere  near  the  rallying-point,  but  had  been  driven 
E  B 


466  MODEUN  JEJUBOP:^.  im. 

back  towards  Smolensko.     Barclay  immediately  gave  up 

the  thonglit  of  fighting  a  battle,  and  took  the  road  to 

Smolensko  himself,  leavins^  his  watchrfires 

Barclay  and  ^  *-' 

at^mde^ka  buming.  His  movement  was  unperceived 
by  the  French ,  the  retreat  was  made  in  good 
order;  and  the  two  severed  Enssian  armies  at  length 
effected  their  junction  at  a  point  three  hundred  miles 
distant  from  the  frontier. 

Napoleon,  disappointed  of  battle,  entered  Witepsk  on 
The  French  ^^^  cvenlng  after  the  Eussians  had  abandoned 
was  away.  .^  (July  28).  Barclay's  escape  was,  for  the 
French,  a  disaster  of  the  first  magnitude,  since  it  ex- 
tinguished all  hope  of  crushing  the  larger  of  the  two 
Eussian  armies  by  overwhelming  numbers  in  one  great 
and  decisive  engagement.  The  march  of  the  French 
during  the  last  twelve  days  showed  at  what  cost  every 
further  step  must  be  made.  Since  quitting  Wilna  the 
50,000  sick  and  stragglers  had  risen  to  100,000.  Fever 
and  disease  struck  down  whole  regiments.  The  provision- 
ing of  the  army  was  beyond  all  human  power.  Of  the 
200,000  men  who  still  remained,  it  might  almost  be 
calculated  in  how  many  weeks  the  last  would  perish.  So 
fearful  was  the  prospect  that  Napoleon  himself  thought 
of  abandoning  any  further  advance  until  the  next  year, 
and  of  permitting  the  army  to  enter  into  winter-quarters 
upon  the  Dwina.  But  the  conviction  that  all  Eussian 
resistance  would  end  with  the  capture  of  Moscow  hurried 
him  on.  The  army  left  Witepsk  on  the  13th  of  August, 
and  followed  the  Eussians  to  Smolensko.  Here  the 
entire  Eussian  army  clamoured  for  battle.    Barclay  stood 


18ia.  THE  FRENCH  ENTER  8M0LEN8K0.  467 

alone  in  perceiving  the  necessity  for  retreat.  The  generals 

caballed  against  him ;  the  soldiers  were  on  the  point  of 

mutiny ;  the  Czar  himself  wrote  to  express  his  impatience 

for  an  attack  upon  the  French.      Barclay  nevertheless 

persisted  in  his  resolution  to  abandon  Smolensko.    He  so 

far  yielded  to  the  army  as  to  permit  the  rearguard  to 

engage  in  a  bloody  struggle  with  the  French 

when   they  assaulted   the   town;    but   the     smoiensko. 
•^  '  Aug.  la 

evacuation  was  completed  under  cover  of 
night ;  and  when  the  French  made  their  entrance  into 
Smolensko  on  the  next  morning  they  found  it  deserted  and 
in  ruins.  The  surrender  of  Smolensko  was  the  last  sacri- 
fice that  Barclay  could  extort  from  Eussian  pride.  He 
no  longer  opposed  the  universal  cry  for  battle,  and  the 
retreat  was  continued  only  with  the  intention  of  halting 
at  the  first  strong  position.  Barclay  himself  was  sur- 
veying a  battle-ground  when  he  heard  that  the  command 
had  been  taken  out  of  his  hands.  The  Czar  had  been 
forced  by  national  indignation  at  the  loss  of  Smolensko 
to  remove  this  able  soldier,  who  was  a  Livo- 
nian  by  birth,  and  to  transfer  the  command  seded  ly  Kutp. 
to  Kutusoff,  a  thorough  Eussian,  whom  a 
life-time  spent  in  victories  over  the  Turk  had  made,  in 
spite  of  his  defeat  at  Austerlitz,  the  idol  of  the  nation. 

When  Kutusoff   reached  the  camp,  the  prolonged 
miseries  of  the  French  advance  had  already 
reduced  the  invaders  to  the  number  of  the     advance  from 

Smolenaka 

army  opposed  to  them.    As  far  as  Smolensko 

the  French  had  at  least  not  suffered  from  the  hostility  of 

the  population,  who  were  Poles,  not  Eussians ;  but  on 

E   E    2 


468  MODERN   EUROTB.  I812. 

reaching  Smolensko  they  entered  a  country  where  every 
peasant  was  a  fanatical  enemy.  The  villages  were  burnt 
down  by  their  inhabitants,  the  corn  destroyed,  and  the 
cattle  driven  into  the  woods.  Every  day's  march  onward 
from  Smolensko  cost  the  French  three  thousand  men. 
On  reaching  the  river  Moskwa  in  the  first  week  of 
September,  a  hundred  and  seventy-five  thousand  out  of 
Napoleon's  three  hundred  and  eighty  thousand  soldiers 
were  in  the  hospitals,  or  missing,  or  dead.  About  sixty 
thousand  guarded  the  line  of  march.  The  Eussians, 
on  the  other  hand,  had  received  reinforcements  which 
covered  their  losses  at  Smolensko ;  and  although  detach- 
ments had  been  sent  to  support  the  army  of  Eiga, 
Kutusoff  was  still  able  to  place  over  one  hundred 
thousand  men  in  the  field. 
X  On  the  5th  of  September  the  Eussian  army  drew  up 
for  battle  at  Borodino,  on  the  Moskwa,  seventy  miles 
west  of  the  capital.  At  early  morning  on  the  7th  the 
French  advanced  to  the  attack.  The  battle  was,  in  pro- 
portion to  its  numbers,  the  most  sanguinary  of  modern 
times.  Forty  thousand  French,  thirty  thousand  Eussians 
were  struck  down.  At  the  close  of  the  day  the  French 
were  in  possession  of  the  enemy's  ground,  but  the  Eus- 
Battie  of  Boro-  siaus,  uubrokcu  in  their  order,  had  only  re- 
treated to  a  second  line  of  defence.  Both 
sides  claimed  the  victory ;  neither  had  won  it.  It  was  no 
catastrophe  such  as  Napoleon  required  for  the  decision  of 
the  war ,  it  was  no  triumph  sufficient  to  save  Eussia  from 
the  necessity  of  abandoning  its  capital.  Kutusoff  had  sus- 
tained too  heavy  a  loss  to  face  the  French  beneath  the 


1812.  NAPOLEON  AT  MOSCOW.  469 

walls  of  Moscow.  Peace  was  no  nearer  for  the  70,000  men 
who  had  heen  killed  or  wounded  in  the  fight.  The  French 
steadily  advanced ;  the  Russians  retreated  to  Moscow,  and 
evacuated  the  capital  when  their  generals  decided  that 
they  could  not  encounter  the  French  assault.  The  Holy 
City  was  left  undefended  oefore  the  invader.  But  the 
departure  of  the  army  was  the  smallest  part  of  the  evac- 
uation. The  inhahitants,  partly  of  their  own  free  will, 
partly  under  the  compulsion  of  the  Governor,     _^ 

^  *'  ^  Eracuataon      of 

abandoned  the  city  in  a  mass.  No  gloomy  ^?S°^m^SI 
or  excited  crowd,  as  at  Vienna  and  Berlin, 
thronged  the  streets  to  witness  the  entrance  of  the  great 
conqueror,  when  on  the  14th  of  September  Napoleon  took 
possession  of  Moscow.  His  troops  marched  through  silent 
and  deserted  streets.  In  the  solitude  of  the  Kremlin 
Napoleon  received  the  homage  of  a  few  foreigners,  who 
alone  could  be  collected  by  his  servants  to  tender  to  him 
the  submission  of  the  city. 

But  the  worst  was  yet  to  come.  On  the  night  after 
Napoleon's  entry,  fires  broke  out  in  different 
parts  of  Moscow.  They  were  ascribed  at 
first  to  accident ;  but  when  on  the  next  day  the  French 
saw  the  flames  gaining  ground  in  every  direction,  and 
found  that  all  the  means  for  extinguishing  fire  had  been 
removed  from  the  city,  they  understood  the  doom  to 
which  Moscow  had  been  devoted  by  its  own  defenders. 
Count  Eostopchin,  the  governor,  had  determined  on  the 
destruction  of  Moscow  without  the  knowledge  of  the  Czar. 
The  doors  of  the  prisons  wg-e  thro>vn  open.  Eostopchin 
gave  the  signal  by  setting  fire  to  his  own  palace,  and  let 


470  MODBBN  EUROPE.  I812. 

loose  "his  bands  of  incendiaries  over  tlie  city.  For  five 
days  the  flames  rose  and  fell ;  and  when,  on  tlie  evening 
of  tlie  20tli,  tlie  last  fires  ceased,  three -fourtlis  of  Mos- 
cow lay  in  ruins. 

Such  was  the  prize  for  which  ^N^apoleon  had  sacrificed 
200,000  men,  and  engulfed  the  weak  remnant 

Napoleon      at  r>    1  •  •       1  1       1         -1  1 

Moscow.  Sept.       of  his  army  six  hundred  miles  deep  in  an 

14r-0ct  19.  "^  ^ 

enemy's  country.  Throughout  all  the  terrors 
of  the  advance  Napoleon  had  held  fast  to  the  belief  that 
Alexander's  resistance  would  end  with  the  fall  of  his 
capital.  The  events  that  accompanied  the  entry  of  the 
French  into  Moscow  shook  his  confidence ;  yet  even  now 
Napoleon  could  not  believe  that  the  Czar  remained  firm 
against  all  thoughts  of  peace.  His  experience  in  all  earlier 
wars  had  given  him  confidence  in  the  power  of  one  con- 
spicuous disaster  to  unhinge  the  resolution  of  kings. 
His  trust  in  the  deepening  impression  made  by  the  fall 
of  Moscow  was  fostered  by  negotiations  begun  by  Kutu- 
soff  for  the  very  purpose  of  delaying  the  French  retreat. 
For  fiye  weeks  Napoleon  remained  at  Moscow  as  if  spell- 
bound, unable  to  convince  himself  of  his  powerlessness  to 
break  Alexander's  determination,  unable  to  face  a  retreat 
which  would  display  to  all  Europe  the  failure  of  his  arms 
and  the  termination  of  his  career  of  victory.  At  length 
the  approach  of  winter  forced  him  to  action.  It  was  im- 
possible to  provision  the  army  at  Moscow  during  the 
winter  months,  even  if  there  had  been  nothing  to  fear  from 
the  enemy.  Even  the  mocking  overtures  of  Kutusoff  had 
ceased.  The  frightful  reality  could  no  longer  be  concealed. 
On  the  19th  of  October  the  order  for  retreat  was  given. 


isa  RETREAT  FROM  M0800W.  471 

It  was  not  the  destruction  of  Moscow,  but  the  departure 
of  its  inhabitants,  that  had  brought  the  conqueror  to  ruin. 
Above  two  thousand  houses  were  still  standing;  but 
whether  the  buildings  remained  or  perished  made  little 
difference ;  the  whole  value  of  the  capital  to  Napoleon  was 
lost  when  the  inhabitants,  whom  he  could  have  forced  to 
procure  supplies  for  his  army,  disappeared.  Vienna  and 
Berlin  had  been  of  such  incalculable  service  to  Napoleon 
because  the  whole  native  administration  placed  itself 
under  his  orders,  and  every  rich  and  important  citizen 
became  a  hostage  for  the  activity  of  the  rest.  When 
the  French  gained  Moscow,  they  gained  nothing  beyond 
the  supplies  which  were  at  that  moment  in  the  city.  All 
was  lost  to  Napoleon  when  the  class  who  in  other  capitals 
had  been  his  instruments  fled  at  his  approach.  The  con- 
flagration of  Moscow  acted  upon  all  Europe  as  a  signal 
of  inextinguishable  national  hatred  ;  as  a  military  opera- 
tion, it  neither  accelerated  the  retreat  of  Napoleon  nor 
added  to  the  miseries  which  his  army  had  to  undergo. 

The  French  forces  which  quitted  Moscow  in  October 
numbered  about  100,000  men.  Eeinforce-  Napoieon  leave* 
ments  had  come  in  during  the  occupation  of 
the  city,  and  the  health  of  the  soldiers  had  been  in  some 
degree  restored  by  a  month's  rest.  Everything  now  de- 
pended upon  gaining  a  line  of  retreat  where  food  could 
be  found.  Though  but  a  fourth  part  of  the  army  which 
entered  Eussia  in  the  summer,  the  army  which  left  Mos- 
cow was  still  large  enough  to  protect  itself  against  the 
enemy,  if  allowed  to  retreat  through  a  fresh  country ;  if 
forced  back  upon  the  devastiited  line  of  its  advance  it  was 


472  MODERN'  JSUBOPB.  18I2. 

impossible  for  it  to  escape  destruction.  Napoleon  there- 
fore determined  to  make  for  Kaluga,  on  tlie  south  of  Mos- 
cow, and  to  endeavour  to  gain  a  road  to  Smolensko  far 
distant  from  that  bj  wbicb  be  bad  come.  Tbe  army- 
moved  from  Moscow  in  a  southern  direction.  But  its 
route  had  been  foreseen  by  Kutusoff .  At  the  end  of  four 
days'  march  it  was  met  by  a  Eussian  corps  at  Jaroslavitz. 
A  bloody  struggle  left  the  French  in  possession  of  the 
road :  they  continued  their  advance ;  but  it  was  only  to 
j5nd  that  Kutusoff,  with  his  full  strength,  had  occupied  a 
line  of  heights  farther  south,  and  barred  the  wiay  to 
Kaluga.  The  effort  of  an  assault  was  beyond  the  powers 
of  the   French.      Napoleon    surveyed    the 

Forced  to  retreat  ,  ...  ,  •in  c    i    i 

by  the  same  eucmy  s  positiou,  and  recognised  the  latal 
necessity  of  abandoning  the  march  south- 
wards and  returning  to  the  wasted  road  by  which  he  had 
advanced.  The  meaning  of  the  backward  movement  was 
quickly  understood  by  the  army.  From  the  moment  of 
quitting  Jaroslavitz,  disorder  and  despair  increased  with 
every  march.  Thirty  thousand  men  were  lost  upon  the 
road  before  a  pursuer  appeared  in  sight.  When,  on  the 
2nd  of  November,  the  army  reached  Wiazma,  it  num- 
bered no  more  than  65,000  men.  ^ 

KutusofE  was  unadventurous  in  pursuit.  The 
Kntasoflfouows  ncccssity  of  moviug  his  army  along  a 
bypaxaueiroad.     pg^j.g^^g][  j.^^  south  of  tho  Freuch,  iu  ordcr 

to  avoid  starvation,  diminished  the  opportunities  for 
attack;  but  the  general  himself  disliked  risking  his 
forces,  and  preferred  to  see  the  enemy's  destruction 
effected  by  the  elements.     At  Wiazma,  where,  on  the 


1812.  THE  FBENOE  AT  SMOLENSKO.  473 

3rd  of  November,  tlie  Frencli  were  for  the  first  time 
attacked  in  force,  Kutusoff's  own  delay  alone  saved  them 
from  total  ruin.  In  spite  of  heavy  loss  the  French  kept 
possession  of  the  road,  and  secured  their  retreat  to  Smo- 
lensko,  where  stores  of  food  had  been  accumulated,  and 
where  other  and  less  exhausted  French  troops  were  at  hand. 
Up  to  ,the  6th  of  November  the  weather  had  been 
sunny   and  dry.      On   the   Gth   the   lon^- 

J  J  o         prort.    Not.  6. 

delayed  terrors  of  Eussian  winter  broke 
upon  the  pursuers  and  the  pursued.  Snow  darkened 
the  air,  and  hid  the  last  traces  of  vegetation  from  the 
starving  cavalry  trains.  The  temperature  sank  at  times 
to  forty  degrees  of  frost.  Death  came,  sometimes  in  the 
unfelt  release  from  misery,  sometimes  in  horrible  forms 
of  mutilation  and  disease.  Both  armies  were  exposed  to 
the  same  sufferings ;  but  the  Eussians  had  at  least  such 
succour  as  their  countrymen  could  give :  where  the 
French  sank,  they  died.  The  order  of  war  disappeared 
under  conditions  which  made  life  itself  the  accident  of  a 
meal  or  of  a  place  by  the  camp-fire.  Though  most  of 
the  French  soldiery  continued  to  carry  their 
arms,  the  Guard  alone  kept  its  separate  smoientko. 
formation ;  the  other  regiments  marched  in 
confused  masses.  From  the  9th  to  the  13th  of  Novem- 
ber these  starving  bands  arrived  one  after  another  at 
Smolensko,  expecting  that  here  their  sufferings  would 
end.  But  the  organisation  for  distributing  the  stores 
accumulated  in  Smolensko  no  longer  existed.  The 
perishing  crowds  were  left  to  find  shelter  where  they 
could ;  sacks  of  corn  were  thrown  to  them  for  food. 


474  MODERN  EUEOPB.  I812 

It  was  impossible  for  Napoleon  to  give  his  wearied 
Russian  armies  soldiers  rest,  £or  new  Russian  armies  were 
south  attempt  to     advancino^  from  the  north  and  the  south  to 

cut    off    Frencli  O 

retreat.  ^^^  ^£p  ^l^^l^  retreat.     From  the  Danube  and 

from  the  Baltic  Sea  troops  were  pressing  forward  to  their 
meeting-point  upon  the  rear  of  the  invader.  Witgen- 
stein,  moving  southwards  at  the  head  of  the  army  of  the 
Dwina,  had  overpowered  the  French  corps  stationed 
upon  that  river,  and  made  himself  master  of  Witepsk. 
The  army  of  Bucharest,  which  had  been  toiling  north- 
wards ever  since  the  beginning  of  August,  had  advanced 
to  within  a  few  days'  march  of  its  meeting-point  with 
the  army  of  the  Dwina  upon  the  line  of  Napoleon's 
communications.  Before  Napoleon  reached  Smolensko 
he  sent  orders  to  Victor,  who  was  at  Smolensko  with 
some  reserves,  to  march  against  Witgenstein  and  drive 
him  back  upon  the  Dwina.  Yictor  set  out  on  his 
mission.  During  the  short  halt  of ,  Napoleon  in  Smo- 
lensko, Kutusoff  pushed  forward  to  the  west  of  the 
KrasnoL  Frcuch,  and  took  post  at  Ejrasnoi,  thirty 

miles  farther  along  the  road  by  which 
Napoleon  had  to  pass.  The  retreat  of  the  French 
seemed  to  be  actually  cut  off.  Had  the  Eussian  general 
dared  to  face  Napoleon  and  his  Guards,  he  might  have 
held  the  French  in  check  until  the  arrival  of  the 
two  auxiliary  armies  from  the  north  and  south  enabled 
him  to  capture  Napoleon  and  his  entire  force.  Kutusoff, 
however,  preferred  a  partial  and  certain  victory  to  a 
struggle  with  Napoleon  for  life  or  death.  He  permitted 
Napoleon  and  the  Guard  to  pass  by  unattacked,  and 


1B12.  PASSAGE  OF  THE  BEBESINA.  476 

then  fell  upon  tlie  hinder  divisions  of  the  French  army. 
,(Nov.  17.)  These  unfortunate  troops  were  successively 
cut  to  pieces.  Twenty-six  thousand  were  made  prisoners. 
Ney,  with  a  part  of  the  rear-guard,  only  escaped  by 
crossing  the  Dnieper  on  the  ice.  Of  the  army  that  had 
quitted  Moscow  there  now  remained  but  10,000  com- 
batants and  20,000  followers.  Kutusoff  himself  was 
brought  to  such  a  state  of  exhaustion  that  he  could 
carry  the  pursuit  no  further,  and  entered  into  quarters 
upon  the  Dnieper. 

It  was  a  few  days  after  the  battle  at  Kjrasnoi  that 
the  divisions  of  Victor,  coming  from  the  victor  iomaNa. 
direction  of  the  Dwina,  suddenly  encoun-  ^**°* 

tered  the  remnant  of  Napoleon's  army.  Though  aware 
that  Napoleon  was  in  retreat,  they  knew  nothing  of  the 
calamities  that  had  befallen  him,  and  were  struck  with 
amazement  when,  in  the  middle  of  a  forest,  they  met 
with  what  seemed  more  like  a  miserable  troop  of  captives 
than  an  army  upon  the  march.  Victor's  soldiers  of 
a  mere  auxiliary  corps  found  themselves  more  than 
double  the  effective  strength  of  the  whole  army  of 
Moscow.  Their  arrival  again  placed  Napoleon  at  the 
head,  of  30,000  disciplined  troops,  and  gave  the  French 
a  gleam  of  victory  in  the  last  and  seemingly  most 
hopeless  struggle  in  the  campaign.  Admiral  Tchit- 
chagoff,  in  command  of  the  army  marching  from  the 
Danube,  had  at  length  reached  the  line  of  Napoleon's 
retreat,  and  established  himself  at  Borisov,  where  the 
road  tlirough  Poland  crosses  the  river  Beresina.  The 
bridge  was  destroyed  by  the  Russians,  and  Tchitchagoff 


476  MODERN  EUROPE.  I812. 

opened  comimiiiicatioii  with  Witgenstein's  army,  which 
lay  only  a  few  miles  to  the  noii^h.  It  appeared  as  if  the 
retreat  of  the  French  was  now  finally  intercepted,  and 
the  surrender  of  Napoleon  inevitahle.  Yet  even  in  this 
hopeless  situation  the  military  skill  and  daring  of  the 
French  worked  with  something  of  its  ancient  power. 
The  army  reached  the  Beresina ;  Napoleon  succeeded  in 

withdrawing  the  enemy  from  the  real  point 
Beresina.  Nov.     of  passagc ;  bridgcs  wcrc  thrown  across  the 

river,  and  after  desperate  fighting  a  great 
part  of  the  army  made  good  its  footing  upon  the  western 
hank  (Nov.  28).  But  the  losses  even  among  the  effec- 
tive troops  were  enormous.  The  fate  of  the  miserable 
crowd  that  followed  them,  torn  by  the  cannon-fire  of  the 
Eussians,  and  precipitated  into  the  river  by  the  breaking 
of  one  of  the  bridges,  has  made  the  passage  of  the 
Beresina  a  synonym  for  the  utmost  degree  of  human 
woe. 

This  was  the  last  engagement  fought  by  the  army. 
The  Gruards  still  preserved  their  order;  Marshal  Ney 
still  found  soldiers  capable  of  turning  upon  the  pursuer 
with  his  own  steady  and  unflagging  courage ;  but  the 
bulk  of  the  army  struggled  forward  in  confused  crowds, 
harassed  by  the  Cossacks,  and  laying  down  their  arms 
by  thousands  before  the  enemy.  The  frost,  which  had 
broken  up  on  the  19th,  returned  on  the  30th  of  Novem- 
ber with  even  greaj!:er  severity.  Twenty  thousand  fresh 
troops  which  joined  the  army  between  the  Beresina  and 
Wilna  scarcely  arrested  the  process  of  dissolution.  On 
the  3rd  of  December  Napoleon  (juitted  the  army.     Wilna 


1812.  THE  FllENOH  BEACH  THE  NIEMEN.  ill 

itself  was  abandoned  with  all  its  stores ;  and  when  at 
length  the  fugitives  reached  the  Niemen,  French  wach the 
they  numbered  little  more  than  twenty  ^»®"«^^^"»- 
thousand.  Here,  six  months  earlier,  three  hundred  and 
eighty  thousand  men  had  crossed  with  Napoleon.  A. 
hundred  thousand  more  had  joined  the  army  in  the 
course  of  its  retreat.  Of  all  this  host,  not  the  twentieth 
part  reached  the  Prussian  frontier.  A  hundred  and 
seventy  thousand  remained  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the 
Russians ;  a  greater  number  had  perished.  Of  the  twenty 
thousand  men  who  now  beheld  the  Niemen,  probably 
not  seven  thousand  had  crossed  with  Napoleon.  In  the 
presence  of  a  catastrophe  so  overwhelming  and  so  un- 
paralleled the  Russian  generals  might  well  be  content 
with  their  own  share  in  the  work  of  destruction.  Yet 
the  event  proved  that  Kutusoff  had  done  ill  in  sparing 
the  extremest  effort  to  capture  or  annihilate  his  foe.  Not 
only  was  Napoleon's  own  escape  the  pledge  of  continued 
war,  but  the  remnant  that  escaped  with  him  possessed  a 
military  value  out  of  all  proportion  to  its  insignificant 
numbers.  The  best  of  the  army  were  the  last  to  suc- 
cumb. Out  of  those  few  thousands  who  endured  to  the 
end,  a  very  large  proportion  were  veteran  officers,  who 
immediately  took  their  place  at  the  head  of  Napoleon's 
newly-raised  armies,  and  gave  to  them  a  military  effi- 
ciency soon  to  be  bitterly  proved  by  Europe  on  many  a 
German  battle-field. 

Four  hundred  thousand  men  were  lost  to  a  conqueror 
who  could  still  stake  the  lives  of  half  a  million  more. 
The  material  power  of  Napoleon,  though  largely,  wad 


478  MODERN'  EUROPE,  I812. 

not  fatally  diminislied  by  tlie  Eussian  campaign ;  it  was 
tlirougli  its  moral  effect,  first  proved  in  the  action  of 
Prussia,  that  the  retreat  from  Moscow  created  a  new 
order  of  things  in  Europe.  The  Prussian  contingent, 
commanded  by  General  von  York,  lay  in  front  of  Eiga, 
where  it  formed  part  of  the  French  subsidiary  army- 
corps  led  by  Marshal  Macdonald.  Early  in  November 
the  Eussian  governor  of  Eiga  addressed  himself  to  York, 
assuring  him  that  Napoleon  was  ruined,  and  soliciting 
York  himself  to  take  up  arms  against  Mac- 
Prussian  contin-     douald.*      York   had   no  evidence,  beyond 

gent  at  Riga.  ** 

the  word  of  the  Eussian  commander,  of  the 
extent  of  Napoleon's  losses ;  and  even  if  the  facts  were 
as  stated,  it  was  by  no  means  clear  that  the  Czar  might 
not  be  inclined  to  take  vengeance  on  Prussia  on  account 
of  its  alliance  with  Napoleon.  York  returned  a  guarded 
answer  to  the  Eussian,  and  sent  an  ofiicer  to  Wilna  to  as- 
certain the  real  state  of  the  French  army.  On  the  8th  of 
December  the  o£B.cer  returned,  and  described  what  he  had 
himself  seen.  Soon  afterwards  the  Eussian  commandant 
produced  a  letter  from  the  Czar,  declaring  his  intention 
to  deal  with  Prussia  as  a  friend,  not  as  an  enemy.  On 
these  points  all  doubt  was  removed ;  York's  decision 
was  thrown  upon  himseK.  York  was  a  rigid  soldier  of 
the  old  Prussian  type,  dominated  by  the  idea  of  military 
duty.  The  act  to  which  the  Eussian  commander  invited 
him,  and  which  the  younger  officers  were  ready  to  hail 
as  the  Kberation  of  Prussia,  might  be  branded  by  his 
sovereign  as  desertion  and  treason.  Whatever  scruples 
•  Droysen,  Leben  des  Grafen  York.    L,  394. 


1812.  YORICS  CONVENTION  WITH  THE  RUSSIANS.     479 

and  perplexity  might  be  felt  in  such  a  situation  by  a 
loyal  and  obedient  soldier  were  felt  by  York.  He  never- 
theless chose  the  course  which  seemed  to  be  for  his 
country's  good ;  and  having  chosen  it,  he  accepted  all 
the  consequences  which  it  involved.    On  the 

■*•  York's    conven- 

30th  of  December  a  convention  was  signed     R^LaS?'  i^! 

80 

at  Tauroggen,  which,  under  the  guise  of  a 
truce,  practically  withdrew  the  Prussian  army  from 
Napoleon,  and  gave  the  Eussians  possession  of  Konigs- 
berg.  The  momentous  character  of  the  act  was  recog- 
nised by  Napoleon  as  soon  as  the  news  reached  Paris. 
York's  force  was  the  strongest  military  body  upon  the 
Eussian  frontier ;  united  with  Macdonald,  it  would  have 
forced  the  Eussian  pursuit  to  stop  at  the  Niemen ;  aban- 
doning Napoleon,  it  brought  his  enemies  on  to  the  Vistula, 
and  threatened  incalculable  danger  by  its  example  to  all 
the  rest  of  Germany.  For  the  moment,  however,  Napo- 
leon could  count  upon  the  spiritless  obedience  of  King 
Frederick  William.  In  the  midst  of  the  French  regi- 
ments that  garrisoned  Berlin,  the  King  wrote  orders 
pronouncing  York's  convention  null  and  void,  and 
ordering  York  himself  to  be  tried  by  court-martial.  The 
news  reached  the  loyal  soldier :  he  received  it  with  grief, 
but  maintained  his  resolution  to  act  for  his  country's 
good.  "  With  bleeding  heart,"  he  wrote,  "  I  burst  the 
bond  of  obedience,  and  carry  on  the  war  upon  my  own 
responsibility.  The  army  desires  war  with  France ; 
the  nation  desires  it;  the  King  himself  desires  it, 
but  his  will  is  not  free.  The  army  must  make  his  will 
free." 


480  MOBEEN  EUIWFE.  1813. 

York's  act  was  nothing  less  tlian  tlie  turning-point 
in  Prussian  history.     Another  Prussian,  at 

The  Czar    and  ^    ^  '' 

Stein.  ^]^jg  great  crisis  of  Europe,  played  as  great, 
though  not  SQ  conspicuous,  a  part.  Before  the  outbreak 
of  the  Eussian  war,  the  Czar  had  requested  the  exile 
Stein  to  come  to  St.  Petersburg  to  aid  him  with  his 
counsels  during  the  struggle  with  Napoleon.  Stein 
gladlj  accepted  the  call ;  and  throughout  the  campaign 
he  encouraged  the  Czar  in  the  resolute  resistance  which 
the  Eussian  nation  itseK  required  of  its  Grovernment.  So 
long  as  French  soldiers  reiHained  on  Eussian  soil,  there 
was  indeed  little  need  for  a  foreigner  to  stimulate  the 
Czar's  energies ;  but  when  the  pursuit  had  gloriously 
ended  on  the  Niemen,  the  case  became  very  different. 
Kutusoff  and  the  generals  were  disinclined  to  carry  the 
war  into  G^many.  The  Eussian  army  had  itself  lost 
three -fourths  of  its  numbers ;  Eussian  honour  was  satis- 
fied ;  the  liberation  of  Western  Europe  might  be  left  to 
Western  Europe  itseK.  Among  the  politicians  who  sur- 
rounded Alexander,  there  were  a  considerable  number, 
including  the  first  minister  Eomanzoff,  who  still  believed 
in  the  good  policy  of  a  French  alliance.  These  were  the 
influences  with  which  Stein  had  to  contend,  when  the 
question  arose  whether  Eussia  should  rest  satisfied  with 
its  own  victories,  or  summon  all  Europe  to  unite  in  over- 
throwing Napoleon's  tyranny.  No  record  remains  of 
the  stages  by  which  Alexander's  mind  rose  to  the  clear 
and  firm  conception  of  a  single  European  interest  against 
Napoleon ;  indications  exist  that  it  was  Stein's  personal 
influence  which  mo^  largely  affected  his  decision.   Even 


1813.  STEIN  RAISES  EAST  PRUSSIA  481 

in  the  darkest  moments  of  the  war,  when  the  forces  of 
Eussia  seemed  wholly  incapable  of  checking  Napoleon's 
advance,  Stein  had  never  abandoned  his  scheme  for  raising 
the  German  nation  against  Napoleon.  The  confidence 
with  which  he  had  assured  Alexander  of  ultimate  victory 
over  the  invader  had  been  thoroughly  justified ;  the  tri- 
umph which  he  had  predicted  had  come  with  a  rapidity 
and  completeness  even  sui-passing  his  hopes.  For  a 
moment  Alexander  identified  himself  with  the  statesman 
who,  in  the  midst  of  Germany's  humiliation,  had  been  so 
resolute,  so  far-sighted,  so  Aspiring.*  The  minister  of 
the  peace-party  was  dismissed :    Alexander 

1  ji'i  J  T  'J       T~»  •  Alexander  en- 

oraered  his  troops  to  advance  mto  rrussia,     tere    Prussia. 

^  '        Jan.,  1813. 

and  charged  Stein  himself  to  assume  the 
government  of  the  Prussian  districts  occupied  by  Eussian 
armies.  Stein's  mission  was  to  arm  the  Landwelir,  and 
to  gather  all  the  resources  of  the  country  for  war  against 
France  ;  his  powers  were  to  continue  until  some  definite 
arrangement  should  be  made  between  the  King  of 
Prussia  and  the  Czar. 

Armed  with  this  commission  from  a  foreign  sovereign. 
Stein  appeared  at  Konigsberg  on  the  22nd  of  January, 
1818,  and  published  an  order  requiring  the 
governor  of  the  province  of  East  Prussia  to     won fJomAiex 


convoke  an  assembly  for  the  purpose  of  ann- 
ing   the   people.     Stein   would   have  desired   York  to 
appear  as  President  of  the  Assembly;   but  York,  like 
most  of  the  Prussian  oSicials,  was  alarmed  and  indig- 
nant at  Stein's  assumption  of  power  in  Prussia  ;is  the 

*  Pertz,  iii  211,  »eq.    Seeley,  iii  21. 
F  F 


482  MOBEBN  EUROPE.  1813 

representative  of  tlie  Eussian  Czar,  and  hesitated  to  con- 
nect himself  with  so  revolutionary  a  measure  as  the 
arming  of  the  people.  It  was  only  upon  condition  that 
Stein  himself  should  not  appear  in  the  Assembly  that 
York  consented  to  recognise  its  powers.  The  Assembly 
met.  York  entered  the  house,  and  spoke  a  few  soul- 
stirring  words.  His  undisguised  declaration  of  war  with 
France  was  received  with  enthusiastic  cheers.  A  plan  for 
the  formation  of  a  Landwehr,  based  on  Scharnhorst's 
plans  of  1808,  was  laid  before  the  Assembly,  and  accepted. 
Forty  thousand-  men  were  called  to  arms  in 

Province  of  East  .  .^^^_  .  ir»,i 

Prussia  arms,  a  provuicc  wnich  included  nothing  west  oi  the 
Vistula.  The  nation  itself  had  begun  the 
war,  and  left  its  Grovernment  no  choice  but  to  follow. 
Stein's  task  was  fulfilled ,  and  he  retired  to  the  quarters 
of  Alexander,  unwilling  to  mar  by  the  appearance  of 
foreign  intervention  the  work  to  which  the  Prussian 
nation  had  now  committed  itself  beyond  power  of  recall. 
It  was  the  fortune  of  the  Prussian  State,  while  its  King 
dissembled  before  the  French  in  Berlin,  to  possess  a  soldier 
brave  enough  to  emancipate  its  army,  and  a  citizen  bold 
enough  to  usurp  the  government  of  its  provinces. 
Frederick  William  forgave  York  his  intrepidity ;  Stein's 
action  was  never  forgiven  by  the  timid  and  jealous 
sovereign  whose  subjects  he  had  summoned  to  arm  them- 
selves for  their  country's  deliverance. 

The  Grovernment  of  Berlin,  which  since  the  begin- 
ning of  the  Eevolutionary  War  had  neither  been  able 
to  fight,  nor  to  deceive,  nor  to  be  honest,  was  at  length 
forced  by  circumstances  into  a  certain  effectiveness  in 


1813.  TREATY  OF  KALiaCH.  483 

all  three  forms  of  action.  In  tlie  interval  between 
the  first  tidings  of  Napoleon's  disasters  and  the  an- 
nouncement of  York's  convention  with  the 

Policv  of   Har- 

Russians,    Hardenberg   had   been    assuring         denbergr. 
Napoleon  of  his  devotion,  and  collecting  troops  which  he 
carefully  prevented  from  joining  him.*     The  desire  of 
the  King  was  to  gain  concessions  without  taking  part  in 
the  war  either  against  Napoleon  or  on  his  side.     When, 
however,   the   balance   turned   more   decidedly   against 
Napoleon,  he  grew   bolder;    and   the   news  of  York's 
defection,  though  it  seriously  embarrassed  the  Cabinet 
for  the  moment,  practically  decided  it  in  favour  of  war 
with  France.     The  messenger  who  was  sent  to  remove 
York  from  his  command  received  private  instructions  to 
fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Russians,  and  to  inform  the 
Czar  that,  if  his  troops  advanced  as  far  as  the  Oder, 
King  Frederick  William  would  be  ready  to  conclude  an 
alliance.      Every  post  that  arrived  from  East  Prussia 
strengthened  the  warlike  resolutions  of  the  Government. 
At  length  the  King  ventured  on  the  decisive  step  of 
quitting  Berlin  and  placing  himself  at  Breslau  (Jan.  25). 
At  Berlin  he  was  in  the  power  of  the  French ;  at  Breslau 
he  was  within  easy  reach  of  Alexander.    The  significance 
of  the  journey  could  not  be  mistaken :  it  was  imme- 
diately followed  by  open  prepiuntion  for  war  with  France. 
On  February  3rd  there  appeared  an  edict  inviting  volun- 
teers to  enrol  themselves :  a  week  later  all  exemptions 
from  military  service  were  abolished,  and  the  entire  male 
population  of   Prussia   between  the  ages  of  seventeen 

•  Ouckeu,  Oestwreich  und  Preosseu,  i.  28. 
P  F   2 


484  MODERN  EUBOFE.  1813. 

and  twenty-four  was  declared  liable  to  serve.  General 
Knesebeck  was  sent  to  tbe  headquarters  of  tbe  Czar,  wbicb 
were  now  between  Warsaw  and  Kaliscb,  to  conclude  a 
treaty  of  alliance.  Knesebeck  demanded  securities  for 
the  restoration  to  Prussia  of  all  the  Polish  territory 
which  it  had  possessed  before  1806 ;  the  Czar,  unwilling 
either  to  grant  this  condition  or  to  lose  the  Prussian 
alliance,  kept  Knesebeck  at  his  quarters,  and  sent  Stein 
with  a  Eussian  plenipotentiary  to  Breslau  to  conclude  the 
treaty  with  Hardenberg  himself.  Stein  and  Hardenberg 
met  at  Breslau  on  the  26th  February.  Hardenberg 
accepted  the  Czar's  terms,  and  the  treaty, 
lisch.  Feb.  27.  ]jnown  as  the  Treaty  of  Kalisch,*  was  signed 
on  the  following  day.  By  this  treaty,  without  guaran- 
teeing the  restoration  of  Prussian  Poland,  Eussia  under- 
took not  to  lay  down  its  arms  until  the  Prussian  State 
as  a  whole  was  restored  to  the  area  and  strength  which 
it  had  possessed  before  1806.  Por  this  purpose  annexa- 
tions were  promised  in  Northern  Grermany.  With  regard 
to  Poland,  Eussia  promised  no  more  than  to  permit 
Prussia  to  retain  what  it  had  received  in  1772,  together 
with  a  strip  of  territory  to  connect  this  district  with 
Silesia.  The  meaning  of  the  agreement  was  that  Prussia 
should  abandon  to  Eussia  the  greater  part  of  its  late 
Polish  provinces,  and  receive  an  equivalent  German  terri- 
tory in  its  stead.  The  Treaty  of  Kalisch  vixtuaUy  sur- 
rendered to  the  Czar  all  that  Prussia  had  gained  in  the 
partitions  of  Poland  made  in  1793  and  in  1795.      The 

*  Martens,    N.  R.,    EEL    234.    British  and    Foreign   State   Papers 
(Hertslet),  i.  49. 


1813.  TREATY  OF  KALISCH.  485 

sacrifice  was  deemed  a  most  severe  one  by  every  Prussian 
politician,  and  was  accepted  only  as  a  less  evil  tlian  the 
loss  of  Eussia's  friendship,  and  a  renewed  submission  to 
Napoleon.  No  single  statesman,  not  even  Stein  himself, 
appears  to  have  understood  that  in  exchanging  its  Polish 
conquests  for  German  annexations,  in  turning  to  the 
German  west  instead  of  to  the  alien  Slavonic  east,  Prussia 
was  in  fact  taking  the  very  step  which  made  it  the  pos- 
sible head  of  a  future  united  Germany. 

War  was  still  not  declared  upon  Napoleon  by  King 
Frederick  WiQiam,  but  throughout  the  month  of  Feb- 
ruary the  light  cavalry  of  the  Eussians  pushed  forward 
unhindered  through  Prussian  territory  towards  the 
Oder,  and  crowds  of  volunteers,  marching  through  Ber- 
lin on  their  way  to  the  camps  in  Silesia,  gave  the  French 
clear  signs  of  the  storm  that  was  about  to  burst  upon 
them.*  The  remnant  of  Napoleon's  army,  now  com- 
manded by  Eugene  Beauharnais,  had  fallen 
back  step  by  step  to  the  Oder.  Here,  rest-  ^to*SieSS** 
ing  on  the  fortresses,  it  might  probably 
have  checked  the  Eussian  advance  :  but  the  heart  of 
Eugene  failed;  the  line  of  the  Oder  was  abandoned, 
and  the  retreat  continued  to  Berlin  and  the  Elbe. 
The  Cossacks  followed.  On  the  20th  of  February  they 
actually  entered  Berlin  and  fought  with  the  French  in 
the  streets.  The  French  gaiTison  was  far  superior  in 
force ;  but  the  appearance  of  the  Cossacks  caused  such 
a  ferment  that,  although  the  alliance  between  France 
and  Prussia  was  still  in  nominal  existence,  the  French 

*  For  Bresl&u  in  February,  see  Steffuus,  7.  68L 


486  MODERN  EUROPE.  I8I8. 

troops  expected  to  be  cut  to  pieces  by  tbe  people.  For 
some  days  tbey  continued  to  bivouac  in  tbe  streets,  and 
as  soon  as  it  became  known  tbat  a  regular  Eussian 
force  bad  reacbed  tbe  Oder,  Eugene  determined  to 
evacuate  Berlin.  On  tbe  4tb  of  Marcb  tbe  last  Frencb 
soldier  quitted  tbe  Prussian  capital.  Tbe  Cossacks  rode 
tbrougb  tbe  town  as  tbe  Frencb  left  it,  and  fougbt  witb 
tbeir  rear-guard.  Some  days  later  Witgenstein  appeared 
witb  Eussian  infantry.  On  Marcb  17tb  York  made  bis 
triumpbal  entry  at  tbe  bead  of  bis  corps,  bimself  cold  and 
rigid  in  tbe  midst  of  tumultuous  outbursts  of  patriotic  joy. 
It  was  on  tbis  same  day  tbat  King  Frederick  William 

issued  bis  proclamation  to  tbe  Prussian 
declares  wl^     pcoplc,  declaring  tbat  war  bad  begun  witb 

France,  and  summoning  tbe  nation  to  enter 
upon  tbe  struggle  as  one  tbat  must  end  eitber  in  victory 
or  in  total  destruction.  Tbe  proclamation  was  sucb  as 
became  a  monarcb  conscious  tbat  bis  own  faint-bearted- 
ness  bad  been  tbe  principal  cause  of  Prussia's  bumilia- 
tion.  It  was  simple  and  unboastful,  admitting  tbat  tbe 
King  bad  made  every  effort  to  preserve  tbe  Frencb 
alliance,  and  ascribing  tbe  necessity  for  war  to  tbe  in- 
tolerable wrongs  inflicted  by  Napoleon  in  spite  of 
Prussia's  fulfilment  of  its  treaty-obligations.  Tbe  ap- 
peal to  tbe  great  memories  of  Prussia's  earlier  sovereigns, 
and  to  tbe  example  of  Eussia,  Spain,  and  all  countries 
wbicb  in  present  or  in  earlier  times  bad  fougbt  for  tbeir 
independence  against  a  stronger  foe,  was  wortby  of  tbe 
trutbful  and  modest  tone  in  wbicb  tbe  King  spoke  of 
tbe  misfortunes  of  Prussia  under  bis  own  rule. 


laia.  IDEA  OF  QEEMAN  UNITY.  487 

But  no  exhortations  were  necessary  to  fire  the  spirit 
of  the  Prussian  people.  Seven  years  of  spirit  of  the 
suffering  and  humiliation  had  done  their 
work.  The  old  apathy  of  all  classes  had  vanished  under 
the  pressure  of  a  bitter  sense  of  wrong.  If  among  the 
Court  party  of  Berlin  and  the  Conservative  landowners 
there  existed  a  secret  dread  of  the  awakening  of  popular 
forces,  the  suspicion  could  not  be  now  avowed.  A  move- 
ment as  penetrating  and  as  universal  as  that  which 
France  had  experienced  in  1792  swept  through  the 
Prussian  State.  It  had  required  the  experience  of  years 
of  wretchedness,  the  intrusion  of  the  French  soldier 
upon  the  peace  of  the  family,  the  sight  of  the  homestead 
swept  bare  of  its  stock  to  supply  the  invaders  of  Eussia, 
the  memory  of  Schill's  companions  shot  in  cold  blood 
for  the  cause  of  the  Fatherland,  before  the  Prussian 
nation  caught  that  flame  which  had  spontaneously  burst 
out  in  France,  in  Spain,  and  in  Eussia  at  the  first  shock 
of  foreign  aggression.  But  the  passion  of  the  Prussian 
people,  if  it  had  taken  long  to  kindle,  was  deep,  stead- 
fast, and  rational.  It  was  undisgraced  by  the  frenzies 
of  1792,  or  by  the  religious  fanaticism  of  the  Spanish 
war  of  liberation;  wliere  religion  entered  into  the 
struggle,  it  heightened  the  spirit  of  seK-sacrifice  rather 
than  that  of  hatred  to  the  enemy.  Nor  was  it  a  thing 
of  small  moment  to  the  future  of  Europe 

'■  Idea  of  Gemuui 

that   in   every  leading  mind   the  cause  of  "^'^• 

Prussia  was  identified  with  the  cause  of  the  whole  Ger- 
man race.  The  actual  condition  of  Germany  warranted 
no  such  conclusion,  for  Saxony,  Bavaria,  and  the  whole 


488  MODERN  EUROPE.  I813. 

of  tlie  Elienish  Federation  still  followed  Napoleon :  but 
the  spirit  and  tlie  ideas  whicb.  became  a  living  force 
wben  at  lengtb  tbe  contest  with  Napoleon  broke  ont 
were  tbose  of  men  like  Stein,  wbo  in  tbe  depths  of 
Grermany's  humiliation  had  created  the  bright  and  noble 
image  of  a  common  Fatherland.  It  was  no  more  given 
to  Stein  to  see  his  hopes  fulfilled  than  it  was  given  to 
Mirabeau  to  establish  constitutional  liberty  in  France, 
or  to  the  Italian  patriots  of  1797  to  create  a  united 
Italy.  A  group  of  States  where  kings  like  Frederick 
William  and  Francis,  ministers  like  Hardenberg  and 
Metternich,  governed  millions  of  people  totally  destitute 
of  political  instincts  and  training,  was  not  to  be 
suddenly  transformed  into  a  free  nation  by  the  genius 
of  an  individual  or  the  patriotism  of  a  single  epoch. 
But  if  the  work  of  German  union  was  one  which,  even 
in  the  barren  form  of  military  empire,  required  the 
efforts  of  two  more  generations,  the  ideals  of  1813  were 
no  transient  and  ineffective  fancy.  Time  was  on  the  side 
of  those  who  called  the  Prussian  monarchy  the  true 
centre  round  which  Germany  could  gather.  If  in  the 
sequel  Prussia  was  slow  to  recognise  its  own  oppor- 
tunities, the  fault  was  less  with  patriots  who  hoped  too 
much  than  with  kings  and  ministers  who  dared  too  little. 
For  the  moment,  the  measures  of  the  Prussian  Go- 
.•     *^v      vernment  were  worthy  of  the  spirit  shown  by 

Formation  of  the  J  r  J 

Landwehr.  ^"j^^  uatiou.  Schamhorst's  military  system 
had  given  Prussia  100,000  trained  soldiers  ready  to  join 
the  existing  army  of  45,000.  The  scheme  for  the  forma- 
tion of  a  Landwehr,  though  not  yet  carried  into  effect. 


1813.  PRUSSIA  IN  1813.  489 

needed  only  to  receive  the  sanetion  of  the  King.  On  the 
same  day  that  Frederick  William  issued  his  proclamation 
to  the  people,  he  decreed  the  formation  of  the  Landwehr 
and  the  Landsturm.  The  latter  force,  which  was  intended 
in  case  of  necessity  to  imitate  the  peasant  warfare  of 
Spain  and  La  Yend^e,  had  no  occasion  to  act:  the 
Landwehr,  though  its  arming  was  delayed  hy  the 
poverty  and  exhaustion  of  the  country,  gradually  became 
a  most  formidable  reserve,  and  sent  its  battalions  to 
fight  by  the  side  of  the  regulars  in  some  of  the  greatest 
engagements  in  the  war.  It  was  the  want  of  arms  and 
money,  not  of  willing  soldiers,  that  prevented  Prussia 
from  instantly  attacking  Napoleon  with  200,000  men. 
The  conscription  was  scarcely  needed  from  the  immense 
number  of  volunteers  who  joined  the  ranks.  Though 
the  completion  of  the  Prussian  armaments  required 
some  months  more,  Prussia  did  not  need  to  stand 
upon  the  defensive.  An  army  of  50,000  men  was 
ready  to  cross  the  Elbe  immediately  on  the  annval 
of  the  Eussians,  and  to  open  the  next  campaign  in  the 
territory  of  Napoleon's  allies  of  the  Ehenish  Federation. 


CHAPTEE  XI. 

The  War  of  Liberation — Bliiclier  crosses  the  Elbe — ^Battle  of  Liitzen — ^The 

Allies  retreat  to  Silesia — Battle  of  Bautzen — ^Armistice — Napoleon  intends 
to  intimidate  Austria — Mistaken  as  to  the  forces  of  Austria — Metternich's 
Policy — Treaty  of  Reichenbach — ^Austria  offers  its  Mediation — Congress  of 
Prague — Austria  enters  the  War — Aripies  and  Plans  of  Napoleon  and  the 
Allies— Campaign  of  August — Battles  of  Dresden,  Grosbeeren,  the  Katz- 
bach,  and  Kulm — Effect  of  these  Actions— Battle  of  Dennewitz — German 
Policy  of  Austria  favourable\to  the  Princes  of  the  Phenish  Confederacy — 
Frustrated  hopes  of  German  Unity— Battle  of  Leipzig — ^The  Allies  reach 
the  Rhine— Offers  of  Peace  at  Frankfort — Plan  of  Invasion  of  France — 
Backwardness  of  Austria — The  Allies  enter  France — Campaign  of  1814 — 
Congress  of  Chatillon — Napoleon  moves  to  the  rear  of  the  Allies — The  Allies 
advance  on  Paris — Capitulation  of  Paris — Entry  of  the  Allies — Dethrone- 
ment of  Napoleon — Restoration  of  the  Bourbons — The  Charta — Treaty  of 
Paris — Territorial  effects  of  the  War,  1792-1814 — Every  Power  except 
France  had  gained — France  relatively  weaker  in  Europe — Summary  of  the 
permanent  effects  of  this  period  on  Europe. 

The  first  tliree  montlis  of  the  year  1813  were  spent  by 
Napoleon  in  Napoleoii  ill  vigorous  preparation  for  a  cam- 
paign in  Nortliern  Germany.  Immediately 
after  receiving  tlie  news  of  York's  convention  with  tlie 
Eussians  lie  had  ordered  a  levy  of  350,000  men.  It  was 
in  vain  that  Frederick  William  and  Hardenberg  affected 
to  disavow  the  general  as  a  traitor ;  Napoleon  divined  the 
national  character  of  York's  act,  and  laid  his  account  for 
a  war  against  the  combined  forces  of  Prussia  and  Eussia. 
In  spite  of  the  catastrophe  of  the  last  campaign,  Napo- 
leon was  still  stronger  than  his  enemies.  Italy  and  the 
Ehenish  Federation  had  never  wavered  in  their  allegiance; 


1818.  BES0UBCE8  OF  NAPOLEON,  4©1 

Austria,  though  a  cold  ally,  had  at  least  shown  no  signs 
of  hostility.  The  resources  of  an  empire  of  forty  million 
inhabitants  were  still  at  Napoleon's  command.  It  was  in 
the  youth  and  inexperience  of  the  new  soldiers,  and  in  the 
scarcity  of  good  officers,*  that  the  losses  of  the  previous 
year  showed  their  most  visible  effect.  Lads  of  seventeen, 
commanded  in  great  part  by  officers  who  had  never  been 
through  a  campaign,  took  the  place  of  the  soldiers  who 
had  fought  at  Friedland  and  Wagram.  They  were  as 
brave  as  their  predecessors,  but  they  failed  in  bodily 
strength  and  endurance.  Against  them  came  the  rem- 
nant of  the  men  who  had  pursued  Napoleon  from  Mos- 
cow, and  a  Prussian  army  which  was  but  the  vanguard 
of  an  armed  nation.  Nevertheless,  Napoleon  had  no  cause 
to  expect  defeat,  provided  that  Austria  remained  on  his 
side.  Though  the  Prussian  nation  entered  upon  the  con- 
flict in  the  most  determined  spirit,  a  war  on  the  Elbe 
against  Eussia  and  Prussia  combined  was  a  less  desperate 
venture  than  a  war  with  Eussia  alone  beyond  the  Niemen. 
When  King  Frederick  William  published  his  decla- 
ration of  war  (March  17),  the  army  of 
Euff^ne  had  already  fallen  back  as  far  west  theEibe.Mard», 
as  Magdeburg,  leaving  garrisons  in  most  of 
the  fortresses  between  the  Elbe  and  the  Eussian  frontier. 
Napoleon  was  massing  troops  on  the  Maia,  and  preparing 
for  an  advance  in  force,  when  the  Prussians,  commanded 
by  Bliicher,  and  some  weak  divisions  of  the  Eussian  army, 
pushed  forward  to  the  Elbe.     On  the  18th  of  March  the 

*  For  the  difference  between  the  old  and  the  new  officers,  see  Oorr6e> 
pondance  de  Napoleon,  27  Avril,  1813. 


492  ^         MODERN  EUBOPK  isia 

Cossacks  appeared  in  fhe  suburbs  of  Dresden,  on  tbe  ri^ht 
bank  of  tbe  river.  Davoust,  wbo  was  in  command  of  tbe 
Frencb  garrison,  blew  up  two  arcbes  of  tbe  bridge,  and 
retired  to  Magdeburg :  Bliicber  soon  afterwards  entered 
Dresden,  and  called  upon  tbe  Saxon  nation  to  rise  against 
Napoleon.  But  be  spoke  to  deaf  ears.  Tbe  common 
people  were  indifferent ;  tbe  officials  waited  to  see  wbicb 
side  would  conquer.  Bliicber  could  scarcely  obtain  pro- 
visions for  bis  army ;  be  passed  on  westwards,  and  came 
into  tbe  neigbbourbood  of  Leipzig.  Here  be  found  bim- 
self  forced  to  bait,  and  to  wait  for  bis  allies.  Tbougb  a 
detacbment  of  tbe  Russian  army  under  Witgenstein  bad 
already  crossed  tbe  Elbe,  tbe  main  army,  witb  Kutusoff, 
was  still  lingering  at  Kaliscb  on  tbe  Polisb  frontier, 
wbere  it  bad  arrived  six  weeks  before.  As  yet  tbe  Prus- 
sians bad  only  50,000  men  ready  for  action ;  until  tbe 
Russians  came  up,  it  was  unsafe  to  advance  far  beyond  tbe 
Elbe.  Bliicber  counted  every  moment  lost  tbat  kept  bim 
from  battle :  tbe  Russian  commander-in-cbief,  sated  witb 
glory  and  sinking  beneatb  tbe  infirmities  of  a  veteran, 
could  scarcely  be  induced  to  sign  an  order  of  marcb.  At 
lengtb  Kutusoff's  illness  placed  tbe  command  in  younger 
bands.  His  strengtb  failed  bim  during  tbe  marcb  from 
Poland ;  be  was  left  dying  in  SUesia ;  and  on  tbe  24tb 
of  April  tbe  Czar  and  tbe  King  of  Prussia  led  forward 
bis  veteran  troops  into  Dresden. 

Napoleon  was  now  known  to  be  approacbing  witb 
considerable  force  by  tbe  roads  of  tbe  Saale.  A  pitcbed 
battle  west  of  tbe  Elbe  was  necessary  before  tbe  Allies 
could  bope  to  win  over  any  of  tbe  States  of  tbe  Rbenish 


1813.  BATTLE  OF  LTtTZEN.  493 

Confederacy;  the  flat  country  beyond  Leipzig  offered 
the  best  possible  field  for  cavalry,  in  which  the  Battle  of 
Allies  were  strong  and  Napoleon  extremely 
deficient.  It  was  accordingly  determined  to  unite  all  the 
divisions  of  the  army  with  Bliicher  on  the  west  of  Leipzig, 
and  to  attack  the  French  as  soon  as  they  descended  from 
the  hilly  country  of  the  Saale,  and  began  their  march 
across  the  Saxon  plain.  The  Allies  took  post  at  Liitzen  : 
the  French  advanced,  and  at  midday  on  the  2nd  of  May 
the  battle  of  Liitzen  began.  Till  evening,  victory  inclined 
to  the  Allies.  The  Prussian  soldiery  fought  with  the 
utmost  spirit ;  for  the  first  time  in  Napoleon's  campaigns, 
the  French  infantry  proved  weaker  than  an  enemy  when 
fighting  against  them  in  equal  numbers.  But  the  gene- 
ralship of  Napoleon  turned  the  scale.  Seventy  thousand 
of  the  French  were  thrown  upon  fifty  thousand  of  the 
Allies;  the  battle  was  fought  in  village  streets  and 
gardens,  where  cavalry  were  useless ;  and  at  the  close  of 
the  day,  though  the  losses  on  each  side  were  equal,  the 
Allies  were  forced  from  the  positions  which  they  had 
gained.  Such  a  result  was  equivalent  to  a  lost  battle. 
Napoleon's  junction  with  the  anny  of  Eugene  at  Magde- 
burg was  now  inevitable,  unless  a  second  engagement  was 
fought  and  won.  No  course  remained  to  the  Allies  but 
to  stake  everything  upon  a  renewed  attack,  or  to  retire 
behind  the  Elbe  and  meet  the  reinforcements  assembling 
in  Silesia.  King  Frederick  William  declared  for  a  second 
battle* ;  he  was  over-ruled,  and  the  retreat  commenced. 

•  Henckel  von  Donnersraarck,  p.  187.    The  battles  of  Liitsen,  Bautzen, 
and  Leip^g  are  described  in  the  despatches  of  Lord  Catheart)  who  wit- 


494  MODERN  EUROPE.  isia 

Napoleon  entered  Dresden  on  May  14t]i.  No  attempt 
was  made  by  tlie  Allies  to  liold  the  line  of 
Dresden.  May  tlie  Elbe ;  all  tbe  sanguine  bopes  with  wbicb 
Bliicber  and  bis  comrades  bad  advanced  to 
attack  Napoleon  witbin  tbe  borders  of  tbe  Ebenisb  Con- 
federacy were  dasbed  to  tbe  ground.  Tbe  Tatberland 
remained  divided  against  itself.  Saxony  and  tbe  rest  of 
tbe  vassal  States  were  secured  to  France  by  tbe  victory 
of  Li'itzen ;  tbe  liberation  of  Germany  was  only  to  be 
wrougbt  by  prolonged  and  obstinate  warfare,  and  by  tbe 
wholesale  sacrifice  of  Prussian  life. 

It  was  witb  deep  disappointment,  but  not  witb  any 

wavering  of  purpose,  tbat  tbe  allied  generals 

Bautzen.       fell    back    before     Napoleon    towards    tbe 

May  21.  ^        ^  ^  ^ 

Silesian  fortresses.  Tbe  Prussian  troops 
wbicb  bad  bitberto  taken  part  in  tbe  war  were  not  tbe 
tbird  part  of  tbose  wbicb  tbe  Grovemment  was  arm- 
ing; new  Eussian  -divisions  were  on  tbe  marcb  from 
Poland.  As  tbe  Allies  moved  eastwards  from  tbe  Elbe, 
botb  tbeir  own  forces  and  tbose  of  Napoleon  gatbered 
strength.  Tbe  retreat  stopped  at  Bautzen,  on  tbe  river 
Spree;  and  here,  on  tbe  19th  of  May,  90,000  of  the 
Allies  and  tbe  same  number  of  the  French  drew  up  in 
order  of  battle.  The  Allies  held  a  long,  broken  chain 
of  hills  behind  the  river,  and  the  ground  lying  between 
these  hills  and  tbe  village  of  Bautzen.  On  tbe  20tb 
the  French  began  tbe  attack,  and  won  the  passage  of 
tbe  river.     In  spite  of  the  approach  of  Ney  with  40,000 

nessed  them  in  company  with  the  Czar  and  King  Frederick  William. 
Records;  Russia,  207,  209. 


I  UNIVERSITY  J 

im,  ABMI8TI0E  AFTER  BAUTZEK.  495 

more  troops,  the  Czar  and  the  King  of  Prussia  deter- 
mined to  continue  the  battle  on  the  following  day.  The 
struggle  of  the  21st  was  of  the  same  obstinate  and 
indecisive  character  as  that  at  Liitzen.  Twenty-five 
thousand  French  had  been  killed  or  wounded  before  the 
day  was  over,  but  the  bad  generalship  of  the  Allies  had 
again  given  Napoleon  the  victory.  The  Prussian  and 
Russian  commanders  were  all  at  variance ;  Alexander, 
who  had  to  decide  in  their  contentions,  possessed  no 
real  military  faculty.  It  was  not  for  want  of  brave 
fighting  and  steadfastness  before  the  enemy  that  Bautzen 
was  lost.  The  AUies  retreated  in  perfect  order,  and 
without  the  loss  of  a  single  gun.  Napoleon  followed, 
forcing  his  wearied  regiments  to  ceaseless  exertion,  in  the 
hope  of  ruining  by  pursuit  an  enemy  whom  he  could 
not  overthrow  in  battle.  In  a  few  more  days  the 
discord  of  the  allied  generals  and  the  sufferings  of 
the  troops  would  probably  have  made  them  unable 
to  resist  Napoleon's  army,  weakened  as  it  was.  .  But 
the  conqueror  himself   halted   in   the  mo- 

-L  Anni8tio6. 

ment   of  victory.      On   the    4th    of   June        ^"^^^ 
an  armistice  of  seven  weeks  arrested  the  pursuit,  and 
brought  the  first  act  of  the  War  of  Liberation  to   a 
close. 
^.       Napoleon's  motive  for  granting  this  interval  to  his 
enemies,  the  most  fatal  step  in  his  whole  career,  has 
been  vaguely  sought  among  the  general  rea- 
sons for  military  delay ;  as  a  matter  of  fact,  Austria. 
Napoleon  was  thinking  neither  of  the  condition  of  his 
own  army  nor  of  that  of  the  Allies  when  he  broke  off 


496  MODERN  JSUBOPK  1813. 

hostilities,  but  o£  tlie  probable  action  of  the  Court  of 
Vienna.*  "  I  shall  grant  a  truce/'  he  wrote  to  the  Viceroy 
of  Italy  (June  2,  1818),  "on  account  of  the  armaments 
of  Austria,  and  in  order  to  gain  time  to  bring  up  the 
Italian  army  to  Laibach  to  threaten  Vienna.''  Austria 
had  indeed  resolved  to  regain,  either  by  war  or  negotia- 
tion, the  provinces  which  it  had  lost  in  1809.  It  was 
now  preparing  to  offer  its  mediation,  but  it  was  also 
preparing  to  join  the  Allies  in  case  Napoleon  rejected  its 
demands.  Metternich  was  anxious  to  attain  his  object, 
if  possible,  without  war.  The  Austrian  State  was 
bankrupt ;  its  army  had  greatly  deteriorated  since  1809 ; 
Metternich  himself  dreaded  both  the  ambition  of  Russia 
and  what  he  considered  the  revolutionary  schemes  of  the 
Grerman  patriots.  It  was  his  object  not  to  drive  Napo- 
leon from  his  throne,  but  to  establish  a  European 
system  in  which  neither  France  nor  Eussia  should  be 
absolutely  dominant.  Soon  after  the  retreat  from 
Moscow  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna  had  informed  Napoleon, 
though  in  the  most  friendly  terms,  that  Austria  could 
not  longer  remain  in  the  position  of  a  dependent  ally.f 
Metternich  stated,  and  not  insincerely,  that  by  certain 
concessions  Napoleon  might  still  count  on  Austria's 
friendship  ;  but  at  the  same  time  he  negotiated  with  the 

*  The  account  given  in  the  following  pages  of  Napoleon's  motives 
and  action  during  the  armistice  is  based  upon  the  following  letters 
printed  in  the  twenty-fifth  volume  of  the  Correspondence : — To  Eugene, 
June  2,  July  1,  July  17,  Aug.  4;  to  Maret,  July  8;  to  Daru,  July  17; 
to  Berthier,  July  23 ;  to  Davoust,  July  24,  Aug.  5 ;  to  Ney,  Aug.  4, 
Aug.  12.  The  statement  of  Napoleon's  error  as  to  the  strength  of  the 
Austrian  force  is  confirmed  by  Metternich,  i.  150. 

t  Oncken,  i.  80. 


1813.  NAPOLEON  AND  AUSTRIA,  407 

allied  Powers,  and  encouraged  tliem  to  believe  that 
Austria  would,  under  certain  circumstances,  strike  on 
tlieir  behaK.  The  course  of  the  campaign  of  May  was 
singularly  favourable  to  Metternich's  policy.  Napoleon 
had  not  won  a  decided  victory  ;  the  Allies,  on  the  other 
hand,  were  so  far  from  success  that  Austria  could  set 
almost  any  price  it  pleased  upon  its  alliance.  By  the 
beginning  of  June  it  had  become  a  settled  matter  in  the 
Austrian  Cabinet  that  Napoleon  must  be  made  to  resign 
the  niyrian  Provinces  conquered  in  1809  and  the  dis- 
tricts of  North  Grermany  annexed  in  1810 ;  but  it  was 
still  the  hope  of  the  Q-ovemment  to  obtain  this  result 
by  peaceful  means.  Napoleon  saw  that  Austria  was 
about  to  change  its  attitude,  but  he  had  by  no  means 
penetrated  the  real  intentions  of  Mettemich.  He 
credited  the  Viennese  Grovernment  with  a  stronger 
sentiment  hostility  towards  himself  than  it  actually 
possessed ;  at  the  same  time  he  failed  to  appreciate  the 
fixed  and  settled  character  of  its  purpose.  He  believed 
that  the  action  of  Austria  would  depend  simply  upon 
the  means  which  he  possessed  to  intimidate  it ;  that,  if 
the  army  of  Italy  were  absent,  Austria  would  attack 
him  ;  that,  on  the  other  hand,  if  he  could  gain  time  to 
bring  the  army  of  Italy  into  Camiola,  Austria  would 
keep  the  peace.  It  was  with  this  belief,  and  solely  for 
the  purpose  of  bringing  up  a  force  to  menace  Austria, 
that  Napoleon  stayed  his  hand  against  the  Prussian  and 
Eussian  armies  after  the  battle  of  Bautzen,  and  gave 
time  for  the  gathering  of  the  immense  forces  which 
were  destined  to  effect  his  destruction. 
G  G 


498  MOBEEN   EUEOFE,  I813. 

Immediately  after  tlie  conclusion  of  tlie  armistice  of 
June  4tli,  Metternich  invited  Napoleon  to 

Mettemicli  oflPers  iai-j  tj-  f»  i 

Austria's  media-  acccpt  Austria  s  mcdiatiou  tor  a  general 
peace.  The  settlement  which  Metternich 
contemplated  was  a  very  different  one  from  that  on 
which  Stein  and  the  Prussian  patriots  had  set  their 
hopes.  Austria  was  willing  to  leave  to  Napoleon  the 
whole  of  Italy  and  Holland,  the  frontier  of  the  Ehine, 
and  the  Protectorate  of  Western  Grermany :  all  that  wa.s 
required  by  Metternich,  as  arbiter  of  Europe,  was  the 
restoration  of  the  provinces  taken  from  Austria  after  the 
war  of  1809,  the  reinstatement  of  Prussia  in  Western 
Poland,  and  the  abandonment  by  France  of  the  North- 
German  district  annexed  in  1810.  But  to  Napoleon  the 
greater  or  less  extent  of  the  concessions  asked  by  Austria 
was  a  matter  of  no  moment.  He  was  determined  to 
make  no  concessions  at  all,  and  he  entered  into  negotia- 
tions only  for  the  purpose  of  disguising  from  Austria  the 
real  object  with  which  he  had  granted  the  armistice. 
While  Napoleon  affected  to  be  weighing  the  proposals 
of  Austria,  he  was  in  fact  calculating  the  number  of 
marches  which  would  place  the  Italian  army  on  the 
Austrian  frontier;  this  once  effected,  he  expected  to 
hear  nothing  more  of  Metternich's  demands. 

It  was  a  game  of  deceit ;  but  there  was  no  one  who 
was   so  thoroughly  deceived  as    Napoleon 

Napoleon  de-       ,   .  , ,.         -p.  .  ,.  .         , 

ceived  as  to  the     himseli.     Uv  somc  extraordmary  miscalcu- 

f  orces  of  Austria.  •'  ^ 

lation  on  the  part  of  his  secret  agents  he 
was  led  to  believe  that  the  whole  force  of  Austria,  both 
in  the  north  and  the  south,  amounted  to  only  100,000 


I8ia  AUSTRIA    OFFERS   ITS   MEDIATION,  499 

men,*  and  it  was  on  this  estimate  that  he  had  formed 
his  plans  of  intimidation.  In  reality  Austria  had  double 
that  number  of  men  ready  to  take  the  field.  By  degrees 
Napoleon  saw  reason  to  suspect  himself  in  error.  On 
the  11th  of  July  he  wrote  to  his  Foreign  Minister,  Maret, 
bitterly  reproaching  him  with  the  failure  of  the  secret 
service  to  gain  any  trustworthy  information.  It  was 
not  too  late  to  accept  Metternich's  terms.  Yet  even 
now,  when  the  design  of  intimidating  Austria  had 
proved  an  utter  delusion,  and  Napoleon  was  convinced 
that  Austria  would  fight,  and  fight  with  very  powerful 
forces,  his  pride  and  his  invincible  belief  in  his  own 
superiority  prevented  him  from  drawing  back.  He 
made  an  attempt  to  enter  upon  a  separate  negotiation 
with  Eussia,  and,  when  this  failed,  he  resolved  to  face 
the  conflict  with  the  whole  of  Europe. 

There  was  no  longer  any  uncertainty  among  Napo- 
leon's enemies.  On  the  27th  of  June,  Austria  had 
signed  a  treaty  at  Eeichenbach,  pledging  itself  to  join 
the  allied  Powers  in  the  event  of  Napoleon 
rejecting  the  conditions  to  be  proposed  by  Reic'enLSi. 
Austria  as  mediator ;  and  the  conditions  so 
to  be  proposed  were  fixed  by  the  same  treaty.  They 
were  the  following : — The  suppression  of  the  Duchy  of 
Warsaw;  the  restoration  to  Austria  of  the  lUyrian 
Provinces  ;  and  the  surrender  by  Napoleon  of  the  North - 
German  district  annexed  to  his  Empire  in  1810.  Terms 
more  hostile  to  France  than  these  Austria  declined  to 
embody  in  its  mediation.  The  Elbe  might  still  sever 
•  Napoleou  to  Eugene,  Ist  July,  1813. 

a  a  2 


600  MODERN  EUEOFE.  I8l& 

Prussia  from  its  Grerman  provinces  lost  in  1807  ;  Napo- 
leon might  still  retain,  as  chief  of  the  Ehenish  Con- 
federacy, his  sovereignty  over  the  greater  part  of  the 
German  race. 

From  the  moment  when  these  conditions  were  fixed, 
there  was  nothing  which  the  Prussian  generals  so  much 
dreaded  as  that  Napoleon  might  accept  them,  and  so  roh 
the  Allies  of  the  chance  of  crushing  him  by  means  of 
Austria's  support.  But  their  fears  were  groundless. 
The  comisels  of  Napoleon  were  exactly  those  which  his 

worst  enemies  would  have  desired  him  to 
Trague.  July  15     adopt.     War,  and  nothing  but  war,  was  his 

j&xed  resolve.  He  affected  to  entertain 
Austria's  propositions,  and  sent  his  envoy  Caulaincourt 
to  a  Congress  which  Austria  summoned  at  Prague  ;  but 
it  was  only  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  a  few  more  weeks 
of  preparation.  The  Congress  met ;  the  armistice  was 
prolonged  to  the  10th  of  August.  Caulaincourt,  how- 
ever, was  given  no  power  to  close  with  Austria's  demands. 
He  was  ignorant  that  he  had  only  been  sent  to  Prague 
in  order  to  gain  time.  He  saw  the  storm  gathering: 
unable  to  believe  that  Napoleon  intended  to  fight  all 
Europe  rather  than  make  the  concessions  demanded  of 
him,  he  imagined  that  his  master  still  felt  some  doubt 
whether  Austria  and  the  other  Powers  meant  to  adhere 
to  their  word.  As  the  day  drew  nigh  which  closed  the 
armistice  and  the  period  given  for  a  reply  to  Austria's 
ultimatum,  Caulamcourt  implored  Napoleon  not  to 
deceive  himself  with  hopes  that  Austria  would  draw 
back.      Napoleon  had  no  such  hope ;  he  knew  well  that 


1818.  AUSTRIA  ENTERS  THE   WAR  M)l 

Austria  would  declare  war,  and  lie  accepted  the  issue. 
Caulaincourt  heard  nothing  more.  At  mid-  Au»tri»  enten 
night  on  the  10th  of  August  the  Congress 
dechired  itself  dissolved.  Before  the  dawn  of  the  next 
morning  the  army  in  Silesia  saw  the  blaze  of  the  beacon- 
fires  which  told  that  negotiation  was  at  an  end,  and  that 
Austria  was  entering  the  war  on  the  side  of  the  Allies.* 
Seven  days'  notice  was  necessary  before  the  com- 
mencement of  actual  hostilities.  Napoleon, 
himself  stationed  at  Dresden,  held  all  the  ifm  and  the 
lower  course  of  the  Elbe ;  and  his  generals 
had  long  had  orders  to  be  ready  to  march  on  the  morning 
of  the  18th.  Forces  had  come  up  from  all  parts  of  the 
Empire,  raising  the  French  army  at  the  front  to  300,000 
men ;  but,  for  the  first  time  in  Napoleon's  career,  his 
enemies  had  won  from  a  pause  in  war  results  even  sur- 
passing his  own.  The  strength  of  the  Prussian  and 
Eussian  armies  was  now  enormously  different  from  what 
it  had  been  at  Liitzen  and  Bautzen.  The  Prussian 
Landwehi%  then  a  weaponless  and  ill-clad  militia  drilling 
in  the  villages,  was  now  fully  armed,  and  in  great  part 
at  the  front.  New  Eussian  divisions  had  reached 
Silesia.  Austria  took  the  field  with  a  force  as  numerous 
as  that  which  had  checked  Napoleon  in  1809.  At  the 
close  of  the  armistice,  350,000  men  actually  faced  the 
French  positions  upon  the  Elbe ;  300,000  more  were  on 
the  march,  or  watching  the  German  fortresses  and  the 
frontier  of  Italy.  The  allied  troops  operating  against 
Napoleon  were  divided  into  three  armies.     In  the  north, 

*  Metternich,  L  163. 


502  MODERN  EUROPE,  isia. 

between  Wittenberg  and  Berlin,  Bernadotte  commanded 
60,000  Eussians  and  Prussians,  in  addition  to  bis  own 
Swedisb  contingent.  Bliicber  was  placed  at  tbe  bead 
of  100,000  Eussians  and  Prussians  in  Silesia.  Tbe 
Austrians  remained  undivided,  and  formed,  togetber  witb 
some  Eussian  and  Prussian  divisions,  tbe  great  army  of 
Bobemia,  200,000  strong,  under  tbe  command  of 
Scbwarzenberg.  Tbe  plan  of  tbe  campaign  bad  been 
agreed  upon  by  tbe  Allies  soon  after  tbe  Treaty  of 
Eeicbenbacb  bad  been  made  witb  Austria.  It  was  a 
sound,  tbougb  not  a  daring  one.  Tbe  tbree  armies,  now 
forming  an  arc  from  Wittenberg  to  tbe  nortb  of 
Bobemia,  were  to  converge  upon  tbe  line  of  Napoleon's 
communications  bebind  Dresden ;  if  separately  attacked. 
Plan  of  the         tbcir  geucrals  were  to  avoid  all  bazardous 

Allies.  1 

engagements,  and  to  manoeuvre  so  as  to 
weary  tbe  enemy  and  preserve  tbeir  own  general  rela- 
tions, as  far  as  possible,  uncbanged.  Bliicber,  as  tbe 
most  exposed,  was  expected  to  content  bimself  tbe  longest 
witb  tbe  defensive ;  tbe  great  army  of  Bobemia,  after 
securing  tbe  mountain-passes  between  Bobemia  and 
Saxony,  migbt  safely  turn  Napoleon's  position  at 
Dresden,  and  so  draw  tbe  two  weaker  armies  towards  it 
for  one  vast  and  combined  engagement  in  tbe  plain  of 
Leipzig. 

In  outline,  tbe  plan  of  tbe  AUies  was  tbat  wbicb 

Napoleon  expected  tbem  to  adopt.     His  own  design  was 

Napoleon's  plan     ^^  anticipate  it  by  an  offensive  of  extraordi- 

of  attack.         nary  suddenness  and  effect.   Hostilities  could 

not  begin  before  tbe  morning  of  tbe  18tb  of  August; 


1813.  TRIPLE  MOVEMENT.  503 

by  the  21st  or  the  22nd,  Napoleon  calculated  that  he 
should  have  captured  Berlin.  Oudinot,  who  was  at  Wit- 
tenberg with  80,000  men,  had  received  orders  to  advance 
upon  the  Prussian  capital  at  the  moment  that  the  armis- 
tice expired,  and  to  force  it,  if  necessary  by  bombard- 
ment, into  immediate  surrender.  The  effect  of  this  blow, 
as  Napoleon  supposed,  would  be  to  disperse  the  entire 
reserve-force  of  the  Prussian  monarchy,  and  paralyse  the 
action  of  its  army  in  the  field.  While  Oudinot  marched 
on  Berlin,  Bliicher  was  to  be  attacked  in  Silesia,  and  pre- 
vented from  rendering  any  assistance  either  on  the  north 
or  on  the  south.  The  mass  of  Napoleon's  forces,  centred 
at  Dresden,  and  keeping  watch  upon  the  movements  of 
the  army  of  Bohemia,  would  either  fight  a  great  battle, 
or,  if  the  Allies  made  a  false  movement,  march  straight 
upon  Prague,  the  centre  of  Austria's  supplies,  and  reach 
it  before  the  enemy.  AU  the  daring  imagination  of 
Napoleon's  earlier  campaigns  displayed  itseK  in  such  a 
project,  which,  if  successful,  would  have  terminated  the 
war  within  ten  days ;  but  this  imagination  was  no  longer, 
as  in  those  earlier  campaigns,  identical  with  insight  into 
real  possibilities.  The  success  of  Napoleon's  plan  in- 
volved the  surprise  or  total  defeat  of  Bemadotte  before 
Berlin,  the  disablement  of  Bliicher,  and  a  victory,  or  a 
strategical  success  equivalent  to  a  victory,  over  the  vast 
army  of  the  south.  It  demanded  of  a  soldiery,  inferior 
to  the  enemy  in  numerical  strength,  the  personal  supe- 
riority which  had  belonged  to  the  men  of  Jena  and 
Austerlitz,  when  in  fact  the  French  regiments  of  con- 
scripts had  ceased  to  be  a  match  for  equal  numbers  of 


601  MODERN  EUliOFE.  isia. 

the  enemy.  But  no  experience  could  alter  Napoleon's 
fixed  belief  in  tlie  fatuity  of  all  warfare  except  liis  own. 
After  the  havoc  of  Borodino,  after  the  even  struggles  of 
Llitzen  and  Bautzen,  he  still  reasoned  as  if  he  had  before 
him  the  armies  of  Brunswick  and  Mack.  His  plan  as- 
sumed the  certainty  of  success  in  each  of  its  parts ;  for 
the  failure  of  a  single  operation  hazarded  all  the  rest,  by  re- 
quiring the  transfer  of  reinforcements  from  armies  already 
too  weak  for  the  tasks  assigned  to  them.  Nevertheless, 
the  utmost  that  Napoleon  would  acknowledge  was  that 
the  execution  of  his  design  needed  energy.  He  still 
underrated  the  force  which  Austria  had  brought  into  the 
field  against  him.  Though  ignorant  of  the  real  position 
and  strength  of  the  army  in  Bohemia,  and  compelled  to 
wait  for  the  enemy's  movements  before  striking  on  this 
side,  he  already  in  imagination  saw  the  war  decided  by 
the  fall  of  the  Prussian  capital. 

On  the  18th  of  August  the  forward  movement  began. 
Oudinot  advanced  from  Wittenberg  towards 
ment.  Aug.  18  Bcrliu ;  Napolcou  himself  hurried  into  Si- 
lesia, intending  to  deal  Bliicher  one  heavy 
blow,  and  instantly  to  return  and  place  himself  before 
Schwarzenberg.  On  the  21st,  and  following  days,  the 
Prussian  general '  was  attacked  and  driven  eastwards. 
Napoleon  committed  the  pursuit  to  Macdonald,  and 
hastened  back  to  Dresden,  already  threatened  by  the 
advance  of  the  Austrians  from  Bohemia.  Schwarzen- 
berg and  the  allied  sovereigns,  as  soon  as  they  heard  that 
Napoleon  had  gone  to  seek  Bliicher  in  Silesia,  had  in  fact 
abandoned  their  cautious  plans,  and  determined  to  make 


1813.  BATTLE  OF  DRESDEN.  606 

an  assault  upon  Dresden  with  the  Bohemian  army  alone. 
But  it  was  in  vain  that  they  tried  to  surprise  Napoleon. 
He  was  back  at  Dresden  on  the  25th,  and  ready  for  the 
attack.  Never  were  Napoleon's  hopes  higher  than  on 
this  day.  His  success  in  Silesia  had  filled  him  with  con- 
fidence. He  imagined  Oudinot  to  be  already  in  Berlin ; 
and  the  advance  of  Schwarzenberg  against  Dresden  gave 
him  the  very  opportunity  which  he  desired  for  crushing 
the  Bohemian  army  in  one  great  battle,  before  it  could 
draw  support  either  from  Bliicher  or  from  Bemadotte. 
Another  Austerlitz  seemed  to  be  at  hand.  Napoleon 
wrote  to  Paris  that  he  should  be  in  Prague  before  the 
enemy ;  and,  while  he  completed  his  defences  in  front  of 
Dresden,  he  ordered  Vandamm'e,  with  40,000  ^^^  ^  jj^^ 
men,  to  cross  the  Elbe  at  Konigstein,  and  ^n.  au?.26,27. 
force  his  way  south-westwards  on  to  the  roads  into 
Bohemia,  in  the  rear  of  the  Great  Army,  in  order  to 
destroy  its  magazines  and  menace  its  line  of  retreat  on 
Prague.  On  August  26th  Schw^arzenberg's  host  assailed 
the  positions  of  Napoleon  on  the  slopes  and  gardens  out- 
side Dresden.  Austrians,  Eussians,  and  Prussians  all 
took  part  in  the  attack.  Moreau,  the  victor  of  Hohen- 
Ihiden,  stood  by  the  side  of  the  Emperor  Alexander, 
whom  he  had  come  to  help  against  his  own  countrymen. 
He  lived  only  to  witness  one  of  the  last  and  greatest 
victories  of  France.  The  attack  was  everywhere  re- 
pelled :  the  Austrian  divisions  were  not  only  beaten,  but 
disgraced  and  overthrown.  At  the  end  of  two  days* 
fighting  the  Allies  were  in  full  retreat,  leaving  20,000 
prisoners  in  the  hands  of  Napoleon.     It  was  a  moment 


506  MODERN  EUROPE,  1813. 

when  the  hearts  of  the  bravest  sank,  and  when  hope 
itself  might  well  vanish,  as  the  rumour  passed  through 
the  Prussian  regiments  that  Mettemich  was  again  in 
friendly  communication  with  Napoleon.  But  in  the 
midst  of  Napoleon's  triumph  intelligence  arrived  which 
robbed  it  of  all  its  worth.  Oudinot,  instead  of  conquer- 
ing Berlin,  had  been  defeated  by  the  Prussians  of  Ber- 
^   ,    ^  nadotte's  army  at  Grrossbeeren  (Aug^.  23),  and 

Battles  of  Gross-  •^  \         to  /> 

SrVMaS  <iriven  back  upon  the  Elbe.  Bliicher  had 
turned  upon  Macdonald  in  Silesia,  and  com- 
pletely overthrown  his  army  on  the  river  Katzbach,  at 
the  very  moment  when  the  Allies  were  making  their 
assault  upon  Dresden.  It  was  vain  to  think  of  a  march 
upon  Prague,  or  of  the  annihilation  of  the  Austrians, 
when  on  the  north  and  the  east  Napoleon's  troops  were 
meeting  with  nothing  but  disaster.  The  divisions  which 
had  been  intended  to  support  Yandamme's  movement 
from  Konigstein  upon  the  rear  of  the  Grreat  Army  were 
retained  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Dresden,  in  order  to  be 
within  reach  of  the  points  where  their  aid  might  be 
needed.  Yandamme,  ignorant  of  his  isolation,  was  left 
with  scarcely  40,000  men  to  encounter  the  Grreat  Army 
Battle  of  Kuim.  ^  ^^^  rctrcat.  Hc  threw  himseK  upon  a 
Aug.  29, 30.  Russian  corps  at  Kulm,  in  the  Bohemian 
mountains,  on  the  morning  of  the  29th.  The  Eussians, 
at  first  few  in  number,  held  their  ground  during  the 
day ;  in  the  night,  and  after  the  battle  had  recommenced 
on  the  morrow,  vast  masses  of  the  allied  troops  poured 
in.  The  Prench  fought  desperately,  but  were  over- 
whelmed,    Yandamme  himself  was  made  prisoner,  with 


I8ia  THE  BATTLES  IN  AUGUST.  607 

10,000  of  his  men.     The  whole  of  the  stores  and  most  of 
the  cannon  of  his  army  remained  in  the  enemy's  hands. 

The  victory  at  Knlm  secured  the  Bohemian  army 
from  pursuit,  and  almost  extinguished  the  effects  of  its 
defeat  at  Dresden.     Thanks  to  the  successes 
of    Bliicher   and  of   Bemadotte's    Prussian     twelve  day.! 

Aug.  la-^. 

generals,  which  prevented  Napoleon  from 
throwing  all  his  forces  on  to  the  rear  of  the  Great 
Army,  Schwarzenberg's  rash  attack  had  proved  of  no 
worse  significance  than  an  unsuccessful  raid.  The 
Austrians  were  again  in  the  situation  assigned  to  them 
in  the  original  plan  of  the  campaign,  and  capable  of  re- 
suming their  advance  into  the  interior  of  Saxony : 
Bliicher  and  the  northern  commanders  had  not  only 
escaped  separate  destruction,  but  won  great  victories 
over  the  French :  Napoleon,  weakened  by  the  loss  of 
100,000  men,  remained  exactly  where  he  had  been  at 
the  beginning  of  the  campaign.  Had  the  triple  move- 
ment by  which  he  meant  to  overwhelm  his  adversaries 
been  capable  of  execution,  it  would  now  hav^  been  fully 
executed.  The  balance,  however,  had  turned  against 
Napoleon;  and  the  twelve  days  from  the  18th  to  the  29th 
of  August,  though  marked  by  no  catastrophe  like  Leipzig 
or  Waterloo,  were  in  fact  the  decisive  period  in  the 
struggle  of  Europe  against  Napoleon.  The  atttick  by 
which  he  intended  to  prevent  the  junction  of  the  three 
armies  had  been  made,  and  had  failed.  Nothing  now 
remained  for  him  but  to  repeat  the  same  movements 
with  a  discouraged  force  against  an  emboldened  enemy, 
or  to  quit  the  line  of  the  Elbe,  and  prepare  for  one 


508  MOBEBN  EUBOPK  I8ia 

vast  and  decisive  encounter  with  all  three  armies  com- 
bined. Napoleon  drove  from  his  mind  the  thought  of 
failure ;  he  ordered  Ney  to  take  command  of  Oudinot's 
army,  and  to  lead  it  again,  in  increased  strength,  upon 
Berlin;  he  himself  hastened  to  Macdonald's  beaten 
troops  in  Silesia,  and  rallied  them  for  a  new  assault 
upon  Bliicher.  All  was  in  vain.  Ney,  advancing  on 
Berlin,  was  met  by  the  Prussian  general  Biilow  at 
Dennewitz,  and  totally  routed  (Sept.  6) :  Bliicher,  find- 
ing that  Napoleon  himseK  was  before  him, 
Deimewitz.  skilfully  avoldcd  battle,  and  forced  his  ad- 
versary to  waste  in  fruitless  marches  the 
brief  interval  which  he  had  snatched  from  his  watch  on 
Schwarzenberg.  Each  conflict  with  the  enemy,  each 
vain  and  exhausting  march,  told  that  the  superiority 
had  passed  from  the  French  to  their  foes,  and  that 
Napoleon's  retreat  was  now  only  a  matter  of  time. 
"  These  creatures  have  learnt  something,"  said  Napoleon 
in  the  bitterness  of  his  heart,  as  he  saw  the  columns 
of  Bliicher  manoeuvring  out  of  his  grasp.  Ney's  re- 
port of  his  own  overthrow  at  Dennewitz  sounded  like 
an  omen  of  the  ruin  of  Waterloo.  "  I  have  been  totally 
defeated,"  he  wrote,  "  and  do  not  yet  know  whether  my 
army  has  re-assembled.  The  spirit  of  the  generals  and 
officers  is  shattered.  To  command  in  such  conditions  is  but 
half  to  command.  I  had  rather  be  a  common  grenadier.' 
The  accession  of  Austria  had  turned 
ofTtSx  ^d7t  the  scale  in  favour  of  the  Allies ;  it  rested 
only  with  the  allied  generals  themselves  to 
terminate  the  warfare  round  Dresden,  and  to  lead  their 


1813.  STEIN  AND  METTEBNIOE.  609 

armies  into  the  heart  of  Saxony.  For  a  while  the 
course  of  the  war  flagged,  and  military  interests  gave 
place  to  political.  It  was  in  the  interval  hetween  the 
first  great  battles  and  the  final  advance  on  Leipzig 
that  the  future  of  Germany  was  fixed  by  the  three 
allied  Powers.  In  the  excitement  of  the  last  twelve 
months  little  thought  had  been  given,  except  by  Stein 
and  his  friends,  to  the  political  form  to  be  set  in  the 
place  of  the  Napoleonic  Federation  of  the  Ehiae. 
Stein,  in  the  midst  of  the  Eussian  campaign,  had  hoped 
for  a  universal  rising  of  the  German  people  against 
Napoleon,  and  had  proposed  the  dethronement  of  all 
the  German  princes  who  supported  his  cause.  His 
policy  had  received  the  general  approval  of  Alexander, 
and,  on  the  entrance  of  the  Eussian  army  into  Ger- 
many, a  manifesto  had  been  issued  appealing  to  the 
whole  German  nation,  and  warning  the  vassals  of 
Napoleon  that  they  could  only  save  themselves  by 
submission.*  A  committee  had  been  appointed  by  the 
allied  sovereigns,  under  the  presidency  of  Stein  himself, 
to  administer  the  revenues  of  all  Confederate  territory 
that  should  be  occupied  by  the  allied  armies.  Whether 
the  reigniiig  Houses  should  be. actually  expelled  might 
remain  in  uncertainty;  but  it  was  the  fixed  hope 
of  Stein  and  his  friends  that  those  princes  who  were 
permitted  to  retain  their  thrones  would  be  permitted 
to  retain  them  only  as  officers  in  a  great  German 
Empire,  without  sovereign  rights  either  over  their  own 

•  Haussor,  iy.  59.    One  of  the  originals  is  contained  in  Lord  Catheartli 
despatch  from  Kalisuh,  March  2SUi^  18J3.    BecortU ;  Bussi*^  YoL  206. 


510  MODERN  EUBOPK  1813. 

subjects  or  in  relation  to  foreign  States.  Tlie  Kings  of 
Bavaria  and  Wiirtemberg  bad  gained  tbeir  titles  and 
mucb  of  tbeir  despotic  power  at  borne  from  Napoleon ; 
tbeir  independence  of  tbe  Head  of  Germany  bad  made 
tbem  notbing  more  tban  tbe  instruments  of  a  foreign 
conqueror.  Under  wbatever  form  tbe  central  autbority 
migbt  be  revived,  Stein  desired  tbat  it  sbould  be  tbe 
true  and  only  sovereign  Power  in  Grermany,  a  Power 
to  wbicb  every  German  migbt  appeal  against  tbe 
oppression  of  a  minor  Government,  and  in  wbicb  tbe 
wbole  nation  sbould  find  its  representative  before  tbe 
rest  of  Europe.  In  tbe  face  of  sucb  a  central  autbority, 
wbetber  an  elected  Parliament  or  an  Imperial  Council, 
tbe  minor  princes  could  at  best  retain  but  a  fragment 
of  tbeir  powers ;'  and  sucb  was  tbe  tbeory  accepted 
at  tbe  allied  bead-quarters  down  to  tbe  time  wben 
Austria  proffered  its  mediation  and  support.  Tben 
everytbing  cbanged.  Tbe  views  of  tbe  Austrian  Go- 
vernment upon   tbe  future  system  of   Germany  were  in 

direct  opposition  to  tbose  of  Stein's  party. 

Metternicb  dreaded  tbe  tbougbt  of  popular 
agitation,  and  looked  upon  Stein,  witb  bis  idea  of  a 
National  Parliament,  and  bis  plans  for  detbroning  tbe 
Rbenisb  princes,  as  little  better  tban  tbe  Jacobins  of 
1792.  Tbe  offer  of  a  restored  imperial  dignity  in  Ger- 
many was  declined  by  tbe  Emperor  of  Austria  at  tbe 
instance  of  bis  Minister.  Witb  cbaracteristic  sense 
of  present  difficulties,  and  blindness  to  tbe  great  forces 
wbicb  really  contained  tbeir  solution,  Metternicb  argued 
tbat  tbe  minor  princes  would  only  be  driven  into  tbe 


1813.  AU3TEIA*a    GERMAN  POLIOY.  611 

arms  of  tlie  foreigner  by  the  establishment  of  any 
supreme  German  Power.  They  would  probably  desert 
Napoleon  if  the  Allies  guaranteed  to  them  everything 
that  they  at  present  possessed ;  they  would  be  freed  from 
all  future  temptation  to  attach  themselves  to  France  if 
Austria  contented  itself  with  a  diplomatic  influence  and 
with  the  ties  of  a  well-constructed  system  of  treaties. 
In  spite  of  the  influence  of  Stein  with  the  Emperor 
Alexander,  Metternich's  views  prevailed.  Austria  had 
so  deliberately  kept  itseK  in  balance  during  the  first 
part  of  the  year  1813,  that  the  Allies  were  now 
willing  to  concede  everything,  both  in  this  matter  and 
in  others,  in  return  for  its  support.  Nothing  more  was 
heard  of  the  dethronement  of  the  Confederate  princes, 
or  even  of  the  limitation  of  their  powers.  It  was  agreed 
by  the  Treaty  of  Teplitz,  signed  by  Prussia,  Eussia, 
and  Austria  on  September  9th,  that  every  State  of 
the  Rhenish  Confederacy  should  be  placed  in  a  position 
of  absolute  independence.  Negotiations  were  opened 
with  the  King  of  Bavaria,  whose  army  had  steadily 
fought  on  the  side  of  Napoleon  in  every  campaign  since 
1806.  Instead  of  being  outlawed  as  a  criminal,  he  was 
welcomed  as  an  ally.  The  Treaty  of  Eied,  signed  on 
the  3rd  of  October,  guaranteed  to  the  King  of  Bavaria, 
in  return  for  his  desertion  of  Napoleon,  full  sovereign 
rights,  and  the  whole  of  the  territory  which  he  had 
received  from  Napoleon,  except  the  Tyrol  and  the 
Austrian  district  on  the  Inn.  What  had  been  accorded 
to  the  King  of  Bavaria  could  not  be  refused  to  the 
rest  of  Napoleon's  vassals  who  were  willing  to  make 


Allies  cross  the 
Elbe.    Oct.  3. 


612  MODERN  BVBOPE.  I813. 

their  peace  with  the  Allies  in  time.  Germany  was  thus 
left  at  the  mercy  of  a  score  of  petty  Cabinets.  It  was 
seen  by  the  patriotic  party  in  Prussia  at  what  price  the 
alliance  of  Austria  had  been  purchased.  Austria  had 
indeed  made  it  possible  to  conquer  JSTapoleon,  but  it  had 
also  made  an  end  of  all  prospect  of  the  union  of  the 
Grerman  nation. 

Till  the  last  days  of  September  the  position  of  the 
hostile  armies  round  Dresden  remaiaed  little 
changed.  Napoleon  unweariedly  repeated 
his  attacks,  now  on  one  side,  now  on  another,  but  with- 
out result.  The  Allies  on  their  part  seemed  rooted  to 
the  soil.  Bernadotte,  balanced  between  the  desire  to 
obtain  Norway  from  the  Allies  and  a  foolish  hope  of 
being  called  to  the  throne  of  France,  was  bent  on  doing 
the  French  as  little  harm  as  possible;  Schwarzenberg, 
himself  an  indifferent  general,  was  distracted  by  the 
councillors  of  all  the  three  monarchs;  Bliicher  alone 
pressed  for  decided  and  rapid  action.  At  length  the 
Prussian  commander  gained  permission  to  march  north- 
wards, and  unite  his  army  with  Bernadotte's  in  a  for- 
ward movement  across  the  Elbe.  The  long-expected 
Eussian  reserves,  led  by  Bennigsen,  reached  the  Bohe- 
mian mountains ;  and  at  the  beginning  of  October  the 
operation  began  which  was  to  collect  the  whole  of  the 
allied  forces  in  the  plain  of  Leipzig.  Bliicher  forced  the 
passage  of  the  Elbe  at  Wartenburg.  It  was  not  until 
Napoleon  learnt  that  the  army  of  Silesia  had  actually 
crossed  the  river  that  he  finally  quitted  Dresden. 
Then,  hasteniQg  northwards,  he  threw  himself  upon  the 


1813.  Battle  of  leipzio.  513 

Prussian  general ;  but  Bliiclier  again  avoided  battle,  as 
be  bad  done  in  Silesia ;  and  on  tbe  7tb  of  October  bis 
army  united  witb  Bernadotte's,  wbicb  bad  crossed  tbe 
Elbe  two  days  before. 

Tbe  enemy  was  closing  in  upon  Napoleon.  Obsti- 
nately as  be  bad  beld  on  to  tbe  line  of  tbe  Elbe,  be 
could  bold  on  no  longer.  In  tbe  frustration  of  all  bis 
bopes  tbere  flasbed  across  bis  mind  tbe  wild  project  of  a 
marcb  eastwards  to  tbe  Oder,  and  tbe  gatbering  of  all 
tbe  besieged  garrisons  for  a  campaign  in  wbicb  tbe 
enemy  sbould  stand  between  bimseK  and  France ;  but 
tbe  dream  lasted  only  long  enougb  to  gain  a  record. 
Napoleon  ventured  no  more  tban  to  send  a  corps  back 
to  tbe  Elbe  to  tbreaten  Berlin,  in  tbe  bope  of  tempting 
Bliicber  and  Bernadotte  to  abandon  tbe  advance  wbicb 
tbey  bad  now  begun  in  co-operation  witb  tbe  great 
army  ofScbwarzenberg.  From  tbe  lOtb  to  tbe  14tb 
of  October,  Napoleon  lingered  at  Diiben,  between  Dres- 
den and  Leipzig,  restlessly  expecting  to  bear  of  Bliicber's 
or  Bemadotte's  retreat.  Tbe  only  definite  information 
tbat  be  could  gain  was  tbat  Scbwarzenberg  was  pressing 
on  towards  tbe  west.  At  lengtb  be  fell  back  to  Leipzig, 
believing  tbat  Bliicber,  but  not  Bernadotte,  was  ad- 
vancing to  meet  Scbwarzenberg  and  take  part  in  a  great 
engagement.  As  be  entered  Leipzig  on  October  14tb 
tbe  cannon  of  Scbwarzenberg  was  beard  on  tbe  soutb. 
Napoleon  drew  up  for  battle.  Tbe  number  of  bis  troops 
in  position  around  tbe  city  was  1 70,000 :  about  Bata«  of  Lefa>. 
15,000  otbers  lay  witbin  call.  He  placed 
Marmont  and    Ney  on  tbe  nortb  of  Leipzig  at  the 

H  H 


514  MODBUN  JSUEOI'JEJ.  i8i3. 

village  of  Mockem,  to  meet  tlie  expected  onslauglit 
of  Bliiclier ;  and  himself,  witli  th.e  great  mass  of  his 
army,  took  post  on  the  south,  facing  Schwarzenberg. 
On  the  morning  of  the  16th,  Schwarzenberg  began  the 
attack.  His  numbers  did  not  exceed  150,000,  foT  the 
greater  part  of  the  Eussian  army  was  a  march  in  the 
rear.  The  battle  was  an  even  one.  The  Austrians 
failed  to  gain  ground :  with  one  more  army-corps 
Napoleon  saw  that  he  could  overpower  the  enemy.  He 
was  still  without  intelligence  of  Bliicher's  actual  appear- 
ance in  the  north ;  and  in  the  rash  hope  that  Bliicher's 
coming  might  be  delayed,  he  sent  orders  to  ISTey  and 
Marmont  to  leave  their  positions  and  hurry  to  the 
south  to  throw  themselves  upon  Schwarzenberg.  'Nej 
obeyed.  Marmont,  when  the  order  reached  him,  was 
actually  receiving  Bliicher's  first  fire.  He  determined  to 
remain  and  defend  the  village  of  Mockem,  though  left 
without  support.  York,  commanding  the  van-guard  of 
Blii  cher's  army,  assailed  him  with  the  utmost  fury.  A 
third  part  of  the  troops  engaged  on  each  side  were  killed 
or  wounded  before  the  day  closed ;  but  in  the  end  the 
victory  of  the  Prussians  was  complete.  It  was  the 
only  triumph  won  by  the  Allies  on  this  first  day  of 
the  battle,  but  it  turned  the  scale  against  Napoleon. 
Marmont' s  corps  was  destroyed ;  Ney,  divided  between 
Napoleon  and  Marmont,  had  rendered  no  effective  help 
to  either.  Schwarzenberg,  saved  from  a  great  disaster, 
needed  only  to  wait  for  Bernadotte  and  the  Eussian 
reserves,  and  to  renew  the  battle  with  an  additional 
force  of  100,000  men. 


laa.  BATTLE  OF  LEIPZIG,  516 

In  the  course  of  the  night  Napoleon  sent  proposals 
for  peace.  It  was  in  the  vain  hope  of  receiving  some 
friendly  answer  from  his  father-in-law,  the  Austrian 
Emperor,  that  he  delayed  making  his  retreat  during  the 
next  day,  while  it  might  still  have  been  unmolested. 
No  answer  was  returned  to  his  letter.  In  the  evening 
of  the  17th,  Bennigsen's  army  reached  the  field  of  battle. 
Next  morning  began  that  vast  and  decisive  encounter 
known  in  the  language  of  Germany  as  "  the  Battle  of 
battle  of  the  nations,"  the  greatest  battle 
in  all  authentic  history,  the  culmination  of  all  the 
military  effort  of  the  Napoleonic  age.  Not  less  than 
300,000  men  fought  on  the  side  of  the  AUies;  Napo- 
leon's own  forces  numbered  170,000.  The  battle  raged 
all  round  Leipzig,  except  on  the  west,  where  no  attempt 
was  made  to  interpose  between  Napoleon  and  the  line 
of  his  retreat.  As  in  the  first  engagement,  the  decisive 
successes  were  those  of  Bliicher,  now  tardily  aided  by 
Bernadotte,  on  the  north;  Schwarzenberg's  divisions, 
on  the  south  side  of  the  town,  fought  steadily,  but 
without  gaining  much  ground.  But  there  was  no  longer 
any  doubt  as  to  the  issue  of  the  struggle.  If  Napoleon 
could  not  break  the  Allies  in  the  first  engagement,  he 
had  no  chance  against  them  now  when  they  had  been 
joined  by  100,000  more  men.  The  storm  of  attack 
grew  wilder  and  wilder:  there  were  no  new  forces  to 
•  call  up  for  the  defence.  Before  the  day  wiis  half  over 
Napoleon  drew  in  his  outer  line,  and  began  to  make 
dispositions  for  a  retreat  from  Leipzig.  At  evening  long 
trains  of  wounded  from  the  hospitals  passed  through 
H  H  2 


516  ^    M0D:EBK  EUEOPB,  1813. 

the  western  gates  of  the  city  along  the  road  towards  the 
Ehine.  In  the  darkness  of  night  the  whole  army  was 
withdrawn  from  its  positions,  and  dense  masses  poured 
into  the  town,  until  every  street  was  blocked  with  con- 
fused and  impenetrable  crowds  of  cavalry  and  infantry. 
The  leading  divisions  moved  out  of  the  gates  before 
sunrise.  As  the  throng  lessened,  some  degree  of  order 
was  restored,  and  the  troops  which  Napoleon  intended 
to  cover  the  retreat  took  their  places  under  the  walls  of 
Leipzig.  The  Allies  advanced  to  the  storm  on  the 
morning  of  the  19th.  The  French  were 
zig,  19th.  driven  into  the  town :  the  victorious  enemy 

French  retreat.  •' 

pressed  on  towards  the  rear  of  the  retreating 
columns.  In  the  midst  of  the  struggle  an  explosion 
was  heard  above  the  roar  of  the  battle.  The  bridge 
over  the  Elster,  the  only  outlet  from  Leipzig  to  the 
west,  had  been  blown  up  by  the  mistake  of  a  French 
soldier  before  the  rear-guard  began  to  cross.  The  mass 
of  fugitives,  driven  from  the  streets  of  the  town,  found 
before  them  an  impassable  river.  Some  swam  to  the 
opposite  bank  or  perished  in  attempting  to  do  so;  the 
rest,  to  the  number  of  15,000,  laid  down  their  arms. 
This  was  the  end  of  the  battle.  Napoleon  had  lost  in 
the  three  days  40,000  killed  and  wounded,  260  guns, 
and  30,000  prisoners.  The  killed  and  wounded  of  the 
Allies  reached  the  enormous  sum  of  54,000. 

The  campaign  was  at  an  end.  Napoleon  led  off  a 
large  army,  but  one  that  was  in  no  condition  to  turn 
upon  its  pursuers.  At  each  stage  in  the  retreat  thousands 
of  fever-stricken  wretches  were  left  to  terrify  even  the 


1818.        "        TEEMS  OFFERED  AT  FBANKFOBT.  517 

pursuing  army  with  the  dread  of  their  infection.      It 
was  only  when  the  French  found  the  road  to  Frankfort 
blocked  at  Hanau  by  a  Bavarian  force  that 
they   rallied  to   the  order  of  battle.     The     Napoi«m  to 

•^  the  Rhine. 

Bavarians  were  cut  to  pieces ;  the  road  was 
opened;  and,  a  fortnight  after  the  Battle  of  Leipzig, 
Napoleon,  with  the  remnant  of  his  great  army,  re-crossed 
the  Ehine.  Behind  him  the  fabric  of  his  Empire  fell  to 
the  ground.  Jerome  fled  from  Westphalia;*  the  princes 
of  the  Ehenish  Confederacy  came  one  after  another  to 
make  their  peace  with  the  Allies ;  Biilow,  with  the  army 
which  had  conquered  Ney  at  Dennewitz,  marched  tlirough 
the  north  of  Germany  to  the  deliverance  of  Helland. 
Three  days  after  Napoleon  had  crossed  the  Ehine  the 
Czar  reached  Frankfort;  and  here,  on  the  conditions  of 
7th  of   November,  a  military  council  was     to  Napoieon  at 

'  -^  Frankfort,  Not. 

held,  in  which  Bliicher  and  Grneisenau,  ''*^- 
against  almost  all  the  other  generals,  advocated  an  im- 
mediate invasion  of  France.  The  soldiers,  however,  had 
time  to  re-c(msider  their  opinions,  for,  on  the  9th,  it  was 
decided  by  tne  representatives  of  the  Powers  to  send  au 
offer  of  peace  to  Napoleon,  and  the  operations  of  the  war 
were  suspended  by  common  consent.  The  condition  on 
which  peace  was  offered  to  Napoleon  was  the  surrender 
of  the  conquests  of  France  beyond  the  Alps  and  the 
Ehine.  The  Allies  were  still  willing  to  permit  the 
Emperor  to  retain  Belgium,  Savoy,  and  the  Ehenish 
Provinces;  they  declined,  however,  to  entei*  into  any 
negotiation  until  Napoleon  had  accepted  this  basis  of 
*  Memoires  de  Jeromei  vi.,  223. 


518.  MODE£,N  MUIWFK  1813. 

peace;  and  thej  demanded  a  distinct  reply  before  tlie 
end  of  the  month,  of  November. 

Napoleon,  who  had  now  arrived  in  Paris,  and  saw 
around  him  all  the  signs  of  power,  returned  indefinite 
answers.  The  month  ended  without  the  reply  which 
Offer  of  pea<»  ^^^  Allics  required;  and  on  the  1st  of 
iJec.  1.     '  December  the  offer  of  peace  was  declared  to 

be  withdrawn.  It  was  still  undecided  whether  the  war 
should  take  the  form  of  an  actual  invasion  of  France. 
The  memory  of  Brunswick's  campaign  of  1792,  and  of 
the  disasters  of  the  first  coalition  in  1793,  even  now 
exercised  a  powerful  influence  over  men's  minds.  Austria 
was  unwilling  to  drive  Napoleon  to  extremities,  or  to 
give  to  Eussia  and  Prussia  the  increased  influence  which 
they  would  gain  in  Europe  from  the  total  overthrow  of 
Napoleon's  power.  It  was  ultimately  determined  that 
the  allied  armies  should  enter  France,  but 

Flan  of  invasion 

of  France.  .|.-j^^.j-  j.-^^^  Austriaus,  iustcad  of  crossing  the 
north-eastern  frontier,  should  make  a  detour  by  Switzer- 
land, and  gain  the  plateau  of  Langres  in  Champagne, 
from  which  the  rivers  Seine,  Marne,  and  Aube,  with  the 
roads  following  their  valleys,  descend  in  the  direction  of 
the  capital.  The  plateau  of  Langres  was  said  to  be  of 
such  strategical  importance  that  its  occupation  by  an 
invader  would  immediately  force  Napoleon  to  make  peace. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  plateau  was  of  no  strategical 
importance  whatever;  but  the  Austrians  desired  to 
occupy  it,  partly  with  the  view  of  guarding  against  any 
attack  from  the  direction  of  Italy  and  Lyons,  partly 
from  their  want  of   the  heavy   artillery  necessary  for 


1813.  WELimOTUN  E^sTEUa  FUANCE,  519 

besieging  the  fortresses  farther  north,*  and  from  a  just 
appreciation  of  the  dangers  of  a  campaign  conducted  in 
a  hostile  country  intersected  by  several  rivers.  Anything 
was  welcomed  by  Metternich  that  seemed  likely  to  avert, 
or  even  to  postpone,  a  struggle  with  Napoleon  for  life 
or  death.  Bliicher  correctly  judged  the  march  through 
Switzerland  to  be  mere  procrastination.  He  was  himself 
permitted  to  take  the  straight  road  into  Trance,  though  his 
movements  were  retarded  in  order  to  keep  pace  with  the 
cautious  steps  of  Schwarzenberg.  On  the  last  day  of  the 
year  1813  the  Prussian  general  crossed  the  Khine  near 
Coblentz;  on  the  18th  of  January,  1814, 
the  Austrian  army,  having  advanced  from  France,  Jan., 
Switzerland  by  BeKort  and  Yesoul,  reached 
its  halting-place  on  the  plateau  of  Langres.  Here  the 
march  stopped ;  and  here  it  was  expected  that  terms  of 
peace  would  be  proposed  by  Napoleon. 

It  was  not  on  the  eastern  side  alone  that  the  invader 
was  now  entering  France.  Wellington  had  passed  the 
Pyrenees.      His  last  victorious  march  into  the  north  of 

•  "  Tonr  lordship  has  only  to  recollect  the  fonr  days*  continued  fighting 
at  Leipzig,  followed  by  fourteen  dajrs'  forced  marches  in  the  worst  weather, 
in  order  to  understand  the  reasons  that  made  some  repose  absolutely  neces- 
sary. The  total  loss  of  the  Austriaiis  alone,  since  the  10th  of  August,  at 
the  time  of  our  arrival  at  Frankfort,  waa  80,000  men.  We  were  entirely 
unprovided  with  heavy  artillery,  the  nearest  battery  tr^  not  having 
advanced  further  than  the  frontiers  of  Bohemia.'*  It  was  thought  for  » 
moment  that  the  gates  of  Strasburg  and  Huningen  miglit  be  opened 
by  bribery,  and  the  Austrian  Government  authorised  the  expenditure  of  a 
milli(m  florins  for  this  purpose ;  in  that  case  the  march  into  Switrorland 
would  have  been  abandoned.  The  bribing  plan,  however,  broke  down. 
—Lord  Aberdeen's  despatches,  Nov.  24^  Dec.  26,  1818.  Aecords: 
Austria,  107. 


520  MODERN  BUBOPK  1814. 

Spain  began  on  tlie  day  when  the  Prussian  and  Eussian 
armies  were  defeated  by  Napoleon  at  Bautzen  (May  21, 
1813).  During  tbe  armistice  of  Dresden,  a  week  before 
Austria  signed  tbe  treaty  wbicb  fixed  tbe 
tering    France     couditious  of  its  armed  mediation,  be  bad 

from  the  south. 

gained  an  overwhelming  triumph  at  Yittoria 
over  King  Joseph  and  the  French  army,  as  it  retreated 
with  all  the  spoils  gathered  in  five  years'  occupation  of 
Spain  (June  21).  A  series  of  bloody  engagements  had 
given  the  English  the  passes  of  the  P3rrenees  in  those 
same  days  of  August  and  September  that  saw  the  allied 
armies  close  around  Napoleon  at  Dresden:  and  when, 
after  the  catastrophe  of  Leipzig,  the  wreck  of  Napoleon's 
host  was  retreating  beyond  the  Ehine,  Soult,  the  defender 
of  the  Pyrenees,  was  driven  by  the  British  general  from 
his  entrenchments  on  the  Nivelle,  and  forced  back  under 
the  walls  of  Bayonne. 

Twenty  years  had  passed  since,  in  the  tempestuous 
morn  of  the  Eevolution,  Hoche  swept  the  armies  of  the 
first  coalition  across  the  Alsatian  frontier.  Since  then, 
French  soldiers  had  visited  every  capital,  and  watered 
every  soil  with  their  blood;  but  no  ^foreign  soldier  had 

set  foot  on  French  soil.  Now  the  cruel 
unable  to  hold     goads    of    Napolcou's    military   glory   had 

spent  the  nation's  strength,  and  the  force  no 
longer  existed  which  could  bar  the  way  to  its  gathered 
enemies.  The  armies  placed  upon  the  eastern  frontier 
had  to  fall  back  before  an  enemy  five  times  more 
numerous  than  themselves.  Napoleon  had  not  expected 
that  the  Allies  would  enter  France  before  the  spring. 


M14.  CAMPAIGN  IN  FRANCE.  521 

With  three  montlis  given  him  for  organisation,  he  could 
have  made  the  frontier-armies  strong  enough  to  maintain 
their  actual  positions  :  the  winter  advance  of  the  Allies 
compelled  him  to  ahandon  the  border  districts  of  France, 
and  to  concentrate  his  defence  in  Champagne,  between 
the  Marne,  the  Seine,  and  the  Aube.  This  district  was 
one  which  offered  extraordinary  advantages  to  a  great 
general  acting  against  an  irresolute  and  ill-  j^^^  .^.^  _,^ 
commanded  enemy.  By  holding  the  bridges  "^  defence, 
over  the  three  rivers,  and  drawing  his  own  supplies  along 
the  central  road  from  Paris  to  Arcis-sur-Aube,  Napoleon 
could  securely  throw  the  bulk  of  his  forces  from  one 
side  to  the  other  against  the  flank  of  the  Allies,  while 
his  own  movements  were  covered  by  the  rivers,  which 
could  not  be  passed  except  at  the  bridges.  A  capable 
commander  at  the  head  of  the  Allies  would  have 
employed  the  same  river-strategy  against  Napoleon  him- 
self, after  conquering  one  or  two  points  of  passage  by 
main  force ;  but  Napoleon  had  nothing  of  the  kind  to 
fear  from  Schwarzenberg ;  and  if  the  Austrian  head- 
quarters continued  to  control  the  movements  of  the 
allied  armies,  it  WUs  even  now  doubtful  whether  the 
campaign  would  close  at  Paris  or  on  the  Khine. 

For  some  days  after  the  arrival  of  the  monarchs  and 
diplomatists  at  Langres  (Jan.  22),  Mettemich  and  the 
more  timorous  among  the  generals  opposed  q^^_  ^ 
any  further  advance  into  France,  and  *®^^ 
argued  that  the  army  had  already  gained  all  it  needed 
by  the  occupation  of  the  border  provinces.  It  was  only 
upon  the  threat  of  the  Czar  to  continue  the  war  by  him- 


522  MODERN  EUROPE.  1814. 

self  tliat  tlie  Austrians  consented  to  move  forward  upon 
Paris.  After  several  days  had  been  lost  in  discussion, 
tlie  advance  from  Langres  was  begun.  Orders  were 
given  to  Bliicber,  who  bad  pusbed  back  tbe  French 
divisions  commanded  by  Marmont  and  Mortier,  and  who 
was  now  near  St.  Dizier  on  the  Marne,  to  meet  the  Great 
Army  at  Brienne.  This  was  the  situation  of  the  Allies 
when,  on  the  25th  of  January,  Napoleon  left  Paris,  and 
placed  himself  at  Chalons  on  the  Marne,  at  the  head  of 
his  left  wing,  having  his  right  at  Troyes  and  at  Arcis, 
guarding  the  bridges  over  the  Seine  and  the  Aube. 
Napoleon  knew  that  Bliicber  was  moving  towards  the 
Austrians ;  he  hoped  to  hold  the  Prussian  general  in 
check  at  St.  Dizier,  and  to  throw  himself  upon  the 
heads  of  Schwarzenberg's  columns  as  they  moved  to- 
wards the  Aube.  Bliicber,  however,  had  already  passed 
St.  Dizier  when  Napoleon  reached  it.  Napoleon  pursued, 
and  overtook  the  Prussians  at  Brienne.  After  an  in- 
decisive battle,  Bliicber  fell  back  towards  Schwarzenberg. 
The  allied  armies  effected  their  junction,  and  Bliicber, 
now  supported  by  the  Austrians,  turned  and  marched 
down  the  right  bank  of  the  Aube  to  meet  Napoleon. 
Napoleon,  though  far  outnumbered,  accepted  battle. 
He  was  attacked  at  La  Eothiere,  close  above  Brienne, 
and  defeated  with  heavy  loss  (Feb.  1).  A  vigorous 
pursuit  would  probably  have  ended  the  war ;  but  the 
Austrians  held  back.  Schwarzenberg  believed  peace  to 
be  already  gained,  and  condemned  all  further  action  as 
useless  waste  of  life.  In  spite  of  the  protests  of  the 
Emperor  Alexander,  he  allowed  Napoleon  to  retire  un- 


1814.  CAMPAIGN  IN  FEANOE.  523 

molested.  Schwarzenberg's  inaction  was  no  mere  error  in 
military  judgment.  There  was  a  direct  conflict  l^etween 
tlie  Czar  and  tlie  Austrian  Cabinet  as  to  the  cik^.  io  be 
obtained  by  the  war.  Alexander  already  insisted  on  the 
dethronement  of  Napoleon;  the  Austrian  Government 
would  have  been  content  to  leave  Napoleon  in  power  if 
he  would  accept  a  peace  giving  France  no  worse  a 
frontier  than  it  had  possessed  in  1791.  Castlereagh, 
who  had  come  from  England,  and  Hardenberg  were  as 
yet  inclined  to  support  Metternich's  policy,  although  the 
whole  Prussian  army,  the  public  opinion  of  Great 
Britain,  and  the  counsels  of  Stein  and  all  the  bolder 
Prussian  statesmen,  were  on  the  side  of  the  Czar.* 

Already  the  influence  of  the  peace -party  was  so  far 
in  the  ascendant  that  negotiations  had  been  opened  with 
Napoleon.  Eepresentatives  of  all  the  Powers 
assembled  at  Chatillon,  in  Burgundy;  and  ciiatiuon.  Feb. 
there,  towards  the  end  of  January,  Caulain- 
court  appeared  on  behalf  of  France.  The  first  sitting 
took  place  on  the  5th  of  February;  on  the  following 
day  Caulaincourt  received  full  powers  from  Napoleon  to 
conclude  peace.  The  Allies  laid  down  as  the  condition 
of  peace  the  limitation  of  France  to  the  frontiers  of 
1791.  Had  Caulaincourt  dared  to  conclude  peace  in- 
stantly on  these  terms,  Napoleon  would  have  retained 

•  CastlereajfVs  dos))atch  from  Langres,  Jan.  29,  1814.  Beoords: 
Continent,  Vol.  11. :  "  As  far  a»  I  have  hitherto  felt  myself  called  on  to 
give  an  opinion,  I  have  stated  tliat  the  British  Government  did  not  decline 
treating  with  Bnonaparte."  "  The  Czar  said  ho  observed  my  riew^  of  the 
question  was  different  iloiw  what  he  believed  prevailed  in  Engbuid*  {id, 
Feb.  16).    See  Southey's  fine  Ode  on  the  Negotiations  of  1814 


524  MOJPEEN  EUROPE.  1814. 

liis  throne ;  but  "he  was  aware  that  Napoleon  had  only 
granted  him  full  powers  in  consequence  of  the  disastrous 
tattle  of  La  Eothi^re,  and  he  feared  to  be  disavowed  by 
his  master  as  soon  as  the  army  had  escaped  from  danger. 
InBtead  of  simply  accepting  the  Allies'  offer,  he  raised 
questions  as  to  the  future  of  Italy  and  Grermany*  The 
moment  was  lost ;  on  the  9tB,,  of  February  the  Czar 
recalled  his  envoy  from  Chatillon,  and  the  sittings  of 
the  Congress  were  broken  off. 

Schwarzenberg  was  now  slowly  and  unwillingly 
moving  foj-wards  along  the  Seine  towards  Troyes. 
Bliicher  was  permitted  to  return  to  the  Marne,  and  to 
advance  upon  Paris  by  an  independent  line  of  march.  He 
crossed  the  country  between  the  Aube  and  the  Marne,  and 
joined  some  divisions  which  he  had  left  behiSid  him  on 
the  latter  river.     But  his  dispositions  were 

Defeats  of  Bltt-  ^ 

liSne^ reb*io  outrageously  careless :  his  troops  were  scat- 
tered over  a  space  of  sixty  miles  from  Chalons 
westward,  as  if  he  had  no  enemy  to  guard  against  except 
the  weak  divisions  commanded  by  Mortier  and  Marmont, 
which  had  uniformly  fallen  back  before  his  advance. 
Suddenly  Napoleon  himself  appeared  at  the  centre  of  the 
long  Prussian  line  at  Champaubert.  He  had  hastened 
northwards  in  pursuit  of  Bliicher  with  30,000  men,  as 
soon  as  Schwarzenberg  entered  Troyes ;  and  on  February 
10th  a  weak  Eussian  corps  that  lay  in  the  centre  of 
Bliicher's  column  was  overwhelmed  before  it  was  known 
the  Emperor  had  left  the  Seine.  Tl^en,  turning  leftwards, 
Napoleon  overthrew  the  Prussian  van-guard  at  Mont- 
mirail,  and  two  days  later  attacked  and  defeated  Bliicher 


1814.  OONQEEiSS  OF  OEATILLON.  b2^ 

himself,  who  was  bringing  up  the  remainder  of  his  troops 
in  total  ignorance  of  the  enemy  with  whom  he  had  to  deal. 
In  four  days  Bliicher's  army,  which  numbered  70,000 
men,  had  thrice  been  defeated  in  detail  by  a  force  of 
30,000.  Bliicher  was  compelled  to  fall  back  upon 
Chalons ;  Napoleon  instantly  returned  to  the  support  of 
Oudinot's  division,  which  he  had  left  in  front  of  Schwar- 
zenberg.  In  order  to  relieve  Bliicher,  the  Austrians  had 
pushed  forward  on  the  Seine  beyond  Montereau.  Within 
three  days  after  the  battle  with  Bliicher,  Napoleon  was 
back  upon  the  Seine,  and  attacking  the  heads  of  the 
Austrian  column.  On  the  18th  of  February  he  gained  so 
decisive  a  victory  at  Montereau  that  Schwarzenberg 
abandoned  the  advance,  and  fell  back  upon 
Troyes,  sending  word  to  Bliicher  to  come 
southwards  again  and  help  him  to  fight  a  great  battle. 
Bliicher  moved  off  with  admirable  energy,  and  came  into 
the  neighbourhood  of  Troyes  witliin  a  week  after  his 
defeats  upon  the  Marne.  But  the  design  of  fighting  a 
great  battle  was  given  up.  The  disinclination  of  the 
Austrians  to  vigorous  action  was  too  strong  to  be  over- 
come ;  and  it  was  finally  determined  that  Schwarzenberg 
should  fall  back  almost  to  the  plateau  of 
Langres,  leaving  Bliicher  to  unite  with  the  untoward, 
troops  of  Biilow  which  had  conquered  Hol- 
land, and  to  operate  on  the  enemy's  flank  and  rear. 

The  effect  of  Napoleon's  sudden  victories  on  the 
Marne  was  instantly  seen  in  the  councils  of  the  allied 
sovereigns.  Alexander,  who  had  withdrawn  his  envoy 
from  Chatillon,  could  no  longer  hold  out  against  nego- 


Monteres^ 
Feb.  18. 


526  MODERN  EUIiOPE.  18U. 

tiations  witli  Napoleon.     He  restored  tlie  powers  of  his 
envoy,  and  tlie  Confess  re-assembled.    But 

Congress         of  ^  *-'        ^ 

8umed?'''Feb.'^S  Napoleon  already  saw  himself  in  imagination 
driving  tlie  invaders  beyond  the  Ehine,  and 
sent  orders  to  Caulaincourt  to  insist  upon  the  terms  pro- 
posed at  Frankfort,  which  left  to  France  both  the  Ehenish 
Provinces  and  Belgium.  At  the  same  time  he  attempted 
to  open  a  private  negotiation  with  his  father-in-law  the 
Emperor  of  Austria,  and  to  detach  him  from  the  cause  of 
the  Allies.  The  attempt  failed ;  the  demands  now  made 
by  Caulaincourt  overcame  even  the  peaceful  inclinations 
of  the  Austrian  Minister;  and  on  the  1st  of  March  the 
Allies  signed  a  new  treaty  at  Chaumont,  pledging  them- 
selves to  conclude  no  peace  with  Napoleon  that  did  not 
restore  the  frontier  of  1791,  and  to  maintain  a  defensive 
alliance  against  France  for  a  period  of  twenty  years.* 
Caulaincourt  continued  for  another  fortnight  at  Chatillon, 
instructed  by  Napoleon  to  prolong  the  negotiations,  but 
forbidden  to  accept  the  only  conditions  which  the  Allies 
were  willing  to  grant. 

Bliicher  was  now  on  his  way  northwards  to  join  the 
so-called  army  of  Bemadotte  upon  the  Aisne. 


Napoleon  fol- 
lows Bliicher  tc 
the  north.  Battle 
ofLaon.Mar.lO, 


ihIL?!h.'Bfttte     Since  the  Battle  of  Leipzig,  Bernadotte  him- 


self had  taken  no  part  in  the  movements  of 
the  army  nominally  under  his  command.  The  Nether- 
lands had  been  conquered  by  Biilow  and  the  Eussian 
general  Winzingerode,  and  these  officers  were  now  push- 
ing southwards  in  order  to  take  part  with  Bliicher  in  a 
movement  against  Paris.     Napoleon  calculated  that  the 

*  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1.  121. 


ML4.  THE  ALLIES  MOVE  ON  PARIS.  627 

fortress  of  Soissons  would  bar  the  way  to  the  northern 
army,  and  enable  him  to  attack  and  crush  Bliiclier  before 
he  could  effect  a  junction  with  his  colleagues.  He  set  out 
in  pursuit  of  the  Prussians,  still  hoping  for  a  second 
series  of  victories  like  those  he  had  won  upon  the  Mame. 
But  the  cowardice  of  the  commander  of  Soissons  ruined 
his  chances  of  success.  The  fortress  surrendered  to  the 
Eussians  at  the  first  summons.  Bliiclier  met  the  advanced 
guard  of  the  northern  army  upon  the  Aisne  on  the  4th 
of  March,  and  continued  his  march  towards  Laon  for  the 
purpose  of  uniting  with  its  divisions  which  lay  in  the  rear. 
The  French  followed,  but  the  only  advantage  gained  by 
Napoleon  was  a  victory  over  a  detached  Eussian  corps  at 
Craonne.  Marmont  was  defeated  with  heavy  loss  by  a 
sally  of  Bliiclier  from  his  strong  position  on  the  hill  of 
Laon  (March  10) ;  and  the  Emperor  himself,  unable  to 
restore  the  fortune  of  the  battle,  fell  back  upon  Soissons, 
and  thence  marched  southward  to  throw  himself  again 
upon  the  line  of  the  southern  army. 

Schwarzenberg  had  once  more  begun  to  move  forward 
on  the  news  of  Bliicher's  victory  at  Laon.  His  troops 
were  so  widely  dispersed  that  Napoleon  might  even  now 
have  cut  the  line  in  halves  had  he  kno\vn  Schwarzenberg's 
real  position.  But  he  made  a  detour  in  order     „ 

•t  Napoleon 

to  meet  Oudinot*s  corps,  and  gave  the  Aus-  SS^  t^e  SJ 
trians  time  to  concentrate  at  Arcis-sur-Aube. 
Here,  on  the  20th  of  Mai'ch,  Napoleon  found  himself  in 
face  of  an  army  of  100,000  men.  His  own  army  was 
less  than  a  third  of  that  number ;  yet  with  unalterable 
contempt  for  the  enemy  he  risked  another  battle.     No 


528  MOBEEN  EUROPE.  isii. 

decided  issue  was  readied  in  the  first  day's  figliting,  and 
Napoleon  remained  in  position,  expecting  that  Schwar- 
zenberg  would  retreat  during  the  night.  But  on  the 
n^orrow  the  Austrians  were  still  fronting  him.  Schwar- 
zenberg  had  at  length  learnt  his  own  real  superiority,  and 
resolved  to  assist  the  enemy  no  longer  by  a  wretched 
system  of  retreat.  A  single  act  of  firmness  on  the  part 
of  the  Austrian  commander  showed  ]N'apoleon  that  the 
war  of  battles  was  at  an  end.  He  abandoned  all  hope  of 
resisting  the  invaders  in  front :  it  only  remained  for  him 
to  throw  himself  on  to  their  rear,  and,  in  company  with 
the  frontier-garrisons  and  the  army  of  Lyons,  to  attack 
their  communications  with  Germany.  The  plan  was  no 
unreasonable  one,  if  Paris  could  either  have  sustained  a 
siege  or  have  fallen  into  the  enemy's  hands  without  ter- 
minating the  war.  But  the  Allies  rightly  judged  that 
Napoleon's  power  would  be  extinct  from  the  moment  that 
Paris  submitted.  They  received  the  intelligence  of  the 
Emperor's  march  to  the  east,  and  declined  to  follow  him. 
The  armies  of  Schwarzenberg  and  Bliicher  approached 
one  another,  and  moved  together  on  Paris.  It  was  at 
Vitry,  on  March  27th,  that  Napoleon  first  discovered 
that  the  troops  which  had  appeared  to  be  following  his 
eastward  movement  were  but  a  detachment  of  cavalry, 
and  that  the  allied  armies  were  in  full  march  upon  the 
capital.  He  instantly  called  up  every  division  within 
reach,  and  pushed  forward  by  forced  marches  for  the 
Seine,  hoping  to  fall  upon  Schwarzenberg's  rear  before 
the  allied  van-guard  could  reach  Paris.  But  at  each  hour 
of  the  march  it  became  more  evident  that  the  enemy  was 


1814.   ^  CAPITULATION  OF  PABIS.  529 

far  in  advance.  For  two  days  Napoleon  urged  his  men 
forward ;  at  length,  unable  to  bear  the  in-  The  AiiiM  .d. 
tolerable  suspense,  he  quitted  the  army  on 
the  morning  of  the  30th,  and  drove  forward  at  the  utmost 
speed  along  the  road  through  Fontainebleau  to  the  capital. 
As  day  sank,  he  met  reports  of  a  battle  already  begun. 
When  he  reached  the  village  of  Fromenteau,  fifteen  miles 
from  Paris,  at  ten  o'clock  at  night,  he  heard  that  Paris 
had  actually  surrendered. 

The  Allies  had  pressed  forward  without  taking  any 
notice  of  Napoleon's  movements,,  and  at  early  morning 
on  the  30th  they  had  opened  the  attack  on  Attack  onPfcri., 
the  north-eastern  heights  of  Paris.  Mar-  March  ao. 
mont,  with  the  fragments  of  a  beaten  army  and  some 
weak  divisions  of  the  National  Guard,  had  but  35,000 
men  to  oppose  to  three  times  that  number  of  the  enemy. 
The  Government  had  taken  no  steps  to  arm  the  people, 
or  to  prolong  resistance  after  the  outside  line  of  defence 
was  lost,  although  the  erection  of  barricades  would  have 
held  the  Allies  in  check  until  Napoleon  arrived  with  his 
army.  While  Marmont  fought  in  the  outer  suburbs, 
masses  of  the  people  were  drawn  up  on  Montmartre,  ex- 
pecting the  Emperor's  appeanmce,  and  the  spectacle  of 
a  great  and  decisive  battle.  But  the  firing  o^^pituiation  o« 
in  the  outskirts  stopped  soon  after  noon :  it  '**' 

was  announced  that  Marmont  had  capitulated.  The  re- 
port struck  the  people  with  stupor  and  fury.  They  had 
vainly  been  demimding  arms  since  early  morning ;  and 
even  after  the  capitulation  unsigned  papers  were  handed 
about  by  men  of  the  working  classes,  advocating  further 
I  I 


530  MODERN  EUROPE,  1814. 

resistance.*  But  tlie  people  no  longer  knew  tow  to 
follow  leaders  of  its  own.  ]N'apoleon  liad  trained  France 
to  look  only  to  himself :  Ms  absence  left  the  masses, 
who  were  still  eager  to  fight  for  France,  helpless  in  the 
presence  of  the  conqueror :  there  were  enemies  enough  of 
the  Grovernment  among  the  richer  classes  to  make  the 
entry  of  the  foreigner  into  Paris  a  scene  of  actual  joy 
and  exaltation.  To  such  an  extent  had  the  spirit  of 
caste  and  the  malignant  delight  in  !N'apoleon*s  ruin  over- 
powered the  love  of  France  among  the  party  of  the  old 
noblesse,  that  upon  the  entry  of  the  allied  forces  into 
Paris  on  the  31st  of  March  hundreds  of  aristocratic 
Allies  enter  womcu  kisscd  thc  hauds,  or  the  very  boots 

Pans,  March 81.  ^^^  horscs,  of  thc  Icadcrs  of  the  train,  and 
cheered  the  Cossacks  who  escorted  a  band  of  French 
prisoners,  bleeding  and  exhausted,  through  the  streets. 

Napoleon's  reign  was  indeed  at  an  end.  Since  the 
rupture  of  the  Congress  of  Chatillon  on  the  18th  of 
March,  the  Allies  had  determined  to  make  his  dethrone- 
ment a  condition  of  peace.  As  the  end  approached,  it 
was  seen  that  no  successor  was  possible  but  the  chief  of 
the  House  of  Bourbon,  although  Austria  would  perhaps 
have  consented  to  the  establishment  of  a  Eegency  imder 
the  Empress  Marie  Louise,  and  the  Czar  had  for  a  time 
entertained  the  project  of  placing  Bernadotte  at  the  head 
of  the  French  State.  Immediately  after  the  entry  into 
Paris  it  was  determined  to  raise  the  exile  Louis  XYIII. 
to  the  throne.  The  politicians  of  the  Empire  who 
followed  Talleyrand  were  not  unwilling  to  unite  with  the 

*  Berauger,  Biograpliie,  ed.  duod.,  p.  354. 


1814.  THE  CZAR  AND   THE  BOURBONS.  631 

conquerors,  and  with  the  small  party  of  Koyalist  no- 
blesse, in  recalling  the  Bourbon  dynasty.     Alexander, 
who  was  the  real  master  of  the  situation,  rightly  judged 
Talleyrand  to  be  the  man  most  capable  of  enlisting  the 
public  opinion  of  France  on  the  side  of  the  new  order. 
He  took  up  his  abode  at  Talleyrand's  house,  and  em- 
ployed this  dexterous  statesman  as  the  advocate  both  of 
the  policy  of  the  Allies,  and  of  the  principles  of  consti- 
tutional liberty,  which  at  this  time  Alexander  himself 
sincerely  befriended.    A  Provisional  Govern- 
ment   was    appointed    under    Talleyrand's        aeXo^, 
leadership.     On  the  2nd  of  April  the  Senate 
proclaimed  the  dethronement  of  Napoleon.     On  the  6th 
it  published  a  Constitution,  and  recalled  the  House  of 
Bourbon. 

Louis  XYIII.  was  still  in  England :  his  brother,  the 
Count  of  Artois,  had  joined  the  invaders  in  France  and 
assumed  the  title  of  Lieutenant  of  the  Kingdom ;  but 
the  influence  of  Alexander  was  necessary  to  force  this 
obstinate  and  unteachable  man  into  anything  like  a 
constitutional  position.  The  Provisional  Government 
invited  the  Count  to  take  up  the  administration  until 
the  King's  arrival,  in  virtue  of  a  decree  of  the  Senate. 
D' Artois  declined  to  recognise  the  Senate's  competency, 
and  claimed  the  Lieutenancy  of  the  Kingdom  as  his 
brother's  representative.  The  Senate  refusing  to  admit 
the  Count's  divine  right,  some  unmeaning  words  were 
exchanged  when  d' Artois  entered  Paris;  and  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  disregarding  the  claims  of  the 
Royal  Lieutenant,  continued  in  the  full  exercise  of  its 
I  i2 


532  MODERN  EUROPE.  1814. 

powers.  At  lengtli  tlie  Czar  insisted  tliat  d'Artois 
should  give  way.  The  decree  of  the  Senate  was  accord- 
ingly accepted  by  him  at  the  Tuileries  on  the  14th  of 
April;  the  Provisional  Government  retired,  and  a 
Council  of  State  was  formed,  in  which  Talleyrand  still 
continued  to  exercise  the  real  powers  of  government.  In 
the  address  made  by  d'Artois  on  this  occasion,  he  stated 
that  although  the  King  had  not  empowered  him  to 
accept  the  Constitution  made  b}^  the  Senate  on  the  6th 
of  April,  he  entertained  no  doubt  that  the  King  would 
accept  the  principles  embodied  in  that  Constitution, 
which  were  those  of  Eepresentative  Grovernment,  of  the 
freedom  of  the  press,  and  of  the  responsibility  of  minis- 
ters. A  week  after  d'Artois'  declaration,  Louis  XVIII. 
arrived  in  France. 

Louis  XYIIL,  though  capable  of  adapting  himself 
in  practice  to  a  constitutional  system,  had  never  permitted 
himself  to  question  the  divine  right  of  the  House  of 
Bourbon  to  sovereign  power.  The  exiles  who  surrounded 
him  were  slow  to  understand  the  needs  of  the  time. 
They  recommended  the  King  to  reject  the  Constitution. 
Louis  made  an  ambiguous  answer  when  the  Legislative 
Body  met  him  at  Compiegne  and  invited  an  expression 
of  the  royal  policy.  It  was  again  necessary  for  the  Cz/ir 
to  interfere,  and  to  explain  to  the  Kinsf  that 

Louis  XVnL  ^  ^ 

and  the  Czar.  Prauce  could  no  longer  be  an  absolute 
monarchy.  Louis,  however,  was  a  better  arguer  than 
the  Count  of  Artois.  He  reasoned  as  a  man  whom  the 
sovereigns  of  Europe  had  felt  it  their  duty  to  restore 
without  any  request  from  himself.     If  the  Senate  of 


mi.  THE  B0UBB0N8  IN  PABI8.  633 

Napoleon,    lie   urged,  had   the   right  to  give   France 
a  Constitution,   he  himself  ought   never  to  have  been 
brought  from   his   peaceful   English   home.      He  was 
willing  to  grant  a  free   Constitution  to  his  people  in 
exercise  of  his  own  royal  rights,  but  he  could  not  recog- 
nise one  created  by  the  servants  of  an  usurper.     Alex- 
ander was  but  half  satisfied  with  the  liberal  professions 
of  Louis  :  he  did  not,  however,  insist  on  his  acceptance 
of   the  Constitution  drawn  up  by  the  Senate,  but  he 
informed  him  that  until  the  promises  made  by  d'Artois 
w^ere  confirmed  by  a  royal  proclamation,  there 
would  be  no  entry  into  Paris.     The  King  at     entem  p»m, 
length    signed   a  proclamation   written   by 
Talleyrand,  and  made  his  festal  entry  into  the  capital  on 
the  3rd  of  May. 

The  promises  of  Louis  himseK,  the  unbroken  cour- 
tesy and  friendliness  shown  by  the  Allies  to  Paris  since 
their  victory  a  month  before,   had  almost 

.   .  Feeling  ol 

extinguished  the  popular  feeling  of  hostility  ^'^'' 
towards  a  dynasty  which  owed  its  recall  to  the  over- 
throw of  French  armies.  The  foreign  leaders  themselves 
had  begun  to  excite  a  certain  admiration  and  interest. 
Alexander  was  considered,  and  with  good  reason,  as  a 
generous  enemy  ;  the  simplicity  of  the  King  of  Prussia, 
his  misfortunes,  his  well -remembered  gallantry  at  the 
Battle  of  Jena,  gained  him  general  sympathy.  It  mH>ded 
but  little  on  the  part  of  the  returning  Bourbons  to  con- 
vert the  interest  and  curiosity  of  Paris  into  affection. 
The  cortege  which  entered  the  capital  with  Louis  XVIII. 
brought  back,  in  a  singular  motley  of  obsolete  and  of 


534  MODERN  EUROPE.  1814. 

foreign  costumes,  the  bearers  of  many  unforgotten  names. 
The  look  of  tlie  King  "himself,  as  lie  drove  tlirongli  Paris, 
pleased  tlie  people.  The  childless  father  of  the  murdered 
Duke  of  Enghien  gained  the  pitying  attention  of  those 
few  who  knew  the  face  of  a  man  twenty-five  years  an 
exile.  But  there  was  one  among  the  members  of  the 
returning  families  whom  every  heart  in  Paris  went  out 
to  meet.  The  daughter  of  Louis  XYI.,  who  had  shared 
the  captivity  of  her  parents  and  of  her  brother,  the  sole 
survivor  of  her  deeply -wronged  house,  now  returned  as 
Duchess  of  Angouleme.  The  uniquely  mournful  history 
of  her  girlhood,  and  her  subsequent  marriage  with  her 
cousin,  the  son  of  the  Count  of  Artois,  made  her  the  natural 
object  of  a  warmer  sympathy  than  could  attach  to  either 
of  the  brothers  of  Louis  XYI.  But  adversity  had  im- 
printed its  lines  too  deeply  upon  the  features  and  the 
disposition  of  this  joyless  woman  for  a  moment's  light 
to  return.  Her  voice  and  her  aspect  repelled  the  affec- 
tion which  thousands  were  eager  to  offer  to  her.  Before 
the  close  of  the  first  days  of  the  restored  monarchy,  it 
was  felt  that  the  Bourbons  had  brought  back  no  single 
person  among  them  who  was  capable  of  winning  the 
Prench  nation's  love. 

The  recall  of  the  ancient  line  had  been  allowed  to 
appear  to  the  world  as  the  work  of  Prance  itself ;  Napo- 
leon's fate  could  only  be  fixed  by  his  con- 

Napoleon. 

querors.  After  the  fall  of  Paris,  Napoleon 
remained  at  Pontainebleau  awaiting  events.  The  soldiers 
and  the  younger  ofiicers  of  his  army  were  still  ready  to 
fight  for  him ;  the  marshals,  however,  were  utterly  weary, 


NAPOLEON  SENT  TO  ELBA,  535 

and  determined  that  France  should  no  longer  suffer  for 
the  sake  of  a  single  man.  They  informed  Napoleon  that 
he  must  abdicate.  Yielding  to  their  pressure,  Napoleon, 
on  the  3rd  of  April,  drew  up  an  act  of  abdication  in 
favour  of  his  infant  son,  and  sent  it  by  Caulaincourt  to  the 
allied  sovereigns  at  Paris.  The  document  was  rejected 
by  the  Allies ;  Caulaincourt  returned  with  the  intelli- 
gence that  Napoleon  must  renounce  the  throne  for  him- 
self and  all  his  family.  For  a  moment  the  Emperor 
thought  of  renewing  the  war ;  but  the  marshals  refused 
their  aid  more  resolutely  than  before,  and,  on  the  6th  of 
April,  Napoleon  signed  an  unconditional  surrender  of  the 
throne  for  himself  and  his  heirs.  He  was  permitted  by 
the  Allies  to  retain  the  unmeaning  title  of  Emperor,  and 
to  carry  with  him  a  body-^uard  and  a  con-     ,,    , 

•^  ./    o  Napoleon  aeot 

siderable  revenue  to  the  island  of  Elba,  toEib*. 
henceforward  to  be  his  principality  and  his  prison.  The 
choice  of  this  island,  within  easy  reach  of  France  and 
Italy,  and  too  extensive  to  be  guarded  without  a  large 
fleet,  was  due  to  Alexander's  ill-judged  generosity 
towards  Napoleon,  and  to  a  promise  made  to  Marmont 
that  the  liberty  of  the  Emperor  should  be  respected. 
Alexander  was  not  left  without  warning  of  the  probable 
effects  of  his  leniency.  Sir  Charles  Stewart,  military 
representative  of  Great  Britain  at  the  allied  head- 
quarters, urged  both  his  own  and  the  allied  Governments 
to  substitute  some  more  distant  island  for  Elba,  if  they 
desired  to  save  Europe  from  a  renewed  Napoleonic  war, 
and  France  from  the  misery  of  a  second  invasion.  The 
Allies,  though  not  without  misgivings,  adhered  to  their 


536  MODERN  EUROPE.  1814. 

original  plan,  and  left  it  to  time  to  justify  tlie  predictions 
of  tlieir  adviser. 

It  was  well  known  what  would  be  tlie  terms  of 
peace,  now  that  Napoleon  was  removed  from  the  throne. 
Treaty  of  Paris,  "^^^^  AlHcs  had  uo  intcutiou  of  depriving 
France  of  any  of  the  territory  that  it  had 
held  before  1792  :  the  conclusion  of  a  definitive  Treaty 
was  only  postponed  until  the  Constitution,  which  Alex- 
ander required  King  Louis  XYIII.  to  grant,  had  been 
drawn  up  by  a  royal  commission  and  approved  by  the 
King.  On  the  27th  of  May  the  draft  of  this  Constitu- 
tion, known  as  the  Charta,  was  laid  before  the  King, 
and  sanctioned  by  him  ;  on  the  80th,  the  Treaty  of  Paris 
was  signed  by  the  representatives  of  France  and  of  all 
the  great  Powers.*  France,  surrendering  all  its  con- 
quests, accepted  the  frontier  of  the  1st  of  January,  1792, 
with  a  slight  addition  of  territory  on  the  side  of  Savoy 
and  at  points  on  its  northern  and  eastern  border.  It 
paid  no  indemnity.  It  was  permitted  to  retain  all  the 
works  of  art  accumulated  by  twenty  years  of  rapine, 
except  the  trophies  carried  from  the  Brandenburg  Grate 
of  Berlin  and  the  spoils  of  the  Library  of  Vienna.  It 
received  back  nearly  all  the  colonies  which  had  been 
taken  from  it  by  Great  Britain.  By  the  clauses  of  the 
Treaty  disposing  of  the  territory  that  had  formed  the 
Empire  and  the  dependencies  of  Napoleon,  Holland  was 
restored  to  the  House  of  Orange,  with  the  provision 
that  its  territory  should  be  largely  increased;  Switzer- 
land was  declared  independent;  it  was   stipulated  that 

*  Britisli  and  Foreigu  State  Papers,  1.  151. 


1814.  Tim  PEACE  OF  PAHIS.  537 

Italy,  with  the  exception  of  the  Austrian  Provinces, 
should  consist  of  independent  States,  and  that  Germany 
should  remain  distributed  among  a  multitude  of  sove- 
reigns, independent,  but  united  by  a  Federal  tie.  The 
navigation  of  the  Ehine  was  thrown  open.  By  a  special 
agreement  with  Great  Britain  the  French  Government 
undertook  to  unite  its  efforts  to  those  of  England  in 
j)rocuring  the  suppression  of  the  Slave-trade  by  all  the 
Powers,  and  pledged  itself  to  abolish  the  Slave-trade 
among  French  subjects  within  five  years  at  the  latest. 
For  the  settlement  of  all  European  questions  not  included 
in  the  Treaty  of  Paris  it  was  agreed  that  a  Congress  of 
the  Powers  should,  within  two  months,  assemble  at 
Vienna.  These  were  the  public  articles  of  the  Treaty 
of  Paris.  Secret  clauses  provided  that  the  Allies — that 
is,  the  Allies  independently  of  France — should  control 
the  distributions  of  territory  to  be  made  at  the  Congress ; 
that  Austria  should  receive  Venetia  and  all  Northern 
Italy  as  far  as  the  Ticino ;  that  Genoa  should  be  given 
to  the  King  of  Sardinia ;  and  that  the  Southern  Nether- 
lands should  be  united  into  a  single  kingdom  >vith 
Holland,  and  thus  form  a  solid  bulwark  against  France 
on  the  north.  No  mention  was  made  of  Naples,  whose 
sovereign,  Murat,  had  abandoned  Napoleon  and  allied 
himself  with  Austria,  but  without  fulfilling  in  good  faith 
the  engagements  into  which  he  had  entered  against  his 
former  master.  A  nominal  friend  of  the  Allies,  he 
knew  that  he  had  played  a  double  game,  and  that  his 
sovereignty,  though  not  yet  threatened,  was  insecure.* 

*  Lord  W.  Beniiiick,  who  was  with  Marat,  warned  him  againai  the 


538  MODERN  EUBOTB.  1814. 

Mucli  yet  remained  to  be  settled  by  the  Congress 

at  Vienna,  but  in  tbe  Treaty  o£  Paris  two 

arran{?ements        at  least  of  the  s^reat  Powers  saw  tbe  obiects 

of  1814.  ^  ^   ^  •* 

attained  for  wbicb  tbey  bad  struggled  so 
persistently  tbrougb  all  tbe  earlier  years  of  tbe  war,  and 
wbicb  at  a  later  time  bad  appeared  to  pass  almost  out  of 
tbe  range  of  possibility.  England  saw  tbe  Netherlands 
once  more  converted  into  a  barrier  against  France,  and 
Antwerp  beld  by  friendly  bands.  Austria  reaped  tbe 
full  reward  of  its  cool  and  well-balanced  diplomacy 
during  tbe  crisis  of  1813,  in  tbe  annexation  of  an  Italian 
territory  tbat  made  it  tbe  real  mistress  of  tbe  Peninsula. 
Castlereagb  and  every  otber  English  politician  felt  tbat 
Europe  had  done  itself  small  honour  in  handing  Yenice 
back  to  the  Hapsburg ;  but  this  had  been  the  condition 
exacted  by  Metternich  at  Prague  before  be  consented  to 
throw  the  sword  of  Austria  into  the  trembling  scale  ;* 

probable  consequences  of  his  duplicity.  Bentiffck  had,  however,  to  be 
careful  in  his  language,  as  the  following  shows. '  Murat  having  sent  him  a 
sword  of  honour,  he  wrote  to  the  English  Government,  May  1, 1814 : ''  It  is  a 
severe  violence  to  my  feelings  to  incur  any  degree  of  obligation  to  an  indi- 
vidual whom  I  so  entirely  despise.  But  I  feel  it  my  duty  not  to  betray 
any  appearance  of  a  spirit  of  animosity."  To  Murat  he  wrote  on  the  same 
day  :  "  The  sword  of  a  great  captain  is  the  most  flattering  present  which  a 
soldier  can  receive.  It  is  with  the  highest  gratitude  that  I  accept  the  gift, 
Sire,  which  you  have  done  me  the  honour  to  send." — Records :  Sicily, 
Yol.  98. 

*  Treaties  of  Teplitz,  Sept.  9,  1813.  In  Bianchi,  Storia  Docnmentata 
della  Diplomazia  Europca,  i.  334,  there  is  a  long  protest  addressed  by 
Metternich  to  Castlereagh  on  May  26,  1814,  referring  with  great  minute- 
ness to  a  number  of  clauses  in  a  secret  Treaty  signed  by  all  the  Powers  at 
Prague  on  July  27,  1813,  and  ratified  at  London  on  August  23,  giving 
Austria  the  disposal  of  all  Italy.  This  protest,  which  has  been  accepted 
as  genuine  in  Reuchlin's  Geschichte  Italiens  and  elsewhere,  is,  with  the 
nlleged  secret  Treaty,  a  forgery.    My  grounds  for  this  statement  are  as 


1814.  THE  PSAOE  OF  PABIS.  589 

and  the  Republican  traditions  both  of  Venice  and  of 
Genoa  counted  for  little  among  the  statesmen  of  1814, 
in  comparison  with  the  divine  right  of  a  Duke  of 
Modena  or  a  Prince  of  Hesse  Cassel.*  France  itself, 
though  stripped  of  the  dominion  won  by  twenty  years 
of  warfare,  was  permitted  to  retain,  for  the  benefit  of  a 
restored  line  of  kings,  the  whole  of  its  ancient  territory, 
and  the  spoil  of  all  the  galleries  and  museums  of  Western 
Europe.  It  would  have  been  no  unnatural  wrong  if  the 
conquerors  of  1814  had  dealt  with  the  soil  of  France  as 
France  had  dealt  with  other  lands ;  it  would  have  been 
an  act  of  bare  justice  to  restore  to  its  rightful  owners 
the  pillage  that  had  been  brought  to  Paris,  and  to  re- 
cover from  the  French  treasury  a  part  of  the  enormous 
sums  which  ISTapoleon  had  extorted  from  conquered 
States.  But  the  Courts  were  too  well  satisfied  with  their 
victory  to  enter  into  a  strict  account  upon  secondary 
matters ;  and  a  prudent  regard  on  the  part  of  the  Allies 

follows : — (1)  There  was  no  British  envoy  at  Prague  in  Jnly,  1813.  (2) 
The  private  as  well  as  the  official  letters  of  Castlere^gli  to  Lord  Caih- 
carf.  of  Sept.  13  and  18,  and  the  instructions  sent  to  Lord  Aberdeen 
during  August  and  September,  prove  that  no  joint  Treaty  existed  up  to 
that  date,  to  which  both  England  and  Austria  were  parties.  Records : 
Russia,  207,  209  A.  Austria,  105.  (3)  Lord  Aberdeen's  reports  of  his 
negotiations  with  Metteruieh  after  this  date  conclusively  prove  that  almost 
all  Italian  questions,  including  even  the  Austrian  frontier,  were  tresied 
as  matters  to  be  decided  by  the  Allios  in  common.  While  Austria's  right 
to  a  preponderance  in  upper  Italy  is  admitted,  the  affairs  of  Rome  and 
Naples  are  always  treated  as  mthiu  the  range  of  English  policy. 

*  The  originals  of  the  Genoese  and  Milanese  petitions  for  independ- 
ence are  in  Records :  Sicily,  Vol.  98.  "  The  Genoese  universally  desire 
th(^  restoration  of  their  ancient  Republic.  They  dread  above  all  other 
arrangements  their  annexation  to  Piedmont,  to  the  inhabit«nt8  of  which 
there  has  always  existed  a  peculiar  aversion.*' — Bentinok*8  Despskd^ 
AprU  27, 1814,  id. 


540     "  MODERN  EUROPE.  1814. 

to  the  prospects  of  the  House  of  Bourbon  saved  IVance 
from  experiencing  what  it  had  inflicted  upon  others. 

The  policy  which  now  restored  to  France  the  frontier 
of  1792  was  viewed  with  a  very  (different  feeling  in 
France  and  in  all  other  countries.  Europe  looked  with 
a  kind  of  wonder  upon  its  own  generosity;  France 
forgot  the  unparalleled  provocations  which  it  had 
offered  to  mankind,  and  only  remembered  that  Belgium 
and  the  Ehenish  Provinces  had  formed  part  of  the 
Eepublic  and  the  Empire  for  nearly  twenty  years. 
These  early  conquests  of  the  Bepublic,  which  no  one 
had  attempted  to  wrest  from  France  since  1795,  had 
undoubtedly  been  the  equivalent  for  which,  in  the  days 
of  the  Directory,  Austria  had  been  permitted  to  extend 
itself  in  Italy,  and  Prussia  in  Germany.  In  the  opinion 
of  men  who  sincerely  condemned  ^Napoleon's  distant 
conquests,  the  territory  between  France  and  the  Rhine 
was  no  more  than  France  might  legitimately  demand, 
as  a  counterpoise  to  the  vast  accessions  falling  to  one 
or  other  of  the  Continental  Powers  out  of  the  territory 
of  Poland,  Yenice,  and  the  body  of  suppressed  States  in 
Grermany.  Poland,  excluding  the  districts  taken  from  it 
before  1792,  contained  a  population  twice  as  great  as 
that  of  Belgium  and  the  Rhenish  Provinces  together : 
Au  the  Powers  Venicc  carrlcd  with  it,  in  addition  to  a 
gaS  territory     Commanding:  province  on  the  Italian  main- 

by  the  war,  1792  ^    ^ 

~^^^^'  land,  the  Eastern  Adriatic   Coast  as  tar  as 

Bagusa.  If  it  were  true  that  the  proportionate  in- 
crease of  power  formed  the  only  solid  principle  of 
European  policy,  France  sustained  a  grievous  injury  in 


1814.  FRANCE   AND    THE    OTHER   POWERS,  541 

receiving  back  tlie  limits  of  1791,  when  every  other 
State  on  the  Continent  was  permitted  to  retain  the 
territory,  or  an  equivalent  for  the  territory,  which  it  had 
gained  in  the  great  changes  that  took  place  between 
1791  and  1814.  But  in  fact  there  had  never  been  a 
time  during  the  last  hundred  and  fifty  years  when 
France,  under  an  energetic  Government,  had  not  pos- 
sessed a  force  threatening  to  all  its  neighbours.  France, 
reduced  to  its  ancient  limits,  was  still  the  equal,  and  far 
more  than  the  equal,  of  any  of  the  Continental  Powers, 
with  aU  that  they  had  gained  during  the  Eevolutionary 
War.  It  remained  the  first  of  European  nations,  though 
no  longer,  as  in  the  eighteenth  century,  the  one  great 
nation  of  the  western  continent.  Its  efforts  after 
universal  empire  had  aroused  other  nations  into  life. 
Had  the  course  of  French  conquest  ceased  before 
Napoleon  grasped  power,  France  would  have  retained  its 
frontier  of  the  Rhine,  and  long  have  exercised  an  un- 
bounded influence  over  both  Germany  and  Italy,  through 
the  incomparably  juster  and  brighter  social  life  which 
the  Revolution,  combined  with  all  that  France  had  in- 
herited from  the  past,  enabled  it  to  display  to  those 
countries.  Napoleon,  in  the  attempt  to  impose  his  rule 
upon  all  Europe,  created  a  power  in  Germany  whose 
military  future  was  to  be  not  less  solid  than  that  of 
France  itself,  and  left  to  Europe,  in  the  accord  of  his 
enemies,  a  firmer  security  against  French  attack  than 
any  that  the  efforts  of  statesmen  had  ever  framed. 

The    league  of  the  older  monarchies  had  proved 
stronger  in  the  end  than  the  genius  and  the  ambition  of 


642  .    MODEEN  EUEOFK  I8i^ 

a  single  man.  But  if,  in  tlie  service  of  Napoleon,  France 
permanenteffect  ^'^  cxliausted  its  wcaltli,  smik  its  fleets,  and 
ri^Sisu.  sacrificed  a  million  lives,  only  that  it  might 
lose  all  its  earlier  conquests,  and  resume  limits  wliich 
it  had  outgrown  before  Napoleon  held  his  first  command, 
it  was  not  thus  with  the  work  which,  for  or  against 
itself,  France  had  effected  in  Europe  during  the  move- 
ments of  the  last  twenty  years.  In  the  course  of  the 
epoch  now  ending  the  whole  of  the  Continent  up  to  the 
frontiers  of  Austria  and  Eussia  had  gained  the  two 
fruitful  ideas  of  nationality  and  political  freedom. 
There  were  now  two  nations  in  Europe  where  before 
National  sense  ex-  thcrc  had  becu  but  aggregates  of  artificial 
anditSy.  Statcs,     Germany  and  Italy  wcrc  uo  lougcF 

mere  geographical  expressions :  in  both  countries, 
though  in  a  very  unequal  degree,  the  newly-aroused 
sense  of  nationality  haS  brought  with  it  the  claim  for 
unity  and  independence.  In  Grermany,  Prussia  had 
set  a  great  example,  and  was  hereafter  to  reap  its 
reward ;  in  Italy  there  had  been  no  State  and  no 
statesman  to  take  the  lead  either  in  throwing  off 
Napoleon's  rule,  or  in  forcing  him,  as  the  price  of 
support,  to  give  to  his  Italian  kingdom  a  really  national 
government.  Failing  to  act  for  itself,  the  population  of 
all  Italy,  except  Naples,  was  parcelled  out  between  Aus- 
tria and  the  ancient  dynasties ;  but  the  old  days  of  pas- 
sive submission  to  the  foreigner  were  gone  for  ever,  and 
time  was  to  show  whether  those  were  the  dreamers  who 
thought  of  a  united  Italy,  or  those  who  thought  that 
Metternich's  statesmanship  had  for  ever  settled  the  fate 
of  Yenice  and  of  Milan. 


1814.  PERMANENT  EFFECT  ON  EVBOFJS.  643 

The  second  legacy  of  the  Eevolutionary  epoch,  the 
idea  of  constitutional  freedom,  which  in  1789  had  heen 
as  much  wanting  in  Spain,  where  national  spirit  was  the 
strongest,  as  in  those  German  States  where  it  was  the 
weakest,  had  heen  excited  in  Italy  hy  the  D,,i^,o,  litt. 
events  of  1796  and  1798,  in  Spain  hy  the  ^"^• 
disappearance  of  the  Bourhon  king  and  the  self -directed 
struggle  of  the  nation  against  the  invader :  in  Prussia  it 
had  been  introduced  by  the  Grovemment  itself  when 
Stein  was  at  the  head  of  the  State.  "  It  is  impossible," 
wrote  Lord  Castlereagh  in  the  spring  of  1814,  "not  to 
perceive  a  great  moral  change  coming  on  in  Europe,  and 
that  the  principles  of  freedom  are  in  full  operation."* 
There  was  in  fact  scarcely  a  Court  in  Europe  which  was 
not  now  declaring  its  intention  to  frame  a  Constitution. 
The  professions  might  be  lightly  made ;  the  desire  and 
the  capacity  for  seK-govemment  might  still  be  limited 
to  a  narrower  class  than  the  friends  of  liberty  imagined ; 
but  the  seed  was  sown,  and  a  movement  had  begun  which 
was  to  gather  strength  during  the  next  thirty  years  of 
European  history,  while  one  revolution  after  another 
proved  that  Governments  could  no  longer  with  safety 
disregard  the  rights  of  their  subjects. 

Lastly,  in  all  the  territory  that  had  formed  Napo- 
leon's Empire  and  dependencies,    and  also  in  Prussia, 
legal  changes  had  been  made  in  the  rights 
and    relations    of    the   different   classes   of 
society,  so  important  as  almost  to  create  a  new  type  of 
social  life.     Within  the  Empire  itself  the  Code  Napol^n, 

•  Caatlereagh,  x.  la 


544  MODERN  EUROPE.  1814. 

conferring  upon  tlie  subjects  of  France  tlie  benefits  wbich 
tbe  French  had  already  won  for  themselves,  had  super- 
seded a  society  resting  on  class -privilege,  on  feudal 
service,  and  on  the  despotism  of  custom,  by  a  society 
resting  on  equality  before  the  law,  on  freedom  of  con- 
tract, and  on  the  unshackled  ownership  and  enjoyment 
of  land,  whether  the  holder  possessed  an  acre  or  a  league. 
The  principles  of  the  French  Code,  if  not  the  Code  itself, 
had  been  introduced  into  Napoleon's  kingdom  of  Italy, 
into  Naples,  and  into  almost  all  the  Grerman  depend- 
encies of  France.  In  Prussia  the  reforms  of  Stein  and 
Hardenberg  had  been  directed,  though  less  boldly,  to- 
wards the  same  end;  and  when, after  1814,  the  Ehenish 
Provinces  were  annexed  to  Prussia  by  the  Congress  of 
Vienna,  the  Grovemment  was  wise  enough  and  liberal 
enough  to  leave  these  districts  in  the  enjoyment  of  the 
laws  which  France  had  given  them,  and  not  to  risk  a 
comparison  between  even  the  best  Prussian  legislation 
and  the  Code  Napoleon.  In  other  territory  now  severed 
from  France  and  restored  to  German  or  Italian  princes, 
attempts  were  not  wanting  to  obliterate  the  new  order 
and  to  re-introduce  the  burdens  and  confusions  of  the  old 
regime.  But  these  reactions,  even  where  unopposed  for  a 
time,  were  too  much  in  conflict  with  the  spirit  of  the  age 
to  gain  more  than  a  temporary  and  precarious  success. 
The  people  had  begun  to  know  good  and  evil :  examples 
of  a  free  social  order  were  too  close  at  hand  to  render  it 
possible  for  any  part  of  the  western  continent  lo  relapse 
for  any  very  long  period  into  the  condition  of  the 
eighteenth  century. 


1814.J  THE  NAPOLEONIC  AGE.  546 

It  was  indeed  within  a  distinct  limit  that  the  Revo- 
lutionary epoch  effected  its  work  of  political  and  social 
change.  Neither  England  nor  Austria  re- 
ceived the  slightest  impulse  to  progress. 
England,  on  the  contrary,  suspended  almost  all  internal 
improvement  during  the  course  of  the  war ,  the  domestic 
policy  of  the  Austrian  Court,  so  energetic  in  the  reign 
immediately  preceding  the  Revolution,  became  for  the 
next  twenty  years,  except  where  it  was  a  policy  of  re- 
pression, a  policy  of  pure  vacancy  and  inaction.  But  in 
all  other  States  of  Western  Europe  the  period  which 
reached  its  close  with  Napoleon's  fall  left  deep  and  last- 
ing traces  behiud  it.  Like  other  great  epochs  of  change, 
it  bore  its  own  peculiar  character.  It  was  not,  like  the 
Renaissance  and  the  Reformation,  a  time  when  new 
worlds  of  faith  and  knowledge  transformed  the  whole 
scope  and  conception  of  human  life ;  it  was  not,  like  our 
own  age,  a  time  when  scientific  discovery  and  increased 
means  of  communication  silently  altered  the  physical 
conditions  of  existence;  it  was  a  time  of  changes 
directly  political  m  their  nature,  and  directly  effected  by 
the  political  agencies  of  legislation  and  of  war.  In  the 
perspective  of  history  the  Napoleonic  age  will  take  its 
true  place  among  other,  and  perhaps  greater,  epochs. 
Its  elements  of  mere  violence  and  disturbance  will  fill 
less  space  in  the  eyes  of  mankind ;  its  permanent  crea- 
tions, more.  As  an  epoch  of  purely  political  energy, 
concentrating  the  work  of  generations  within  the  com- 
pass of  twenty-five  years,  it  will  perhaps  scajrcelj  find  a 
parallel. 

J  J 


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